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SECURITY INFORMATION

2 May 1952


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Copy No. 52

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**


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Office of Current Intelligence

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



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**S U M M A R Y****GENERAL**

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**FAR EAST**

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GENERAL

1. Soviet fighters ordered to attack aircraft in Koethen area:

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

four Soviet fighter aircraft were ordered to attack an unidentified aircraft, called "a big one" [Redacted] at a point near Koethen in the Soviet Zone of Germany. [Redacted] stated that the aircraft was "not flying in any corridor."

3.3(h)(2)

Comment:

[Redacted] observers in Berlin indicated that the Air France DC-4 which was attacked on 29 April was outside the authorized corridor when attacked.

3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST

2. Recent enemy messages in Korea suggest no major operations planned in May:

[Redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

An unidentified North Korean unit, possibly subordinate to the V Corps in the Wonsan-Hamhung area, [Redacted] on 29 April that "the training course at the Corps will be held from the 1st of May to the 30th of May."

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The continuance of April [Redacted]

[Redacted] procedures during May and continued training in a major North Korean command may be interpreted as an indication that no major enemy operation is contemplated in the immediate future.

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**3. Burmese Government and Communists seeking agreement with Karens:**

[REDACTED] The Minister for the Karen State is reliably reported to be discussing with insurgent Karen leaders a proposal for general amnesty if they surrender to the Karen State Government.

3.3(h)(2)

The creation of a joint Karen-Burman commission to determine the boundaries of an autonomous Karen state is also promised.

Meanwhile, discussion of an alliance between Karen and Communist forces is continuing, according to another report, which alleges that top Karen leaders are now in favor of such an alliance.

Comment: This reported Burmese offer to the Karens is the most attractive to date.

**4. Important Huk leader seen ready to cooperate with Philippine Government:**

[REDACTED] A Manila journalist has received an apparently authentic letter addressed to President Quirino from Huk leader Luis Taruc in which Taruc indicated disillusionment with the Communist

3.3(h)(2)

cause. He proposed that Quirino call and preside over a meeting of major land owners to attempt a genuine and peaceful solution of Philippine agrarian problems. Defense Secretary Magsaysay has directed that an answer be sent suggesting a meeting of Taruc, the journalist and himself.

Philippine authorities consider Taruc the "softest" of the top Communist leaders and believe that the letter signifies a break in the Huk front which can be exploited.

Comment: Taruc in the past has been recognized as the top Huk leader. Recent evidence indicates, however, that the first echelon of Philippine Communist leadership is now composed of "harder" Communists.

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~~TOP SECRET~~**5. Indian official foresees no recognition for Vietnam:**

Indian Consul General Kamath, during a fare-<sup>3.3(h)(2)</sup>  
well call on American Minister Heath in Saigon,  
discounted the possibility of Vietnam being  
recognized soon by India. He believed such  
an action would not only unnecessarily link India with one side in the  
"cold war" but align it with "dubious" French and Vietnamese political  
elements.

**SOUTH ASIA****6. High Indian official advocates partition of Kashmir:**

In two recent conversations with American Am-  
bassador Bowles, Secretary General Bajpai of  
the Indian Ministry of External Affairs expressed  
his conviction that further discussions between  
India and Pakistan on Kashmir would be useless unless the subject of  
partition could be raised. Bajpai stated that the Indian Government has  
not fully considered its position on the partition question. He thought,  
however, that if an agreement on Kashmir were ever to be reached, it  
would have to be based on partition with a plebiscite only in the most  
densely settled portion of the state.

Comment: Indications are that the Indian  
Government, anxious to avoid the onus of terminating negotiations but  
uncertain of its ability to maintain its stand on the number of troops to  
be kept in Kashmir, is attempting to postpone discussions or to turn  
them into a new channel.

**WESTERN EUROPE****7. Austrian conservatives may file strong protest against American inter-  
ference:**

Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber reportedly<sup>3.3(h)(2)</sup>  
contemplates strong protests to the US Govern-  
ment regarding the public release of an American

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
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report on restrictive business practices in Austria. Gruber allegedly connects the release of the report with the current investigation of illegal diversions of dollar funds from the European Recovery Program for private purposes and feels that the United States is trying to weaken the People's Party position.

Comment: Preliminary findings of the current investigation suggest that full disclosure of the magnitude of illegal dollar diversions may seriously embarrass and further weaken the People's Party in the coalition government.

8. Trieste issue jeopardizes Italian government position in elections:



In view of the elections in southern Italy on 25 May, the British and the American Embassies in Rome are disturbed by the lack of progress at the London tripartite talks on the administration of Zone A of Trieste. 3.3(h)(2)

The US Embassy points out that the Italian Government's policy has weakened its domestic popularity at a critical time. By exploiting the issue of nationalism, "to the extreme limit of irresponsibility," the neo-Fascists and other extreme rightist groups, which substantially supported the Christian Democrats in 1948, have grown so much in the past year that the electoral margin of the political center over the left is seriously reduced.

The Embassy observes that a reverse for the middle-of-the-road groups in the elections could start a chain of political developments seriously blocking American objectives in this area.

Comment: Neo-Fascist and other nationalist elements are successfully exploiting the Trieste issue to prove that Italy's alliance with the Atlantic Pact powers is unprofitable. The neo-Fascist movement seems to be increasing its electoral potential and, even more considerably, its political influence, first manifest in the 1951 elections.


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**9. Belgium and Netherlands threaten not to sign Defense Community treaty:**

The Belgian Ambassador in Washington notified the Department of State on 30 April of his government's "misgivings" about initialing the European Defense Community treaty unless all member countries adopt a uniform twenty-four month military service period. He added that the Belgian delegate to the Community conference has already been instructed to state that Belgium cannot sign the treaty unless this condition is met. He proposed that the Community adopt the twenty-four month figure now but leave the Community Council free to modify it later.

3.3(h)(2)

On the same day the Dutch EDC delegate stated that he could not even initial the articles of the treaty already agreed upon unless his government knew how Germany's financial contribution for the first year was to be divided.

Comment: A reduction of the Belgian term of military service to eighteen months - equal to that of France and Italy - would force Belgium to cut its commitment of forces to NATO. There is little chance that France and Italy would increase the levels of their military service to meet the Belgian demand.

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