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SUMMARY

FAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

SOUTH ASIA

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- 4. French Foreign Office now opposes removal of Moroccan Sultan (page 4).

EASTERN EUROPE

- 5. Yugoslav Government opposes revision of Italian Peace Treaty (page 5).

WESTERN EUROPE

- 6. Italian Government reluctant to face Trieste elections (page 6).

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
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SOUTH ASIA

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. French Foreign Office now opposes removal of Moroccan Sultan: 3.3(h)(2)

According to a French Foreign Office official, the external disadvantages arising from a deposition of the Sultan now seem to outweigh the internal advantages, and the situation will be allowed to

rest in the hope that the Sultan will eventually give in to the French on a majority of points at issue.

Internally, the Sultan is blocking the French reform program. Because he has lost nearly all tribal support and his following is located chiefly in the cities, the French believe that a suitable replacement could be chosen and installed without serious disturbances. The international repercussions of such a move, however, would be serious. French motives

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would be misrepresented by the Arab League, which might be supported by Asian nations and, if the issue reached the UN, by Latin American nations as well.

Comment: The Foreign Office estimate of the internal Moroccan situation is not supported by reports from Morocco.

The Sultan's intransigence in refusing to permit the French to impinge further upon his sovereignty has solidified the admiration and support of the majority of educated and politically conscious Moroccans, despite the traditional French program of pitting one faction against the other in order to keep the upper hand.

The pressure from French property interests in Morocco, as well as the disinclination in conservative French circles to permit greater autonomy, will work against any moderation of French Foreign Office policy in Morocco, no matter who may succeed Juin as Resident General when he assumes his SHAPE command.

EASTERN EUROPE

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5. Yugoslav Government opposes revision of Italian Peace Treaty:

According to Assistant Foreign Minister Mates, the Yugoslav Government opposes a revision of the Italian Peace Treaty because it believes that Italy may be more interested in obtaining territorial concessions through such revision than in amending the military provisions. Mates says that the Italian Foreign Office has sent a circular telegram to its foreign missions emphasizing the question of territorial concessions.

According to Mates, the Yugoslav Government believes that Italy and Yugoslavia should attempt to negotiate a bilateral settlement on Trieste and other outstanding issues. The Yugoslav Government might then inform the NATO countries that it had no objection to a revision of the peace treaty's military provisions. It would ask these countries, however, to consider the effect of any increase in the Italian military establishment on Yugoslavia's position vis-a-vis the Cominform.

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Comment: Yugoslav officials have previously opposed revision of the military provisions of the Italian Peace Treaty on the grounds that such a revision would provide the USSR with an opportunity to justify the Satellites' military build-up in violation of their peace treaties. Mates' remarks, however, offer further indication that Yugoslavia's opposition is based primarily on the fear that an increase in Italian military strength would improve Italy's ability to press its claims for the return of all the Free Territory of Trieste.

WESTERN EUROPE

6. Italian Government reluctant to face Trieste elections:

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The Italian Embassy in London has made an oral approach to the British Foreign Office with regard to postponing the Trieste local elections, now scheduled for 7 October. The preliminary view of the British is that the elections should not be postponed.

At the same time, Premier De Gasperi has been urging the US Ambassador in Rome that the elections should be postponed for at least six months, preferably a year, unless certain electoral provisions favoring Italy are introduced.

De Gasperi said that because of resurgent national feeling the Italian Government "could not stand by without injecting itself" into the Trieste elections, which activity "would not be helpful in the relations with Yugoslavia." Furthermore, the Trieste campaign would have a bad effect on the coming municipal elections in Italy. The Cabinet has tentatively decided to postpone the latter until "the conclusion of the (national) census," which will be initiated in early November.

Comment: There have been previous reports that the Italian Government may postpone the series of local elections rather than face a loss of prestige for the Christian Democrats, such as occurred

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in the spring voting. Suggestions for postponement of the Trieste elections show a similar concern. The Italian Government may also be concerned over apparently growing sentiment in Trieste favoring independence of the area, a movement supported locally by both Italian Communists and a small group of Slovene parties.

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
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Activities and Methods

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