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Handwritten initials/signature

1 July 1951

[Redacted]

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 4
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

- 1. UN not to be involved in cease-fire negotiations (page 3).

NEAR EAST

- 2. Iranian Prime Minister remains intransigent (page 3).
- 3. Iranian Government reportedly not united on its attitude toward the International Court (page 4).

[Redacted]

EASTERN EUROPE

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE

- 6. French Communists appeal ban on 15 July rally (page 6).

LATIN AMERICA

- 7. Panama to cancel registration of ships destined for North Korean or Chinese Communist ports (page 7).

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GENERAL

1. UN not to be involved in cease-fire negotiations:

3.3(h)(2)


 Commenting to the US UN delegation on a Korean cease-fire, UN Secretary General Lie supported the procedure being followed by the US and stated that he hoped for a meeting of military commanders in the field. Lie said that the Unified Command would have full authority to act for the UN. Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko, a Soviet national who supposedly consulted Malik, reportedly told Lie that the North Korean commander would probably have several Chinese Communist "advisers." The US delegation comments that the Soviet maneuver and Malik's refusal to see UN General Assembly President Entezam were designed to bypass the UN Good Offices Committee.

Comment: The US Ambassador in Moscow also commented that preliminary negotiations preferably should not be undertaken by the UN since the present Soviet attitude toward the UN's position in the Korean affair is not clear.

NEAR EAST

2. Iranian Prime Minister remains intransigent:

3.3(h)(2)

 The Iranian Prime Minister stated, after representations by the US Ambassador, that he would withdraw the anti-sabotage law at the next session of Parliament on 1 July. The US Ambassador, however, made it clear that he could not guarantee that this would ensure that Anglo-Iranian Oil Company employees would remain in Iran.

The Prime Minister, moreover, rejected the consideration of any modus vivendi with the AIOC, even for a short time, on the grounds that the nationalization law abolished the AIOC in Iran and made the oil the property of the Iranian Government. Hence,

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there could be no question of tanker receipts made out to both the Iranian Oil Company and the AIOC. The Prime Minister stated that if the old customers would not buy the oil, there would be new ones; he mentioned an Indian company, and implied that the Russians would be desirous of getting oil. In reply to the Ambassador's statement that any new customers would not have transport facilities, the Prime Minister replied that Iran's freedom meant more to it than anything else, and that Iran would see the whole industry closed down before conceding any point that would violate the nationalization law.

Comment: While the Prime Minister's statements occur before the release of a US proposal for a "moratorium," which is now under consideration, they appear to doom this last hope to failure. He has been so consistent in advocating the letter of the nationalization law, that it would appear futile to hope for any compromise.

3. Iranian Government reportedly not united on its attitude toward the International Court:

3.3(h)(2)




Iran has sent a formal statement to the International Court of Justice reiterating that the court lacks jurisdiction in the oil dispute.

Although the three-man Iranian delegation that left for The Hague on 29 June has no authority other than to deliver Iran's written statement, the US Ambassador in Tehran reports sharp differences of opinion within the government on the "Cavalier handling" of this matter.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Despite Iran's categorical rejection of British efforts to bring the oil dispute before the International Court, the Iranian Foreign Ministry has in recent weeks concerned itself with this problem.



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3.3(h)(2)



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3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE**6. French Communists appeal ban on 15 July rally:**

3.3(h)(2)



The National Council for the Communist-dominated World Peace Movement has announced that it will request the French Government to revoke its ban on the rally scheduled for 15 July in Paris. The organization's communique declared that the government's decision to impose the ban was taken on the false pretext that the rally is "Communist." Preparations for the rally will continue.

Comment: The French Government is apparently determined to maintain its ban on the rally, and meticulous police precautions will be taken to prevent a formal meeting. The French Communist Party can be expected, however, to make a maximum effort for this long-planned event, which is of special importance for the party's prestige in Moscow, as a test of its "peace" propaganda capabilities in Western Europe. Nevertheless, no French Communist peace demonstration in the past two years has had mass support, largely because the bulk of pro-Communist voters in France respond only to Communist Party appeals on domestic issues.

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LATIN AMERICA

7. Panama to cancel registration of ships destined for North Korean or Chinese Communist ports: 3.3(h)(2)



The Panamanian Foreign Office has advised that the registration of a Panama flag vessel, which was involved in transshipment violating the UN embargo, has been canceled. The Foreign Office promised that the US Consul General in Calcutta would be authorized to pick up and hold for Panamanian Government action the registration of any Panamanian flag vessel that may in the future call at Calcutta enroute to North Korean or Chinese Communist ports. The Panamanian Government is now considering a public announcement that its registration will be withdrawn from any ship destined for one of the above ports.

Comment: In view of the large number of vessels that have registered in Panama, Panamanian support is essential to the effectiveness of the UN embargo. Withdrawal of registry is the only penalty that the Panama Government is capable of enforcing. The promptness of Panama's action in this instance indicates a high degree of cooperativeness of the part of the new Arosemena administration.

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

Report of Articles Submitted 1 - 15 July 1943

I. Summary

130 articles submitted
 39 articles rejected
 91 articles published

Of those submitted:

1 was held over from previous day

Of the 129 recorded:

3 were received before 1200
 0 was received between 1201 and 1300
 14 were received between 1301 and 1400
 35 were received between 1401 and 1500
 17 were received between 1501 and 1530
 60 were received after 1530

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 DATE 12-12-76 REVIEWER

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II. Detailed report

Issue	Article #	Published		Rejected	
		Submitted	By	Submitted	By
1 July	1	1200/30	1	after 1530/30	2
	2	1400/30	2	after 1530/30	2
	3	1400/30	2	1350/30	3
	4	1400/30	2		
	5	1200/30	1		
	6	1350/30	3		
	7	after 1530/30	3		
3 July	1	1430/2	3	1445/2	5
	2	after 1530/2	1	after 1530/2	2
	3	after 1530/2	2	after 1530/2	2
	4	1430/2	2	after 1530/2	2
	5	after 1530/2	2		
	6	after 1530/30 *	1		
	7	after 1530/2	1		
	8	1320/2	1		

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<u>Issue</u>	<u>Article #</u>	<u>Published Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>	<u>Rejected Submitted</u>	<u>By</u>
4 July	1	1448/3	2	1430/3	3
	2	1510/3	1	1430/3	3
	3	1510/3	2	after 1530/3	1
	4	1515/3	2	1505/3	2
	5	after 1530/3	2	after 1530/3	2
	6	after 1530/3	2	1420/3	2
	7	after 1530/3	2	1448/3	2
	8	1430/3	3	1505/3	1
6 July	1	after 1530/5	2	after 1530/5	1
	2	1520/5	2	1500/5	3
	3	after 1530/5	2		
	4	after 1530/5	2		
	5	1527/5	2		
	6	after 1530/5	2		
	7	1415/5	3		
7 July	1	after 1530/6	3	1520/6	3
	2	after 1530/6	2	1440/6	1
	3	after 1530/6	2	1440/6	1
	4	1520/6	2	after 1530/6	1
	5	1417/6	2		
	6	1455/6	2		
	7	1515/6	1		
8 July	1	after 1530/7	1	1415/7	2
	2	after 1530/7	2	1425/7	3
	3	after 1530/7	2	after 1530/7	2
	4	1425/7	2		
	5	after 1530/7	1		
	6	1109/7	3		
	7	after 1530/7	3		
	8	after 1530/7	3		
	9	1400/7	3		
10 July	1	after 1530/9	2	after 1530/9	2
	2	1510/9	H	1440/9	2
	3	after 1530/9	2		
	4	after 1530/9	3		

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Abbreviations:

- S 1 - Section 1, Support Branch
- E 2 - Section 2, Support Branch
- W 3 - Section 3, Support Branch
- ~~A - Air Section, Indications Branch~~
- ~~EC - Economic Section, Indications Branch~~
- ~~P - Political Section, Indications Branch~~
- ~~M - Military Section, Indications Branch~~
- NR - O/R
- SI - O/SI
- * - Held over from previous day
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SOV STRATEGY STAFF

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Issue	Article #	Published	Br	Reflected	Br
		Submitted		Submitted	
11 July	1	1400/10	3	1325/10	1
	2	1400/10	2	1438/10	1
	3	after 1530/10	2	1498/10	1
	4	after 1530/10	2	1438/10	1
	5	1500/10	2		
12 July	1	1520/11	3	1500/11	3
	2	1415/11	2		
	3	1430/11	2		
	4	after 1530/11	2		
	5	1415/11	2		
	6	1415/11	2		
	7	after 1530/11	2		
	8	after 1530/11	2		
	9	1440/11	2		
	10	1525/11	2		
	11	1432/11	1		
13 July	1	after 1530/12	1	1515/12	2
	2	after 1530/12	1	after 1530/12	2
	3	1430/12	2	after 1530/12	2
	4	1455/12	2		
	5	after 1530/12	2		
	6	after 1530/12	2		
	7	after 1530/12	3		
14 July	1	after 1530/13	2	1510/13	2
	2	1520/13	2	1500/13	2
	3	1520/13	2	after 1530/13	2
	4	after 1530/13	2		
	5	after 1530/13	2		
	6	after 1530/13	3		
15 July	1	1415/14	2	after 1530/14	2
	2	1415/14	2	1335/14	1
	3	1340/14	3		
	4	after 1530/14	3		
	5	after 1530/14	2		
	6	after 1530/14	2		
	7	after 1530/14	2		
	8	after 1530/14	2		
	9	after 1530/14	2		
	10	after 1530/14	2		
	11	1400/14	1		
	12	1340/14	3		

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