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SECURITY INFORMATION

25 January 1953

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Office of Current Intelligence


CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUMMARY

GENERAL

- 1. Greeks express interest in transferring Slavic minority to Yugoslavia (page 3).

FAR EAST

- 2. New Chinese road construction near Burmese border reported (page 3).

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WESTERN EUROPE


- 4. Comment on political situation in East Germany (page 5).

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GENERAL

1. Greeks express interest in transferring Slavic minority to Yugoslavia:

[redacted] [redacted] has asked United States assistance in sounding out Yugoslavia on the possibility of transferring 50,000 "Macedonians" from northern Greece to Yugoslavia. He explained that these people assisted the Communists during the Greek Civil War and would be a serious problem in case of another war. They also form the basis for claims on the part of Yugoslav Macedonia to portions of Greek Macedonia.

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Greece, however, does not wish to approach Tito directly since such a demarche could give him an excuse for again claiming minority rights for the Macedonians in Greece.

Comment: The transfer of this group would assist the Greek Government in solving its difficult minority problem. It would also remove one of the primary impediments to closer Greek-Yugoslav cooperation, since Yugoslav support of a "free Macedonia" has in the past been one of the major irritants in relations between the two countries.

Nevertheless, the problem is complicated by the fact the Greek Macedonians are not a homogeneous group either nationally or ideologically. Furthermore, Yugoslav leaders still hope for the eventual integration of Macedonia, and hence would be adverse to losing their future claims to northern Greece.

FAR EAST

2. New Chinese road construction near Burmese border reported:

[redacted]

A military road from Kunming in Yunnan Province southwest to Ssumao, about 100 miles from the Burmese border, is now

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complete, [redacted] A labor force is being recruited at several points beyond Ssumao, presumably for extending the road to the border, where it would connect with the existing motor road from Kengtung in Burma.

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Comment: [redacted]

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This construction will improve the Communist military position in the Burma-Laos border area.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

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
WESTERN EUROPE**4. Comment on political situation in East Germany:**

Reports during the past week indicate that anti-Zionism may now be a major factor in current East German political developments. The fact that arrests and denunciations of Jews have so far been confined to those who have resided in the West suggests a primary concern for internal security. There is little doubt, however, that the regime hopes to take advantage of latent anti-Semitism in general, and the entire Jewish community appears to be under close surveillance.

The arrest of Foreign Minister Dertinger on 15 January has further demoralized the Christian Democratic Union. Defections continue, and a rigorous screening of party members according to their "attitude toward the Soviet Union" has been initiated. While the government's purge is presumably calculated ultimately to exclude all non-Communists from official positions, it has not yet affected members of the National Democratic Party. This party appeals strongly to ex-Nazis and has picked up the anti-Zionist line.

Rumors that the purge will reach to the top levels of the Socialist Unity Party itself must still be regarded as speculative.

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
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