

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

18 January 1952

[Redacted]

Copy No. 49

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 31
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ~~DECLASSIFIED~~
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009
AUTH. HR 70
DATE 12-19-01 REVIEWER [Redacted]

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[Redacted]

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~



SUMMARY

USSR

- 1. Comment on new travel restrictions in the USSR (page 3).
- 2. New indications of TU-4's or jet bombers in the Soviet Far East (page 3).

FAR EAST

- 3. Chinese Communist food production reportedly increased (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- 4. American Ambassador in Cairo opposes dispatch of US military assistance to Canal zone (page 6).
- 5. Italians reportedly seek deal with British regarding recruitment of workers for Suez (page 6).
- 6. Greek Deputy Prime Minister expresses preference for American command (page 6).
- 7. Greek Marshal Papagos urges new elections (page 7).


WESTERN EUROPE

- 8. Niemoeller limits scope of Moscow discussions (page 8).
- 9. Belgium takes firm stand against Temporary Council recommendations (page 8).

LATIN AMERICA

- 10. Outlawed Venezuelan party reportedly purchasing arms in Paris (page 9).

* * * *



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

USSR

1. Comment on new travel restrictions in the USSR:

The Soviet Government has enlarged the restricted travel area for foreign diplomats to include key localities in the vicinity of Moscow as well as twenty-two cities in European Russia and Siberia. This action has the effect of further limiting foreign knowledge of defensive installations surrounding Moscow. Five of the cities are located on the Trans-Siberian railroad west of Lake Baikal. With these additions to previous restrictions, all possibility of observing this main artery for the supply of war materials and industrial goods to the Far East and the Korean front is eliminated. (See map on following page.)

2. New indications of TU-4's or jet bombers in the Soviet Far East:

3.3(h)(2)

indicate the probability that TU-4 (B-29 type) aircraft or jet bombers, or both, are present in the Soviet Far East. Since 19 November, at least six aircraft subordinate to the Third Long Range Air Army at Khabarovsk have displayed flight characteristics resembling those of the TU-4.


3.3(h)(2)

On 14 January, an aircraft flying in the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok area, using communications procedures usually associated with bombers and transports, reported that it was flying at altitudes up to 29,000 feet and attaining speeds of approximately 400 miles per hour. The same aircraft reported an altitude of approximately 26,000 feet six minutes after take-off. This suggests a very high-performance jet type, although the indicated rate of climb may be the result of an error in transmission.

- 3 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)




UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AREAS CLOSED TO FOREIGNERS

▨ Areas closed to foreigners.

△ Localities within a closed area but open to foreigners.

— Boundary of U.S.S.R.



■ Localities closed to foreigners prior to Jan. 1952.

● Additional localities closed to foreigners, beginning Jan. 1952.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

FAR EAST

3. Chinese Communist food production reportedly increased:

3.3(h)(2)

The preliminary Communist estimate of food production in China during 1951 is 130,065,000 tons, or ten million tons higher than the 1950 output,

final figures will not be available until the levy of farm taxes is completed in March 1952.

Comment: Increased food production would indicate that Communist China's economy, which is predominantly agricultural, has not been critically affected in spite of the strains of the Korean conflict. Although final figures will probably vary from the preliminary estimate given above, the Chinese Communists appear to have been successful in at least maintaining the 1950 level of agricultural output, from which Peiping was able to export over a million tons.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]

3.5(c)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. American Ambassador in Cairo opposes dispatch of US military assistance to Canal zone:

[REDACTED] According to the US Ambassador in Cairo, the 3.3(h)(2) dispatch of American warships or other military contingents to the Suez Canal zone in compliance with the British request for assistance would endanger the establishment of the proposed Middle East Command.

Comment: The Egyptian Government has already publicly warned that it would consider foreign military assistance to the British authorities in the Canal zone as a "hostile act."

5. Italians reportedly seek deal with British regarding recruitment of workers for Suez:

[REDACTED] The Italians are reportedly trying to arrange a 3.3(h)(2) deal whereby the British will be allowed to recruit semi-skilled Italian labor for the Suez Canal zone on condition that Britain import Italian workers for its coal mines.

Comment: The British would like to obtain 14,000 semi-skilled Italian workers for the Canal area. The Italians, however, in view of their large unprotected minority within Egypt and their desire to maintain good relations with the Arab states, are not likely to permit the British to recruit any considerable number of workers in addition to those already in the Suez area.

6. Greek Deputy Prime Minister expresses preference for American command:

[REDACTED] Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos stated that the Greek Government preferred American to British command over its defenses since "it would be more rational that orders should be issued by the same authority which assures the supply of equipment and provisions."

3.3(h)(2)

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~ [REDACTED]


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

3.3(h)(2)

7. Greek Marshal Papagos urges new elections:

 Marshal Papagos, leader of the opposition in Parliament, has reiterated to the American Ambassador his determination not to collaborate with Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos, whom he distrusts. The present government, Papagos believes, is damaging Greece by its release of dangerous Communists, by political meddling in the army, and by failing to deal with pressing economic problems. Papagos urged the Ambassador to use his influence with the King for the dissolution of Parliament and for holding new elections on the majority system. 3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Marshal Papagos has steadily opposed collaboration with any other party and has continued to call for new elections. Recent governmental moves, replacing pro-Papagos army officers and pressing for an investigation of the rightist officers' organization, have apparently strengthened this attitude and there is little hope for effective cooperation between Papagos and Venizelos. While the government has obviously been lax in its screening of the political prisoners it has released — possibly a thousand persons have been set free — Papagos has exaggerated his criticism in the hope of enlisting the Ambassador's support.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)


WESTERN EUROPE

8. Niemoeller limits scope of Moscow discussions:

 Pastor Martin 3.3(h)(2)
Niemoeller, during his recent visit to Moscow, concentrated his attention on church matters and the question of German prisoners of war.


He refused to have high-level political talks except for a discussion with Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin.




 Bishop Otto 3.3(h)(2)
Dibelius, top German Protestant leader, feels that the Western Powers have not taken sufficient interest in promoting talks on unity between the East and West Germans. The Bishop points out that the strongest anti-Communist element of a united Germany would be found in East Germany.

Comment: Dibelius' recent statements on the Niemoeller trip and the question of German unification have not been consistent. Although he first indicated that he agreed with some of the criticism of Niemoeller's mission to Moscow, he later publicly defended the trip.

On the issue of German unity, Dibelius has told Adenauer that he approved in general of the Chancellor's policy of placing West German integration ahead of German unification. This latest report of his support of unity discussions suggests a lack of strong convictions on the subject.

9. Belgium takes firm stand against Temporary Council recommendations:

 Belgian Foreign Minister van Zeeland has 3.3(h)(2)
refused to consider withdrawing his country's note rejecting the NATO Temporary Council Committee's recommendations for increased Belgian defense expenditures. Claiming domestic approval, he reiterated

- 8 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)


~~TOP SECRET~~

Belgium's opposition to the Committee's procedures and stated that his country was not alone in thinking that the rights of the smaller countries were at stake. Van Zeeland suggested that the only solution would be for another group of twelve representatives to discuss comparative national contributions.

Comment: Belgium's intransigent attitude on this question and on the European Payments Union may be extended to its position on the European Defense Community, notwithstanding the recently announced modification of the Dutch stand.

LATIN AMERICA

10. Outlawed Venezuelan party reportedly purchasing arms in Paris:



two former high officials of the outlawed Democratic Action Party of Venezuela are negotiating for contraband arms in Paris. 3.3(h)(2)

One consignment of arms was reportedly shipped, or about to be shipped, on 7 January.

Comment: One of the Democratic Action officials went to Paris in November to present "the case against the Venezuelan dictatorship" to the United Nations. This report may represent merely an erroneous interpretation of his presence in Paris. 3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~