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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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WEEKLY REVIEW

CONGO

The incursion by Gizenga forces into the Luluabourg area of Kasai Province, which caused much apprehension in Leopoldville, has faded out this week. UN sources claim that Luluabourg is a "UN city"; nevertheless Congolese troops of Mobutu, according to press reports, have engaged in riots with the local populace which have resulted in more than 40 fatalities. The UN has confirmed that another Gizenga force estimated at two battalions is moving from Ikala in central Congo toward Coquilbatville, capital of Equateur Province, which the UN reports virtually unguarded by Leopoldville forces. Hammarskjold told Ambassador Stevenson on 28 February he did not think recent military operations in the Congo had changed the balance of power among the various factions.

For at least a month, Gizenga's forces have apparently operated with relative freedom in northern Kasai Province. The population there, which includes Lumumba's own tribe, either is politically apathetic or favors Gizenga's Stanleyville regime. The force that "took" Luluabourg apparently had reason to expect that Mobutu's troops would not resist.

The Gizengist withdrawal began on 27 February, the troops quitting Luluabourg "like a wave on sand," some disappearing into the bush after abandoning their weapons, and some withdrawing to the northeast toward Kivu Province. According to UN sources, all Congolese troops have been cleared from the city and the airport.

According to the Ghanaian UN commander on the scene, the

officers of the invading force did not have control of their men, and the force evidently dispersed rather than submit to a disarmament agreement which its leaders had negotiated with the local UN contingent. Gizengist officers involved in these negotiations and the commander of the pro-Mobutu garrison asked for and received UN protection, although there are indications that the Leopoldville government intends to take disciplinary action against its officers. This confusion in Luluabourg illustrates the dependence of Congolese military operations on the whims of individual units.

The Gizenga forces in Luluabourg, according to eyewitnesses, did not have even the most meager logistical support --and other Stanleyville columns operating in Kasai are probably in a similar condition. Gizenga's over-all supply problem appears to be precarious.

The expulsion of five Communist journalists from Stanleyville on 28 February--allegedly because Gizenga was piqued about not receiving aid from Communist countries--probably was intended by Gizenga to dramatize his supply situation.

The Sudanese UN delegate told an American official on 27 February that Khartoum does not intend to give way to Soviet and UAR pressure for transit rights. He said various devices were being tried, but would not succeed.

Gizenga apparently remains the dominant figure in Stanleyville and the city is

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reported calm. General Lundula, Gizenga's chief of staff, reportedly issued orders on 26 February that anyone molesting Europeans will be shot, and Gizenga had earlier decreed that only the central Stanleyville government can order the death sentence. Gizenga, who has little tribal support and has maintained his position largely through political manipulation, may have weakened it by defending Europeans.


However, he appears to have removed some potential rivals. Benard Salumu, formerly his representative in Cairo and more recently a leading figure in the Stanleyville regime, is reported to have fled, presumably as a result of a struggle for power.

In Leopoldville, the rioting by Congolese army elements appears to have resulted from fear both of an impending attack by Gizenga's columns and the possibility of attempts by UN forces to disarm Mobutu's troops. Kasavubu's radio address on 27 February in which he urged resistance to UN "tutelage" may worsen the already tense situation between UN personnel and the Congolese army, and further attacks on UN personnel could lead to retaliatory action by the UN force.

In late February, Congolese officials in Leopoldville were making frantic efforts to put together a force with which to oppose Gizenga's advance. In the event Gizenga's forces move on Leopoldville, they would be unlikely to meet effective opposition in eastern Leopoldville Province, where

most the the tribes supported Lumumba.

Acting Defense Minister Kazadi was trying to raise two battalions of volunteers in the Leopoldville area, and reportedly even asked Albert Kalonji, head of the South Kasai State, to send his two battalions of poorly trained troops against the Gizenga force in Luluabourg. When this request was reported to the UN command, Dayal protested, objecting to Kalonji's "aggressive posture." According to UN sources in New York, Kalonji's troops had taken up positions near Luluabourg by 27 February.



General Mobutu, with approximately 1,500 troops, is in the vicinity of Bumba, possibly still hoping to advance into Orientale Province. UN sources estimate that, although he has some trucks brought up by river from Coquilhatville, he would not be able to carry out an attack on Stanleyville. Following a 21 February meeting with UN commander McKeown, Mobutu promised to take up only defensive positions to prevent infiltrations from Stanleyville, but he refused to meet with Lundula to discuss a cease-fire and establishment of a neutral zone. Hammarshjold thinks there is a chance that Mobutu and Lundula might join forces in a military alliance against all politicians.

Mobutu may be planning attempts to reassert Leopoldville's

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control in Kivu Province. The American consul in Dsunbura reported on 23 February that Mobutu troops in plain clothes had appeared in Ruanda-Urundi, allegedly on a mission to buy off the garrisons now controlled by Gizenga across the Congo border in Bukavu. The consul comments that this operation has a better chance of succeeding than did Mobutu's abortive attempt on 1 January, also from Ruanda-Urundi, to take over Kivu Province. Belgium would be open to further severe censure should such an operation take place from Ruanda-Urundi, which it administers as a UN trust territory.


Gizenga's apparent military successes probably contributed to the 28 February agreement among Tshombé, Ilco, and Kalonji, which provides for a

pooling of military forces and continuing military and political consultations. By thus tacitly admitting the existence of Katanga as a separate entity, Ilco and Kheavubu may have undermined their claim to be the spokesmen for the entire Congo.

The agreement is unlikely to result in much direct military support for the Leopoldville regime. Tshombé is more likely to use his troops against dissident Baluba tribesmen to maintain his own position. Within the last two weeks he has reportedly issued Mauser rifles and ammunition to many members of his Conakat party in Elisabethville and the surrounding villages, but this action appears to be more an attempt to raise morale and to guard against an anti-Conakat uprising than to increase the fighting strength of the Katanga army. However, Tshombé on 28 February denounced his tacit cease-fire agreement with the UN and threatened for the first time to move his troops outside of Katanga.

UN Mandate

Secretary General Hammarskjöld describes his new Congo mandate as "open ended" regarding what is to be done and "indefinite" regarding who is to carry it out. He remains cautious in his interpretation of provisions authorizing the use of force. He believes that UN troops could take positions to keep contending

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forces apart and use force to hold such positions against attack. However, in his view, UN forces could not initiate the use of force. Hammarskjold insists that he must abide by the limitations set by countries contributing troops and cites Tunisian, Ethiopian, and Sudanese demands that their troops not become parties to internal conflicts.

On the basis of this interpretation, UN advisers estimate that 25 battalions (23,000 men) are necessary to maintain law and order. They believe 19 battalions could prevent troop movements within the Congo. If Morocco and Indonesia comply with Hammarskjold's appeal to keep their troops there, the UN force in the Congo will remain at 19 battalions. Hammarskjold has requested African states to supply five or six additional battalions for use in Katanga, and apparently is hoping for three or more battalions from India. He regards an Indian contribution as the "key" to the situation at present.

Hammarskjold has held a series of meetings with his 16-member Congo Advisory Committee with the over-all objective of forcing the states represented on that body to take responsibility as a group for implementation of the resolution. He believes that the only way he can act is by some agreement among Africans which would offset Soviet pressure. By involving these states in executive decisions about UN Congo operations, Hammarskjold probably hopes to protect his office and the Secretariat from the inevitable attack by UN members should UN troops ever actually initiate the use of force.

Hammarskjold does not intend to replace Dayal immediately, although his contract expires in two weeks. Hammarskjold said that Dayal would have to stay until "we are around the corner" of the present crisis. Hammarskjold's reluctance to replace Dayal stems in part from the difficulty of finding a suitable replacement as well as to his fear of alienating India. His requests for several men from various Asian and African countries have been refused by the governments mainly on the ground that these men were needed at home.

Paris is sharply critical of UN efforts in the Congo and believes they have only weakened the prestige and strength of the legitimate government. Opposed to any expansion of the UN mandate, and to centralization of the Congolese Army, Paris advocates strong and immediate support of Kasavubu and believes the US, Britain, France, Belgium, and friendly African countries should act in concert to build up Kasavubu so that he could serve as a lodestone around whom a moderate central government could be formed. Though Paris has ceased its initial direct aid to the Katanga forces, its extreme irritation with the UN, its dislike of US policy, and the serious threat to Kasavubu, suggest that Paris may consider direct aid imperative.

Khrushchev Letters

Khrushchev's letters of 22 February to Nehru and other heads of government probably were intended as the USSR's response not only to Hammarskjold's new mandate but also

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to recent US warnings against unilateral intervention. Khrushchev sought to counter the Security Council resolution by insisting that the UN operation has failed and that if the present situation continues, Western forces may intervene "behind the facade of the UN."

The letters repeated most of the points contained in the Soviet Government's statement of 14 February on the Congo, with the addition of a renewed demand that Hammarskjold be replaced by a three-man executive organ representing the West, the Communist bloc, and the neutralists. Khrushchev charged, "It is Hammarskjold who killed Lumumba," and declared, "We cannot tolerate a UN secretary general branded with this abominable murder."

The Soviet premier avoided a direct attack on the United States, but he warned certain unnamed "statesmen in the West" that a "big stick" policy is "rife with mortal danger for those who pursue it." Khrushchev's proposal to replace the UN operation by a commission of African states is an attempt to align the pro-Gisanga Casablanca powers--Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, and the UAR--with the USSR. Nkrumah had earlier proposed reconstituting the UN force into an African military command for the Congo and now intends to present his plan personally to the UN General Assembly session scheduled to reconvene on 7 March. A 32 February communiqué signed by the Casablanca powers meeting in Accra called for reorganization of the UN Congo forces and their subordination to an African command.

Khrushchev's proposed commission, which would deal only with the "legal government" of Gisanga, would have the tasks of supervising the removal of the "aggressors," ensuring the termination of "all forms of foreign intervention," and creating conditions for "normal activities by the Congolese Government and parliament."

By publishing Khrushchev's letter to Nehru, Moscow may hope to head off an Indian decision

to send combat troops to the Congo. Nehru and Defense Minister Manon are apparently thinking in terms of a brigade-size unit (about 3,000 men).

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