
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	at the
	recent Baghdad talks King Saud indicated
	that he was giving consideration to call-
	ing an all-Moslem conference,
	The conference would
have the purpos	se of developing a general position on relation
with the West	and would be attended by Moslem leaders not
only of Baghdad	l pact nations but of North African countries
and Indonesia a	s well as all Arab countries.
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	Saud's idea is that if Nasr fails to attend, he
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will be isolated	Saud's idea is that if Nasr fails to attend, he i, whereas if he does, he would find himself
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# 2. DJAKARTA DISMISSES EAST INDONESIAN MILITARY COMMANDER

<u>Co</u>	mment on:		
		tion is the latest in a series of ste	mual as iis ac- ps indi-
	cating the harebellious p	ardening attitude of President Sukarno tow rovinces.	ard the
	ing problem Djuanda. T East Indone	It is quite likely that Sukarno, who alled for vigorous action to solve Indonests, overruled the recommendation of Primble latter, who has just returned from a visian command, reportedly warned only the nual's dismissal would not solve the crisis	ia's press- ne Minister isit to the ree days
	cial task for suggest, ho	Samual can be expected to ignore rno attempt to enforce it, he would call or rce of Col. Sudirman in southern Celebes, wever, that Sudirman, although loyal to be entirely reliable in this situation.	n the spe- . Reports
		an would not follow Djakarta's directives is erous results!'	it tney would
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3. NASR REASSERTS INTENT TO SEIZE ISRAELI "TEST" SHIP

Egyptian president Nasr has told that if an Israeli ship enters Egyptian territorial waters to transit the Suez Canal, the ship, crew

and cargo will be seized,

Comment

Because of Nasr's past vehemence on this subject, there is little reason to doubt that a ship bearing the Israeli flag would be seized. Any concession by Nasr on this point would result in a serious loss of face in the Arab world. The attempt made in 1954 to send an Israeli ship through the canal ended in the confiscation of the vessel and its cargo.

Nasr's position with regard to a non-Israeli vessel transiting the canal to an Israeli port is uncertain. Before the hostilities last fall, most such vessels passed unimpeded, but some seizures of cargo were effected on the ground that they were contraband war materials.

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## 4. MOLLET USING SUEZ ISSUE TO RETAIN PREMIERSHIP

Comment on:
France and the United States "are drifting apart" over the Suez issue. In an apparent effort to elicit US support in the UN Security Council, he said a serious outburst of anti-American feeling would arise in France if Mollet's appeal to the council were fruitless.  He denied that Mollet's recent moves were dictated by domestic political considerations, but admitted that the premier's appeal to the council on Suez and his dramatic attempt to resign would have "domestic repercussions." The immediate favorable popular response to Mollet's latest move on Suez indicates the continued value of this issue as a rallying point for French nationalist sentiment.
the government expects to survive the vote of confidence on the tax issue, now scheduled for 21 May. Despite increasing speculation on a new premier, Mollet is apparently confident that the assembly will prefer to leave the Socialists saddled with the problems of Algeria and France's shaky financial situation. His advisers expect that in the event Mollet falls, the rise of his prestige during the crisis that follows will permit his return to power.

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#### 5. POLISH PARTY PLENUM

Comment on:			
	Polish sources have told representatives of the Western press that First Secretary Gomulka's speech to the ninth plenum of the Polish Communist Party on 15 May was followed on 16 May by attacks on his policies by his Stalinist opponents. These attacks, reportedly directed against his entire policy rather than parts of it, suggest a concerted move against Gomulka and a high degree of cohesion within the Stalinist Natolin wing.		

Press observers believe that the Natolin attacks have served to reduce criticism of Gomulka by the party's liberal wing, which was singled out for criticism in his keynote speech. Gomulka may now give up his attempts to appease the Natolins and strongly insist on acceptance of his moderate program in the hope that a show of firmness will bring him enough support from uncommitted sectors to offset Natolin hostility.

The terse communiqué issued by the central committee on 18 May stated that Minister of Agriculture Ochab had been released from his post as a central committee secretary, though he remains on the politburo. Zenon Kliszko, an old associate of Gomulka, and politburo member Jerzy Morawski, a liberal, were added to the secretariat. Ochab, a former first secretary, was probably released from his duties as secretary to enable him to devote full time to implementing Gomulka's important agricultural reforms. Apparently no one from the Stalinist group was added to either the politburo or secretariat.

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### 6. SOUTH VIETNAM ALTERS TACTICS ON OVERSEAS CHINESE

South Vietnam is planning a long-range policy of harassment, rather than largescale immediate direct action, to force locally born Chinese to accept natural-

ization,

, ...

The policy will be based primarily on scattered arrests, small-scale expulsion and economic pressures.

Comment

Vietnamese foreign secretary Mau agreed recently to permit voluntary expatriation to Taiwan of those Chinese who refuse naturalization, but this may have been only a temporary expedient to prevent further rioting in Saigon while President Diem is abroad. In the face of a hardening resistance among the Chinese community of nearly 1,000,000, Vietnamese leaders remain confident the Chinese will comply eventually in order to protect their wide commercial interests, and the government appears willing to suffer any economic losses in the process. Compliance thus far has been negligible despite intimidation by the government.

While Chinese reaction to a coercive policy would depend on its pace and severity, further rioting, rupture of Saigon-Taipei relations, and growing pro-Peiping sentiment among the Chinese in Vietnam are possible consequences.

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