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SECURITY INFORMATION

28 May 1952

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN




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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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
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**GENERAL**

**1. Embassy Moscow expects Soviet harassment in Berlin to stop short of provocation:**



The US Embassy in Moscow estimates that Soviet harassing tactics may be expected to stop at a point where the USSR believes that going further could provoke actual hostilities involving Soviet and Western forces.


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Embassy officials point out, however, that the Soviet Union doubtless considers that much could be done to render the Western situation in Berlin unsatisfactory by a succession of creeping restrictions, none of which might be expected to appear in itself important enough for strong Western counter-measures.

The Embassy concludes that the USSR is probably preparing to exploit these possibilities "with great energy and impudence."

**FAR EAST**

**2. Chinese forces in Korea to increase offensive capabilities:**



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Comment:

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[redacted] several Chinese units in the forward area have already accumulated heavy stocks of petroleum and ammunition. A general supply build-up in the forward area, if achieved, would increase the capability for an offensive of major proportions.

**3. Far East Command asserts Communists possess overwhelming air superiority:**

[redacted] The Far East Command on 27 May estimated that the enemy has a total of 1,115 aircraft massed in Manchuria and that this overwhelming superiority gives him a major offensive capability. The home bases of UN F-86's, as well as the headquarters of both our ground and air forces in Korea, are well within the combat radius of the 350 jet and 35 piston fighters based at Antung, Tatungkou, Takushan and Sinuiju. Only a few miles farther inland on the Anshan-Mukden airfields, 30 light bombers, 240 jets and 85 piston fighters are in position to provide support as well as additional shock power for a striking force.

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Although there are no indications of an impending air offensive, FECOM notes that the Communists have sufficient aircraft, personnel, air facilities and logistic support to launch an offensive without warning in which UN planes, crowded on Kimpo and Suwon airfields, would quite possibly sustain more than 50 percent destruction from the initial attack. Such losses would necessitate forfeiture of offensive aerial superiority in favor of defense tactics.

**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

**4. France conditions further air base grants on full US support in North Africa:**

[redacted] According to a high Foreign Office official, France will not consider granting the United States base rights in Algeria and Tunisia if assurances are not received of complete American confidence in its North African policy.

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France expects unconditional American support for the reforms which it is ready to institute in Tunisia and Morocco.

Comment: Faced with international criticism of its action in North Africa, France has also resorted to other pressure tactics, such as suggesting the possibility of withdrawal from the United Nations if that organization decides to discuss the Tunisian question.


### WESTERN EUROPE

#### 5. Comment on East German retaliation for signing of contractual agreement:

The reactions of the East German Government to the signing of the Allied-West German contractual agreement are of the kind and magnitude anticipated, and must at the moment be regarded as only potentially explosive. The months-long propaganda build-up against the approval of the contractual agreement portended some vigorous reaction by the East German Government; it has, however, made it clear that the new border decrees are not irrevocable.

This suggests that the primary objective of the East German and Soviet Governments is still to block or delay the contractual agreement, the European Defense Community, and any form of European unity.

#### 6. Latest Soviet note evokes critical response in West Germany:

 West German politicians are greeting the 24 May Soviet note with skepticism, calling it a "clumsy and ill-advised" attempt to conceal inadequate Soviet policies. One leading member of the Federal coalition states that besides being unacceptable to the coalition parties, the note deprives the opposition Social Democrats of an important part of their arguments against Chancellor Adenauer's foreign policies.

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American officials in Bonn observe that for the first time on such an important development, the Social Democrats are maintaining an embarrassed silence.

Comment: These German comments suggest that Moscow has blundered in its campaign to win support in West Germany against ratification of the contractual agreement. Whether or not ratification by Germany is delayed by time-consuming Allied-Russian talks will probably depend upon the support which can be built up in West Germany for such talks.

The failure of the note to offer any constructive suggestions for German unification, its propagandistic tone and its favorable references to the Potsdam agreement, will tend to dampen German enthusiasm for Allied-Russian discussions.

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