

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION



6 November 1952




Copy No.

57

3.5(c)

3.5(c)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT NO. 23  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 18 Dec 79 REVIEWER: 


3.5(c)



3.5(c)

Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~  
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUMMARY

SOVIET UNION

- 1. Soviet fighter units in Kamchatka re-equipping with jets (page 3).

FAR EAST

- 2. Foreign Minister Okazaki lists obstacles to Japanese rearmament (page 3).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- 3.

3.3(h)(2)

WESTERN EUROPE

- 4.

3.3(h)(2)

\* \* \* \*

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

**SOVIET UNION**

**1. Soviet fighter units in Kamchatka re-equipping with jets:**



3.3(h)(2)

3.3(h)(2)

evidence that Soviet fighter units on Kamchatka are being equipped with jet planes.

On 9 and 10 October two aircraft of a fighter regiment believed to be based at Petropavlovsk engaged in flights at altitudes considered indicative of jet planes.

Comment: The possibility that fighter units in Kamchatka would convert from conventional to jet planes was suggested by the presence of MIG-15 plant representatives at Petropavlovsk,


3.3(h)(2)

Two fighter regiments are known to be based at Petropavlovsk and a third is located in the northern Kurils.

Strengthening of this outer line of Soviet Far Eastern defenses with modern fighters was first indicated by the conversion of units in the southern Kurils to jets, beginning in July.

**FAR EAST**

**2. Foreign Minister Okazaki lists obstacles to Japanese rearmament:**



While stating that the new Yoshida cabinet favors a substantial rearmament program, Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki has told

3.3(h)(2)

~~TOP SECRET~~



3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

Ambassador Murphy that several major obstacles bar early action on the question.

The chief barriers are the difficulty of amending the anti-war clause of the Constitution; the resistance anticipated from the Socialist Parties, intellectual groups, and women; and Yoshida's distrust of the old military clique.

Comment: A two-thirds Diet vote, plus a majority popular vote, is necessary to amend the Constitution. Okazaki favors an information program to enlighten the public on the need for rearmament prior to any attempt to initiate an amendment. Meanwhile, the Japanese Government, mindful of the heavy cost of rearmament, may be expected to continue its cautious approach to the question.

3.3(h)(2)

## NEAR EAST - AFRICA

3.


- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)




3.3(h)(2)

**WESTERN EUROPE**

3.3(h)(2)

4.



~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)