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GENERAL

1. <u>Comment on new Communist proposal in the Korean talks:</u>

In their new proposal for settling the POW
issue, the Communists, while moving toward a cease-fire, still appear
determined not to accept any arrangement which would result in failure
to repatriate a substantial number of prisoners.

The 7 May proposal offers certain compromises,
but does not alter the Communist position on the critical point regarding
the disposition of prisoners unwilling to return after Communist "explana-
tions" to them. The Communists continue to propose that the fate of these
prisoners be decided by a political conference.

Should the United Nations reject this proposal,
the Communists eventually might accept as an alternative the disposition
of the unwilling by the five-nation commission, which includes India.

2. <u>British views regarding UN appeal on Laos:</u>

The British Foreign Office believes that an   3.3(h)(2)
appeal to the United Nations on Laos should
be extended to embrace all Indochina and
should specify Communist China as the sup-
plier of war materials. Otherwise, the Communists are likely to claim
that the struggle in Indochina is a civil war over which the United Nations
has no jurisdiction.

3.3(h)(2)

Comment: Thailand has long sought greater
Western commitment to its defense, and these suggested steps would do
much to insure against a Thai accommodation to the Communist Orbit
if threatened by invasion.

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3. **East German scientist reportedly develops radically new process having BW significance:**

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a capable East German veterinary scientist has crystallized and mutated (altered) an animal virus by application of ultrasonics.

Comment: 3.3(h)(2)
a scientifically feasible extension of Soviet virological research and has significant biological warfare implications. Viruses so processed would give the Soviet bloc a superior scientific capability applicable to BW.

The crystallization would improve the operational characteristics of BW agents by making them more sturdy and compact. The alteration would make possible the creation of new viruses which would cause unrecognizable diseases, and against which advance specific preventive measures could not be taken.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. **Secretary Dulles to be urged by Nagib to visit Morocco:**

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Comment: While Nagib and other Arab leaders may raise the North African question, local problems are likely to be given maximum emphasis.

An audience with the sultan, which would have to be arranged through the French, would be a mere formality, but the Moroccan nationalists would consider it significant.

WESTERN EUROPE

5. De Gaulle's break with followers may delay Mayer's downfall:

As a result of the break between General de   3.3(h)(2)
Gaulle and his followers, a showdown in the
French Parliament over Premier Mayer's
program may be delayed while the non-
Communist parties vie for the deputies just cut adrift.

The Embassy believes that no more than one third of the Gaullist deputies will remain in opposition. An important number may shift toward the Independents, and others are expected to join the Radical Socialists, the Popular Republicans, and the Socialists.

Comment: The dissolution of the Gaullist parliamentary group removes the strongest rallying point for non-Communist critics of close French cooperation with United States policy. While it makes more certain the support of some Gaullist deputies for the EDC, no great change in government policy on key issues can be expected before the national congresses expected next month.

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