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SUMMARY

SOVIET UNION

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FAR EAST

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3.3(h)(2)


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	SOVIET UNION	
USSR redeploys jet fig	hters in Far East:	3.3(h)(2)
	And a state of the Control of the State of t	3.3(h)(2
	at least 217 MIG-15's were scheduled to ma	ke
	one-way flights from bases in the southern Maritime Province to more northerly bases	
including Sakhalin, (se		ð
	Approximately 100 of these were scheduled lights, originating at 9th Air Army and 5th Fle 0th Air Army and 7th Fleet bases in the northe Sakhalin.	et
new-type MIG's have raircraft may have been be located at Komsomo being replaced by later to 20 others slated for	Comment: About 90 of the MIG-15's sched based at four southern Maritime airfields where ecently been operating. This suggests that the removed to the major MIG-15 factory known tolsk for reconditioning or modification after model jets. Some of these planes, in addition Khabarovsk, may also be destined to bolster tongth in the Khabarovsk-Komsomolsk areas.	re ese co
	Dispatch of 90 MIG-15's from 5th Fleet base would strengthen Soviet naval air units along the and on southern Sakhalin.	
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	FAR EAST	
Movement of Chinese a	FAR EAST	
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armies which were still in Korea in February were to be transferred to China proper to strengthen the coastal defense.

Comment: This report tends to confirm previous analysis that the large-scale troop movement from South and East China to Korea during the past several months represents a rotation rather than a reinforcement of Chinese Communist forces in Korea.

3,	Taipei agrees in principle to withdrawal of forces from Burma:	
		3.3(h)(2)
	Taipei agrees in principle to the withdrawal of Chinese Nationalist forces from Burma but, because of the practical difficulties involved, "cannot be held responsible" for failing to effect it.	J
·	<u>Comment</u> : The Nationalist Government has previously been reluctant even to agree in principle to the withdrawal and probably will not cooperate in carrying it out.	
	Meanwhile the Burmese Government on 25 March lodged a complaint with the United Nations against Chinese Nationalist aggression.	
	SOUTHEAST ASIA	
4.	Polish ship in Rangoon loading rubber and steel for Communist China:	
	A Polish vessel is in Rangoon loading 1,500 tons of Burmese rubber and 300 tons of scrap steel for discharge at the Chinese Communist port of Whampoa, following a stop at Colombo.	3.3(h)(2)

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The American Embassy in Rangoon believes that the decision by the Burmese to permit this shipment was reached at cabinet level.

Comment: This shipment will mark the first known delivery of rubber from a United Nations member to Communist China since the UN-sponsored embargo of May 1951.

In early February, a Burmese Cabinet member told an Embassy officer that in view of its neutral foreign policy, Burma was reluctant to forbid rubber exports to China. This is probably a sincere explanation, considering the Rangoon government's extreme fear of angering Peiping.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

5. Mossadeq reportedly takes steps to remove Majlis opposition leader:

	On 20 March Prime Minister Mossadeq appointed Haerizadeh, pro-Shah leader of the opposition in the Majlis, as a "special inspector" of Iranian diplomatic missions	3.3(h)(2)
_abroad,		

Comment: Mossadeq, feeling that Haerizadeh, who recently formed a 10-man "Freedom" group in the Majlis, could not be accused of being a "British agent," apparently chose this method as the simplest way to remove him.

The same tactics were employed last September to remove another potential Mossadeq rival, Allahyar Saleh, who was appointed Ambassador to the United States.

6.	Ibn Saud grants Farouk \$500,000 annually:	
	King Ibn Saud sent \$500,000 to former King Farouk some months ago and has allotted him a similar amount annually, He has also directed that Farouk be urged to continue to "have confidence" in him.	3.3(h)(2) 3.3(h)(2)
	Comment: In allotting this aid, Ibn Saud runs a serious risk of damaging the good relations he has promoted with the Nagib government in Cairo.	
7.	Israel asks United States for \$70,000,000 grant:	•
	Ambassador Eban and three other Israeli officials in Washington have asked the State Department for a grant of approximately \$70,000,000 to meet debts falling due between April 1953 and May 1954. The Israelis stated that the national debt would be permanently reduced by that amount.	3.3(h)(2)
	Comment: On 10 March Ambassador Davis reported from Tel Aviv that Israel was planning to request "one-time" special assistance from the United States and would require \$20,000,000 in outside aid for the quarter ending 30 June 1953.	
	WESTERN EUROPE	
8.	Key German politician reportedly favors Bundesrat approval of EDC:	÷
	Reinhold Maier, head of the key Baden- Wuerttemberg delegation in the West German Bundesrat, reportedly told a meeting of his Free Democratic Party	3.3(h)(2)
	that approval of the Bonn and Paris treaties in the	3.3(h)(2)

upper house would not fail for lack of Baden-Wuerttemberg's five votes. Chancellor Adenauer allegedly asked Maier to postpone Bundesrat action in order to have a bargaining point in his forthcoming Washington talks.

Comment: Maier, whose attitude on ratification has not been clear, is in a position to tip the scales either way in the Bundesrat. Favorable Bundesrat action on the treaties, which received final lower house approval on 19 March, now appears likely by late April.