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20 October 1956


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
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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

DOCUMENT ID: 1  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.  X  
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2009  
AUTH: HR 70-2  
DATE: 2/26/24 REVIEWER: 

## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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
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
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## 1. TOP-LEVEL SOVIET DELEGATION IN WARSAW



A TASS communiqué issued in Moscow early on 20 October confirms that Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Warsaw on 19 October to carry on discussions with leading members of the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party. The communiqué stated that Wladyslaw Gomulka, purged in 1948 for "Titoism" and just reinstated in the central committee, attended the discussions. The statement gave no indication that the four Soviet presidium members are participating in the work of the plenum of the Polish party central committee now in session.

According to the communiqué, a delegation of the Polish politburo will "shortly" go to Moscow to discuss political and economic questions with the Soviet leaders. The fact that Poland will send such a delegation to Moscow for additional talks suggests that Soviet policy toward Poland and the other Satellites is still being formulated. Pending a decision on this policy, the Soviet leaders can be expected to make a strong effort to prevent the Polish plenum from taking further public steps confirming the present trend toward internal democratization and independence from Moscow.

The noncommittal tone of the communiqué and an unusual reference to the atmosphere of "outspokenness" in the talks suggest that there remain divergent views between the Polish and Soviet leaders. The high level of the Soviet delegation is probably intended to impress the Poles with the unity of the Soviet leadership at a time of basic readjustment in Soviet-Satellite relations. 

2. CHINESE COMMUNIST REMARKS ON SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS




The New York Times correspondent in Warsaw is convinced of the authenticity of the report given him by two members of the Polish party's central committee that the Chinese Communists have assured Polish party leader Ochab of their support for Polish "independence." The American embassy in Warsaw is also inclined to believe the account.

The correspondent states that it was Chou En-lai, not Mao Tse-tung, as originally reported in the Times, who gave the assurances to Ochab on his trip to Peiping last month. Chou is said to have declared that he understood the Polish desire for independence and that "Poland should not be dictated to by the Kremlin."

Comment

In making these remarks, Chou did not necessarily intend to question Soviet policy toward the Satellites. His remarks are consistent with the Chinese understanding of Soviet policy pronouncements on "independent roads to socialism."

### 3. POLE PREDICTS TWO-PARTY SYSTEM IN POLAND



Julian Hochfeld, a former Socialist who is now a member of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party and the Sejm (parliament), recently told a small group at London University that he envisaged the establishment soon of a two-party system in Poland. He said the "opposition" party would be made up of social democrats or groups inspired by social democratic traditions. When asked whether the Russians would give permission to a two-party system for Poland, he replied, "We shall not ask Khrushchev."

In discussing Poland's economic situation, Hochfeld also said, "We shall approach the United States for economic aid. . . ." In other comments, he maintained that the Russians "could not put the clock back" in Poland and that great progress would be made under Gomulka. He stressed that workers' councils along the lines of Yugoslav experiments would be established.

#### Comment

Hochfeld is expressing the views of a significant segment of those elements within the Communist party who favor liberalization. Hochfeld recently distinguished himself before the Sejm with outspoken criticism of the regime for blaming past excesses on individuals rather than the system.

**4. SEMENOV COMMENTS ON SUEZ AND JORDAN DISPUTES**

[Redacted]

[Redacted]


Soviet deputy foreign minister Semenov told [Redacted]

[Redacted] British-American "machinations" in Jordan are designed to pave the way for eventual intervention in the Near East. He suggested that the British are eyeing Jordan as a base to replace Suez and Cyprus and that the help offered to Jordan by Iraq is fictitious because Iraq has only one brigade which it can make available.

**Comment**


The USSR is expected to take a strong stand in support of Jordan's demand that the Security Council punish Israel for its recent border attacks. Soviet propaganda has been implying that the Western powers instigated these attacks to create a pretext for intervening in Jordan on the eve of that country's parliamentary elections.

## 5. JAPAN AND THE USSR RESTORE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS



The declaration restoring diplomatic relations between Japan and the USSR, signed by Prime Minister Hatoyama and Premier Bulganin on 19 October, seems certain to receive Diet approval and probably will be acceptable to most Japanese. The Soviet pledge to return Shikotan and the Habomai Islands when a peace treaty is concluded and to continue discussions on the status of the southern Kurils will probably placate irredentist sentiment critical of the agreement and prevent a serious division in the ruling Liberal-Democratic Party. The present agreement, however, does not remove a major obstacle to concluding a peace treaty, since the USSR may continue to make the return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands contingent on Japanese recognition of Soviet sovereignty over Sakhalin and the Kurils.

Disappointment over failure to gain the immediate return of the territories will be largely overcome by promises of Soviet support for Japan's admission to the UN--which the Japanese delegation has stated is unconditional--the early repatriation of Soviet-held Japanese prisoners, the assurance that the fishery pacts will be implemented, and optimistic projections of Japanese-Soviet trade.

The USSR will probably increase its economic, cultural and political overtures toward Japan and intensify its campaign for the withdrawal of American forces and for a neutral Japan. As Japanese detainees are released, Communist propaganda can be expected to contrast this with the continued imprisonment of American-convicted war criminals. 



**6. BONN ANNOUNCES NATO FORCE GOALS FOR 1956 WILL NOT BE MET**

[REDACTED] The West German government has announced that it will not meet the NATO force goals for 1956. Germany's submission to the NATO annual review will

[REDACTED] be amended at the next NATO council meeting. The Bonn government has blamed the Western allies for this situation, charging that they have not released barracks as originally planned.

The embassy says the source of the difficulty is the failure of the Refugee Ministry to relinquish occupied barracks and administrative delays in starting new construction.

**Comment**

These modifications in Bonn's defense effort are designed to win support for Adenauer in the 1957 election in face of the unpopularity of the rearmament program.

Adenauer continues to maintain that the total German force goal of 500,000 will not be affected by these changes. Citing the alleged barracks shortage, the Defense Ministry has halted the recruiting of volunteers.

7. CHOU EN-LAI HINTS AT ACTION IF HONG KONG RIOTS RECUR



"You know we could cause plenty of trouble in Hong Kong easily, but don't want to," Communist China's Premier Chou En-lai told



Chou

stated

such riots menaced China's security. He added that Kuomintang "gangsters" could create more riots and that "peaceful" residents might then decide to resist.



Comment

Chou made these remarks following British rejection of Communist charges that Hong Kong authorities had been derelict in dealing with the riots.

Chou's statement that "peaceful" citizens might resist during any future disturbance constitutes a warning that pro-Communist organizations in Hong Kong might act in case of any future riots.

**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
(Information as of 1700, 19 October)

[redacted]  
the 2nd Syrian Tank Brigade, composed of Soviet T-34 tanks, is now stationed in the Dera area, just north of the Jordanian border along the main road to Amman. [redacted]

Syria's delivery of heavy weapons to Jordan has called forth praise and gratitude such as that which accompanied the sale of Soviet bloc arms to Egypt, according to the American embassy in Amman. Ambassador Mallory comments that though the quantity of arms given to Jordan is so far fairly small, Syria is getting the benefit of Iraq's failure to send troops into Jordan. The ambassador stated that Iraqi "heavy-footedness" and the prompt Syrian action are a defeat for the West and will have substantial influence on the national parliamentary elections. [redacted]

Ambassador Moose in Damascus reports that as a result of the Jordanian request for British air support during the recent Israeli attack, Britain requested and obtained overflight privileges from Syria for military planes from Cyprus. [redacted]