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SECURITY INFORMATION

28 October 1952

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Copy No. 57

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

[Redacted]

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DOCUMENT NO. 15
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 18 Dec 79 REVIEWER: [Redacted]

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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
GENERAL

1. Soviet official suggests armistice solution lies in New York:



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Comment: The USSR has launched a campaign to undermine the United States stand on the Korean question and create dissension among UN members.



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
FAR EAST

2. Enemy twin-jet bombers arrive in Manchuria:



Eight Soviet IL-28 jet bombers flew from Chita in Soviet Russia to Tsitsihar in Manchuria

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
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Comment: These twin-engine light bombers may be destined ultimately for Port Arthur to replace the TU-2 bomber division which left there in early October. Since they represent the only known jet bombers in Manchuria, their presence in Mukden, even on a temporary basis, would increase the capability of Communist air power against UN targets in Korea.

3. Chinese Communists concerned over possible Nationalist invasion:



The Chinese Communists expect an early invasion of mainland China by the Nationalists from Formosa, according to continuing reports received by the American Consul General in Hong Kong. These reports


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suggest that the new invasion precautions which have been taken in many coastal cities are a result of fear aroused by Nationalist aerial reconnaissance and guerrilla raids in sensitive areas.

Comment: The recent large-scale Nationalist raid on Nan Jih Island, off the Fukien coast about 80 miles northeast of Amoy, may have been regarded by the Communists as a prelude to invasion of the mainland.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Deteriorating political situation confronts Iraqi Regent:



Four political parties in Iraq are reportedly ready to boycott the forthcoming elections if the Regent turns down a series of reforms,

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[redacted] palace officials 3.3(h)(2)
in Baghdad have resolved to bring the deteriorating political situation to the attention of the Regent.

Comment: Parliament was dissolved on 27 October. Iraq, now governed by a caretaker government, awaits the decision of the Regent on the date of the elections, which will be held shortly, on whether there are to be reforms, and on the make-up of the caretaker cabinet which will conduct the elections. The political parties threatening a boycott are extremists and their demands for electoral reforms have had the backing of the Communists.

These reports indicate that the political pressures which have been causing upheavals in Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon may also be powerful in Iraq. 3.3(h)(2)

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General Nagib and the Egyptian Foreign Minister have informed 

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 that Egyptian participation in MEDO is impossible as long as British troops remain in the Suez area. Nagib stated that while he would not be "so foolish as the Wafd" and fight the British, he could not accept anything short of British evacuation of the canal zone.


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The general stated that it was in Egypt's interest to enter an organization such as MEDO, but also pointed out the disadvantages which he believed Egypt would suffer in joining. Its participation, he said, would induce the other Arab countries to follow suit. If Egypt subsequently withdrew, other countries, particularly Syria and Iraq, might remain and Egypt would then be isolated.

Nagib informed  however, that he would continue studying the question of participation and discuss the matter with him in two or three weeks.

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Comment: This is the clearest statement to date of the Egyptian military regime's attitude on the withdrawal of British troops from the canal zone. It is also the first suggestion that the Cairo government might not join MEDO even if Britain evacuated the Suez area.

7. General Nagib's moderate policy reportedly hampered by lack of Western aid:

General Nagib is quoted as complaining that he has not yet received any advantage from his friendly policy toward the West,

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and consequently is experiencing difficulty in controlling the nationalist members of his cabinet, who he says are inclined to favor Russia.

Nagib cited his failure to obtain jet aircraft and the release of 5,000,000 pounds from Great Britain as handicaps that make it difficult for him to convince extremists in the cabinet that a pro-Western policy is worthwhile.

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Comment: The British Cabinet is expected to decide shortly whether to release some of the 65 jet aircraft ordered by Egypt. Release of the 5,000,000 pounds is still under discussion.

WESTERN EUROPE

8. Italian ratification of EDC to await French parliamentary action:

[REDACTED] The American Embassy in Rome states that the Italian Government will await clarification of the French parliamentary situation before seeking ratification of the EDC treaty.

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The Embassy believes that it will be under heavy attack for failure to secure concessions on Trieste, and will therefore not be receptive to pressure for prompt ratification.

Comment: Italy's own requests for concessions in American aid, and for support of its position on Trieste in return for ratification of EDC, may well depend on the parliamentary recommendations which Pinay has invited on possible "additions" to the EDC treaty.

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