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	CENTRAL INTEL	LIGENCE AGEN	CY

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GENERAL

1	. Chou En-lai opposed to transfer of prisoners to United Nations:	
	After a two-hour conversation with Chou En-lai on 26 May, the Indian ambassador in Peiping informed his British colleague that the Chinese premier seemed genuinely interested in a peacethe fate of prisoners who remain unwilling to be repatriated. Chou was "obdurate" on the latter point and rejected the ambassador's counterarguments.	(h)(2) -
	were presented on 25 May, the senior Communist negotiator stated that the proposals for the ultimate disposition of prisoners unwilling to returneither to release them in Korea or to transfer the issue to the UN General Assembly"could not be agreed to."	 !
	At the l June meeting in Panmunjom, the Communists are expected to reject officially this critical point in the UN proposals and to reaffirm their demand for indefinite consideration of the prisoners issue by a political conference where the prisoners' release could be blocked. In view of Nehru's recent public endorsement of the UN's proposals, the Communists may no longer regard favorably a possible alternative proposal for disposition of the prisoners by majority vote of the five-nation custodial commission.	
2.	French Foreign Ministry disapproves Western initiative on East-West problems:	
	French Foreign Ministry experts on the Soviet Union, including Ambassador Joxe, think that the present Western "impatience" for talks with the USSR is "most unfortunate." They feel Moscow should be forced to take the lead in any overtures.	3.3(h)(2



3.3(h)(2)

The Foreign Ministry spokesman who relayed these views to Ambassador Dillon believes that there will be leaks of any disagreements at the forthcoming Bermuda talks. Although a final agreement to make concessions to the Russians would be "ill advised," the absence of one would be condemned by Western public opinion as "intransigence."

The French official agrees that it would be desirable to avoid any linking of the three-power talks to four-power talks, but believes that this connection would be impossible to avoid.

٥.	Soviet diplomat comments on East-West Issues:
	The first secretary of the Soviet embassy in London told an American embassy officer that the Austrian question must be settled in connection with the German problem. He said
	that Secretary Dulles had overemphasized the Austrian treaty as evi-

dence of the USSR's peaceful intentions.

He personally saw no reason why Germany could not be unified on the basis of the Oder-Neisse frontier and with general elections on a proportional basis for East and West Germany, without outside influence.

The secretary also said he was convinced that there would be an armistice in Korea. He pointed out that the hostilities in Korea had been a severe drain on the USSR and China as well as the US.

Comment: The secretary's remarks suggest that the USSR is trying to create the impression that it is still willing to settle outstanding East-West issues despite recent difficulties over Austria and Korea.



4. Possible Chinese Communist invasion of Tachen Islands indicated:

in the islands.

indications of 3.3(h)(2)
an imminent Chinese Communist operation
against the Tachen Islands. Transport planes
have appeared in the nearby Choushan Islands,
Communist naval units in the Choushans have
been strengtnened and are more aggressive, and Ningpo airfield on the

mainland opposite the Tachens is now operational.

In addition, an individual arrested in the Tachens recently allegedly carried documents describing landing sites

Comment: The Tachens, the northernmost of the Nationalist-held islands on the China coast, lie about 200 miles south of Shanghai. About 6,000 Nationalist troops, 2,000 marines and 10,000 guerrillas are available for their defense.

A Chinese Communist invasion of the islands was reported as imminent at this time a year ago and has been reported four times since February. Chinese Communist forces along the Chekiang coast now number at least 70,000 men and could capture the islands whenever they care to make the effort.

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5. Highest numbered Chinese Communist air division now believed to be 31st:

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	the 34th	
	Air Division had been identified, probably in	
	South China.	
	At pres	_
ent, the highest number	ed air division of the 27 currently identified is	

ent, the highest numbered air division of the 27 currently identified is the 31st; the 1st, 27th, 29th, and 30th have not as yet been observed.

3.3(h)(2)



SOUTHEAST ASIA

	Vietnam's new defense minister has informed 3.3(h)(2
	the American consul in Hanoi that Bao Dai is
	currently working on a plan for a Vietnamese
	army of 500,000 within the next three years.
Bao Dai reportedly	stated that the present Vietnamese military estab-
	ing and that the time has come to make a 'last offer'
to the French, indi	cating that unless they support his army plan, he will

Comment: The French-Vietnamese program for the build-up of the Vietnam army is considerably behind schedule. Bao Dai's principal purpose in making demands on the French is probably to strengthen his political position in Vietnam.

Assuming adequate foreign aid, a Vietnam army of 500,000 is conceivable, but unless the government gains greater popularity the reliability of such an army would be questionable.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

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EASTERN EUROPE

В.	Czechoslovakia opens first aluminum plant:		
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Comment: This plant, the first of its kind in Czechoslovakia, had been scheduled to go into operation next October with an initial annual production of 3,000 to 4,000 tons based on imports of semi-processed Hungarian ore. By 1955 the plant is scheduled to reach its maximum production of approximately 40,000 tons a year, or about seven percent of the output forecast for the Orbit. A substantial part of this production will probably be used in Czechoslovakia's expanding aircraft and war industries.

The planned expansion of Satellite aluminum output should eliminate by 1955 the bloc's dependence on imports.

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WESTERN EUROPE

Preliminary Yugoslav-Italian talks on Trieste reportedly stalled:
In reply to a Yugoslav approach to Italy offering a settlement of the Trieste question along the present zonal boundaries, the Italian Foreign Office countered with a plan which would cede Zone A and the coastal strip of Zone B to Italy. Following this meeting on 22 May, the Yugoslav negotiator reported that nothing had been accomplished and that previous progress was jeopardized.
approach as a maneuver to relieve American pressure on Tito for concessions on Trieste before the Italian elections. In the light of Yugoslavia's previous conditions and its obvious apprehension over assumed Western plans for a solution favorable to Italy, the sincerity of the Yugoslav approach is questionable.
Rearmament issue reportedly threatens split in West German Social Democratic Party:
Social Democratic Party chairman Erich 3.3(h)(2) Ollenhauer now faces opposition from other party leaders over his antagonism to the Bonn and Paris treaties. party moderates believe that if its campaign against the treaties is continued, the party will find it difficult to join a government coalition following the September election.
Ollenhauer reportedly thinks that he will be overthrown at the next party conference unless a four-power meeting or a court decision against the treaties proves that his policies have been politically wise.
Comment: There is a growing belief 3.3(h)(2) in Bonn that the Constitutional Court will reject the treaties.
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