

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

29 April 1952



Copy No. 52

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN


DOCUMENT NO. 56  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S 2009  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 12-19-79 REVIEWER:



3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

**SUMMARY**

**GENERAL**

- 1. Britain backs UN stand on Korean prisoner exchange issue (page 3).
- 2. French delegation to Moscow Economic Conference favorably impressed (page 3).
- 3. [redacted] (page 4). 3.3(h)(2)

**SOVIET UNION**

- 4. Soviet plant doubles allocation of tires for stockpiling (page 5).

**FAR EAST**

- 5. Additional armor arrives in North Korea (page 5).
- 6. Existence of operational Chinese airfields near Indochina border doubted (page 6).

**SOUTH ASIA**

- 7. Indian aide memoire on Tunisia accompanied by bitter comment (page 6).

**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

- 8. Iranian Prime Minister's position less secure (page 7).
- 9. Greek Army officers [redacted] considering military coup (page 7). 3.3(h)(2)

**WESTERN EUROPE**

- 10. Adenauer remains firm on integration (page 8).

**LATIN AMERICA**

- 11. Bolivian Government party lacks control of its ranks (page 8).

\* \* \*

[redacted]


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

## GENERAL

1. Britain backs UN stand on Korean prisoner exchange issue:


 British Foreign Secretary Eden has instructed 3.3(h)(2) the Foreign Office to prepare a paper for circulation to the other Commonwealth members recommending support of the United Nations' refusal to repatriate prisoners of war against their will.

Comment: The Foreign Office had previously submitted to Eden a brief recommending compromise with the Communists on this issue if necessary to prevent the collapse of the truce negotiations. Prime Minister Churchill had informally expressed the view that prisoners held by the UN must not be handed over to face reprisals.

The other Commonwealth countries contributing to UN forces in Korea have not committed themselves on the prisoner exchange issue.

3.3(h)(2)

2. French delegation to Moscow Economic Conference favorably impressed:

 According to a French Foreign Ministry official, the French delegation to the Moscow Economic Conference appeared favorably impressed by the sincerity of Soviet desire for trade. Representatives of French firms discussed deals at the conference, but these are still subject to negotiation and export-licensing approval by the French Government.

A Soviet offer of wheat at the conference for delivery before the end of May has now led the French Government to reopen bilateral trade negotiations. No agreement was made with Poland, since French requirements for coal have been met. The protocols of trade concluded with East Germany, Rumania and China are merely expressions of intent to promote the sale of the broadly defined commodities.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.



3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

## SOVIET UNION

4. Soviet plant doubles allocation of tires for stockpiling:

[redacted] the Erevan Tire Plant was making a shipment of tires for stockpiling that was twice as large as originally specified in November 1951.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The shortage of tires for current use is apparently being permitted to continue in order to accelerate both the stockpiling program and exports to Communist China. In 1951 the Erevan plant produced about 200,000 tires with tubes, approximately three percent of the total Soviet production.

Continued shortages of tires since 1948 in the Soviet Union are essentially the result of limited manufacturing facilities rather than inadequate supplies of raw materials.

## FAR EAST

5. Additional armor arrives in North Korea:

[redacted] the arrival of additional tanks and self-propelled guns in the Pyongyang area.

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] at least 43 tanks and 22 self-propelled artillery pieces have been brought into Korea on freight cars from China. The unidentified North Korean unit which originated these messages is to receive some of this armor.

Comment: Both the North Korean 105th Tank Division and 10th Mechanized Division are located in the Pyongyang area, and could reasonably be the recipient of these tanks.

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

6. Existence of operational Chinese airfields near Indochina border doubted:

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted] the American Air Attache in Saigon believes that there are no operational airfields in the Pinghsiang-Lungchou-Ningming triangle of South China, several miles from the Indochina border.

Comment: This contradicts a report of 5 March that French air patrols had sighted two parallel paved runways, each 6,000 feet long, at Lungchou.

## SOUTH ASIA

7. Indian aide memoire on Tunisia accompanied by bitter comment:

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

Secretary General Bajpai of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs on 25 April read to American Ambassador Bowles the contents of an aide memoire on the Tunisian question, which was apparently identical to that reportedly distributed on the same day by the Indian UN delegation in New York.

Bajpai commented bitterly that the United States grossly underestimated the depth of Asian feeling on colonialism. He deplored the American tendency to take the pro-Westernism of Asian leaders such as Nehru for granted. He implied that several Indian cabinet members had wanted the aide memoire to follow a more strongly anti-Western line.

Comment: Bajpai had told Ambassador Bowles on 11 April that he generally approved of the reasons given him by the Ambassador for the United States' abstention on the Tunisian question. Since that date Prime Minister Nehru, who apparently inspired the aide memoire, seems to have communicated some of his personal feelings to Bajpai.

- 6 -


~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~ 

3.5(c)

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

8. Iranian Prime Minister's position less secure:

American Ambassador Henderson reports that Prime Minister Mossadeq is now facing serious difficulties and opposition within Iran. Evidences of dissension have appeared among his leading supporters, notably Maki and Kashani, and the new Majlis, instead of being amenable to Mossadeq, appears to be more critical than had been anticipated. 3.3(h)(2)


Mossadeq now recognizes that he must accommodate himself to the Shah's wishes, and the Prime Minister's decision to give the assurances necessary for the resumption of American military aid was the result of strong pressure from the Shah.

Comment: There are growing indications that the economic consequences of Mossadeq's policies may do more to unseat his government than any of the diplomatic or political influences to which he has been subjected. The Prime Minister's hold on the government has not been appreciably weakened, although he failed to appear at the opening of the Majlis on 27 April.

In spite of the Shah's presumed victory in inducing Mossadeq to give the Mutual Security Act assurances, there is no evidence that the Shah is ready to remove the Prime Minister.

9. Greek Army officers  considering military coup:

3.3(h)(2)



A group of army officers led by a Greek Rally deputy, retired General Kosmas, are  "beginning to talk" of an armed coup to be headed by opposition leader Papagos. The move, aimed at ending the protracted government crisis, is supported by Generals Ketses, Dovas and Ioannou. 3.3(h)(2)

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ 

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Comment: There has been considerable dissatisfaction in Greece over the purge of pro-Papagos army officers during past months, and plans for a coup may have been discussed. The Marshal would be unlikely to support such an attempt, however, now that he and his supporters are increasingly optimistic over the possibility of unseating the government.

Since all the officers [redacted] supporting this move were potential victims of the government-instigated purge, [redacted] could be part of a maneuver foreshadowing a more determined government effort to oust them.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

## WESTERN EUROPE

### 10. Adenauer remains firm on integration:

[redacted] Chancellor Adenauer is attempting to correct the misinterpretations arising from his radio interview of 24 April and to make it clear that he has not changed his attitude toward integration with the West. He had intended merely to state that if Germany were unified, the projected Allied-German treaties could be modified by the consent of all participants.

3.3(h)(2)

The Federal Republic has since informed the French Government that it still accepts the provision in the contractual agreement that any unified German Government shall be bound by the terms of the contract.

American officials in Bonn comment that during the interview the Chancellor had evidently been thinking only of local politics, and not of the possible repercussions abroad.

## LATIN AMERICA

### 11. Bolivian Government party lacks control of its ranks:

[redacted] the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement in Bolivia has no control over its members and is "at the mercy of armed Communist miners,"

3.3(h)(2)

- 8 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)



~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

**Comment:** The government party is split by the struggle of various factions for dominance. The principal factions are President Paz Estenssoro's relatively moderate group and the extreme nationalists headed by Juan Lechin, Minister of Mines and Petroleum and an important labor leader. Lechin has urged the miners to keep their arms, presumably to strengthen his position.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)