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SECURITY INFORMATION

15 November 1951

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3.5(c)

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48

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

FAR EAST

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

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
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FAR EAST

1.



3.3(h)(2)

2. Preparations for Viet Minh attack reported:

3.3(h)(2)



The Viet Minh [redacted] have begun recruitment of able-bodied men in several provinces of the Tonkin delta, an activity which is usually a prelude to an attack. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] the chiefs of Viet Minh "sections" in Hanoi have been instructed to move into Hanoi from their present sub-urban locations, and that this order may indicate plans to coordinate a wave of violence within the city with attacks by regular Viet Minh forces throughout the delta. 3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Recruiting of able-bodied men is a continuing Viet Minh activity. Any accelerated recruiting at this time is probably more a measure of the heavy losses sustained by the Viet Minh during their unsuccessful October operations than of their intention to launch an offensive throughout the delta.

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The Viet Minh will probably attack some point or points on the French perimeter during the latter part of November, but not in sufficient strength to threaten Hanoi seriously. The Viet Minh would hardly stage an uprising in Hanoi unless it were strong enough to attempt an all-out attack on the French in Tonkin with a fair prospect of success.

3.3(h)(2)

3. London seriously concerned over Malayan situation:



Officials in the Colonial Office state that Colonial Secretary Lyttelton's forthcoming visit to Malaya is prompted by concern over the failure of the latest guerrilla-suppression pro-

gram to produce results commensurate with the cost, and by the demands of local authorities for broader emergency powers. Since a major turnover of ranking officials is in prospect, Lyttelton wishes to consult with the retiring officials on the spot.

Malcolm MacDonald's term of office as Commissioner General in Southeast Asia expires next May and probably will not be renewed in view of Churchill's known distrust of him.

Comment: No indications have been received that the new Cabinet intends to make any basic changes in present British policies in the Malayan emergency. The British are apparently counting on General Lockhart, the new commander, to prosecute the campaign with greater vigor and a more intelligent grasp of the political problems involved.


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
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## NEAR EAST

3.3(h)(2)

5. Egyptian Minister of Interior indicates interest in Middle East Command:

The Egyptian Minister of Interior, who is also the politically powerful Secretary General of the Wafd Party, has informed the US Ambassador in Cairo that Egypt could accept the

Middle East Command under certain conditions.

British forces must evacuate Egypt within approximately one year, leaving only a limited number of technicians, including American as well as British personnel. In addition, airplanes used in the Suez Canal area must be Egyptian, even if flown by British pilots.



3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The fact that the second most influential official in the Egyptian Cabinet has followed the Prime Minister in broaching Egypt's possible acceptance of the Western defense scheme indicates that the Government's abrupt rejection of the plan three weeks ago did not close the door to further negotiations on the subject. It is noteworthy that the Sudan issue was not mentioned.

The wide gap, however, between Egyptian and Western thinking on the defense issue and the extreme demands made in public by Egyptian Government officials still minimize the hope for any settlement.

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3.3(h)(2)

**EASTERN EUROPE****6. Current Dutch position imperils Yugoslav finances:**

Dutch officials have rejected a Yugoslav request to postpone the initial payment on a six million guilder (approximately 1.5 million dollars) debt from the summer of 1952 to 1954.

Comment: Dutch diplomats have indicated privately to US officials that there is some hope for a postponement next summer if the Yugoslav balance of payments deficit is still serious.

A final Dutch refusal would set an unfavorable precedent. For, unless Yugoslavia's European creditors agree to a debt readjustment, a significant portion of tripartite aid funds, amounting to a maximum of 125 million dollars, will be dissipated in the form of payments on a 60 million dollar Yugoslav debt to Austria, Belgium and Western Germany.

3.3(h)(2)

**WESTERN EUROPE****7. British request broadening of military aid criteria:**

The British Defense Ministry has asked the US Military Assistance Advisory Group in London whether the military aid given Great Britain by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program can be applied to (1) research and development equipment, (2) technical assistance for the overhauling of US type equipment, (3) component parts, (4) engineering construction equipment, and (5) British forces not committed to NATO.

Comment: For many months British officials have attempted to bring about a broadening of the criteria by which US military aid to Britain is determined. They probably see an immediate opportunity for increased aid, pending the results of NATO studies, and quite independent of any forthcoming requests for US economic assistance.

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