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21 Jan 54

GENERAL

	Eden sees Berlin meeting as test of Soviet attitude:
	Foreign Secretary Eden sees little chance of settling the question of free all-German
	elections during the Berlin conference,
	clootions dating the zeram contains,
	He hopes, however, that dis-
	agreement on one point will not prevent discussion of others, and that
	the renewed East-West contacts can be maintained after the conference.
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	Comment: Eden's views as reported here
	are compatible with Churchill's attitude that, at a minimum, the meet-
	ings may reveal what the Malenkov regime is thinking on a variety of
	subjects.
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Europe, resulted from a Soviet desire to avoid attracting attention to this point rather than from inaccuracy of the statement.

Comment: Both diplomatic hints and Soviet propaganda have indicated that the Soviet position at the Berlin conference will follow the above lines.

a Latin American caucus on 18 January agreed that a General Assembly debate on Korea was inadvisable under conditions hich threatened a clash between India and other members over interpretation of the armistice agreement. The Colombian delegate said he felt that direct approach to the Indian delegation concerning Latin American position to a recall of the assembly in February might influence New elhi to request postponement until April. Then, he said, the "atmoshere might be more conducive to general debate." Comment: The Latin Americans may also refer postponement until April in order to avoid a conflict with the enth Inter-American Conference scheduled to open in Venezuela on March. With the opposition of the Latin American loc and most of the UN members with troops in Korea, India's chances it getting 31 votes in favor of a recall in February are very slim.		Adiag to the chief Colombian delegate
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MVD to regain forced labor and other economic functions:		
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Comment: The productive units of the MVD, which had been in charge of many large economic development projects, were transferred to various ministries of the government in March 1953. These transfers left the MVD with only police and intelligence functions, and thus drastically reduced its ability to influence economic matters in other ministries.

The return of some economic functions to the MVD at this time suggests that it was stripped of its forced labor and productive functions primarily as a result of the power struggle which developed after Stalin's death. Now, with Beria purged and the ministry under strict party control, the MVD may resume many of its former functions as an important economic organ of the government exploiting forced labor.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

According to the American army attaché in
Saigon, the French now believe that the Viet
Minh has one artillery regiment in position
in a ravine west of Dien Bien Phu, and that
there are three battalions of 12.7mm anti-

vicinity.

French headquarters states it is "confirmed" that 37mm antiaircraft units with a total of perhaps 15 weapons are moving westward toward Dien Bien Phu. They add that from 3,000 to 10,000 37mm shells are stored at Tuan Giao, some 20 miles northwest of Dien Bien Phu. No antiaircraft fire has yet been observed near the French outpost, however, and no 37mm fire has been noted anywhere in Tonkin.

Comment: The Viet Minh reportedly has been moving two regiments of 75mm and 105mm howitzers toward Dien Bien Phu since late December, and the unit reported west of the town is believed to be one of these. The French have believed that the enemy would not attack until these units are in position.

regarding the Viet Minh's possession of 37mm antiaircraft artillery, which might be a serious threat to French air supply and attack missions.



6.	French request more American aid for stepped-up air effort:					
	Premier Laniel on 18 January requested enough additional American aid to increase the French air potential in Indochina by about 30 percent. In justification, he cited the ex-					
	pansion of operations against the Viet Minh to two new areas, Dien Bien Phu and central Laos, which has increased the burden on the French air force.					
	Specific requests were made for reinforcement of two B-26 groups now in Indochina from 16 to 25 planes each and for retention of the 12 C-119 transport planes already on loan to the French. He also asked for 25 more B-26's to constitute a third group of bombers and for approximately 400 American ground personnel to service transport and bomber aircraft. It is expected that the American would serve on a temporary basis and in a civilian capacity.					
	Comment: American air force observers have frequently reported waste in French handling of American aircraft, arising from a serious shortage of maintenance personnel.					
7.	Comment on surrender of Karen insurgent leader:					
	The reported surrender on 18 January of Brigadier Kyaw Lay and nearly 200 Karen insurgents to the Burmese government is the second largest defection in five years of strife. Kyaw Lay,					
	highest repling Vener leaden to give live 16					
	highest ranking Karen leader to give himself up.					
ſ						
	this surrender was probably					

motivated by the drop in morale caused by loss of territory following the departure of Chinese Nationalist troops which had been operating in Kyaw Lay's theater. If this defection should encourage further large-scale capitulations, the Burmese government would have largely overcome its strongest military opponent.

There is still no indication, however, that the principal Karen leaders are prepared to stop fighting.



NEAR EAST - AFRICA

8.	Rumors may prevent Iraqi-American military aid agreement:	

Ambassador Berry in Baghdad says that the United States may be losing its chance to negotiate the military aid agreement requested by Iraq last March. He notes

that Prime Minister Jamali has been forced by his opponents to disclaim any such agreement and any interest in a Middle East command. Berry observes that rumors based on newspaper stories picture Iraq as "chained to the West" through a military pact with Turkey and Pakistan.

Comment: Recent reports emphasize Jamali's precarious political position and his increasing sensitivity to ultranationalist sentiment. His difficulties may be increased by Saudi Arabia's rejection on 15 January of the American draft military grant aid agreement.

WESTERN EUROPE

9. Bonn demands reduction of East German police prior to all-German elections:

In commenting on Western policies for the Berlin conference, West German government officials have declared that the East German people's police must be reduced

before free all-German elections are held. These officials feel that the presence of the well-armed East German force would intimidate the populace during and after any elections, and that it must be cut to the size of the 10,000-man West German border police beforehand.

Comment: Bonn has previously maintained that a reconstitution of the East German government based on free elections would be sufficient to protect the Soviet zone populace during the formative period of the unified government.



defense strategy	
	The American embassy in Paris reports that Premier Laniel and Foreign Minister Bidault are much concerned over the possible withdrawal of American and British forces from the Continent. Laniel intends to take up the matter with the United States immediately after the Berlin conference.
T	
leading to a with revived following policy reapprais	Comment: Fears of a peripheral strategy drawal of American forces from Western Europe werg Secretary Dulles' warning in December of a possible al.
Paris apparently Indochina:	preparing public for dispatch of more troops to
	According to the American embassy in Par Jacques Fauvet's article on 18 January in L
	Monde on French policy in Indochina was encouraged by government sources to pre- ion for the news that more men must be sent to that

The embassy believes that this news will provoke new sentiment for complete withdrawal. Although Pleven and Finance Minister Faure reportedly wish to end the conflict as soon as possible, Fauvet stated that there are no supporters in the cabinet for a policy of abandonment.

Comment: Pleven told the American ambassador in Paris last week that he will try to fulfill Navarre's request for 300 officers and 1,800 noncommissioned officers. Combat, an anti-NATO Paris daily, has already seized on the new Vietnamese government's demand for complete independence as additional proof that there are no reasons left for France to stay in Indochina. Domestic pressure will probably be cited by the French delegation at Berlin in any plea for American and British forbearance if the Soviet delegation makes overtures on Indochina.

12. De Gasperi reportedly sees no threat of early Communist take-over in Italy:

ex-premier De Gasperi believes that Americans exaggerate the Communist peril in

Italy, and that any possible Communist take-over would be a matter of years, not of weeks or months. He feels that the Italian Communists cannot be fought by repressive police tactics, but that "strong men" should be put in the Foreign Trade and Labor Ministries.

The secretary general of the Italian Foreign Ministry told Ambassador Luce during a recent discussion that communism is "not as dangerous in Italy as you Americans seem to believe but is too strong for the government to act effectively against at this time."

