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SECURITY INFORMATION

25 April 1953

3.5(c)

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Office of Current Intelligence

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

FAR EAST

- 1. Yoshida's reluctance to rearm reportedly encouraged [redacted] 3.3(h)(2) (page 3).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

- ✓ 2. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

- ✓ 3. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)
- 4. Jordan disturbed over Israeli sniping in Jerusalem (page 4).
- ✓ 5. Egyptian Foreign Ministry reaffirms unyielding position on Suez Canal issue (page 5).
- 6. Britain acquiesces in postponement of Sudanese elections (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

- ✓ 7. Vyshinsky says USSR wants an Austrian treaty (page 6).
- 8. Comment on West German delay in ratifying EDC treaty (page 7).
- ✓ 9. British express reservations on new American aid proposal (page 8).

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[redacted] 3.5(c)

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FAR EAST

- 1. Yoshida's reluctance to rearm reportedly encouraged [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

[redacted]

The Japanese Government has been greatly impressed [redacted] 'crushing US superiority' in atomic weapons would be an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression

for many years, [redacted]

The US Embassy believes that Yoshida's recent reluctance to speed rearmament could well have resulted from the alleged statement. [redacted] 3.3(h)(2)
an ingrained suspicion of Japanese intentions and thus dislike the idea of early Japanese rearmament.


Comment: While such information would undoubtedly add to Yoshida's long-standing objections to speedy rearmament, there are many other equally valid explanations for his attitude. Ambassador Murphy previously reported that the real limiting factors to Japanese rearmament were plant facilities and techniques, and that even if the new government were favorably disposed, actual progress would be slow.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

- 2. [redacted]

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
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3.3(h)(2)


NEAR EAST - AFRICA

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3.3(h)(2)

4. Jordan disturbed over Israeli sniping in Jerusalem:



King Hussain of Jordan has complained to the American Ambassador about the Israeli sniping on 22 and 23 April against Arab Legion outposts and inhabitants of Old Jerusalem.

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Subsequently, the Jordanian Prime Minister warned both the British and the American Ambassadors that full-scale military operations might break out and that the Arab Legion would reply to any continuation of the attacks.

American Consul General Tyler in Jerusalem reports that all the evidence he can find supports the Jordanian belief that Israel planned the shootings.

[Redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

5. Egyptian Foreign Ministry reaffirms unyielding position on Suez Canal issue:


[Redacted] Egypt is not now and has at no time been contemplating a defense agreement with the West, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry advised its missions abroad [Redacted] Moreover, the aim of the forthcoming discussions with Britain is to "liquidate rapidly all stationing of British forces and personnel on Egyptian territory." 3.3(h)(2)

The Foreign Ministry believes that both the United States and Britain realize that a strong, "contented" Egypt is necessary for Near Eastern stability, and that a satisfactory solution of the Suez Canal dispute is accordingly imperative. Nevertheless, the Foreign Ministry does not wish to encourage its missions to "overestimate the progress made."


[Redacted] 3.3(h)(2)

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3.3(h)(2)

6. Britain acquiesces in postponement of Sudanese elections:

The British Foreign Office has reluctantly^{3.3(h)(2)} accepted the Electoral Commission's decision to postpone the Sudanese parliamentary elections until fall. Britain has been anxious to create the parliament as soon as possible in order to relieve itself of the onus for ruling the Sudan alone.

The Foreign Office believes that the Egyptians and pro-unity Sudanese wanted the delay in order to prolong their own campaign.

Comment: The role of the British Governor of the Sudan has been the source of frequent Anglo-Egyptian disputes which almost blocked agreement to begin discussions on the Suez issue.

WESTERN EUROPE**7. Vyshinsky says USSR wants an Austrian treaty:**

In response to an inquiry by the Austrian UN^{3.3(h)(2)} observer, Andrei Vyshinsky said that the USSR wants to reach agreement on an Austrian treaty. He added that the withdrawal of the abbreviated text "would greatly improve prospects of agreement."

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The Austrian observer attached considerable significance to the statement and to Vyshinsky's unusually cordial attitude.

Comment: Vyshinsky's attitude and comments are a part of current Soviet efforts to appear conciliatory. The USSR still seems to be attempting to obtain its own terms, since its official position has consistently been that the West must withdraw its abbreviated text of the Austrian treaty prior to discussion.

The fact that the statement was made to an Austrian official presumably means that Vyshinsky is aware of Austria's desire to have the abbreviated text sponsored by the United States withdrawn, if it will speed treaty discussions. Britain has supported the Austrian position, and France thus far seems undecided.

8. Comment on West German delay in ratifying EDC treaty:

Despite the West German Bundesrat's decision on 24 April to postpone a vote on the Bonn and Paris treaties and ask the Constitutional Court for a prior advisory opinion on their legality, eventual upper house approval still seems likely. In any event, Chancellor Adenauer will probably block the request for an advisory court opinion by refusing to commit the Bundestag, or lower house, to a joint parliamentary court petition as required by law. He has also suggested that he may ask President Heuss to sign the major parts of the treaty without the express approval of the Bundesrat.

Responsible for the Bundesrat action was Reinhold Maier, leader of the key Baden-Wuerttemberg delegation, who had recently assured officials that he would vote for early ratification. In the last several days, however, Maier had lost political support in his home state, and he apparently believed that its cabinet would oust him unless he did everything possible to secure a prior court decision.

While there is now much uncertainty as to when the Bundesrat will again consider the treaties, both American and German officials are convinced that Maier will support them when they are put to a vote.


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9. British express reservations on new American aid proposal:



Top British officials have requested a further^{3.3(h)(2)} discussion with the United States on its position that direct economic assistance should be replaced by offshore procurement contracts.

Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler doubts that the substitution of offshore procurement contracts would yield adequate dollar receipts during the 1954 fiscal year.

Minister of State Selwyn Lloyd states that Churchill feels strongly that this is no time to give any appearance of relaxation in the Western defense effort.

Comment: These British reactions emphasize the most important problems facing the current NATO ministerial meeting. Other NATO members can be expected to express anxiety over the interim period during a shift from direct to more indirect US aid, and the Western countries, as well as the Soviet Union, would be inclined to view a defense stretch-out as a relaxation.

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