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
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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FAR EAST

1. India unwilling further to advise Burma against UN appeal on Chinese Nationalist troop issue: 3.3(h)(2)

[REDACTED]

A high Indian official has informed the British High Commissioner of his government's irritation at the American and British suggestion that India intervene with Burma to forestall an appeal to the UN regarding armed Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma. Referring to the apparent involvement of American nationals, the official stated, with emphasis, that unless the US and UK showed "a more helpful attitude" India could not advise the Burmese against taking the matter to the UN.

Comment: On 12 September, the US Embassy in New Delhi reported that India had advised the Burmese to delay presenting their case to the UN for "several days," in order that India could take up the matter with the US. India subsequently indicated that it was unwilling to accept the US contention that the problem was one which should be settled by Asians.

India's influence is one of the few restraining factors which might cause the Burmese not to take their case to the UN.

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3. French act to meet Viet Minh action in western Tonkin:

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The American Consulate in Hanoi on 19 September cabled that something was "in the air" in western Tonkin and noted French preparations for airborne action. A French General Staff officer gave assurance that no Chinese Communists were involved.

With the rainy season slackening, the resumption of Viet Minh action is to be expected. Enemy action in western Tonkin would probably be to divert French forces from the more critical delta area.

Iran

NEAR EAST

4. Iranian Prime Minister offers to reopen negotiations:

3.3(h)(2)

Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq has sent further proposals on the oil issue to the British. Minister of Court Ala, who presented them to the British Ambassador in Tehran, also furnished a copy to the US Charge in Tehran.

According to Ala, Mossadeq genuinely desires to reopen the negotiations and to reach an agreement, and, as a gesture of goodwill, would be willing to send a mission to London. Moreover, Ala says, the new proposals contain no ultimatum on British personnel at Abadan. While Mossadeq had refused to put anything in writing, he agreed, and the Shah would guarantee, that the "technical director" mentioned in the proposals would be a British national.

The British Ambassador, according to Ala, received these new proposals coldly, pointing out their close similarity to the proposals previously rejected.

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Comment: A reopening of negotiations might halt some of the rising opposition to the Prime Minister. Agreement to the appointment of a British technical director could be an important step in bringing the two parties closer together. However, in view of the initial British reaction, and Mossadeq's unwillingness to "put anything in writing," the present maneuver does not appear too promising.

5. Able Iranian Governor of Azerbaijan removed:

3.3(h)(2)

The Governor General of Azerbaijan, Dr. Iqbal, states that he resigned because he did not have the support of the Shah. However, it is generally believed that Iqbal was maneuvered out of his position by the Iranian Prime Minister, who felt that the Governor was hostile to his National Front Party.

Iqbal predicts disorders and increased Communist activities and influence in Azerbaijan, particularly in view of the "bankruptcy of state finances." The US Embassy feels that the National Front replacement may not be so vigorously anti-Communist or so effective an administrator of this critical province.

Comment: Iqbal's departure from Azerbaijan removes a strong anti-Communist influence from a strategic area where Communists have recently renewed public demonstrations. The replacement during the last few months of six other provincial governors with National Front supporters may be part of Mossadeq's preparations for the approaching elections.

Egypt
6. Egyptian King welcomes Turkish participation in Middle East defense:

3.3(h)(2)

Palace advisors have intimated to the US Ambassador in Cairo that King Farouk would welcome the inclusion of Turkey in any proposed Middle East defense organization.

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The King's concern over the pressure within the Egyptian Government to abrogate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty has been further shown by his requesting an early visit from the British Ambassador to discuss the situation. Both the US and British Ambassadors feel that the King must be given as much "ammunition" as possible in regard to concessions on the Suez Canal and Sudan issues if abrogation of the treaty is to be hindered.

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Comment: Farouk's desire not to abrogate the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and his reported interest in a regional defense scheme for the Middle East may prove to be of considerable value. However, Farouk has made it clear that if a showdown on abrogating the treaty does come, he will be forced to yield to popular Egyptian nationalist sentiment.

EASTERN EUROPE

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8. Yugoslav Government resumes deportations to Cominform states:

[Redacted]

The Yugoslav Government has resumed the practice of deporting to Cominform states persons it considers undesirable.

[Redacted] informed the US

Embassy in Belgrade that on the night of 10 September 56 persons were deported to Sofia, four of them Soviet citizens and the remainder stateless. The embassy has received additional reports

[Redacted] of deportations to Bulgaria, as well as to Hungary.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Expulsion of undesirable persons from Yugoslavia into Cominform countries was stopped a year ago, while deportations into Trieste were increased. American and British officials have recently urged Yugoslav authorities to decrease the flow of refugees into Trieste, but Yugoslav assurances on this score have not been carried out. These representations may have prompted the Yugoslav Government to resume the expulsion of undesirables into Cominform states.

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WESTERN EUROPE

10. Conditional interzonal trade pact signed in Germany:

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A conditional interzonal trade pact was signed on 20 September by the East and West Germans after prolonged negotiations during which Federal Republic officials had insisted on cessation of East German harassing tactics in Berlin.

High Commissioner McCloy has instructed US officials in Berlin to keep a close watch on Soviet and East German actions in order to determine that the conditions of the pact are met. If the various Soviet-East German restrictions are not lifted, the Allies will promptly consider suspending the trade agreement.

Comment: Although assurances were given by the East Germans that the various harassing measures would cease, detailed agreement on the measures was not reached in each case. No reports have as yet been received of the removal of any of the restrictions.

Just as the trade negotiations were ending, Soviet authorities announced that certain check-points on the border between East and West Germany would be closed in order to permit "road repairs." Although reasons for this move are not known, the closing of the points will apparently be only a negligible inconvenience to the West German truckers.

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
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