

~~TOP SECRET~~



18 October 1956


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
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
# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



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**1. IRAQ DELAYS DECISION ON SENDING TROOPS AND SUPPLIES INTO JORDAN**

[REDACTED] No movement of Iraqi troops or supplies of any kind into Jordan will be undertaken at present, Iraqi prime minister Nuri Said told Ambassador Gallman on 17 October. As a result of the talks between an Iraqi mission to Amman and the Jordanian government which ended on 16 October, Iraq will consider action only after its Council of Ministers has received and considered a resolution from the Jordanian cabinet requesting that Iraq station at least one infantry division and a light artillery brigade close to Jordan's border. These forces would enter Jordan only in case of aggression, as provided for by treaty. Iraq had declined, Nuri said, Jordan's request that Iraq and Britain base aircraft at Mafraq in north Jordan.

Nuri added that the problem of the command of forces must also be settled before his troops could move into Jordan, and indicated that Jordanian commitments to Syria providing for a "joint command" were an additional obstacle.

**Comment**

Despite his desire to extend Iraq's influence in Jordan while Egypt is preoccupied with Suez, Nuri remains reluctant to provoke an Israeli attack. He has apparently been deterred by strong pressure from Israel, Egypt, Syria, and France.

**2. IMMINENT WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM HUNGARY REPORTED**

[REDACTED] [REDACTED] the USSR will withdraw its troops from Hungary before the end of this year, and that unspecified Soviet conditions for such a withdrawal have been accepted by Hungary, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] Soviet forces allegedly have begun to crate equipment and make other preparations for departure. A Hungarian official reportedly has stated that the USSR intends to retain only two "military bases" in Hungary. [REDACTED]

**Comment**

The conclusion of the Austrian state treaty in May 1955 removed the legal basis for the retention of troops in Hungary and Rumania.

The removal of the approximately 27,000 Soviet troops now stationed in Hungary would support previous indications that the USSR is adopting a policy which would significantly reduce evidence of its control in at least some of the Satellites. Nationally oriented Hungarian Communist elements, who may now wield the dominant influence in the party, are undoubtedly pushing for the removal or reduction of Soviet forces.

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### 3. SOUTH KOREANS CAPTURE NINE CHINESE COMMUNIST FISHERMEN

[REDACTED] A South Korean coast guard vessel captured nine Chinese Communist fishermen [REDACTED]

that it had taken the men off a captured Chinese fishing vessel about 100 miles southwest of Cheju Island, just inside the "Rhee line," but had abandoned the ship when "several strange vessels approached."

#### Comment

Although China does not recognize the Rhee line, South Korea imprisons alien fishermen apprehended inside it. Peiping reacted strongly to a similar encounter in December 1955, and South Korea can be expected to exploit the present incident to promote tension with the Chinese.

[REDACTED]

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#### 4. JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTRY EXPECTS EARLY RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH SATELLITES



Japanese Foreign Ministry officials have indicated [redacted] that the restoration of relations with the USSR will open the way for the early resumption of relations with the European Satellites. [redacted] Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already approached Japan, and that only the advances of East Germany will be refused.

#### Comment

In response to previous Satellite approaches, the first of which was made by Poland in December 1954, Tokyo maintained that relations must first be re-established with the USSR. Japan probably considers Satellite ties valuable primarily as a means of demonstrating that it is an independent nation in the international community.

While the restoration of relations will facilitate trade, strategic trade controls and Japan's lack of interest in most Satellite products restrict commercial exchanges. Triangular trade deals, however, may aid in expanding the limited prospects for Satellite trade.



**THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION**  
(Information as of 1700, 17 October)

[redacted] Israel has called up additional reserve units and personnel, although probably not in large numbers, [redacted]. Israel also [redacted] barred UN Truce Supervisory Organization observers from the area immediately southwest of Lake Tiberias, which is opposite the junction of the Syrian and Jordanian borders. Israeli reinforcement of the Northern Command was reported previously. [redacted]

The Iraqi-Jordanian talks in Amman [redacted] [redacted] were "successful," except for the question of command of the joint military forces, [redacted]


[redacted] It was decided that an Iraqi brigade would be sent "soon" into Jordan to Mafraq and Salt, north and west of Amman in East Jordan. Supply points would be established at these two locations, and at H-4 and H-5 pumping stations on the Kirkuk pipeline. The remaining elements of an Iraqi division would subsequently move in stages to H-3 pumping station, 40 miles from the Jordan border in western Iraq. A Syrian "armored brigade" would be stationed in Dera, immediately north of the Jordan border. [redacted]

Iraqi prime minister Nuri, meanwhile, advised the American ambassador on 16 October that he had not fixed a new date for entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan, and would not do so until he had studied the report of the Iraqi mission which had just returned from Amman. If Iraqi troops entered Jordan, Nuri wished to have established a "joint headquarters command" as a device to keep command of Iraqi troops in Iraqi hands. Also, prior to the Iraqi movement Nuri wanted definite information on what, if anything, had been agreed on by Jordan, Egypt and Syria with respect to a "joint command." [redacted]

[redacted] Possible Egyptian and Syrian efforts to forestall the Iraqis by concluding a "joint command" agreement with



Jordan may be indicated



**BIWEEKLY SUMMARY**  
**(4 October-17 October 1956)**

**THE TAIWAN STRAIT**

**Report of the IAC Current Intelligence Group  
for the Taiwan Strait Problem**

1. There were no significant combat operations in the area during the period. [REDACTED]

2. The Chinese Communists in recent weeks have reiterated Peiping's willingness to negotiate a Taiwan settlement with the Nationalists. Chou En-lai has been quoted as stating that Chiang Kai-shek would be permitted to remain on Taiwan and retain his armed forces under Communist control. In another interview, Chou professed confidence that Chiang was "willing to concede." The Chinese Nationalists state they have rejected a recent covert Communist overture for negotiations made through Hong Kong.

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Peiping intends "to open negotiations" with Washington for a settlement of the Taiwan question after the American elections. [REDACTED]

### TAIWAN STRAIT SITUATION 17 OCTOBER 1956

#### CHINESE COMMUNIST AIRFIELD LEGEND:

DESIGNATIONS	PRIMARY AIRFIELD CONSIDERED MOST IMPORTANT IN AREA WITH PREPARED RUNWAY GENERALLY 5000 FEET OR LONGER.	SECONDARY AIRFIELD AUXILIARY OR EMERGENCY BASES OR FIELDS OF LESSER IMPORTANCE. RUNWAYS GENERALLY LESS THAN 5000 FEET.
	ACTIVE BASE FOR MILITARY & CIVILIAN AIR- CRAFT. SOME BASES USED BY PISTON TYPES MAY BE USABLE BY JETS	● OPERATIONAL
INACTIVE BASES CAPABLE OF USE BY AIRCRAFT	● SERVICEABLE	▲
CURRENT STATUS UNDETERMINED	● UNKNOWN	▲

#### USABILITY

+		?	■
MIG-15	TU-2	UNKNOWN	UNDER CONSTRUCTION
MIG-17	IL-10		
IL-4	LA-9/11		
IL-28	IL-2		
	ETC.		

\* FIELDS NOT CONSIDERED CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING SUSTAINED OPERATIONS AT PRESENT.

