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SECURITY INFORMATION

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GENERAL

1. Comment on Soviet renewal of German peace treaty proposal:

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[redacted] In its 9 April note, the Soviet Union for the first time directly proposed four-power discussions of free all-German elections and investigation of electoral conditions. The East German Government made such a proposal last September with Soviet support, and it was rejected by Chancellor Adenauer.

The note does not point to any forthcoming concessions, but instead reveals all the weaknesses of Russia's German policy. As a result, it is not likely to deflect the West German Government from its present course of Western integration.

The USSR has attempted to devise a new approach to appeal to West Germany and to convince the Western powers that further negotiation would produce real concessions. It has been unable to make effective proposals, however, for fear of further weakening its hold on Germany.

The new proposal indicates that the USSR cannot agree to free elections, which would result in the loss of East Germany, fearing an ultimate westward orientation of a unified Germany. Accordingly, the note only proposes that the four powers discuss the question.

In answering the Western demand for UN investigation of electoral conditions, the note suggests that such a check could be carried out by a commission of the four occupying powers, presumably operating under a Soviet veto threat, but does not propose the setting up of such a commission.

The Soviet note essentially represents a legalistic attempt to delay developments in the West without committing the USSR. Accordingly, it specifies neither a date nor an agenda for such a meeting.

The failure of the USSR to clarify its earlier proposal for a German army confirms the impression that this offer was made primarily to increase Soviet influence among German nationalists. By reaffirming the Oder-Neisse line, however, the USSR indicates that it does not intend to make a drastic play for German opinion by offering to take the former German territories away from Poland.

In a final attempt to appeal to West European and German opinion, the Soviet note concludes with the warning that the choice is now being made between a united Germany, connoting peace, and a divided Germany carrying with it a continuing threat of war in Europe.

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2. comments on aim of BW propaganda campaign: 3.3(h)(2)

 believes 3.3(h)(2)
 that the Kremlin achieved its goal in the biological warfare propaganda campaign when the Oslo appeal for an investigation sponsored by the World Peace Council was issued on 1 April.
 contends that the crusade against bacteriological weapons is being added to that against atomic weapons in order to rekindle the enthusiasm of the signatories of the Stockholm Peace Appeal.

Comment: This interpretation supports the belief that the Soviet campaign on biological warfare is now tapering off and will be handled in a routine manner as part of the Soviet "peace" campaign against Western imperialism.

FAR EAST

3. Peiping rejects Indian proposal for investigation of BW charges:

 The Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs states that Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai "flatly rejected" an Indian proposal for investigation of biological warfare charges. India had proposed a three-man body, one member to be selected by Peiping, another by the United Nations, and a third to be chosen by those two members. 3.3(h)(2)

Chou offered instead an investigation by the World Peace Council, and also made a "most vague" suggestion that Burma, Indonesia and India investigate Peiping's "evidence."

Comment: After India's first offer to investigate the BW charges was rebuffed by one of Chou En-lai's deputies three weeks ago, the Indian Ambassador was instructed to press the matter with Chou himself.


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4. Burmese unable to estimate when Chinese Nationalists will be "liquidated":

In reply to a recent query from the Chinese Communist Vice Foreign Minister as to how soon the Burmese Government could "liquidate" the Chinese Nationalists in Burma, the Rangoon Foreign Ministry on 22 March stated that, regrettably, no definite estimate could be given. The excuse offered was that Burmese forces were "also committed" against various insurgents.

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Comment: Continuing high-level Chinese Communist interest in the Nationalist problem has been  between the Burmese Ambassador in Peiping and his government. The Burmese Government announced a "campaign" against the Nationalists early this month, probably to satisfy Peiping of its sincerity.

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
SOUTH ASIA

5. Importance of Stalin-Radhakrishnan interview said to be exaggerated:

Secretary General Bajpai of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs has told Ambassador Bowles that he believes the importance of the 6 April interview between Premier Stalin and Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan in Moscow has been exaggerated out of all proportion. The Secretary General stated that the conference had no implication beyond the obvious desire of Stalin to convince India that the Soviet Union was always ready to come to an understanding with the West.

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LATIN AMERICA

6. Bolivian Army Commander in Chief supports government:

Colonel Mejia, Chief of Bolivian Army Intelligence, has told the US Air Attache that General Torres, Commander in Chief of the Bolivian

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Army, is not backing the revolt led by the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR), as claimed by broadcasts of the MNR-controlled radio. Mejia stated that General Seleme, Minister of Government, is the only important defector, and that Torres is outside La Paz awaiting loyal troops which he will lead back into the capital.

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MNR broadcasts are still exhorting the public to proceed to various points to receive arms and to join in the fight. Sporadic shooting continues in La Paz, and the situation in important cities of the interior remains in doubt.

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