pproved for Release: 2019/09/16 C02996968 TOP SECRET 3.5(c) 3.3(h)(2) 17 November 1955 Copy No. 100 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN NO CHANGE IN CLASS. [] DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2010 AUTH: HR 79-203 **REVIEWER:** Office of Current Intelligence **CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY** 

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## 1. BRITISH COMMISSIONER GENERAL FOR SOUTHEAST ASIA FAVORS STRENGTHENING SEATO

The American ambassador in Phnom Penh reports that Sir Robert Scott, who took up his duties as the British commissioner general for Southeast

Asia in September, has indicated a positive attitude toward SEATO and is casting about for practical means to strengthen the organization. Scott is scheduled to preside at next month's meeting of the SEATO powers in Bangkok.

Scott stated that although SEATO would not be really effective until Burma and Indonesia become members--which is unlikely in the near future--he believed that military men throughout the area were awakening to strategic realities and might ultimately have a greater influence on neutralist civil leaders than is now apparent. He also was pleased to note, on his recent trip through Southeast Asia, that security in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia was not as bad as he had feared.

Comment

The British government, concerned with implementing the 1954 Geneva

agreements on Indochina and anxious to maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia, has shown little interest in strengthening the SEATO organization. It has, in fact, sought to prevent any SEATO action which might conceivably antagonize the Communists. Scott's favorable attitude probably does not reflect a change in London's policy.

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## 2. VIET MINH FORCING CLOSURE OF SAINTENY OFFICE IN HAIPHONG

A member of France's Sainteny mission indicates that the mission's Haiphong office will be closed as a result of Viet Minh pressure. The

French representative there has been forbidden the use of radio facilities and accused of illegal currency transactions. A Viet Minh official is said to have stated that pressure is being applied because of the French government's failure to accept an official Viet Minh representative in Paris.

The French official suggests that the Viet Minh wants to keep all Western observers out of Haiphong and believes that the British vice consul may be squeezed out next.

Comment

French interest in the soft "Sainteny approach" has been gradually diminishing because of the failure of the mission to achieve any significant results. Viet Minh authorities may feel that a change in tactics on their part is called for to determine whether or not the presence of the Sainteny mission holds any further benefits for them.

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#### THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (Information as of 1700, 16 November)

No significant military activity has been reported. Israel is withdrawing troops in substantial numbers from the Syrian frontier. It is not known where these troops are going. Israeli Foreign Ministry officials continue their efforts to convince the West of the serious dangers in the situation. One such official, speaking in Geneva, avers that recent developments have changed Israel's "sense of isolation to one of strangulation" and that "Israel is left to its limited but forceful wisdom."

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Egyptian foreign minister Fawzi told Ambassador Byroade on 14 November that Egypt wants to get back to its "traditional system" of depending upon the West for arms. Fawzi said that if this could be done, the Soviet bloc deal could be made a "one shot" affair and the "nightmare" closed out as soon as possible. Fawzi indicated, however, that Egypt did not have any specific equipment request in mind for the immediate future. Fawzi's remarks appear to be part of Nasr's current attempts to keep a foot in both the Western and Soviet camps.

Although the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Cairo has denied that his visit to Soviet ambassador Solod had anything to do with arms, Cairo's semiofficial radio continues to state that the meeting dealt with this subject. The radio claims that King Saud has suggested to the USSR that Saudi representatives meet with the ambassador in Cairo to discuss means of enabling the Soviet Union to send arms to Saudi Arabia.

An American press dispatch from Cairo quotes an informed source to the effect that the USSR will support Saudi Arabia 'by all possible means'' in its dispute with Britain over the Buraimi oasis. If the USSR has actually made such an offer, it presumably refers to possible Saudi action in the United Nations as well as to Soviet bloc arms offers to the Saudis. (Press)

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#### BIWEEKLY SUMMARY 3-16 November 1955

#### THE TAIWAN STRAIT

## Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait Problem

1. There were no significant military developments. There continues to be no evidence that the Chinese Communists are preparing to initiate major combat operations in the near future.

2. The runways of the six Chinese Communist airfields which have been under construction along the East China coast now appear to be capable of use at any time the Communists so desire. Four of them, Nantai, Chingyang, Lungchi and Chenghai, are capable of supporting jet fighter and jet light bomber operations. The field of similar capacity at Lungtien could be made ready for operations in a short time. The other, at Swatow, can handle only light transport aircraft. There are no indications that the Chinese Communists will occupy these airfields soon, although air units could begin using them with little advance preparation.

3. Chinese Communist commentary on the Taiwan issue during the past two weeks subsided to a low level. The October Revolution celebrations in Peiping on 6 and 7 November featured speeches by Yudin, the Soviet ambassador to China, and others stressing support of the Soviet people for the Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan.

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