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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SOVIET UNION

1. Unusual number of Soviet aircraft fly to Chukotsk Peninsula:

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an unprecedented number of flights from southeastern Siberia northward along the coast into the Chukotsk Peninsula.

At least 94 military aircraft, most of them subordinate to the 10th Air Army and the Commander in Chief, Soviet Far East, participated in this activity. The majority of the aircraft had been based in the Khabarovsk area. Some of them may have come from as far away as Kuibyshevka, a major military center several hundred miles west of Khabarovsk on the Trans-Siberian Railroad.

Comment: The staging of these flights suggests that the aircraft involved are of relatively limited range and are probably military transports or light bombers.

In the past, activity of this type, pointing to a priority air lift, has frequently accompanied the transfer of a Soviet Air Force unit from one base to another. It therefore suggests a strengthening of air power in the Chukotsk area.

It is also possible that the aircraft are transporting cargoes for economic enterprises in the Chukotsk region, although there is no information indicating a pressing need for priority cargoes at this time.

FAR EAST

2. Vehicle sightings in North Korea approach record high:

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The Far East Command reports that enemy vehicle sightings in North Korea during the week 19 - 25 April totaled 24,142, double that of the preceding period and the second highest weekly total on record. Southbound traffic comprised 59 percent

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
of the sightings, a relatively low figure, although an increase over the previous week. Sixty-one percent of the sightings were south of the 39th parallel, which is above recent averages.

Communist traffic reached a new weekly high on the road between Pyongyang and Sariwon in western Korea, and heavy traffic was noted on the route from Wonsan to Chorwon in the east and central sector.

Comment: The enemy has maintained a consistently high level of supply movement throughout the cease-fire talks, resulting in a greatly improved position in supplies and personnel.

WESTERN EUROPE

3. Prospects for French ratification of EDC seen improving:



On the basis of an "extensive inquiry" just 3.3(h)(2) concluded, the American Embassy in Paris reports that the French National Assembly is taking a somewhat more favorable attitude toward the European Defense Community, in particular because of the Soviet Union's advocacy of a new German Army.

A crucial remaining issue is the hope-for assurances from the United States and Britain against a break-up of the community because of the withdrawal of any member. Opponents of the community find their best campaign issue in the popular confusion over the nature and extent of the expected American and British commitments.

While Socialist leader Guy Mollet can now be expected to defend the treaty, although without enthusiasm, at his party's congress opening 22 May, the question remains whether enough deputies will consider that the US and British assurances are sufficient.

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Comment: The French Government obtained a scant vote of confidence in February on the European Defense Community plan, with reservations designed to placate the Socialists. The vote was obtained on the strength of a promise by Foreign Minister Schuman that he would seek not only declarations by the American and British Governments but also "legal and political commitments" from the parliaments of those countries.

4. Adenauer coalition objects to haste on contractual agreements:



American representatives in West Germany note signs of opposition within the government coalition to the negotiations on contractual agreements which might delay signature beyond 19 May.

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Heinrich von Brentano, Christian Democratic leader in the Bundestag, complained at Adenauer's refusal to keep the coalition informed on the negotiations and his "unreasonable demand" that the member parties approve the contracts in too short a time. Brentano and other coalition leaders felt that certain features of the contracts would meet stubborn resistance from their parties.

American representatives in Bonn believe that Brentano probably exaggerated the extent of the coalition objections.

Comment: This reaction by Bundestag leaders is similar to objections voiced many times in the past to Adenauer's lone-hand tactics. The present timetable for the conclusion of negotiations gives the government parties a full two weeks to consider the contractual agreements.

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LATIN AMERICA

5. Bolivian coup may complicate US-Chilean copper problem:

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ties in solving the copper price problem have been attributed to "Yankee imperialism's hostility" and lack of understanding by spokesmen of all parties. "It is not easy to foresee," he said, "how far this campaign will go with the impulse which it will necessarily receive from the triumph of the Bolivian revolution. "

[Redacted] if the United States should make concessions on tin to Paz Estenssoro which it had not made in other price conflicts, "it would be inviting a positive incitement to revolt and civil war in countries which have problems which they interpret as similar. "

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