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SECURITY INFORMATION

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~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

SUMMARY

GENERAL

1. Burma explains position on UN appeal (page 3).
2. Chinese UN delegate to disclaim responsibility for troops in Burma (page 3).

SOVIET UNION

3. Pravda re-emphasizes role of party leadership (page 4).
4. Prominent Yugoslav's views on probable effects of Stalin's death (page 4).

SOUTHEAST ASIA

5. Bao Dai opposes follow-up of recent Vietnamese elections (page 5).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Mossadeq maintains position on oil and Point IV (page 5).

EASTERN EUROPE

7. Sharp increase in 1952 Soviet exports to Bulgaria (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

8. Denmark refuses to permit US inspection of grounded MIG-15 (page 7).

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3.5(c)

- 2 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

GENERAL

1. Burma explains position on UN appeal:

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the decision to bring the Chinese Nationalist problem to the UN was made because of the government's political embarrassment. Militarily, the situation was said to be well in hand.

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3.3(h)(2)

[Redacted]

Comment: The Burmese Government's political embarrassment has arisen principally from Communist exploitation of public resentment at the recent depredations attributed to Li Mi's forces.

Although the Foreign Office depreciated the military problem, [Redacted] government forces have suffered heavy reverses at the hands of the Nationalists during the past few weeks and further deterioration of the military situation could undercut any diplomatic steps toward a solution.

3.3(h)(2)

2. Chinese UN delegate to disclaim responsibility for troops in Burma:

[Redacted]

If the problem of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma is raised in the United Nations General Assembly, the Nationalist Government will disclaim responsibility for those forces on the grounds that it does not have effective control over them.

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The Nationalist delegate will state that an order to those forces to withdraw from Burma would not be obeyed and that the problem of maintaining peace and order there is Burma's responsibility.

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3.5(c)

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3.5(c)

Comment: The Nationalist delegate took essentially the same position in the General Assembly in January 1952 following Vyshinsky's assertion that the United States was supporting Nationalist operations in Burma.

SOVIET UNION

3. Pravda re-emphasizes role of party leadership:



The first official press commentary to follow the announcement of Stalin's illness appeared in Pravda on 5 March. Repeatedly stressing the interdependence of the party and the people, the editorial appealed particularly for unity and cohesion during these difficult times.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: The reiteration of this theme is probably intended to give the country as a whole a feeling of continuity in the party's leadership.

The emphasis on the role of the party and the inclusion of a quotation from Malenkov's report to the 19th Party Congress support the speculation that Malenkov, as the party's leader, is in the strongest position to succeed Stalin.

4. Prominent Yugoslav's views on probable effects of Stalin's death:



The American Embassy in Belgrade reports that Mose Pijade, eminent Yugoslav theoretician, expressed his opinion that at least for the immediate future the Soviet Union would be so weakened by Stalin's death that it would tend to withdraw from international affairs. He added that Tito and Kardelj "did not quite agree" with his view.

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- 4 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

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
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3.5(c)

Pijade thought that since no one approaching Stalin's ability remained on the scene, either a clique within the Politburo (now replaced by the Presidium), or the Politburo itself, would govern collectively. Concerning rivalries within the Politburo, he emphasized that there were no hard facts to go on and that opinions frequently expressed on this point were purely speculative.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

5. Bao Dai opposes follow-up of recent Vietnamese elections:




In a recent discussion with Ambassador Heath,^{3.3(h)(2)} Bao Dai asserted that the successful candidates in the municipal elections of 25 January were opponents of the government who would unwittingly serve Viet Minh ends. He accordingly argued against the formation of provincial legislatures and a national assembly.

Comment: The January elections were hailed by French, Vietnamese, and American observers as "a blow against the Viet Minh." They brought many of Vietnam's "fence-sitters" into the country's political life for the first time and demonstrated that those candidates who opposed French policy and the present Vietnam Government made the strongest popular appeal. Such political enthusiasm as was engendered by the elections would be dissipated by a failure to announce definite plans for the formation of a national assembly.

Bao Dai's opposition to the further development of representative government stems from his well-founded fear that his position would be threatened.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6. Mossadeq maintains position on oil and Point IV:



On 4 March, Prime Minister Mossadeq told Ambassador Henderson that if the United States were interested in Iran's security, it would not^{3.3(h)(2)}

- 5 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)

~~TOP SECRET~~

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support Britain in the oil blockade. Mossadeq stated that the Soviet Union has protested against Point IV activities in northern Iran and the protests embarrass the Iranian Government. He added that as long as Point IV personnel interest themselves in agricultural rather than development projects the Soviet Union would consider them spies.

Comment: The Prime Minister's latest statements to Henderson are no different from those of the past. He may still hope to persuade the United States to help settle the oil dispute on his terms. When he relinquishes that hope, a less friendly attitude may be anticipated.

Soviet pressure to oust American advisers was most recently reported some weeks ago in conjunction with the Soviet-Iranian negotiations over the Caspian fisheries concession.

EASTERN EUROPE

7. Sharp increase in 1952 Soviet exports to Bulgaria: 3.3(h)(2)

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volume of Bulgaria's 1952 imports from the Soviet Union was about double that of 1951.

Much sharper increases were noted in petroleum products, in industrial machinery and equipment, and in shipments from the Soviet Engineering Directorate, which is responsible among other things for export of military goods.

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WESTERN EUROPE

8. Denmark refuses to permit US inspection of grounded MIG-15:

[REDACTED] The Danish Defense Minister on 5 March refused the American Air Attache permission to inspect the Polish Air Force MIG-15 which landed on Bornholm that morning. Stating that the matter was to be kept exclusively Danish, he promised that the United States would nevertheless obtain full information from the Danish investigations.

3.3(h)(2)

The Department of State has instructed the American Embassy at Copenhagen to state that the United States Government considers the matter of "crucial military importance," and to seek a minimum assurance that the plane will not be returned promptly to Poland. Washington has suggested plans for examination of the plane by American technicians.

- 7 -

~~TOP SECRET~~

3.5(c)