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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY




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# 1. FRENCH PREMIER MOLLET LOSES VOTE OF CONFIDENCE ON TAX PROPOSAL

## Comment on:



The 250 to 213 defeat of French premier Mollet's 16-month-old minority government in a confidence vote on his request for new taxes raises the prospect of a prolonged crisis. Despite President Coty's refusal to accept Mollet's resignation, the premier's defeat on a major policy question makes his position untenable.

Mollet's Socialist Party, whose support or acquiescence is virtually essential to a new government, will probably be reluctant to back a coalition in which the Independents, whose vote was decisive, would play a prominent role. The Socialists argue that the longer the delay, the more Mollet's policies will be justified. Before the confidence vote, there was some speculation that Mollet would be able to succeed himself with a broader coalition, possibly including the Popular Republican Party (MRP).

The Independents have recommended a "government of public safety" and warned that it would be impossible to govern against their opposition. Their attitude stems from their improved position in recent by-elections and their increased influence in the assembly.

The deputies will be under considerable pressure to approve a cabinet quickly so that France's critical financial problems and the Algerian question can be handled. A new premier could be expected to acquiesce quickly in French use of the Suez Canal, and a choice might be facilitated if this point is clarified soon. Even an interim premier, however, will probably insist on budgetary cuts and additional taxes.

The crisis is likely to force President Coty to postpone the visit he planned to the United States for early June, since it is his responsibility to designate the candidates.

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## 2. SAUDI TROOP MOVEMENT BACKS EFFORT TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM JORDAN

### Comment on:

[REDACTED]

The Jordanian cabinet decided on 20 May to present a note to the Syrian embassy the next day requesting the withdrawal of Syrian troops, [REDACTED]

Possibly against the eventuality that the Syrians might refuse to leave, the 3,000-man Saudi Arabian infantry regiment deployed in the Jordan River Valley west of Amman moved on 19 May to old Mafraq airfield near the Syrian border. The new Saudi positions are immediately south of the encampment of the Syrian brigade. The transfer of the Saudi regiment will

also assure the presence of a force loyal to Amman in north Jordan following the evacuation of the new Mafraq air base by British Royal Air Force personnel scheduled for 31 May.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the Jordanian command had ordered the Syrian brigade in Jordan to prepare for movement to Aqaba in South Jordan. The Syrians had not been consulted on the matter and opposed the transfer to so distant a position. [REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

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### 3. HAITIAN ARMY SEIZES GOVERNMENT

Comment on:



Brigadier General Leon Cantave seized control of Haiti's government in a bloodless coup on 21 May, creating a situation which may produce further serious disorders and violence among supporters of opposing presidential candidates.

Cantave had been ordered to resign on 20 May by the executive council of government, which was controlled by two presidential candidates. Five other candidates, firmly in control of the important cities of St. Marc and Cap Haitien, had been supporting Cantave and last week refused to recognize the authority of the council. It now appears probable that supporters of the council may attempt reprisals against the five candidates and Cantave.

Cantave, who is believed to represent the interests of supporters of ousted president Paul E. Magloire, has announced that the army will enforce military rule until a provisional president is selected who can guarantee "free and honest elections." This announcement apparently further postpones the national elections most recently scheduled for 16 June. 

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#### 4. KISHI'S PRIMARY OBJECTIVES FOR WASHINGTON TALKS

[REDACTED]

Japanese prime minister Kishi reportedly plans to emphasize four objectives during his forthcoming visit to Washington: the return of former Japanese residents to the Bonin Islands; US agreement to the establishment of a joint committee to revise the administrative agreement defining the status of American forces; relaxation of the China trade controls; and co-ordination of US investment and Japanese technical aid to Southeast Asia.

Kishi told Kazushige Hirasawa, who is now in the United States to handle public relations for Kishi's visit, that these specific matters had been chosen as the ones on which he is most likely to obtain the "political victory" he needs to consolidate his strength at home.

Kishi emphasized that no request would be made for Japanese administrative control of the Bonins. [REDACTED]

#### Comment

In preliminary discussions with Ambassador MacArthur, Kishi also indicated his intention of laying the groundwork for making additional adjustments in US-Japanese relations, including a revision of the security treaty, a date for the return of the Ryukyus, and an agreement on withdrawal of American forces.

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**5. EGYPTIANS FINANCE LEBANESE  
OPPOSITION POLITICIANS**



Ali Sabri, Nasr's chief political adviser, has authorized Egyptian representatives to spend the equivalent of \$179,000 in influencing the Lebanese parliamentary elections beginning on 9 June.



**Comment**

Egypt stepped up its opposition to the pro-Western policy of Lebanese president Chamoun and prime minister Sami Solh following Lebanon's acceptance of the American Middle East proposals. The Egyptians see a possibility of regaining their influence in Lebanon through the election of a pro-Egyptian or neutralist parliament. Parliament will elect a new president late in 1958.


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## 6. ALBANIAN "TITOIST" FLEES TO YUGOSLAVIA

 Major General Panajot Plaku, Albanian minister without portfolio and member of the central committee of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) Party, escaped to Yugoslavia on 16 May and applied for asylum, according to the Yugoslav radio. According to Western press reports, he said he "sympathized with Tito's independent Communism and disagreed with the pressure maintained on Albania by the Soviet Union."

### Comment

Plaku's flight suggests that the Albanian regime was about to purge him as it did four other pro-Yugoslavs in the upper party hierarchy within the last two years. Two of these had been on the 43-man central committee. Repeated speeches during the past year by party boss Hoxha against "Titoism" indicate the party's difficulties in ridding itself of the influences remaining from its early years as a Yugoslav satellite.


Plaku, reportedly one of the organizers of the Albanian Communist movement, was a deputy defense minister until October 1956, when he became minister without portfolio and chairman of the state geology committee, probably a demotion. 

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## 7. POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE RESOLUTION

Comment on:



The Polish Communist central committee on 20 May reaffirmed the Gomulka policies as outlined last October as "the only correct, realistic policy line." The resolution, which followed a stormy debate on the merits of these policies, indicated that factionalism remains a serious problem in the party. It reflected Gomulka's middle-of-the-road policy toward the party organization by attacking factional groups of both right and left. While "revisionism" was declared to be the principal danger, the resolution also attacked the Stalinists on the central committee, and especially their arguments against Gomulka's policies during the central committee debates. The resolution, which warned party members to observe party discipline in public statements, probably foreshadows further stringent measures to curb the liberal press, as well as measures to cleanse the party of extremist elements.

The fact that Gomulka's keynote speech is to be published in full by Moscow's Kommunist, together with the general conformity of the Polish resolution to current bloc ideological policies, suggests that differences between Gomulka and the Soviet leaders have been narrowed. 

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