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SUMMARY

FAR EAST

Indian Ambassador attempting to influence Japanese policy (page 3). 1. 2. 3.3(h)(2) Plan for major Viet Minh offensive reported (page 4). 3. NEAR EAST - AFRICA Lebanese-Iranian rivalry developing for Turkish seat on Security 4. Council (page 4). British banks prevent transfer of Iranian funds (page 6). 5. EASTERN EUROPE Czechoslovakia purchasing tetraethyl lead from the West (page 7). 6. WESTERN EUROPE Comment on East German "reforms" (page 7). 7.

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FAR EAST

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Chettur suggested that Japan should indicate its disapproval of methods now being pursued on the theory that Peiping would be alienated and peace prospects reduced.

Comment: Chettur, a strong advocate of India's neutrality, has openly criticized American Far Eastern policy. He is supporting neutralist elements in Japan, and is believed to have been instrumental in influencing Nehru against India's participation in the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference at San Francisco.

2. Peiping repudiates Korean POW compromise proposal:

	In an apparent major in the Chinese Peoples G	reversal of its position, lovernment recently
	advised	that
	the Communists are n	o longer willing to
disclosed that the	al rescreening of POW's at Periping government is interested return of 100,000 Communis	sted only in negotiating
20 000 Chinaga		,


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	a military plan for a c by all units to penetral	te the French de-	3.3(h
page). According through October, to northwestern secton attack in the area	to this plan, which covers the wo Viet Minh divisions will a or of the perimeter, followed east of Hanoi. In the souther ill create a diversion.	ne period from July ttack against the by another divisional	-
the operation are t crease Viet Minh c	o collect rice from the ''last' control in the delta area.	the primary aims of harvest and to in-	3.3(h)(2)
			3.3(h)(2)
currently engaged	Most reports indicate in training activities and the	stockpiling of supplies	,
currently engaged does not intend to i dry season in Octo	in training activities and the mount a major offensive until ber.	stockpiling of supplies	
does not intend to a dry season in Octo	in training activities and the mount a major offensive until ber. NEAR EAST - AFRICA	stockpiling of supplies the beginning of the 3.3(h)(2	·)
does not intend to a dry season in Octo	in training activities and the mount a major offensive until ber.	stockpiling of supplies the beginning of the 3.3(h)(2	·)
does not intend to a dry season in Octo	in training activities and the mount a major offensive until ber. NEAR EAST - AFRICA rivalry developing for Turkis	stockpiling of supplies the beginning of the 3.3(h)(2) h seat on Security Cou eral agreement among ons provided for the Arab state to replace y Council. Beirut state s had favored the Leba	2) Incil: 3.3(h
does not intend to a dry season in Octo	in training activities and the mount a major offensive until ber. NEAR EAST - AFRICA rivalry developing for Turkis the Near Eastern nation election in 1952 of an Turkey on the Security that the Arab countrie	stockpiling of supplies the beginning of the 3.3(h)(2) h seat on Security Cou eral agreement among ons provided for the Arab state to replace y Council. Beirut state s had favored the Leba	2) Incil: 3.3(h



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		3.3(h)(2)
	Comment: Both the Iranian and the Leban-ese delegates to the UN have already sought American support for	
5.	British banks prevent transfer of Iranian funds:	
	London banks have prevented transfer of sterling funds from official Iranian accounts	3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2)
	Comment: Despite the justification which may be offered for this procedure, such action tends to encourage anti-British sentiment in Iran and to increase popular support for Mossadeq.	
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3.3(h)(2)

EASTERN EUROPE

6.	Czechoslovakia purchasing tetraethyl lead from the West:

Comment: This is the first indication of an Orbit purchase of tetraethyl from the West. Its source is probably Italy. This amount would ethylate 30,000 tons of high octane aviation gasoline, more than the estimated annual consumption in Czechoslovakia for all purposes.

Orbit requirements in the past have been met from Soviet production. The marked expansion of Soviet production of aviation gasoline, as well as the Soviet policy of stockpiling it only in ethylated form, have sharply increased requirements for tetraethyl lead throughout the bloc.

WESTERN EUROPE

7. Comment on East German "reforms":

Implementation of the administrative "reforms," announced at the Socialist Unity Party conference last week, would continue the trend toward tighter controls and concentration of authority in East Germany which began with the government reorganization announced in May. The "reforms" may reflect dissatisfaction with previous performance, but probably also anticipate the introduction of additional measures likely to be unpopular. These might include still tighter border controls, party and administrative purges, further curtailment of "bourgeois" political activity, and ultimately the complete satellization of East Germany.

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The failure to announce measures for the immediate formation of a national army suggests either that initial steps will be taken sub rosa or that the East Germans will await the lead of the Bonn government.

The possibility that a decision to embark on full-scale rearmament has not yet been reached is supported by the continued emphasis on the necessity of obstructing West German adherence to the European Defense Community while preparing an East German "socialist" base from which the "vassal Bonn government" can be upset.

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