


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13 April 1961

# CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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31-228520

NO CHANGE IN CLASS. E1  
E1 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS, S, C  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 01/01/00  
01/01/00

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

## CONGO

Maneuvering is continuing between officials of the Stanleyville and Leopoldville regimes. A meeting between Gizenga and members of Ileo's cabinet reportedly scheduled for 10 April did not take place. Officials in both capitals apparently are becoming increasingly distrustful of each other. Leopoldville Provincial President Kamitatu, who has been a leader in the efforts to bring the two sides together, now believes that negotiations will be postponed at least until next week.

The chief causes of the postponement apparently were an order from Gizenga "dismissing" Kasavubu and an attempt by Mobutu at unilateral negotiations with officers of Gizenga's forces. Gizenga, who claims that as acting head of the "legitimate government" he is empowered to remove the chief of state if he proves unfit to govern, has issued a decree replacing Kasavubu with a "presidential college" composed of the ministers of Lumumba's cabinet who now are in Stanleyville and Cairo.

Mobutu flew to Bumba on 9 April, allegedly to meet General Lundula, Gizenga's army commander. However, according to Kamitatu, Lundula refuses to operate inde-

pendently of Gizenga, and Mobutu's trip apparently was fruitless. Gizenga reportedly is unwilling to go to any negotiations without Kamitatu, who would refuse to attend any talks in which Mobutu is a participant.

UN-Congolese Relations

The possibility remains of new violence in the lower Congo river area between the Congolese and the UN Command. In reply to Hammarskjold's proposal that a token Nigerian police unit be admitted to Matadi, Kasavubu insisted on a phased arrival. This was deemed unsatisfactory by the secretary general, but he told a group of Western representatives on 8 April that the reply did not warrant strong UN action. Hammarskjold implied that he hoped to gain further concessions from the Congolese by negotiation:

Congolese officials in Leopoldville were told on 11 April that UN chief representative Dayal would return to the Congo. Foreign Minister Domboko asserted this would lead to new incidents between the UN and the Congolese forces. He said that no UN forces would be allowed in Matadi and that the Indian contingent presently being sea-lifted would be fired on if it attempted to land there.

Foodstuffs are piling up at Leopoldville warehouses and sizable quantities of fish, bacon, and meat are going to waste.

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## CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

A senior official of the Congolese transport company blamed the UN for refusing to issue instructions for distribution and warned that company operations would soon be bottlenecked at Leopoldville, and that facilities at Matadi would have to be shut down. The Leopoldville problem, according to the company, has nothing to do with the issue of UN troops in Matadi.


Military Operations in Katanga

Tshombé is continuing his harassment of UN officials in an effort to halt the UN attempt to blunt his military operations around Kabalo. Elisabethville backs reportedly are no longer honoring UN checks, and Katanga

troops at the Kamina base, where some 1,400 Indian troops are stationed, are maintaining roadblocks and mining roads in the area. The UN has reinforced its contingent of Ethiopians at Kabalo; a spokesman for the organization said on 10 April that the UN was in "complete control" of the town.

Efforts to airlift 1,200 Indian troops to Katanga from the Tanganyika port of Dar es Salaam, where the US transport Blatchford remains with some 2,300 Indian troops on board, are stalemated for lack of suitable aviation fuel in Tanganyika and the limited airport facilities there. The UN apparently is attempting to airlift all or part of the Indian contingent in UN aircraft. Hammarström has about 15 C-54s at his disposal, which could carry 40 troops each trip. Any of the Indian troops not airlifted presumably would go by sea to Matadi, or to Lagos, Nigeria.

Hammarström fears that Tshombé's military operations foreshadow intensified civil war in Katanga unless the UN can promptly establish its authority. He believes that Tshombé's moves are an effort to undercut Jason Sendwe, who on 7 April proclaimed himself chief of the Lualaba state and called on its people to resist Tshombé's troops. The secretary general said that he is coming to the conclusion that Tshombé is "simply a criminal and outlaw" and that the element of force on Tshombé's side in diplomatic bargaining with the UN must be removed.


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
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

White mercenaries played a crucial role in the military effort against the Baluba tribesmen of north Katanga;



Tshombé apparently is under pressure from traditionalist leaders in the Katanga legislature, who have introduced a bill calling for the establishment of a prime minister's office. Under this system Tshombé as president would have a largely symbolic role, and actual power would be wielded by the premier. The traditionalists reportedly hope to install their spokesman, Interior Minister Munongo, in the new office. Munongo is an extreme conservative who is strongly opposed to the Belgians and is generally unfriendly to other Europeans.

Belgian Attitudes



Nevertheless, the Socialist Paul-Henri Spaak, who will most likely be the next foreign minister, is expected to adopt a more cooperative attitude toward the UN and is said to be planning to absorb the Ministry of African Affairs into the Foreign Ministry, in the hope of eliminating a major source of pro-Katanga influence and an important channel for undercover dealings with Tshombé. The new government, however, would not advocate a Congo policy which would seriously arouse the Belgian public and jeopardize the prospects for the domestic reforms in which the electorate is primarily interested.

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