

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

12 August 1952



Copy No. 57

3.5(c)  
3.5(c)

**CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**



3.5(c)


DOCUMENT NO. 20  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: HR 70-2

Office of Current Intelligence

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ REVIEWER:

3.5(c)


**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

**SUMMARY**

**FAR EAST**

- 1. North Korean pilots may be training for bomber escort (page 3).
- 2. Viet Minh attack in central Vietnam indicated (page 3).

**SOUTH ASIA**

- 3. Comment on Indian Communists' policy of violent action (page 4).

**NEAR EAST - AFRICA**

- 4. Tanker reportedly arrives at Iranian port (page 4).
- 5. Point IV Program under attack in Iran (page 5).
- 6. Comment on the removal of King Talal of Jordan (page 6).

**WESTERN EUROPE**

- 7. Comment on Soviet tactics in Berlin access dispute (page 6).
- 8. French seen more flexible on Saar question (page 7).

\* \* \* \*




3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

**FAR EAST**

**1. North Korean pilots may be training for bomber escort:**



3.3(h)(2)

**Comment:** The North Korean Air Force is estimated to have a division of MIG-15's, and a division of conventional fighter aircraft, but no bombers. The Communists in China and Manchuria are believed, however, to have 260 light bombers.

3.3(h)(2)

**2. Viet Minh attack in central Vietnam indicated:**



the Viet Minh plans a general attack in the Hue-Tourane area of central Vietnam,

3.3(h)(2)




The French state that they do not have the necessary reserves in this area to withstand an attack in strength.

3.3(h)(2)

**Comment:** General Linares, acting French Commander, noted a strong Viet Minh threat in the Tourane vicinity during his recent trip there. Hue and Tourane lie on the coast half-way between Saigon and Haiphong.

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

The Viet Minh may be planning only a diversionary attack in this sector, as they did on a small scale recently, to draw French reinforcements from more strategic areas. The loss of the important cities of Hue and Tourane, however, would be a severe blow to the French effort in Indochina.

### SOUTH ASIA

#### 3. Comment on Indian Communists' policy of violent action:

During an 8 August debate in the upper house of the Indian Parliament, Communist deputy Sundarayya indicated that the Indian Communist Party has not abandoned violence as an instrument of policy. In the first statement of such strength on the floor of parliament, he declared that the Communists possess arms which they will surrender only if the government promises them amnesty. He asserted that it is the inherent right of the people to revolt against a tyrannical government and that those refusing to surrender arms under duress are patriots.

This statement lends credibility to a June report that the Indian Communist Party had received instructions to resume violent activity concurrently with peaceful united front tactics.

When the preventive detention bill now being debated becomes law, as it undoubtedly will, the Indian Government will be in a better position to suppress Communist activities.

3.3(h)(2)

### NEAR EAST - AFRICA

#### 4. Tanker reportedly arrives at Iranian port:

A 10,000-ton tanker, believed to be American, arrived at Bandar Mashur on 9 August.

3.3(h)(2)

- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

The National Iranian Oil Company has been expecting a tanker of this size, and International Enterprises, a firm which has been trying to promote various oil deals, is expecting three American-flag tankers in August.

Comment: Iranian press reports at the end of July that several tankers had arrived at Iranian ports have not been confirmed, although the British Embassy believed on 31 July that one or more had put in at Bandar Mashur, a loading point for crude oil.

5. Point IV Program under attack in Iran:

[Redacted]

[Redacted] the Tudeh and the Partisans of Peace had been told to sabotage Point IV operations. Attacks against Point IV offices throughout Iran had been ordered, and party members instructed to infiltrate the organization.

3.3(h)(2)  
3.3(i)(2)

[Redacted] Tudeh demonstrations against Point IV reportedly scheduled for 24 July in Isfahan, Tabriz, and Shiraz did not materialize, but that there has been a large increase in Tudeh-directed agitation against the program.

3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The Point IV Program has been a Tudeh target since it was established in Iran. Three Soviet officials who visited Azerbaijan in late April inquired extensively about Point IV projects, and the clandestine Azerbaijan Democratic Station has featured numerous attacks on the program. Nationalist attacks on American aid programs are creating a favorable atmosphere for the Tudeh efforts.

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

6. Comment on the removal of King Talal of Jordan:

The removal of King Talal by the Jordanian Parliament on 11 August and the proclamation of Crown Prince Hussein as king marks the end of the 12-month period of uncertainty which followed King Abdullah's assassination in 1951.

The ouster of the king may cause demonstrations similar to that which took place in Amman on 8 August protesting his rumored replacement. Political factions may attempt to capitalize on any unrest. The government's competent security forces, however, can be expected to suppress any disorders.

Jordan's neighbors have tried during the past year to take advantage of unsettled conditions in the country. Iraq in particular has tried to promote an Iraqi-Jordanian union. With the removal of Talal, the newly-established Regency Council should effectively protect Jordan's interests.

WESTERN EUROPE

7. Comment on Soviet tactics in Berlin access dispute:

The Russians may now be trying to set a precedent for East German "autonomy" in dealing with West Germany and the Western powers. Soviet General Dengin's recent reply that Allied requests for more daily trains to West Berlin would be "referred to the East German authorities" appears to be evidence of this trend.

Allied officials in Berlin advised the Russians that they assumed that the Soviet Control Commission had "issued the necessary instructions" to the East Germans. American observers in Frankfurt, however, believe that the Russians may be trying to force the West into giving de facto recognition to the East German Government.

- 6 -

~~TOP SECRET~~


3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

With this interpretation, the Soviet move tends to corroborate earlier reports that the East Germans expect to receive increased jurisdiction over matters previously subject to four-power control and agreement. Although such authority will hardly be granted prior to ratification of the West German contractual agreement, further Soviet moves to establish the appearance of East German sovereignty are probable.

8. French seen more flexible on Saar question:



Chancellor Adenauer's letter of 4 August has led the French Foreign Office to question German sincerity regarding Europeanization of the Saar. There is every indication, however, that the French want to reach agreement in the current negotiations.

3.3(h)(2)

The American Embassy in Paris believes that when talks are resumed on 13 August, Schuman will be willing to discuss a surrender of certain French privileges, and perhaps a grant of certain advantages to the Germans, but that he will refuse to consider termination of the French-Saar conventions. The Embassy further believes that the question of free elections in the Saar is not an insuperable obstacle, but would be the subject of the "very last concession made by the French."

Comment: The stumbling blocks in the current negotiations are the questions of electoral freedom in the Saar, France's special economic privileges, and the cession of a small portion of French territory to the Saar as a gesture to save face for the Germans.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)