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29 August 1951

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

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2. Embassy London forecasts British position at coming tri-partite meeting 3.3(h)(2)

The US Embassy in London makes the following forecast of the line Britain will take at the tri-partite Foreign Ministers' talks planned to follow the San Francisco Conference:

1. Britain is anxious to pave the way for a general Far Eastern settlement, and regards a Korean armistice as the first indispensable step in that direction. Morrison may suggest that an armistice be followed by general talks outside the UN in order to facilitate participation by the Peiping government. The scope of these talks would depend upon reaching an agreement with regard to Korea. The chief British concern is that, if the armistice talks fail, the US might be tempted to renew a "full-scale military effort." Morrison will probably express the hope that the fighting may develop into a stalemate at approximately the current line, and may ask for assurances that the US will not attempt a full-scale effort unless the Communists launch a major air intervention. The embassy states that in the event of such intervention, Britain would probably be prepared to accept a full-scale war with China, perhaps one "leading to general war."

2. The British believe that the general Western policy toward Communist China should be one of "containment without interference in internal affairs." In this connection, Morrison will probably express the hope that the US might ultimately reaffirm its earlier pledge not to veto UN membership for the Peiping regime, especially if progress can be made in settling the political aspects of the Korean affair.

3. The British will oppose any French moves at this time to demand a Chinese Communist non-aggression pledge on behalf of Indochina, or to obtain a US-UK guarantee of Indochina's borders. In the UK view, the former would be worthless, and the latter contrary to the British "allergy" to unnecessary extension of their defensive responsibilities.

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4. The British are not "overly concerned" regarding Formosa. However, Morrison will probably ask US assurances that the aid given to Chiang is intended and actually used for defensive purposes, and not for preparations for what the British believe would be ill-advised attempts to invade the mainland.


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NEAR EAST

5. Possibility of anti-British violence in Iranian oil installations reduced:

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All non-Iranian AIOC employees have now been evacuated from Iran, with the exception of 350 British subjects and 210 Indian and Pakistani employees who are stationed in Abadan. The


smaller number of non-Iranians materially reduces the likelihood of violence and the consequent possibility of British armed intervention.

Comment: The transfer of British personnel from outlying installations to Abadan likewise makes it easier to provide them with full police protection, lessens the chance of isolated incidents, and makes their evacuation a simpler problem.

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