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SECURITY INFORMATION

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4 November 1952

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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
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FAR EAST

1. Chinese schedule attack for 4 November in central Korea:



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Comment: The early October series of heavy limited-objective attacks by the Communists was similarly indicated by the forward movement of Chinese armored elements. There is no indication that this attack will be more severe than those which have occurred in the past two months.

2. Relief of Chinese armies decreases immediate capability in Korea:



The Far East Command estimated on 3 November that the relief of two front-line Chinese Communist armies, the 12th and the 68th, in east central Korea in the past week has decreased the enemy's immediate capabilities.

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Strong centrally located reserves are still available for early commitment, however, as the relieved armies remain in close proximity to the front.



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
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3. Chinese Communist maneuvers reported in South China:

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the Chinese Communists are participating in "fairly large-scale" army maneuvers in several areas of South China, including Swatow and Canton. [redacted] one purpose of these maneuvers may be to test the combat efficiency of units which may be used against strong Nationalist guerrilla raids on the China coast.

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Comment:

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[redacted] elements of the Chinese Communist 4th Field Army were moved from Canton to positions along the China coast. There are nine Chinese Communist armies totaling about 270,000 men in the two provinces opposite Formosa.

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Mossadeq expresses appreciation of Point IV:

Prime Minister Mossadeq on 31 October told Ambassador Henderson and the Point IV Director for Iran that he appreciated deeply the program's efforts in Iran and wanted it to succeed because it was so closely involved with his own administration. He hoped, however, that no high mission officials would go to northern Iran and that the mission already in Azerbaijan would work quietly in order to avoid a Soviet reaction. He also left the impression that he desired closer American coordination on Point IV with the Iranian Government.

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Comment: Mossadeq has so far resisted extremist demands for the cancellation of the Point IV program. His interest in agricultural and economic reforms and his desire for continued aid will probably cause him to retain the mission as long as it does not come under sharp nationalist attack.

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5. Nagib's call for Arab League meeting attributed to German insult:

General Nagib's decision to call a special meeting of the Arab League to discuss Arab-German relations is apparently his reaction to an alleged insult to the

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Egyptian delegate on the Arab mission which discussed the German-Israeli indemnity in Frankfurt.

The "insult" was the suggestion by the German Deputy Foreign Minister that the Arabs cease propagandizing against the German-Israeli reparations agreement or leave the country.

Comment: The Arab League will meet on 5 November in Cairo to decide what steps to take in regard to Germany's agreement to pay an indemnity to Israel for the victims of Nazi persecution. Although the Arabs threaten Germany with an economic boycott and a severance of diplomatic relations, their hostility is more likely to express itself in opposition to Germany's current efforts to establish a strong political, commercial, and technical position in the Arab states.

6. Sudanese leaders enthusiastic over Egyptian agreement:

The Mahdi, pro-British leader of the Sudanese Independence Party, told the British Ambassador in Cairo on 30 October that he was well satisfied with

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his agreement with the Egyptian Government which assures full Sudanese sovereignty. The Mahdi expressed the hope that Great Britain would accept the principles of the accord.


Speaker Shinkaiti of the Sudanese Legislative Assembly, now in Cairo, told Ambassador Caffery that he is "delighted" with the agreement. He added that there were reports from Khartoum that "some of the British administration are not happy" and that objections might come from Sir James Robertson, Civil Secretary to the Sudanese Government. He concluded that the

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"British administration in the Sudan would make a grievous error if they fought this agreement because the whole of the Sudan would turn against them."

Comment: The Egyptian Government on 2 November announced that the several parties in the Sudan which advocated union with Egypt had merged into a single party which would endorse the Egyptian proposal. The strong endorsement by the pro-British Sudanese leaders who have opposed union with Egypt will put pressure on Britain to include at least some of the Egyptian proposals in the new constitution.

EASTERN EUROPE

7.  Hungary may be producing radar magnetrons:


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Hungary demonstrated an urgent interest in special vacuum tube cathodes "for delivery through 30 June 1952" in late 1951 negotiations between a Hungarian

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
foreign trade agency and a Swiss manufacturer. The Hungarians ordered 55,000 heavy-wall nickel cathode sleeves as well as cathodes of sizes used in standard radio tubes.



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The size of this order suggests that Hungary is beyond the prototype stage and is now producing radar magnetrons. Specification details correspond to those of heavy-wall cathodes used in the United States exclusively in the manufacture of magnetrons for ground and airborne search and fire control radar.

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## WESTERN EUROPE

8. De Gasperi willing to postpone Trieste issue until after Italian elections:

Premier de Gasperi has informally told Ambassador Bunker that a definitive settlement of the Trieste question could be postponed until after the 1953 elections

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without jeopardizing his electoral prospects, provided Italians in Zone B were guaranteed fair treatment and elementary human rights.


De Gasperi stated that a division of the Free Territory along present zonal boundaries was impossible but that a continuous ethnic line solution was both possible and practical, particularly if the United States indicated to Tito that he must cooperate toward such a solution in return for American aid.

Comment: The Yugoslavs have already suggested that the Trieste issue be laid aside and that Italy and Yugoslavia undertake to improve relations in other spheres.

The Yugoslavs have given every indication that they would strongly resist outside pressure intended to force concessions on the Trieste issue.

9. Communist penetration of Austrian police held continuing security problem:

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the Vienna police has been penetrated "to a considerable extent" by the Communists and hence that any information reaching the

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Vienna Police Directorate is available to the Communist Party. The Ministry of Interior may also be penetrated, but the Federal Gendarmerie is considered relatively secure.

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The only potential Communist striking force in Austria, the Werkschuetz or factory guard, is now estimated to number 3,000 men armed with small weapons. Neither the Werkschuetz nor the Communist youth "activists," however, are believed to have received military training.

Comment: Despite the Communist sympathizers in the police and the potential availability of the Werkschuetz, there is no evidence of any serious deterioration in the security situation in Vienna.

Outside Vienna, the most serious security problem is the poor logistical support of the Austrian gendarmerie and Soviet domination of the border guards along the eastern frontiers.

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