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15 September 1960

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 1

Khrushchev's sharp denunciation of US plans to restrict his movements during his stay in New York suggests he is seeking to exploit this issue as a deliberate effort on the part of the United States to create a hostile atmosphere. He has also used this issue to renew charges that the US is not interested in settling major international issues at the General Assembly. Moscow's extensive propaganda build-up for this UN session implies that Khrushchev will advance ostensibly new proposals on disarmament. Along with Eastern European party leaders, Khrushchev can be expected to underline the urgent need for disarmament by citing alleged Western provocations in Berlin and the rearmament of West Germany as major factors in the deterioration of East-West relations. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN Page 3

The first large shipment of arms from the USSR arrived in Cuba on 8 September. Communist China is moving rapidly to establish its diplomatic mission in Havana, and Khrushchev is expected in Cuba after taking part in the opening meetings of the UN General Assembly. Fidel Castro is to head Cuba's UN delegation, which is likely to support the Soviet position on all major issues. In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo regime has reacted to mounting international pressures by calling a mass meeting for 24 September to demonstrate its "popular support" and by threatening retaliation against US businessmen. Continuing tension is evident in Venezuela despite President Betancourt's success in maintaining his three-party coalition following the forced resignation of pro-Cuban Foreign Minister Arcaya. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO Page 5

The struggle for power between Premier Lumumba, President Kasavubu, and Colonel Mobutu in the Congo remains unresolved. UN initiatives aimed at combating Lumumba's extremism have been hampered by the concern of African states--exploited by the USSR--that the UN is infringing on the Congo's sovereignty. Meanwhile, Soviet involvement in the Congo situation continues to increase. In

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addition to expanding the scope of its direct aid to Lumumba [redacted]

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[redacted] the USSR has affirmed its intention of bypassing UN channels in supplying aid, and Khrushchev on 13 September strongly attacked Hammar-skjold for "consciously working in the interests of the imperialists" in the Congo. [redacted]

(b)(3)

SITUATION IN LAOS Page 8

The proclamation of a rival government by General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum in opposition to the Souvanna Phouma government has brought the situation in Laos into a new and more critical phase. Souvanna has reacted moderately to this new threat and has sought to keep the door open for a new compromise by refraining from branding Phoumi and Boun Oum as rebels. The refusal of the King to take sides, in effect a repudiation of Souvanna, has dimmed prospects for a reconciliation between Souvanna and Phoumi, however, and may lead to Souvanna's early resignation. Captain Kong Le is still in military control of Vientiane. The Communist Pathet Lao continues to exploit the division in Laos' non-Communist ranks, exerting military pressure in regions ostensibly loyal to Phoumi and waging a vigorous propaganda campaign calling on all Laotians to get behind the Souvanna government and Kong Le in their struggle against the "traitorous" Phoumi clique. [redacted]

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 1

A contest between the Soviet bloc and the West over the election of the president of the 15th UN General Assembly is in prospect when the assembly opens on 20 September. The competition between two rival Western candidates--Frederick Boland of Ireland and Thor Thors of Iceland--improves the chances of Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia. Cuba's intention to seek the Security Council seat relinquished by Argentina--in opposition to Chile, the choice of the Latin American caucus--may induce delegates from other areas, particularly Africa, to seek this seat. [redacted]

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PART II (continued)

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE Page 2

The fourth general conference of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency, convening in Vienna on the same day the General Assembly opens in New York, will probably be marked by East-West conflicts on several issues, including the perennial one of Chinese representation. [REDACTED]

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS Page 3

At the North Vietnamese party congress--the first important bloc forum since the Bucharest meeting in June --Soviet and Chinese spokesmen reaffirmed their positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese, who were again criticized for lobbying among other parties and for disrupting international organizations, have in fact continued to press their opposition to Soviet policies in other Communist-controlled international bodies. As to governmental relations, the USSR continues to schedule the delivery of military and other aid to China, but there are several indications of a worsening relationship. [REDACTED]

(b)(3)

BERLIN SITUATION Page 5

The East German Government continues to extend its restrictions on travel of West German citizens in East Berlin and East Germany. The Bonn government is reluctant to apply strong countermeasures, such as an embargo on interzonal trade, lest they lead to worse East German retaliation, particularly against West Berlin's large trade with West Germany. East German party boss Ulbricht has disclosed in a memorandum to the UN a plan for the phased disarmament of Germany, including provisions for signing a peace treaty with the "two German states," Western troop withdrawal from West Berlin, and a "free city" of West Berlin. [REDACTED]

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EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL MEASURES Page 7

Despite intensified East German security measures, the refugee flow to West Berlin and West Germany is continuing at a high rate. More than 3,000 refugees reached West Berlin during the week ending 6 September, although this period included the five-day near-blockade of the East Berlin "escape hatch" to the Western sectors. Some 126,500 East Germans have crossed over in the first eight months of the year--far above last year's rate--and the 1960 total is likely to be well above last year's total of 143,000. There has also been a decrease in the number of persons going from West to East. [REDACTED]

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POSSIBLE MISSILE RING AROUND BERLIN Page 8

Berlin by early 1961 will probably be ringed with surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The ring may eventually contain eight or more launch sites, each with local support facilities. In addition there may be two central support facilities. All of the support facilities were reported under construction this summer, and could be completed, with launch sites installed, in early 1961. The two existing operational SAM sites in East Germany--not a part of the Berlin complex--are manned by Soviet personnel, but there is evidence that the East Germans may eventually participate in this activity.

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MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COMMUNICATIONS CABLE Page 10

A high-capacity underground coaxial cable is being installed between Finland and the USSR. Since the cable will provide a circuit capacity greatly in excess of civil requirements, it could be used for transmitting air-defense information into the USSR, under terms of the Finnish-Soviet mutual assistance pact of 1947.

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ALBANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT OF MOSCOW Page 11

The ouster from the Albanian party politburo of a leading ideologist and the elevation to the party secretariat of an agitprop specialist suggest that Tirana is preparing to revamp its equivocal propaganda line on basic issues in the Sino-Soviet controversy. The ideologist will probably be a scapegoat in this instance for the regime's "collective error" in past support of the Chinese on such matters as the inevitability of war and the nature of the imperialist threat. Her ouster, probably a direct result of Soviet pressure, will serve to deter others in the Albanian party and elsewhere who tend to favor the Chinese view.

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NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS THIRD PARTY CONGRESS Page 13

Two themes dominated the sessions of North Vietnam's third party congress, which met in Hanoi from 5 to 10 September--how best to modernize and industrialize the country in accordance with Communist principles and how to reunify Vietnam. Hanoi, hoping for the overthrow of President Diem, plans to solve the latter problem by forming a coalition government with a "democratic" successor government. The long

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continuity of leadership within the Lao Dong party was again underscored by the continuation of the politburo without changes in membership. It became clear at the congress that Le Duan, an individual closely associated with the direction of subversive activities against South Vietnam, is second in power to President Ho Chi Minh. [REDACTED]

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GUINEA STRENGTHENS COMMUNIST BLOC TIES Page 15

Guinea's economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc have been strengthened further as a result of President Touré's current visit to several Communist bloc countries. In Moscow, Touré secured a Soviet commitment to participate in the proposed Konkouré hydroelectric project--Guinea's priority development scheme--while Peiping extended a \$25,000,000 interest-free credit, its first large-scale economic aid to any Black African country. In addition, Touré endorsed a number of Moscow's policy positions and appears to have moved toward closer alignment with the Communist world. [REDACTED]

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USSR AND IRAN MAKING NEW EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS . . . Page 16

Both Moscow and Tehran are making new moves to relieve the long-standing tension in their relations. Following the ouster on 28 August of the staunchly anti-Communist Eqbal as Iranian prime minister, Soviet Ambassador Pegov returned to Tehran, and the Soviet Government diminished its propaganda attacks on the Shah. Sharif Emami, Iran's new prime minister, feels that the immediate task of his government is to improve relations with Moscow, but not at the expense of its ties to the West. Iran has halted its counter-propaganda and has begun to display greater cooperation in minor matters toward Soviet officials in Tehran. [REDACTED]

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INDONESIA Page 17

The confrontation of President Sukarno and the Indonesian Army over the Communist issue appears to have been once more postponed by Sukarno's ban issued on 13 September on the activities of all political parties. The ban frees Sukarno from the necessity of making a direct choice between the army and the Communists; it also obviates an army decision on whether to oppose Sukarno further by extending to other areas the proscription of Communist activity announced last month in three military commands. [REDACTED]

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SOUTH KOREAN CABINET RESHUFFLE Page 18

South Korean Prime Minister Chang Myon and his opponents within his party agreed on 12 September to a compromise cabinet designed to give Chang a working majority in the National Assembly. Although the new cabinet appears to strengthen Chang's position for the time being by drawing his opponents into sharing responsibility for government policy, the terms of the compromise will make it easy for the anti-Chang factionists to function as a de facto opposition bloc in future tests of strength.

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CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE Page 19

The new Belgian coalition cabinet, recently announced by Premier Eyskens in response to public criticism of the government's Congo policy, contains no new influential figures, and may not last through the winter. No major changes in defense and foreign policies are likely; Eyskens' austerity economic program, however, involves defense cuts ranging between 7 and 13 percent, and the drift away from active participation in NATO will probably continue.

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EL SALVADOR'S GOVERNMENT SHAKEN BY LEFTIST ATTACKS Page 20

The moderately progressive regime of Salvadoran President Lemus has been seriously shaken by persistent attacks from leftist student and labor elements, many of whom are pro-Communist and pro-Castro. Tensions have subsided somewhat recently as a result of mediating efforts by businessmen and civic leaders; but the state of siege declared on 5 September still continues, and the outlook for government stability remains uncertain.

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS Page 1

Although Nationalist China is expected to retain China's seat in the UN through the procedural device of the moratorium at this year's General Assembly, the prospect for maintaining the moratorium beyond 1961 is increasingly uncertain. Taipei, despite its association in African minds with "colonial powers,"

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may even pick up additional support from newly sovereign states if they are admitted to the UN before the vote. Many UN members, even among those which have consistently supported the moratorium, have long believed that UN membership with its attendant obligations offers a way of bringing Peiping under some form of international restraint. A strong appeal to this body of opinion may be made in Khrushchev's forthcoming speech to the assembly in which he is expected to call for Communist China's admission while developing his theme of peaceful coexistence. (Secret Noform)

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PART IV

OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES

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PART I

OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST

KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Khrushchev has seized on the question of US security precautions during his stay in New York as head of the USSR's delegation to the UN General Assembly as a pretext for denouncing the American Government's attitude toward the UN. In a telegram answering questions of the London Daily Express on 13 September, the Soviet premier charged that the restrictions on his activities indicate that the United States "does not sympathize with the effort to resolve the major issues" to be considered by the UN. Moscow's formal protest note to the US took a similar line, alleging that the purpose of the restrictions was to "worsen in advance the international climate" when the heads of government meet at the General Assembly.

The sharp reaction by Khrushchev, who will arrive on 19 September, suggests that he anticipates a cool public reception and is seeking an issue to charge the US with intentionally creating a hostile atmosphere. Propaganda allegations that Khrushchev has received numerous invitations from Americans for visits and public appearances also fit into the pattern of creating an impression that Washington is attempting to block Khrushchev's contacts with the American public.

The Soviet campaign to persuade free-world leaders to attend the meeting has met with moderate success. Among the heads of government who plan to attend the initial debates

during the first weeks of the General Assembly are Nasir, Sukarno, Tito, Sihanouk of Cambodia, Moulay Hassan of Morocco, and Koirala of Nepal. Nehru, U Nu, Sekou Touré, and Nkrumah are apparently planning to attend, but probably not until early October. Prime Ministers Daud of Afghanistan and Abboud of Sudan are apparently still undecided. Prior to Eisenhower's announcement that he intends to address the UN on 22 September, no heads of government or prime ministers of Western states were planning to come, except Cuba's Castro, who will fully support the Soviet line.

Soviet propaganda has represented this turnout as a success for Soviet diplomacy and a defeat for the West. Moscow's initial reaction to the announcement that President Eisenhower would address the UN was to dismiss it as a "forced concession" to world opinion which TASS claimed strongly supported the initiative of the USSR.

Disarmament

The extensive Soviet propaganda build-up on the UN meeting has emphasized disarmament. A Pravda editorial of 10 September cited Khrushchev's visit as "new proof" of the USSR's determination to break the deadlock on that issue. Moscow has also suggested that Khrushchev will expand his most recent disarmament proposals. Propaganda implies that he will unveil a new scheme; while staying within the context of complete

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and general disarmament, it will probably be designed to appeal to Afro-Asian neutral states.

Such a bid for this support may involve a revised version of proposals presented on 2 June, with additional emphasis on the economic benefits of disarmament in terms of making funds available for underdeveloped areas. Previous Soviet plans have stopped short of proposing the establishment of a joint fund which would function as a channel for "savings" from disarmament to be used in aid programs. Moscow may feel, however, that a specific proposal at this time will gain widespread Afro-Asian support for its over-all disarmament plan. This approach is reflected in Khrushchev's joint communiqué with Guinea President Touré on 8 September, which listed disarmament, and economic security as principal topics for UN discussions.

Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Naszkowski told American Embassy representatives that Khrushchev would propose an enlargement of the disarmament talks to include some neutrals but not the Chinese Communists.

Khrushchev's immediate aim on disarmament will be to elicit support in the UN General Assembly for a subsequent resolution endorsing "complete and general disarmament" as the prime objective in any future East-West negotiations. In his Pravda interview on 9 August, Khrushchev foreshadowed such a position by claiming that "the Soviet Union wants the General Assembly to recognize universal and complete disarmament as the crucial question." He added, "It is essential that the Gen-

eral Assembly rule that disarmament must be complete."

Colonialism

The reference in the Khrushchev-Touré communiqué to the "national independence of peoples" as a cardinal issue to be taken up by the General Assembly also indicates that in his address to the assembly the Soviet premier will stress attacks on "colonialism" and Western attempts to use the UN action in the Congo crisis as a "cover for imperialism." Khrushchev probably anticipates that with the admission of new African members to the UN and the attendance of some leaders of other Afro-Asian countries, such attacks will garner considerable support.

Germany and Berlin

The Polish deputy foreign minister indicated that Berlin would be raised in connection with disarmament. East German party leader Ulbricht's new plan for phased disarmament for Germany could provide the cue for Khrushchev to stress that the rearmament of Germany and the situation in Berlin are major obstacles to a relaxation of tensions. He can also be expected to use these problems to underline the urgency of disarmament.

It does not seem likely, however, that Khrushchev will advance any new proposals on Berlin, such as presenting an ultimatum to the West demanding acceptance of Soviet positions on disarmament, Germany, and Berlin. Although a Soviet diplomat in Vienna told a New York Times reporter that this would be Khrushchev's position,

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precipitation of a showdown on these issues would not be in keeping with the general emphasis on creating an image of the peace-loving Soviet Union in the presence of high-level Afro-Asian delegations.

Nevertheless, Khrushchev may clarify his position on Berlin in his informal remarks to the press, while leaving

formal presentations of bloc charges against Bonn to be made by the satellite leaders. Gomulka declared recently that the Polish delegation would use the UN rostrum to "warn the nations against the danger of German militarism." He added that Czechoslovakia was also entitled to make a similar warning.

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CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Soviet ship Ilya Mechanikov arrived at Havana with a large cargo on 8 September, the first major bloc arms shipment to the Castro regime. The cargo apparently included armored vehicles, artillery, and a variety of other weapons and equipment. Jet aircraft also may have been delivered. In July, four or five Soviet MI-4 helicopters and at least 10,000 Czech rifles and submachine guns had been delivered to Havana.

Following Castro's 2 September announcement that Cuba will establish relations with Peiping, the head of the Havana office of the New China News Agency has notified the Cuban Foreign Ministry that he had been designated by Peiping to negotiate the exchange of diplomatic missions.

Khrushchev is expected to pay his long-promised visit to

Cuba after his trip to New York for the opening of the UN General Assembly. The Cuban Government has announced that Fidel Castro himself is to head Cuba's UN General Assembly delegation, which will also include Foreign Minister Roa and Nunez Jimenez, the head of Cuba's Communist-dominated Agrarian Reform Institute. Castro will use the world forum for further attacks on the United States and to hold up his revolution as an example for all underdeveloped nations and colonial areas. The Cuban delegation is expected to support the Soviet position on all important issues.

Meanwhile, open opposition to Castro inside Cuba is still uncoordinated and lacks effective leadership. The Castro forces apparently have had no success in routing the guerrilla bands that have been forming in the Escambray Mountains of central Cuba for some

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months. Castro publicly minimized the importance of the guerrillas on 9 September, but the regime actually appears to be taking the threat of a guerrilla build-up seriously.

The Cuban consul in Hong Kong broke with the Castro regime on 12 September and wants to come to the United States.

Dominican Republic

Trujillo has reacted to mounting international pressures by announcing a mass meeting for 24 September to demonstrate his regime's "popular support." Calling a carefully organized rally for this purpose is a device the regime has used before; in this instance it may also provide an occasion for Trujillo to announce his resumption of the presidency in response to "popular demand."

The government-controlled Radio Caribe has warned US businessmen to begin defending Trujillo against US attacks if they want to continue doing business in his country. The US Consulate sees the future of US interests there as "increasingly bleak" as long as Trujillo retains control.

Radio Caribe's propaganda favorable to Castro and the Soviet bloc showed a marked drop following the USSR's unsuccessful demand that the UN Security Council endorse the OAS sanctions against the Do-

minican Government. Attacks on "US imperialism" continue, however, and on 13 September Radio Caribe lashed out at the United States in a vicious attack, calling the US Government "the strongest dictatorship on earth," dominated by "Wall Street and eight capitalists."

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While Trujillo now is attempting to give the impression that he is not personally responsible for the viciously anti-US line of his propaganda outlets, he undoubtedly could control them if he wished. At the same time, his propagandists are active in the United States, where they are attempting to portray the dictator as a stalwart defender against Communism who has been grievously wronged by his great friend, the United States. He is reportedly spending considerable money in the United States to this end. Trujillo's statement of 13 August declaring that his country is determined to "remain outside the orbit of cannibalistic Communism" was undoubtedly made with a view only to its impact in the United States.

Venezuela

Despite Foreign Minister Arcaya's resignation, President Betancourt is successfully maintaining the three-party coalition which has backed his government since its inauguration in February 1959. Nevertheless, continuing tension in Venezuela is suggested by rumors of high-level changes in the armed forces--including the army commander in chief and the chief of the joint general staff. Other indicators are a Communist-instigated armed battle in a key petroleum labor union meeting in which one man was killed and 30 injured, and the brief

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seizure of a Caracas radio station on 12 September by a national guard officer who reportedly hoped to inspire co-conspirators to fulfill a revolutionary plan originally set for 10 September.

Arcaya's resignation may have been regarded by anti-government elements as creating a weak point in the united front of Venezuela's three major parties which have made up the government coalition since President Betancourt's inauguration in February 1959. These left-of-center parties--Betancourt's Democratic Action (AD) group; the Christian Democratic COPEI, and the Republican Demo-

cratic Union (URD)--have presented a united civilian front against the recurring threat of a new dictatorship by Venezuela's traditionally political armed forces.

Little unity has been possible, however, either within or among the parties on the Cuban issue. Betancourt has indicated that he does not want the resignation of the pro-Cuban Arcaya, who is prominent in the URD, to be the cause for breaking the coalition. Betancourt believes that many URD members are disillusioned with their party and could eventually be convinced to leave it.

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REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

The confusion surrounding the Congo situation has been compounded by two coups attempted against Premier Lumumba. President Kasavubu's effort to dismiss the premier and appoint moderate Joseph Ileo, the president of the Senate, in his stead did not receive popular or military support, and Ileo chose the safety of Brazzaville in President Youlou's Congo Republic instead of the political struggle in Leopoldville. In fact, both Kasavubu and Ileo have moved so slowly that American Embassy officials describe their pace as snail-like, and report that Kasavubu "acts more like a vegetable every day."

On 14 September, Colonel Mobutu, newly appointed army commander in chief, announced that the army was taking charge and would enforce a truce until 31 December, thus enabling the

rival political factions to reach an agreement. During the interim a "collect" of Congolese students and technicians would run the Congo in cooperation with the UN. He proposed to stop the Congo's drift toward Communism by closing the Soviet and Czech embassies and consulates, placing military guards around the premises, and forcing the diplomats to leave within 48 hours.

In the absence of disorders or strong reactions on the part of leading Congolese politicians, it appeared that the coup might be succeeding. However, by mid-morning of 15 September, forces loyal to Lumumba seemed to have regained the initiative. Lumumba's claim that Mobutu had been arrested was subsequently denied, however. The situation remains extremely fluid, with the sympathies of the bulk of the Congolese Army unclear.

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
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Lumumba, after beating off Kasavubu's effort to dismiss him, called a rump session of the National Assembly which on 13 September voted him undefined "full powers," and backed his attacks on the UN's role in the Congo. The premier apparently hopes to use this action--challenged by the opposition on the grounds a quorum was lacking--to justify the establishment of a dictatorship.

The premier's ability to retain power has made the UN task vastly more difficult. Further trouble for Secretary General Hammarskjold has arisen from several of the African states which sympathize with Lumumba's proclaimed efforts to preserve the unity of the Congo and to combat foreign--notably Belgian and French--imperialism. Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, and the UAR have all threatened to withdraw troops from the UN Command and implied that they would be put at Lumumba's disposal. Within the last few days, however, as the UN relaxed its control of the Leopoldville radio station and airfields, Ghana and Sudan have adopted a more conciliatory policy toward the secretary general.

Nevertheless, Hammarskjold has been handicapped in his efforts in the Security Council to get backing for a tough policy in the Congo by the wavering of Afro-Asian governments,



whose fears have been exploited by the USSR. The council session on 12 September was adjourned because all contemplated measures would have aided Lumumba, not Kasavubu; the session on 14 September was adjourned when Tunisia proposed a good-offices commission to mediate between opposing Congolese factions--a step which would seem to accord equal recognition to Kasavubu and Lumumba.

For several days there has been a lessening of bloodshed in the Kasai area, although it is not clear whether this has resulted from the general ceasefire which the UN announced on 10 September had been ordered by the Congolese Army. This easing of the situation was probably in part a result of the UN's prohibition against other

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air flights in the Congo. This restriction had grounded the ten Soviet IL-14s which had been used to transport some 200 Lumumba troops to the Kasai battlefront. With the relaxation of the UN restrictions, Lumumba will probably give new attention to the Kasai secessionist problem in an effort to clean up the area preparatory to an all-out Katanga campaign.

Following the small-scale action at two points along the Katanga-Kivu frontier last week, the Katanga border remained quiet until 15 September, when reports reached Elisabethville that 300 Congolese troops loyal to Lumumba were attempting to invade Katanga from Kivu. At the same time, President Tshombé's Katanga regime was confronted with an apparently serious uprising by Baluba tribesmen at Manono.

Tshombé welcomed Ileo's designation as premier and has sent two representatives to meet with Ileo's delegates in Brazzaville to discuss a federated Congo. At the same time, Tshombé continues to make statements favoring complete independence for Katanga. This apparently is largely a bargaining tactic, but also designed to appeal to local advocates of a separate Katanga.

Communist-Bloc Moves

The Communist bloc is becoming more involved in the Congo situation. Khrushchev, in the strongest Soviet attack on Hammarskjold to date, charged on 13 September that the UN secretary general is "consciously working in the interests of the imperialists" in the Congo and that his actions "dovetail with

the policies of the countries which have always espoused the positions of colonialism." Answering questions aboard the Baltika, the Soviet premier denounced Hammarskjold's insistence that all aid to the Congo Government be channeled through the UN as a further effort to uphold colonialist interests, and indicated that he may press the Congo issue at the forthcoming UN General Assembly meeting.

In the fifth Soviet Government statement on the subject, issued on 9 September, the USSR accused Hammarskjold of failing to show the "minimum of impartiality" and of "openly working for the benefit of the colonialists, thereby compromising the UN." Moscow demanded that UN forces occupying Congolese airfields and radio stations be dismissed, and called on the governments whose troops are in the Congo to carry out the "good, correct decisions" of the Security Council, bypassing the UN Command if necessary.

The USSR's reply on 10 September to a note from Hammarskjold regarding direct Soviet aid to the Congo indicated Moscow's intention to continue its unilateral support for Lumumba. The Soviet note stated that the Security Council resolutions "do not and cannot restrict" the right of the Congolese Government to request and receive assistance directly from governments of other countries and asserted that Soviet aid in the form of civil aircraft and motor vehicles was "fully consistent" with these resolutions. Moscow expressed surprise that the secretary general was attempting to control the Congo's relations with other states, specifically the USSR.

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SITUATION IN LAOS

The situation in Laos has taken a new and more critical turn with the repudiation of the Souvanna Phouma government by General Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum. Their self-styled "Revolutionary Committee" proclaimed over Radio Savannakhet on 10 September that it had temporarily set aside the Constitution, "ousted" the Souvanna government, and decreed martial law throughout Laos. All military commanders, civil servants, and people were requested to recognize the authority of committee Chairman Boun Oum and to disregard Vientiane's orders.

Boun Oum is the 50-year-old hereditary ruler of southern Laos who renounced his claims in 1946 in favor of a unified Laos under the King of Luang Prabang. Described as an earthy, practical man of action, Boun Oum is believed to have chafed in recent years over the lack of scope offered for his energies by his sinecure position as inspector general of the Kingdom. Boun Oum was an anti-Japanese resistance leader in World War II, and in 1954 he led commando troops against the invading Viet Minh. He was premier in 1949-50. He favors alignment with the West and the imposition of authoritarian government.

While in effect setting up a de facto government in Savannakhet, Boun Oum and Phoumi apparently do not intend this to be a separatist regime, at least at this time. They have pledged support to King Savang and sent emissaries to Luang Prabang to explain their actions to the monarch.

The Savannakhet group claims the loyalty of all four military region commanders outside of Vientiane, as well as ten of the country's 12 provincial governors, but their sustained allegiance and unity of purpose is open to question. The first military region commander, with headquarters in Luang Prabang, has reversed himself twice and now seems tentatively to be supporting the Souvanna government. The loyalty of lower echelon military units is even more difficult to assess. Boun Oum and Phoumi will require outside financial and logistic support if they are to carry out their plans.


Thus far, Souvanna has reacted to the Boun Oum - Phoumi challenge with moderation, apparently still hoping for a compromise. He has declared a state of emergency throughout the country, but has not yet branded Phoumi and Boun Oum as

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In a talk with Ambassador Brown on 13 September, the King said that Souvanna had "full powers" to deal with the revolt and that if he could not settle it, he should resign. The King added that he would then appoint a new premier, probably Boun Oum. The King made it clear that he privately favored the Phoumi group and hoped Souvanna would resign. Souvanna appeared close to doing so on 14 September, but a Radio Vientiane broadcast of 15 September quoting the premier to the effect that the King had "given him a fresh vote of confidence" indicates he may try to hold on.

The prospects for a compromise solution in Laos appear to be diminishing. Captain Kong Le still controls Vientiane, and he would probably

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rebels. He has also canceled pending negotiations with the Pathet Lao insurgents on the ground that Phoumi's defection has dangerously weakened his bargaining position. The premier has flown to Luang Prabang twice, but has failed to get from the King any denunciation of the Savannakhet revolution. He has also been unsuccessful in luring Phoumi or Boun Oum to Luang Prabang for fresh peace talks under the royal aegis.

reject any resolution of the crisis in favor of the Savannakhet group. For their part, Phoumi and Boun Oum seem to be in no mood for any kind of compromise. They appear confident that Souvanna will be forced to resign and seem prepared to undertake the reduction of the Vientiane garrison under Kong Le. Phoumi's reported announcement that he will "never" negotiate with Souvanna would appear to close the door to new peace talks.

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The Pathet Lao insurgents are exploiting the division of Laos' non-Communist elements. They have increased military pressure in Sam Neua, Phong Saly, and Xieng Khouang provinces in the north and Champassak Province in the south. In the propaganda realm, Phoumi's revolt has enabled the Pathet Lao movement to range itself on the side of legitimacy in the current crisis. The clandestine Pathet Lao radio has called on all Laotians to support the legal Souvanna government and the coup d'etat group of Kong Le in the struggle against the "traitorous and rebellious Phoumi clique."

Hanoi and Peiping have not given events in Laos exceptional attention in their propaganda. North Vietnam has rebroadcast Pathet Lao statements attacking Phoumi and Boun Oum and voicing willingness to cooperate with Souvanna Phouma. Peiping has devoted very little space to the subject, but on 14 September the Chinese Communist radio did accuse Thailand of plotting to use SEATO as a cover to partition Laos. The paucity of independent commentary in the Communist capitals may be due to a desire to picture the matter as purely an internal Laotian affair and forestall accusations of Chinese or Vietnamese intervention

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PART II

NOTES AND COMMENTS

ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

A contest between the Soviet bloc and the West over the election of the president of the 15th UN General Assembly is in prospect when the assembly opens on 20 September.

Late starter Thor Thors of Iceland has campaigned extensively, particularly among Latin American members, despite strong Western urging that he withdraw his candidacy in favor of Frederick Boland of Ireland--the West's early choice. Although Thors' chances of election are slim, he has succeeded in siphoning off some support from Boland, who faces a strong opponent in Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia.

The Soviet bloc intensified its drive for high elective UN offices two years ago with the announced intention of getting a bloc delegate elected as president of this assembly. Nosek's early campaign, his personal popularity at the UN, and the fact that Eastern Europe has never held the presidency are strong points favoring his

candidacy. High-ranking officials of the UN secretariat, moreover, believe that granting a high elective UN office to the Soviet bloc is a "matter of equity." Prior to the Congo crisis, UN Secretary General Hammarskjold indicated his preference for an Eastern European for the presidency, which, by common consent, goes to Europe this year.

The generally capable Boland has gained a large personal following in the relatively few years Ireland has been a member of the United Nations, and his country's formal neutrality may increase his potential appeal among Asian-African bloc members. As of 9 September, he had approximately 35 firm commitments of support--including two or three Arab states and eight Latin American--with 55 votes needed for election.

The elections to fill two of the three vacant seats on the Security Council will probably be more or less routine, with the UAR replacing Tunisia in the



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Middle East seat and Portugal replacing Italy as Western Europe's representative. Argentina's seat is being sought by both Cuba and Chile, Chile being the choice of the Latin American bloc. The Cuban candidacy, although unlikely to gain much support beyond the 12 Communist votes, jeopardizes the "right" to two of the six elective seats on the council

which Latin America has enjoyed since 1945. Lack of a single agreed Latin American candidate probably will encourage others to seek the seat, particularly Asian and African members, who believe their growing numbers are not adequately reflected in Security Council representation.

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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE

The fourth general conference of the UN's International Atomic Energy Agency, convening in Vienna on the same day the General Assembly opens in New York, will probably be marked by East-West conflicts on several important issues, including the perennial one of Chinese representation.

The first problem confronting the 20 September - 7 October meeting is the election of a conference president. The Bulgarian scientist Georgi Nadzhakov, is expected to be elected conference president and a Westerner as chairman of the Board of Governors. The Soviet Union will probably make a new attempt to gain consultative status for the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). This effort to enhance the WFTU's prestige was sidetracked at last year's general conference, but a number of pro-Western delegations seem cool to the American view that the issue should not be raised again.

The bloc may find opportunities for obstructionism and propaganda on the nuclear weapons question in the issue of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes to military uses. A document concerning safeguards, which Moscow has stigmatized as a Western device for preventing underdeveloped countries from gaining a nuclear capability of their own, has been provisionally approved by the Western-controlled Board of Governors. The United States, Britain, and Canada will press for a procedural resolution which simply gives it conference approval and returns it to the board for implementation.

The West's problem will be to keep discussions limited to the document as a whole and to forestall any attempts by bloc or neutral delegates to debate its separate parts

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Neither Moscow nor Peiping has retreated from its basic positions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. At the North Vietnamese party congress that closed this week--the first important international Communist forum since the Bucharest conference in June--the Soviet and Chinese spokesmen each reiterated in strong terms some of his party's central propositions in the long controversy.

Li Fu-chun, the Chinese delegate, emphasized "revisionism"--his country's description of Soviet policy--as the main danger to Communist unity. He warned against using the "fight against dogmatism"--dogmatism being one of the charges leveled at Peiping by Khrushchev--as a "pretext to depart from the fundamental theoretical stand on Marxism-Leninism." Li was the author of the emotional article in the mid-August Red Flag which attacked "modern revisionists," described the Chinese as "real Marxist-Leninists," and warned that those attempting to isolate China would isolate themselves.

Presidium member N. A. Mukhitdinov, the Soviet delegate, in one speech extolled Khrushchev as a "great Leninist" and insisted that his propositions on the noninevitability of war are a continuation of Lenin's policy. In a later speech, he again struck hard at the Chinese. After denouncing Yugoslav revisionists, he said:

No less harmful to the international Communist movement is the manifestation of dogmatism and sectarianism. Parading loud revolutionary phrases, hiding behind isolated proposi-

tions in the works of the founders of Marxism-Leninism, ...they try to sell their erroneous views as Marxist-Leninist truth and force them on others.... They at times oppose their narrow national interests to the international tasks of the world proletariat or even regard them as superior. Their sectarian activities in international organizations harm the democratic forces of the world and the interests of the socialist camp.

As Mukhitdinov implies, the Chinese have continued to press their opposition to Soviet policies in international organizations, despite the fact that such behavior was the immediate cause of the Soviet denunciation of the Chinese party at Bucharest. There now is evidence that at the Third World Conference of Teachers, held in Conakry from 27 July to 1 August, there were the same direct clashes and sharp exchanges between the Soviet and Chinese delegates that occurred at the WFTU meeting in Peiping in early June.

The Russian delegate at Conakry, in a relatively moderate speech, criticized the West, including the United States, on the grounds that Western educational systems were not as advanced as the "socialist" one, but in general he stressed the need for peaceful coexistence and avoidance of war in the nuclear age. The Chinese, in a completely political and very violent speech, attacked the United States 15 times by name and much oftener by inference. The Chinese delegate's speech, following the Russian's, was a direct challenge to the Soviet position.

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A meeting of theoreticians from Communist parties of developed as well as underdeveloped countries is reportedly set for Bucharest this month to discuss the "national liberation movement and the agrarian question." Such a forum will almost certainly consider the differences between the Soviet and Chinese views on the pace and forms of the revolution in underdeveloped countries. The Chinese apparently boycotted the last such meeting in Leipzig last fall.

While party relations continue on the downgrade, governmental relations between Moscow and Peiping give a mixed impression. The Soviet Union this year made a formal request that a motion to seat Peiping in the United Nations be put on the agenda for the forthcoming General Assembly,

Both sides have also taken some steps to reduce public manifestations of the dispute. The eight-week blackout of Moscow home service commentary on Chinese affairs was lifted on 5 September with a story of progress in a Chinese steel plant. On 1 September two undated issues of Kitai, the Russian-language edition of the Chinese pictorial biweekly, were put on sale in Moscow, following an apparent suspension of the magazine in July. The Chinese, for their part, gave coverage to Sino-Soviet friendship meetings in commemoration of the victory over Japan, including a meeting held in Moscow on 2 September which the USSR did not report. On 2 September a

65-man Chinese song-and-dance ensemble left for the Soviet Union.

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Developments in Eastern Europe continue to reflect the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Albanian party changes were apparently the result of Soviet pressure on Tirana to end its equivocation.

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Recent developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute have led Ambassador Thompson in Moscow and the US consul general at Hong Kong to conclude that while the Russians and Chinese may succeed in "plastering over the cracks" in their relationship, they will probably not succeed in actually resolving their differences. Thompson does not expect a complete break in relations--i.e., a break at all levels--but he does not exclude the possibility that the two parties will sever relations.

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BERLIN SITUATION

The East German Government on 8 September announced that all West German citizens must obtain special permits to enter East Berlin, thereby forcing them to meet the same requirements to go to East Berlin as to East Germany. The move is a further step toward incorporating the Soviet sector of the city into East Germany and gives the sector border the character of an East German frontier. By making an East German law directly applicable to East Berlin, the East German regime not only bypassed the normal procedures under which East Berlin municipal authorities have re-enacted any legislation applying to the Soviet sector of Berlin but it also clearly violated four-power agreements guaranteeing freedom of movement within the city.

On the same day, party boss Ulbricht revealed his plan for a phased disarmament of Germany in a memorandum to the United Nations. This plan is a rehash of previous proposals and contains provisions for signing a peace treaty with the "two German states," withdrawal of Western troops from West Berlin, and the transformation of West Berlin into a demilitarized free city at the expiration of the first phase in 1961.

Ulbricht warned that Khrushchev's pledge not to take unilateral steps to change the status quo in Berlin before

making another attempt at negotiations does not mean that West Germans and West Berliners should be permitted to "aggravate the anomalous situation in West Berlin." He intimated that his government will continue attempts to weaken West Berlin's ties with West Germany.

The regime has sent a letter to Secretary General Hammarskjold requesting permission for East German representatives--presumably including Ulbricht as new head of state--to present their views on the German and Berlin questions to the General Assembly. This request is obviously intended to bolster East German claims to sovereignty and equality with West Germany--which, although not a UN member, maintains observers in New York.

The East German statement of 13 September that the regime will refuse to recognize West German passports issued to West Berliners who intend to travel abroad--i.e., to bloc countries--is designed to emphasize the East German contention that West Berlin is not a part of West Germany but is a separate legal entity. In practice, the new regulation probably will cause few difficulties, since the East Germans are continuing--at least for the time being--to accept West Berlin identity documents issued by West Berlin authorities in lieu of passports. The announcement states that these

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identity cards will also be accepted from West Berliners traveling between the city and West Germany.

The announcement does not state whether West Berliners will be required to obtain East German permits to visit East Berlin, as they are required to do to visit East Germany; the regime's announcement of 9 September imposing restrictions on West German travel to East Berlin expressly excepted West Berliners. It appears that for the time being there will be no attempt to force West Berliners to acknowledge East German "sovereignty" over East Berlin by accepting special documentation.

Western Reaction

West German and West Berlin officials view the East German harassment as the beginning of a new series of probing actions against West Berlin's ties with West Germany. Chancellor Adenauer on vacation in Italy--has sent word to his cabinet in Bonn to avoid "any rash moves" in dealing with the East German harassments and in effect to leave the initiative on counter-measures to the Western Allies.


Adenauer sharply criticized Vice Chancellor Erhard's reference on 11 September to West Berlin as "Federal Republic territory" and called on the cabinet to advise West Berlin Mayor Brandt to stop making demands for Western retaliations, thereby implying that he is speaking for the Bonn government. With further East German actions expected, Adenauer stressed that counter-measures, including trade sanctions, must be used judiciously lest they lead to worse Communist measures, especially against West Berlin's large trade with Bonn.

The Bonn government--through Vice Chancellor Erhard--has so far merely called on German businessmen not to subject themselves to the new East German entry requirements and to avoid travel to East Germany as long as the restrictions continue. Bonn is still unwilling to suspend interzonal trade with East Germany.

There are fears in Bonn and in industrial circles that East Germany might retaliate against an embargo of trade with East Germany by cutting off West Berlin's supply lines to West Germany, over which more than one and a half billion dollars' worth of goods were brought to the city in 1959. These shipments dwarf West German exports to East Germany, which amounted to less than 2 percent of West Germany's total exports during the last three years, reaching a peak value in 1959 of \$256,800,000..

American Ambassador Dowling in Bonn feels that the Western Allies should urge Bonn to cut interzonal trade, and fears that the principal Allied

WEST GERMAN TRADE
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)



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15 SEPTEMBER 1960

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counteraction thus far taken--the refusal of travel permits to selected categories of East Germans--is not likely to have much effect on the Ulbricht regime.

Allied officials have expressed concern over Mayor Brandt's plans to go ahead with establishment of a 4,000-man

auxiliary police force by initiating training of 115 members of the regular police force to act as instructors. Although the new force would be used primarily for static guard duties, it would be available to support the regular 13,500-man police force in time of crisis and civil disturbance.

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EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL MEASURES


The East German populace continues to "vote with its feet" against the Ulbricht regime. In the week ending 6 September, more than 3,000 refugees escaped to West Berlin, despite a five-day near-blockade by East German authorities against travel to Berlin, long the principal escape hatch from East Germany. The total for the previous week had been more than 4,500.

Monthly figures have risen steadily, both absolutely and in comparison with last year. Almost 21,500 refugees escaped to the West in August of this year, compared with only 13,610 in August 1959, according to the West German Ministry of Refugees. Of the 21,500, more than 18,000 fled to West Berlin. This exceeds the flow of 16,189 in May in the wake of the forced collectivization and is far above the 10,857 who fled to West Berlin following the uprising in June 1953.

The total of flights to West Germany and West Berlin was almost identical with that of 21,595 in August 1958, when mass flights of intellectuals were at their height. During the first eight months of 1960 more than 126,500 persons applied for refu-

gee status in West Germany and West Berlin, compared with approximately 98,000 during the corresponding period in 1959. The escapees, more than half of whom belong to the labor force, include large numbers of farmers, technicians, and

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
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NUMBER APPLYING FOR REFUGEE STATUS TO WEST GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN



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15 SEPTEMBER 1960

professional men, whose services are badly needed by the Ulbricht regime. Indications point to a total considerably in excess of last year's 144,000, despite intensified East German security precautions.

Reflecting increased international tension and unsettled conditions in East Germany, the number of persons returning from West to East Germany or drawn there by hope of better jobs has fallen this year in comparison with 1959. Refugees reaching West Berlin in July who had previously resettled from West to East Germany told British authorities in Berlin that there was

a sharp drop in the number of individuals asking for admission this spring and that East German officials were being much more careful in their security processing of such individuals. (b)(3)

Whereas last year the East Germans frequently boasted of the high return flow, this year they have been reticent. Their claim that 26,000 persons asked for "asylum" during the first six months contrasts with the claimed figure of 62,000 for the whole of 1959.

The East Germans are likely to continue their harassment of West Berlin, with the aim of reducing its importance as an escape route, and probably will also continue to enforce special controls to limit travel by East Germans to East Berlin. Security precautions on the East - West German frontier are already at a high point and are likely to be maintained at this level. The strict measures now in effect, however, may well cause many East Germans to try to escape at this time if possible, out of fear that all escape routes may soon be closed. (b)(3)

POSSIBLE MISSILE RING AROUND BERLIN

Berlin by early 1961 probably will be ringed with surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The complex apparently will contain at least eight launch sites, each with local logistic support facilities, and may be connected to two central support facilities. The local support facilities are located about 25 miles from the center of the city and are 16 to 22 miles apart.

German Army is under way at some ten locations around Berlin, one adjacent to a missile launch site under construction near Rauen. (b)(1)

these ten include eight SAM launch and two central support facilities. (b)(1)

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
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[redacted] surveying, possibly for a SAM launch site, at another of the ten locations.

[redacted] Since all of these projects were reported under way during the summer of 1960, completion is possible during the first quarter of 1961.

All evidence indicates that the Glau and Jueterbog sites are manned by Soviet personnel. There are indications, however, that the East Germans themselves with eventually participate in SAM operations. These include participation of the East German Army in the construction of the SAM launch site at Rauhen and in the survey for another possible launch site, the extension of contracts for work on these sites to civilian concerns by the East



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German Army, the reported establishment at Pinnow--also near Berlin but outside the SAM complex--of an East German anti-aircraft artillery unit possibly

equipped with missiles, and reports of possible SAM training of East German Army personnel.

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
MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COMMUNICATIONS CABLE

A high-capacity, underground hardened coaxial cable is being installed between Finland and the USSR. When completed, the cable will extend from Moscow via Leningrad and intermediate points in Finland to Helsinki and will provide a circuit capacity double that needed for envisioned civil re-

Finland has a radar network of rather low technical level which could, however, augment the Soviet air-defense system. According to the Finnish-Soviet mutual assistance pact concluded in 1947, Finland might be obliged to pass such data to the Soviet Union in the event Moscow considered itself threatened with an attack via Finland.

(b)(1)

Coaxial Cable Lines in the USSR and Finland — 1960



Three years ago the Russians made the first proposal for an underground cable to connect Leningrad and Helsinki, and final agreement was reached in early 1960. Completion of the line is scheduled for 1962, with both countries financing their own portion of the work and providing their own equipment. Finland has placed orders with Western firms for coaxial cable and carrier equipment

(b)(3)

quirements. The installation of the cable may lead to closer political, economic, and cultural cooperation between the two countries.

which reportedly will be used on their portion of the circuit.

Finland already has two four-tube coaxial cables on separate routes from Helsinki to Kouvala. Beginning in September 1960, one cable with a

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capacity of 1,920 telephone channels will be extended to Vyborg in the USSR.

The Finnish section will probably be laid in a manner similar to the recently completed cable out of Moscow to Kiev and the extension under construction from Moscow to Vyborg. This type of cable, laid underground about 100 feet from the edge of the highway, has unique, underground repeater stations approximately four miles apart. This mode of underground construction, also employed in the US and elsewhere, is more costly than wire and overhead cable lines or high-capacity microwave radio relay lines, but offers greater protection against

natural and man-made damage, including bomb blast.

The stated reason for the new coaxial cable to Helsinki is to increase telephone service between the USSR and Finland. However, there are no known plans for increases in either telephone or television services which would require such a large number of channels. Present plans call for only 960 channels to be used for civil requirements; this would leave a surplus of 960 channels which could be used for military purposes, including the transmittal of air-defense data.

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ALBANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT OF MOSCOW

The ouster of a leading Albanian Communist ideologist--announced on 9 September--and the elevation to the party secretariat of an agitprop specialist suggest that the regime is preparing to revamp its equivocal propaganda line on the basic issues in the Sino-Soviet con-

troversy. Politburo member and party secretary Liri Belishova, the fifth-ranking party leader, was removed from her party positions by a central committee plenum for committing "grave errors in the party line." A report on her activities was made by the politburo and delivered

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ALIJA



HOXHA



MARKO

to the central committee by politburo member Rita Marko, who returned a few months ago from extensive training in the USSR, and probably represented the Soviet interest in the affair.

The central committee also ousted from party membership the head of the Central Auditing Commission for "activities hostile to the party." No elucidation on the charges was made in the central committee's communiqué, nor has there been any further comment by the regime.

Long-standing Albanian preference for the Chinese Communist position on certain issues in the Sino-Soviet dispute was evident at the Rumanian party congress in June. Party boss Enver Hoxha was the only East European party leader who did not attend, and the chief Albanian delegate, politburo member Hysni Kapo, was the only East European who failed specifically to endorse Khrushchev's speech and the only one who favored the Chinese position on war and the nature of the imperialist threat. The Albanian central committee later endorsed Kapo's statements

in a plenary session on 13 July.

Albanian propaganda, presumably in the face of Soviet pressure, has subsequently made limited adjustments, subscribed in general terms to "peaceful coexistence," and acknowledged the "leading role of the USSR," but it has not followed the other East European satellites in criticizing "dogmatism."

While Belishova was one of three important regime officials to visit China this summer and has, in the past, made statements favorable to



BELISHOVA

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the Chinese, it is unlikely that she alone was responsible for the Albanian positions. It is true that her main responsibility was for ideology, but all the leaders at one time or another have been committed to a hard-line, Chinese type of outlook. Use of her as a scapegoat for what is presumably a "collective error" suggests that the regime leaders are preparing to revamp the agitprop apparatus and to move into closer conformity with Moscow's line.

Ramiz Alija, 34-year-old politburo candidate member and propaganda specialist who is considered to be pro-Soviet, was elected by the plenum to the party secretariat, apparently replacing Belishova.

The continued espousal of pro-Chinese views despite Soviet instructions to the contrary has probably given rise to factionalism among the party leaders, and the Belishova ouster may be the first indications that the position of other top leaders will be challenged in coming months. While a purge of Hoxha, who has led the party since 1943, is not likely, he will probably be under pressure to "clean up" his party prior to the scheduled fourth party congress in November.

The removal of Belishova will assist other East European party leaders in keeping dogmatic elements repressed in their own parties. These elements, now in the background, could weaken satellite support for Moscow at some future time.

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NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS THIRD PARTY CONGRESS

Two themes dominated the sessions of North Vietnam's third party congress, which met in Hanoi from 5 to 10 September: how best to modernize and industrialize the country in accordance with Communist principles and how to reunify Vietnam. Hanoi plans to solve the latter problem by forming a coalition government with a "democratic" southern regime once President Diem has been overthrown.

Prior to this congress, the Lao Dong party had never issued a list of its central committee members, although 31 individuals had been identified as members. Eleven of these also sat on the politburo and

six on the secretariat. The congress elected 43 persons to the central committee plus 28 alternates, but all members of the previous central committee and politburo retained their positions, including Minister of National Defense Vo Nguyen Giap, who has been out of the public view much of the last six months. Two alternates, the minister of public security and the army chief of staff, were added to the 11-man politburo.

Changes were also made in the party secretariat and the order of precedence with the politburo. Party Chairman Ho Chi Minh relinquished his concurrent post of secretary.

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general; the position was re-titled "first secretary" and conferred on Le Duan, who until 1957 was responsible for directing subversion in South Vietnam and thus was out of the lime-



HO CHI MINH

light. Two of the new individuals named to the party secretariat served with Le Duan in South Vietnam: Pham Hung, who in July was given over-all control of the government's agricultural programs, and Le Duc



LE DUAN

Tho, who now may be in charge of party organization. They are the only two to be elevated in the politburo order of precedence.

Thus, a "southern clique" may exist within the Lao Dong party, which has been increasing its power since early 1958. The power held by this clique may do much to explain Hanoi's "activist" policy toward South Vietnam--a policy which excludes overt invasion of the south but implies that almost every other tactic to achieve reunification is legitimate.

Duan, apparently second in power to Ho, noted that "the balance of forces...is gradually changing in favor of a revolution" in South Vietnam. Hanoi has dropped its customary formulation that "reunification will be a long, arduous, and complicated task" and now states that the "immediate task" is to overthrow Diem and for a "democratic coalition government" with which the north can do business.

Hanoi's Five-Year Plan for 1961-65 as outlined by Le Duan indicates that Hanoi will henceforth pursue a long-range economic program of industrialization, with emphasis on the development of heavy industry. This formulation is more in line with normal Communist practice than was Hanoi's past practice of emphasizing agriculture. However, the economic realities of North Vietnam's limited industrial base, the serious shortage of technical and managerial skills, and the basic importance of agriculture in the economy will keep the regime from moving rapidly toward its goal of industrialization.

No specific plan targets for individual commodities have been released, but the scope of the regime's ambitions is indicated by the general goal of increasing the value of industrial production by 20 percent a year and that of agricultural production by 10 percent a year during the plan.

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Another subject with which the congress dealt at length was the "peasant problem"--a euphemism for continued peasant opposition to cooperativization. The party has committed itself to the "basic completion"--i.e., 75 percent--of agricultural cooperativization by the end of the year. At a rural cadres conference held earlier this summer it was noted that the program was lagging behind, with only 55 percent of peasant households in cooperatives, just 10 percent more than at the end of 1959.

Cooperativization remains the most explosive issue facing the regime. Concerted opposition of a stubborn peasantry forced the regime to back down on socialization in 1956 when the "correction of errors" program was instituted, and earlier

this year the original Three-Year Plan (1958-60) goal of 100 percent of peasant households in cooperatives was revised downward to 75 percent in the face of peasant opposition.

The new party statutes approved by the congress incorporate more stringent qualifications for party membership. Hanoi conducted its first major party membership campaign since the 1954 cease-fire early this year when it increased the membership 25 percent, bringing the total to 500,000. In reviewing the qualifications of its 100,000 new members, the party now may feel that not enough care was taken in their selection, and, by strengthening the qualifications for membership, it may hope to avoid similar laxity in the future.

(b)(3)

GUINEA STRENGTHENS BLOC TIES

Guinea's economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc have been strengthened further as a result of President Sekou Touré's current visit to several bloc countries. In addition, Touré, who claims to follow a policy of "positive neutrality," appears to have moved toward closer propaganda and ideological alignment with the Communist world.

In Moscow, his first formal stop on a three-week trip which also included state visits to Ulan Bator, Peiping, and Hanoi, Touré secured a Soviet commitment to participate in Guinea's proposed Konkouré hydroelectric project. As developed by French planners before Guinea became independent in 1958, this scheme envisaged the construction on the Konkouré River

of a dam and power plant capable of furnishing up to 3.2 billion kilowatt-hours of cheap electricity a year.

The energy would be used primarily to establish an aluminum industry based on Guinea's large bauxite deposits, some of which are already being exploited by private Western interests. The project, for which the Touré regime has been actively soliciting foreign support since last spring, has highest priority in the Three-Year Plan for economic development launched by Guinea in July.

Although the joint Soviet-Guinean communiqué of 8 September did not announce the extent of the Soviet commitment to "the planned complex of projects on the Konkouré River," Moscow

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presumably is prepared to make additional long-term credits available to Conakry. The USSR's present economic aid program in Guinea is covered by a \$35,000,-000 credit extended in August 1959.

For his part, Touré abetted Soviet policy objectives by committing himself to a personal appearance at the forthcoming UN General Assembly session, as well as by formally endorsing the Soviet propaganda line on the nonpolitical character of the USSR's African activities and on the cause--"imperialist aggression"--of the Congo crisis. Moreover, the Soviet press quoted the Guinean leader as having acknowledged in a Kremlin speech that "progress" made by the bloc was "decisive in the liberation of African peoples"--a point Moscow has been attempting to make in its propaganda to underdeveloped countries.

Touré also reportedly called on newly independent African countries to carry on "class warfare," a concept which Touré, while Marxist-trained, has heretofore maintained was not applicable to Africa in its present stage of development. During a brief stop at Budapest airport en route to Moscow, Touré stated that Guinean-Hungarian relations--which have not yet been established on a formal basis--rested on an "affinity of political orientation."

In Peiping the Chinese marked the visit of Touré--the

first head of an African state to come to Communist China--by announcing an agreement providing for the extension to Guinea over the next three years of a \$25,000,000 interest-free credit. This first large-scale economic aid arrangement to be concluded by the Chinese with any country in Black Africa points up the importance Peiping attaches to its intense competition with Taipei for recognition in that area. Presumably the agreement will bring in additional Chinese personnel to join the approximately 60 "agriculturalists" who have been working on rice cultivation projects in Guinea since last spring. In addition, a friendship treaty was signed.

Touré's trip has also produced new five-year trade pacts with both the USSR and Communist China. The agreement with Peiping--Guinea's first with that regime--calls for an annual exchange of almost \$10,000,000 worth of goods, a level which, if reached, would boost Guinea's presently negligible trade with the Chinese to perhaps 10 percent of its total annual foreign trade. In any event, the new trade pacts are likely to accelerate the diversion from the West to the bloc of the bulk of Guinea's foreign trade. Based largely on barter arrangements, this new pattern of trade is resulting in the mortgaging to bloc countries of future as well as current Guinean exports.

(b)(3)

USSR AND IRAN MAKING NEW EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS

Both the USSR and Iran are making new moves to relieve the long-standing tension in their relations. Soviet Ambassador Pegov returned to his post in

Tehran on 14 September after a "diplomatic" absence of about nine months. His return there last September, after a similar extended absence, coincided with

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Soviet efforts to induce the Shah, who had offered to exclude foreign missile bases from Iranian soil, to expand his proposed guarantee to exclude foreign military bases of all types. Despite many subsequent diplomatic exchanges involving leading figures on both sides, the Shah continued to resist the Soviet demands.

The USSR has also modified its propaganda line on Iran, as it did during the brief thaw in Soviet-Iranian relations in September 1959. Although the "National Voice of Iran"--a clandestine station in the Soviet Caucasus--and the Tudeh (Communist) party broadcasts from East Berlin continue to criticize the Shah and Iran's policies, Radio Moscow on 31 August halted its attacks on the Iranian ruler and began to blame ousted Prime Minister Eqbal--the Shah's scapegoat for the election fiasco--for all differences with Iran.

Soviet leaders, who have alternated pressure moves with blandishments in the hope of undercutting Iran's close political cooperation and military defense ties with Western powers, probably have been encouraged by developments in Tehran. The Shah noted at his 27 August press conference--in which he precipitated the resignation of the staunchly anti-Communist Eqbal

as prime minister by criticizing the conduct of the elections--that Iran was ready to have friendly relations with the USSR and would give serious consideration to Soviet aid offers.

Although the Iranian ruler has in the past made similar statements for the record, the quick endorsement by most Tehran newspapers may have been viewed in Moscow as a sign that the Shah--who is gravely concerned over the future of Iran and his regime--is again ready to try to better relations.

(b)(3)

The new prime minister, Sharif Emami, told Ambassador Wailes on 4 September that the immediate task of his government in the foreign policy field is to improve relations with Moscow, but he asserted that this would not be done at the expense of Iran's ties with the West. As a step in this direction, Tehran on 4 September ceased its counterpropaganda aimed at blunting the Communist bloc's radio attacks on the Shah and Iran's foreign and domestic policies.

(b)(3)

INDONESIA

The confrontation of President Sukarno and the Indonesian Army over the Communist issue appears to have been once more postponed by President Sukarno's ban, issued on 13 September, on the activities of all political parties. He will

decide before 30 November which parties may function legally thereafter.

The ban reportedly was drafted by the army at Sukarno's request and serves as a compromise solution to the problem

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posed by the army last month in proscribing Communist activity in three military commands. The army's move was a direct challenge to Sukarno, who has persistently conciliated the Communists and who, on 17 August, had dissolved the anti-Communist Masjumi and Socialist parties. The ban frees Sukarno from the necessity of choosing between the army and the Communists and obviates an army decision on whether to oppose Sukarno further by extending its anti-Communist ban to other areas.

Sukarno's ban will permit him to proceed more easily with his National Front, a mass organization in which he expects all parties and groups to cooperate. He installed the 63-member central board of the National Front on 8 September; at least 18 of its members are susceptible to Communist direction. Should the front become a viable organization, it could be a considerable asset to the Communists by providing them a protected government organization within which to work.

Colonel Basuki, a high-ranking officer in the office administering Indonesia's martial law, says that among the army's difficulties with Sukarno are the latter's closest advisers. These include Ruslan Abdulgani who, as vice chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, is very close to the President, is antiarmy, and tries to manipulate government activities and issues so that they are detrimental to army interests. The so-called palace clique consists mostly of leftists, and army efforts to break up this group have been unsuccessful. (b)(1)

The army, however, continues to be concerned over President Sukarno's insistence on forging a united political effort in Indonesia with considerable reliance on the Communists.

(b)(3)

SOUTH KOREAN CABINET RESHUFFLE

South Korean Prime Minister Chang Myon and his opponents, the majority Democratic party, agreed on 12 September to a compromise cabinet designed to give Chang a working majority in the National Assembly. The party has over two thirds of the 233 seats in the powerful House of Representatives, but these are about evenly divided between supporters and opponents of the prime minister. Although the new cabinet appears to strengthen Chang's position for the time being by drawing his opponents into shar-

ing responsibility for government policy, the terms of the compromise will make it easy for the anti-Chang factionists to function as a de facto opposition bloc in future tests of strength.

The balance of power between the Democratic factions has rested with about 40 independent and minor party legislators. On 7 September four of Chang's ministers submitted their resignations to open the way for the formation of a cabinet based on broader party

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representation. After considerable negotiation, the anti-Chang faction agreed to enter the cabinet.

The new cabinet is made up of seven Chang supporters, four adherents of and one defector from the opposition faction, and two independents. The Communications Ministry post, assigned to the anti-Chang faction, has not yet been filled. The four opposition faction ministers named are Defense Minister Kwon Chong-ton, Reconstruction Minister Kim U-pyong, Transportation Minister Pak Hae-chong, and Health and Social Affairs Minister Na Yong-kyun. At least three of these men are believed to oppose an open party split, and three of them reportedly had been selected for possible cabinet positions under Chang's

opponent for the premiership, Kim To-yun. None of the four is among the top ten of the opposition faction.

The opposition faction exacted--as the price of its participation in the cabinet--Chang's recognition of it as an independent "negotiating group" in the legislature with the right to recall its men from the cabinet at any time. However, while the anti-Chang faction retains a strong bargaining position, it is likely to be restrained at least for the time being by current public opposition to a party split, by its lack of a working majority in the legislature, and, most importantly, by the likelihood that a no-confidence vote would lead to dissolution of the lower house and new elections.

(b)(3)

CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE

The new Belgian coalition cabinet, recently announced by Premier Eyskens in response to public criticism of the government's Congo policy, contains no new influential figures, and may not last through the winter. No major changes in defense and foreign policies are likely; Eyskens' austerity economic program, however, involves defense cuts ranging between 7 and 13 percent.

Three newly appointed ministers--two Social Christians and one Liberal--are to sit as a kind of supercabinet with the premier, Foreign Minister Wigny, and possibly Defense Minister Gilson to handle major policy questions--primarily Eyskens' proposed new program of social progress through "economic expansion based on financial reform."

The austerity program is basically aimed at offsetting economic losses as a result of the Congo situation. The Congo was estimated last spring to contribute about 6 percent of Belgium's gross national product of \$9.5 billion. The new program calls for a reduction of all current expenditures in the 1961 extraordinary budget and for \$120,000,000 in new taxes. Cuts amounting to \$200,000,000 are to be made in national defense, education, and social benefits such as unemployment and sickness insurance and pensions.

Defense cuts, variously reported as ranging from \$30,000,000 to \$50,000,000--or 7 to 13 percent of the proposed defense budget for 1961--would be made by cutting out some 25,000 military and civilian

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positions in the armed forces and by economies in maintaining Belgian troops in West Germany. The defense minister insists, however, that Belgium will carry



EYSKENS

out contracts for building F-104G fighter planes, provided the United States contributes financial support. The American Em-

bassy in Brussels foresees a continuation of the drift away from active participation in NATO.

Eyskens' program may encounter a stormy reception when presented to Parliament on 27 September. Business interests are opposed to tax increases, while the Socialists and Catholic labor groups are hostile to measures to reduce social benefits. The government will also be hard put to convince public opinion that it intends to give a "new look" to its African policy, in view of the appointment of Count d'Aspremont Lynden as minister of African affairs. His choice is attributed to pressure from the King, and his public association recently with Katanga Province as chief of the Belgian technical mission there may make it difficult for Belgium to improve its position with the independent African states.

(b)(3)

EL SALVADOR'S GOVERNMENT SHAKEN BY LEFTIST ATTACKS

The moderately progressive regime of Salvadoran President Lemus has been seriously shaken by persistent attacks from leftist student and labor elements, many of whom are pro-Communist and pro-Castro. The small and densely populated country is particularly vulnerable to leftist agitation because of the unusually wide economic gap between the peasants and the few wealthy landowning families.

After a student and labor demonstration on 2 September in which one youth was killed and many people were seriously injured as a result of police action, Lemus on 5 September decreed a 30-day state of siege--El Salvador's first since 1952. The President, himself a military man, took this action under pressure from officers of the armed forces

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The state of siege, although removing the immediate threat to the administration from the military, did not halt leftists from exploiting the strong public indignation over the security police's indiscriminate use of force in the 2 September disorders. New disorders were averted when business and community leaders, including the the archbishop of San Salvador, held separate conciliatory meetings with student leaders and the President immediately prior to the leftist demonstration of 9 September, which then was carried out peacefully. Communists and pro-Castro elements, however, will probably be quick to encourage new demonstrations as opportunity offers in an attempt to undermine the government.

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The US Embassy has expressed the belief that most responsible leaders recognize the necessity to support the President through the current crisis. Nevertheless, the general popularity Lemus enjoyed at the time of his election in 1956 has been on the decline for almost a year, and the President's increasingly aloof manner has even alienated many of his working associates. His

hesitance in taking resolute action to curb Communist and pro-Castro subversive activity has prompted many moderate and conservative elements to look to his immediate predecessor, ex-President Osorio, for more effective leadership. Osorio probably would be reluctant to promote a coup against Lemus, but his less scrupulous followers might seek to use future leftist disorders as an excuse to seize power themselves. (b)(3)

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PART III

PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES

CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS

Peiping's claim to China's UN seat is expected to be put off once more through the procedural device of the annual moratorium at this year's UN General Assembly, which opens on 20 September. The newly sovereign African states, although associating Taipei with "colonial powers," may support it if admitted to the UN before the expected moratorium vote. The prospect of maintaining this device beyond 1961, however, is increasingly uncertain.

Moratorium

The General Assembly at each of its past nine sessions has voted a moratorium on consideration of the Chinese representation question. This procedural device for delaying a decision requires only a simple majority of votes. Any vote on substance, such as an ouster of Taipei or admittance of Peiping, requires a two-thirds majority to pass; neither government seems to have sufficient support at this time.

For the first five years, Nationalist China commanded a majority of over two thirds in favor of the moratorium. However, since the admission of 22 new members, mostly from Asia and Africa, it has mustered only a simple majority. This fact has encouraged the nations which advocate Peiping's admission to insist on substantive discussion of the Chinese representation question.

For the first time since 1956, India decided against introducing an agenda item calling

for substantive consideration of the issue. New Delhi's border troubles with Peiping are probably the reason for this decision. However, on 30 August the Indian deputy foreign minister publicly reaffirmed his government's conviction that Communist China must be admitted to the UN. The USSR early this month requested inscription of the item.

15th General Assembly

Of the 82 members of the UN, 31 recognize Peiping--most

MORATORIUM ON CHINESE UN REPRESENTATION
VOTES OF UN MEMBERS

	FOR	AGAINST	ABSTENTIONS	VOTES NOT RECORDED	TOTAL MEMBERSHIP
1951	37	11	4	8	60
1952	42	7	11	--	60
1953	44	10	2	4	60
1954	43	11	6	--	60
1955	42	12	6	--	60
1956	47	24	8	--	79
1957	48	27	6	1	82
1958	44	28	9	--	81
1959	44	29	9	--	82

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recently Guinea and Cuba. Forty-three recognize Taipei, and five acknowledge neither government; the remaining three UN members are Nationalist China and the two constituent republics of the USSR which have UN membership.

Partly as a result of goodwill missions to Africa, including private trade missions and technical training offers, Nationalist China has picked up considerable support from newly independent African nations. The Nationalists have established diplomatic relations this year with Cameroun, Togo, and the Malagasy Republic and are negotiating with nine other


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Recognition of China by UN Members
and new African states not yet members

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former French territories--Mali, Congo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Ivory Coast, Gabon, and the Central African Republic. These nations will probably support Taipei if they are admitted to the UN before the vote on the moratorium.

Havana's recognition of Peiping on 2 September marks the first definite break in western hemisphere support for Taipei. Cuba abstained last year and is expected to oppose the moratorium this year. There is a possibility that the Dominican Republic will vote against the moratorium in reaction to the condemnation by the other American republics. Most other members of the Latin American bloc probably will continue to support Nationalist China.

As in the past, Nationalist China probably will have the support of the Western and Asian nations allied with the United States in defense treaties. Last year Taipei lost the

support of Ethiopia, which abstained; this year it may lose that of Tunisia, which is reportedly considering aligning itself with the other Afro-Asians on this issue.

Nationalist China's chief UN delegate estimates that without the new members, this year's vote would be close to last year's, when 44 members supported the moratorium, 29 voted against it, and 9 abstained.

Peiping's Attitude

The Chinese Communists do not expect to become a member of the UN this year. Their recent propaganda has ignored the subject, and the regime continues to depict the UN as a "tool of American aggressive policy."

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be accepted by the UN as a whole, Peiping as a member would automatically be bound by the terms of the treaty.

Outlook

The present Sino-Soviet controversy may enlist support for Peiping's entry from those UN members who are eager to see Peiping exposed to the rough-and-tumble of UN debates and voting line-ups. These members, which include Britain and Pakistan, believe that possible differences between Communist China and the USSR could be exploited to the fullest at the UN.

The prospects for maintaining a favorable UN vote on the moratorium in future years are becoming increasingly uncertain. There is some possibility that a shift in the voting balance might result not from a gradual erosion of Taipei's position but from a sudden "breakthrough." If it appeared that the vote would be close and that in any event Peiping's admission in the near future was inevitable, a bandwagon situation could develop which would result in a defeat of the moratorium; or should Peiping demand admittance to the UN as its price for adhering to any disarmament or nuclear test ban agreement, Taipei's position might become even more precarious. It is likely that a UN vote against the moratorium would be followed by a vote in favor of admitting Communist China to the UN and giving it a permanent seat on the Security Council.

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Khrushchev's Appearance

Khrushchev, scheduled to appear at the opening of this assembly along with satellite party chieftains, is expected to develop his theme of peaceful coexistence and thereby underscore Peiping's isolation within the bloc. At the same time, he will probably call for the immediate admission of Communist China to the UN. In this context his arguments will probably appeal to many UN members who, although ready to vote for the moratorium this year, have long held the belief that the obligations of UN membership offer a way of bringing Peiping under some form of international restraint.

Such members as Japan are particularly desirous of ensuring that Communist China be a party to any big-power agreement on banning nuclear tests or on other forms of disarmament. They point out that since any such agreement will

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