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SECURITY INFORMATION

3 June 1952

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SUMMARY

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

1. Transfer of Israeli Foreign Office may harm US-Arab relations:




Assistant Secretary of State Byroade reports 3.3(h)(2) that American and other diplomats in the Arab countries, particularly in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, are concerned over the projected move of the Israeli Foreign Office from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. He states that if the United States accepts the Israeli action without a protest, the Arab states will interpret this as another example of American acquiescence in an Israeli fait accompli.

Byroade suggests that the United States might take the position that it cannot participate in the move until the issue of internationalization of Jerusalem has been solved by the United Nations.

Comment: The UN resolution for the internationalization of Jerusalem has never been implemented. Israel controls the New City and Jordan the Old City. Most of the Israeli government offices have already been moved from Tel Aviv.

The projected transfer of the Foreign Office to Jerusalem will immediately force all countries represented in Israel to decide whether to move their diplomatic missions to the New City or openly oppose the Israeli action by remaining in Tel Aviv.



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3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE

3. Soviet Union apparently not yet ready to blockade Berlin:

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[redacted] The Berlin element of the High Commissioner's office believes that the Soviet Union and East Germany are veering away from the menacing position taken only a few days ago and suggests that the Soviet measures in Berlin are directed more at isolating East Germany and intensifying control there than at the immediate strangulation of the city.

This may indicate that the Soviet Union, which will continue to have the power to cut Berlin's communications with the West, is not yet prepared to resort to this drastic measure, but will use various other means to try to block ratification of the contractual agreement and EDC treaty.

4. Possible relocation of Soviet ground force headquarters in East Germany:

[redacted] reveals a redistribution of some elements of the Headquarters, Soviet Group of Occupation Forces, Germany (GOFG), from the Berlin suburb of Potsdam-Babelsberg to the Zossen-Wuensdorf area 25 miles south of Berlin.

3.3(h)(2)

Residents of Potsdam believe that one of the vacated installations there is to be occupied by East German People's Police.

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Comment: Neither the number of headquarters elements involved nor the permanence of the move is established at this time. Renovation of the former German High Command installations in the Zossen-Wuensdorf area started in August 1950 under GOFG supervision

3.3(h)(2)

The barracks, which are estimated to have a capacity of 35,000 to 40,000 troops, were recently only partially occupied.

The move of GOFG headquarters, if confirmed, would follow a recently observed pattern of Soviet Army relocations in East Germany, which apparently are designed to take advantage of improved facilities and to provide greater security from observation. It would also serve to enhance the prestige of the East German Government in Berlin by making it appear more independent.

There is no evidence of the relocation of Soviet air headquarters in Eastern Germany, and, inasmuch as almost all of the tactical ground units are presently in normal summer training areas, any major redistribution of ground force units probably would not become evident until after fall maneuvers.

5. De Gasperi may seek Monarchist support to avoid losing national elections:

On the basis of results from the latest local elections, the US Embassy in Rome estimates that "the slightest unfavorable shift in sentiment between now and 1953 might put the democratic parties in the minority." To avoid this, Premier de Gasperi may "make a serious try at a balancing trick with the Monarchists," although this would cost him the support of the nationally more numerous Democratic Socialists.

3.3(h)(2)

The Premier is expected to revise the electoral law to favor the center, and to seek elimination of the neo-fascists from political competition by outlawing them or controlling their activities through the enforcement of existing laws.

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Comment: Because the elections show that the Christian Democrats have lost their popular mandate, De Gasperi faces the choice of broadening his government, either to the right or to the left. The electoral results suggest that further alienation by the De Gasperi government of the left-center in favor of the conservative right would accelerate the present trend toward extremes and jeopardize Italian cooperation with American policies.

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