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SECURITY INFORMATION

15 September 1953

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SOVIET UNION

1. Comment on Soviet agricultural decree:

[redacted] The decree published by the Communist Party Central Committee on 12 September places an increased emphasis on agriculture and will have far-reaching economic and political effects. It specifies a larger allocation of heavy industry output to agriculture than is provided for in the current Five-Year Plan.

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The new program calls for an increase of approximately 30 percent in the delivery of tractors, and for sharp increases in livestock, vegetable and fodder production by 1954.

Along with increased emphasis on party control of farming, there is to be a large-scale expansion of schools and training facilities to produce agricultural experts. In the interim, some production experts and engineers are to be transferred from industry to agriculture.

Highlighting the political significance of this document are the concessions made to private production and the incentive-producing measures embodied in new delivery rates for the collective farms. The new policy is designed to stimulate the productivity of labor in agriculture and provide more popular support for the new Soviet government.

FAR EAST

2. North Korean air units may be entering North Korea:

[redacted] There are indications that headquarters elements of five North Korean air divisions may recently have moved from Manchuria into North Korea. [redacted]

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] elements of the 5th Division may be located at Mirim, east of Pyongyang, elements of the 3rd and 21st Divisions at Taechan, thirty miles north of Sinanju, and elements of the 4th Division at Chongjin on the east coast. (See map, p. 4.)


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[redacted] elements of the 1st Division, which is a MIG-15 unit, may have moved from Manchuria to Uiju in northwest Korea, and that air force headquarters has moved from Sinuiju, just south of the Yalu River, to Pyongyang. No large movement of aircraft into Korea has been noted, however.

Any strengthening of forces in Korea from outside the country would be a violation of the armistice agreement.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

3. Pressure for stiffer policy against Chinese Nationalists growing in Burma:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] Burma's delegate to the UN General Assembly on 12 September told the American ambassador in Rangoon that there is considerable sentiment in high government circles for a drastic expression of dissatisfaction with the effort to evacuate Chinese Nationalist troops. He stated that this attitude could cause an abrupt change in Burma's policy of moderation.

Comment: Exasperation in Rangoon over the Nationalist problem is increasing, and there are indications that Burma's first step toward a more forceful policy may be withdrawal from the Bangkok negotiations. Burma has submitted a relatively temperate report to the UN General Assembly accusing the Chinese of insincerity in the negotiations.

The American embassy in Bangkok reports that a new evacuation plan is nearing completion and that guarded optimism is now justified, although the local Nationalist charge expressed an opinion that any evacuation would be no more than a token gesture.

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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Comment on assassination of Tunisian nationalist, Hedi Chaker:

[redacted] The widespread protest demonstrations immediately following the killing of Hedi Chaker, a leading Tunisian nationalist, on 13 September may be a prelude to new native attacks on both Europeans and pro-French Tunisians.

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Chaker was considered to be a dangerous nationalist by the French authorities, who held him as a hostage in forced residence. His murder probably was the work of the French underground group, known as the "Red Hand," which is generally believed to have killed the prominent Tunisian labor leader Farhat Hached last December.

The nationalist Neo-Destour party policy committee, of which Chaker was a member, has publicly issued orders for "calm," but may be unable to restrain fanatics.

WESTERN EUROPE

5. French ready for early Saar negotiations with West Germans:

[redacted] Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs Schumann informed Ambassador Dillon on 12 September that the French government will invite Chancellor Adenauer to resume talks on the Saar. The invitation is to be part of Paris' reply to Adenauer's protest in June against the revised French-Saar conventions.

3.3(h)(2)

Schumann expressed the hope that Adenauer will promptly begin negotiations with Foreign Minister Bidault. Ambassador Dillon, however, believes that Adenauer may want to postpone discussions until mid-October.

Comment: A committee of the Council of Europe, ignoring a German request for delay in view of Adenauer's announced intention to initiate early talks with France, began debate

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on 12 September of a proposal to Europeanize the Saar. The French government is expected to consider this proposal an acceptable beginning for negotiations, although it objects to some of the political recommendations. The West German government has not taken a position on the proposal.

6. Comment on composition of West German Bundesrat:

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[redacted] A majority in the West German Bundesrat was virtually assured for Chancellor Adenauer's policies on 13 September when Reinhold Maier announced that he would resign as head of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state government and Bundesrat delegation, which holds the balance of power in the upper house. Maier is being forced to resign by his own Free Democratic Party because of his policy of cooperating with the opposition Social Democrats.

To assure himself the two-thirds majority necessary for constitutional amendments, however, the chancellor will have to reach an agreement with the refugee party in Lower Saxony whereby the latter would dissolve its present coalition with the Social Democrats and form a pro-Adenauer government there. Although Adenauer is still undecided, most Christian Democratic leaders desire to ensure the refugee party's cooperation by including it in the Bonn coalition government.

LATIN AMERICA

7. Chilean president states copper will not be sold to USSR:

3.3(h)(2)

[redacted] According to Chilean foreign minister Fenner, President Ibanez stated categorically at a cabinet meeting on 11 September that Chile would "go all along the line" with the United States and that the prospective deal to sell copper to the USSR had been canceled.

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Ibanez reportedly said that Chilean public opinion had been satisfied by the abrogation of the 1951 decrees forbidding trade with the Orbit and by the resolution indicating that Chile could sell its products wherever it pleased.

Comment: Reportedly the Russian offer to purchase Chile's copper was contingent on the renewal of diplomatic relations, broken since 1947, which Ibanez apparently does not desire at this time.

Further, the immediate financial gain to Chile from copper sales to the USSR would be more than offset by losses of aid from the United States.

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