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**GENERAL**

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1. Widespread opposition in NATO to US position on possible September Council meeting:



Further discussion in the NATO Deputies' meetings of the proposal to hold a Council meeting at Ottawa on 15 September has led to sharp disagreement between the US and most


of the other NATO members.

Many members believe the presence of the Defense Ministers is essential for a decision on Greek and Turkish membership in NATO. The UK, with Dutch, Norwegian and Danish support, insists that a decision on the Middle East command structure be reached concurrently. The French are in general agreement with the US in opposing these views and desiring definitive action on fundamental questions such as the proposed European Defense Forces and agreements on Germany. The French join the Norwegians and the Dutch, however, in preferring to abandon the proposal for a September meeting.

The majority of the members oppose any serious consideration of the German question and favor giving primary attention to the non-military aspects of NATO problems aside from the admission of Greece and Turkey.

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**FAR EAST**




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
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3. Lack of success in suppressing Malaya's rebels reported:

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no end to the emergency is in sight so long as the Communist-led terrorists retain hope of eventual aid from outside Malaya. The officials are hopeful, however, that efforts to cut off the rebels' food supply and an increase in the home guard will decrease their numbers. It is not expected that the now neutral mass of Malayan Chinese will turn against the terrorists until it is quite clear that the West is winning the world power struggle.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Lack of success by the British in their campaign to destroy the 4, 000 to 5, 000 insurgents has been interpreted by US officials in Malaya as the reason for the intended resignation of Lt. General Sir Harold Briggs, Director of Operations. The General, who devised the "Briggs Plan" to exterminate the rebels, was put in charge of its execution. If the plan had been proceeding successfully, he might have been expected to continue in command.

SOUTH ASIA

3.3(h)(2)

4. Chinese Communists desire to open embassy in Nepal:

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has expressed his government's concern over the Chinese Communists' desire to open an embassy in

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Katmandu. The Nepalese Government is faced with two choices: to display no interest in the opening of an embassy and consequently expose itself to a possible Chinese revival of the debatable question of Nepalese sovereignty; or to agree to establishment of an embassy, thereby obtaining Chinese recognition of Nepal's independent status but at the same time enabling the Chinese to make the embassy a center for subversive activities

Comment: Regardless of the action taken, Nepal probably will be unable to prevent the infiltration of Communist elements from Tibet and India. Both the nature of the terrain and the absence of firm government control outside the capital make it difficult to detect and limit the activities of undesirables, some of whom are already operating in Nepal.

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5. India rejects proposed Burmese-Indonesian mediation:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] government's plan to propose that the Prime Ministers of Burma and Indonesia jointly visit New Delhi and Karachi to offer their good offices toward easing the tension between India and Pakistan. [redacted]

[redacted] although the Pakistanis and Indonesians were favorably disposed toward the project, it had been rejected by Nehru.

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Comment: Burma's concern over tension between India and Pakistan was evidenced last week by the visit of the Burmese Foreign Minister to New Delhi to inquire if his government could help solve the impasse on Kashmir.

India's rejection of the mediation offer undoubtedly derives partly from a fear of losing face through mediation by two nations it looks upon as "satellites." More importantly, however, India's refusal reflects a confidence in its ability to maintain independently its present power position vis-a-vis Pakistan and the United Nations, as well as a belief that its current actions will not lead to open warfare with Pakistan.

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## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Comment on Greek Field Marshal Papagos's entry into politics:

Greek Field Marshal Papagos formally entered the political arena on 30 July with an announcement of his intention to participate in the general elections scheduled for 9 September. His decision to enter politics was probably prompted by the seeming impossibility of a reconciliation with the King and a return to his former position as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces.

If Papagos attracts the best men of all parties, as is his announced intention, he could give Greece a stronger and more stable government. There is some danger, however, that Papagos' strong convictions and his military background might eventually lead him to attempt a dictatorship. In any event, established Greek politicians will not welcome a newcomer, particularly of the stature of Papagos, and considerable political maneuvering may be expected. The King, who is strongly opposed to Papagos' emergence into politics, will undoubtedly be tempted to meddle in political affairs.

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
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
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**EASTERN EUROPE**

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**8. Indictment of former Polish Army officers lays emphasis on national deviation:**

The indictment of nine former senior Polish Army officers on trial in Warsaw emphasizes their alleged efforts to created a "Titoist Fascist regime" in Poland and to a lesser extent their "criminal, subversive and espionage activities for the US and UK."

The indictment accuses former Polish Communist Party Secretary Gomulka and ex-Minister of National Defense General Spychalski of protecting these officers. It also ties in the defendants with other Polish national elements, including former Socialists, the Mikolajczyk Peasant Party, and the wartime partisans who have been brought to trial in recent years.

US Embassy Moscow reports that the Soviet press has given the indictment a build-up comparable to that accorded the Rajk trial in Hungary in 1949. The Embassy points out that the trial may be intended to underline Molotov's recent warning against national deviation.

Comment: Although the majority of the defendants were arrested or disappeared during 1949 and 1950 when the Polish

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Army underwent extensive purging of politically suspect officers, this is the first public trial of Polish Army officers. It is the first time since the fall of 1949, when Poland's leading deviationists Gomulka and Spychalski were publicly denounced by the Party for Titoism, that national deviation has been attacked with such vehemence. The extent of play given the problem of national deviation suggests again, as did Molotov's recent speech, the strong Soviet preoccupation with this weakness on its strategic European periphery.

## WESTERN EUROPE

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9. Embassy Moscow believes USSR is showing restraint in Berlin:

US Embassy Moscow, commenting on the Berlin trade impasse, considers that the USSR is anxious to avoid showing itself in an openly provocative attitude at a time when "the peaceful coexistence repertoire is playing in other theaters of operation." The Embassy bases this judgment on the cautious Soviet approach to the Berlin issue, the sporadic

willingness to negotiate with the Allies, and the lack of Soviet propaganda emphasis on the situation. The Embassy feels, however, that the Kremlin hopes to profit even from soft-pedalled tactics in Berlin, so long as the West refrains from provoking Soviet pressure on some larger issue. Embassy officials endorse the plan for a limited Allied airlift, including military planes, as a practical means of easing the present West Berlin export backlog and demonstrating to the Politburo the extent and flexibility of Allied air-power.

The State Department meanwhile recommends a considerable extension of the present partial embargo on West German shipments to East Germany. Although conceding that French objections might preclude the complete termination by the Allies of interzonal trade, the Department urges that at least shipments of all essential and strategic goods to East Germany should be halted, in an attempt to damage the East German economy and force Soviet capitulation.

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LATIN AMERICA

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