

I. On 23 February OSS Bern signalled that source "PONTORMO" (836) had reported that an official of the German Embassy in Northern Italy was then in Switzerland for the purpose of transferring into Swiss francs some marks belonging to members of Kesselring's staff. Source stated that Kesselring and Rahn (former German ambassador to Italy) were ready to quit and even to fight against Hitler if the Allies could offer them a quid pro quo. The German official stated that Kesselring was moved by the feeling that his ultimate destiny, as things were going, was (1) to wind up in the Alpine "reduit" subordinate to SS officials, or (2) to die in a final resistance or be killed for not resisting. As long as he was in Italy, Kesselring still had power and was willing to use it by surrendering in return for some concession. It was not clear whether it was a question of concessions to Kesselring and his staff or troops personally, or whether it was a question of concession to Germany in general. At any rate, Kesselring and his staff appeared to want usable post-war funds.

Source did not disclose name of German Embassy official but would do so and himself step out of the matter if Allies were interested. The official was to come to source again seeking help to sell the free marks at a good rate. Source stated that he would string him along in order to delay him for a few days.

OSS representative in Switzerland commented that he did not rate source very highly but did have independent reasons to believe that it was not impossible that Kesselring and Rahn might be preparing for

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something like this. He added that he was investigating the rumor through more direct and reliable channels.

II. 24 February. OSS Caserta wired OSS Bern that AFHQ was definitely interested in getting positive and authentic information to support the alleged disposition of Kesselring. The story had cropped up repeatedly, but there had never been proof of its accuracy. If Kesselring had wanted to dispatch an emissary with an official message it was thought that he could find ways of doing so. Meanwhile AFHQ would certainly not recommend to the Combined Chiefs of Staff any modification of unconditional surrender such as would be involved in promises, commitments or bargaining. Although Kesselring as a prisoner of war would undoubtedly be given the customary privileges of his rank, it was extremely doubtful that any modification of unconditional surrender would be made.

III. The London Daily Despatch on 24 February carried the story from Charles Clarke, its correspondent in Bern, that Kesselring had made secret overtures to the Allies, quoting a statement said to have been made by a member of Kesselring's entourage reported at the time to have been in Switzerland. According to Clarke's story, Kesselring offered to withdraw under Allied pressure leaving Northern Italian cities intact and preventing their destruction by Neo-Fascists. In return, Kesselring was said to have asked for a free retreat toward German territory where his soldiers could be used to maintain order. He also

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asked for assurances that he would not be considered a war criminal.

IV. 1 March. OSS Bern signalled that a second source had arrived in Bern 25 February having left Vienna on or about 12 February. Source for several years had been acquainted with one Hottel, described as one of the SS chiefs in Vienna who knew vaguely that source had indirect contacts with Americans in Switzerland. Before his departure from Vienna source had been informed by Hottel that Kaltenbrunner, Chief of the SD, wanted to see him. Kaltenbrunner informed source that he and Himmler were most anxious to end the war and, as a first step, were contemplating the liquidation of "war-mongers" within the Nazi Party, especially Bormann (Chief of Staff of the Chancery of the Party; member of War Cabinet; SS Obergruppenfuhrer; after 1941 Hess's successor in office). Himmler and Kaltenbrunner were most anxious to establish contact with the British and Americans and asked source to make an effort in this direction on his trip to Switzerland. They contemplated sending to Switzerland a high SS official who would speak on their behalf provided contact could be established.

Source, on his own initiative, suggested Alfred Potocki, brother of the former Polish minister to Washington, should be permitted to go to Switzerland with him as he felt Potocki had first class contacts with the British. Hottel immediately arranged an exit visa for Potocki and his mother. Potocki expected to proceed first to Leichtenstein where on 1 March he had not yet arrived.

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OSS representative in Bern stated that while he believed the source to be "rather light-weight," he considered the above approach interesting as a sign of the increasing disintegration within the Nazi Party and as an indication of Himmler's antics to prepare alibis. According to source, Himmler was then organizing the defense on the Eastern Front and was largely in command of that theatre of war.

V. 3 March. OSS representative in Bern reported that further conversation with source mentioned in Paragraph IV above, indicated that his SD contacts and information had more importance than was originally believed. Information from other good sources tended to bear out the indications given by source that Himmler, Kaltenbrunner and certain other high SS officials might not go along with the die-hard fanatics and might try to gain some immunity by serving in a transitional regime between Hitler and the occupational forces. They might possibly prefer this to the alternative of joining Hitler, Bormann, et al in the German "reduit." OSS representative again pointed out the statement earlier contributed to Kaltenbrunner that Himmler was anxious to liquidate war-mongers such as Bormann.

OSS representative further stated that, although persons of the Himmler, Kaltenbrunner type could naturally gain no immunity from us, as long as they believed this were possible, it might give us an opportunity to drive a wedge in the SD and thus to reduce the effectiveness of enemy plans for the German "reduit." Stating that he had no

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conscience about double-crossing types like Himmler and Kaltenbrunner, he said that through indirect channels he was arranging to have Hottel come to the Swiss Frontier where a trusted intermediary would meet him.

VI. 5 March. OSS representative in Bern signalled that through two close friends in the Swiss secret intelligence he was advised that an important Italian industrialist named Baron Parelli (the spelling of his name was uncertain) wished to facilitate contact between important German officials in Northern Italy and the Allies with the general view of terminating German resistance in Northern Italy. One of above-mentioned sources was a person well-known to the War Department "under (?) number 6028." Baron Parelli had been for many years Italian representative of Nash Kelvinator and claimed to be well-known in Detroit.

After a meeting between Baron Parelli and an intermediary, it seemed desirable to follow up the matter and rather unexpectedly OSS representative had been advised late on the day of 2 March by his Swiss secret intelligence friend that Standartenfuhrer Dollmann and Zimmer, who was reputedly Dollmann's aide, had arrived at the Swiss Frontier. Reports had it that Dollmann was exceedingly influential in Rome prior to its liberation and that he apparently claimed credit for having saved Rome from destruction. Reputedly he had built up a considerable fortune in connection with the ransoming of important

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individuals and generally, though sometimes for a price, had shown some sympathy for Italians*

OSS intermediary, who was proceeding to Lugano on other business, met Dollmann, Zimmer and Parelli and a Swiss intelligence officer at Lugano on 3 March. To the Swiss intermediary, Dollmann had apparently claimed that he represented Kesseiring, Rahn (Nazi diplomatic representative in Italy), Wolff (senior SS and police leader, Italy), and Carster or Harster (identity unknown); but to OSS intermediary he never specifically so stated. To the latter he indicated only that after consultations at Fasano (Fasana ? Venice area or Istria ?), and subject to confirmation on 6 March, he would return to Switzerland on Thursday, 8 March, with credentials and definite proposals. The nature of the proposals were not indicated but from other talks which intermediaries had, OSS representative assumed that they would bear upon the future disposition of German forces in Northern Italy.

As a real test of Dollmann's sincerity and ability to act, it was suggested that the release of certain Italian patriots be promptly effected. (One of these being Parri, otherwise known as Maurizio, a CLN representative who had been arrested by the Germans in Turin. On 8 March OSS representative signalled that he had been told Parri was being released. See paragraph VII below.) OSS intermediary gave Dollmann no name; Dollmann probably believed that he was associating with a representative of the State Department.

*Eugen Dollman has been described as Himmler's personal envoy in Italy, where he has lived for years. He speaks fluent Italian, and resided in Rome before liberation.

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On 5 March OSS representative stated it was not yet clear whether this move of Dollmann's was separate from or parallel to the earlier negotiations mentioned in paragraphs IV and V, but he was inclined to believe that as far as the North Italian situation was concerned, they would merge if, in fact, Dollmann was acting for Kesselring, Rahn, et al. Without clarification of Dollmann's role, there was naturally no mention made of the Himmler, Kaltenbrunner line.

OSS representative stated that if Dollmann returned he would arrange to find out what he had to say. If this should be of a nature to facilitate unconditional surrender of the German forces in Northern Italy, he suggested that it might be desirable to arrange a military contact to take place on the Swiss side of the Frontier.

He remarked that in spite of AFHQ's observations that if Kesselring wished to dispatch an emissary with an official message he could always find ways of doing it, it should be remembered that those around Kesselring who might wish to facilitate a surrender could act only with the greatest secrecy lest their movements be betrayed by fanatic Nazis in Kesselring's entourage. Thus, he pointed out, the normal procedure of sending an airplane or messenger to our lines might prove difficult, though it was relatively easy for high officials to come to Switzerland, as they had been doing continuously over a long period, without arousing suspicion.

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OSS representative in Bern stated that he had confidence in the Swiss through whom he was dealing and further pointed out that all Swiss interests lay in the facilitation of a peaceful surrender of Germans in North Italy.

VII. On 8 March, OSS representative in Switzerland signalled that Waffen SS General Karl Wolff, together with an OKW representative presumably from Kesselring's staff, plus Dollmann and Zimmer arrived in Lugano that morning allegedly prepared to talk definitely. If this were confirmed, he would see what they had to say. He had been told also that in answer to his request Parri was about to be liberated. If both these reports were true, OSS representative suggested that a high SACMED authority be prepared to go to Bern. Said representative could, with absolute secrecy, arrange entry into Switzerland in civilian clothes, and secret cooperation of local authorities could be assured. There was nothing unusual in this as high military authorities from SHAEF constantly came to Bern.

OSS representative thought that the potentialities of these developments were so far-reaching that they justified immediate consideration in the highest quarters. If Wolff were really working with Kesselring, these two might effect an unconditional surrender provided absolute secrecy could be preserved.

The question remained, how much did Himmler know about this?

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VIII. Meanwhile, on 12 February, OSS Caserta had signalled Bern that an officer named Adriano of CLN, Venice, would shortly arrive in Switzerland and seek to contact OSS. According to reports, he would bring information about several high German officers in the Venice area who were said to be part of a German insurrectionary movement and disposed to collaborate with Allied forces in that area. It was stated that our primary interest would be to ascertain everything possible about said German officers: their aims and motivations, and the strength, composition, leaders and disposition of the alleged insurrectionary movement. OSS Bern was told to facilitate contact and advise if contact were made. Warning was given that an attempt might be made to sell an elaborate military plan which should be treated with great caution.

Connection between the reported Adriano deal and the alleged arrival of Wolff, Dollmann, Zimmer et al is not apparent, nor has there yet been reported the arrival of Adriano in Switzerland.

IX. Reference the Adriano story, the following was reported from OSS Florence:

1. Starting 10 February, military command of Venice was in contact with Venice Platzkommandantur, who, in turn, stated he represented German insurrection movement and was in touch with Kesselring. Desired to meet Allied officer to present proposals and receive a reply for a surrender of troops operating in Italy. On 10 February, Liberation

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Headquarters had sent Adriano to Switzerland to contact OSS and make the proposals. It was said he could approach Kesselring with the following:

- 1) Through Paulus to persuade Von Arnim to join Anti-Nazis.
- 2) The three Generals to bring about collapse of the Front.
- 3) Allies to land at several points on the Adriatic.
- 4) Parachutists to land in Upper Brenta Valley to isolate Kesselring's HQ from Germany.
- *5) Guarantee Kesselring and a few others not to be considered war criminals.
- 6) Guarantee German people not to be exterminated nor sterilized.
- 7) Leave the three Generals with an appearance of authority, presumably as police service.

Reliability of above report is questioned.

2. A second North Italian Source reported 10 February that from various Sub-sources, chiefly German Consul in Turin, the Germans had declared that they would like to make a separate peace in Italy and to meet an American Officer to present their proposals.

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X. On 8 March, OSS Caserta notified OSS representative that AFHQ was considering the question of whether or not a representative should be sent to Switzerland for a possible meeting with German authorities. In the meanwhile, OSS representative should promise nothing but should secure whatever information he could, especially on the reliability of the parties involved and details of the Kesselring - Himmler relationship.

XI. 9 March. OSS representative in Switzerland signalled that Wolff had indicated a willingness to attempt developing a program to take Northern Italy out of the conflict. Wolff considered that a mere military surrender would be difficult to effect. He preferred that capitulation be preceded by a statement to the German people from German leaders in North Italy, that any further struggle was hopeless and would merely cause needless German bloodshed and destruction. Wolff stated that Bohn was in accord with him but that Kesselring whose adherence was essential had not been won over.

Wolff was proceeding immediately to join Kesselring and endeavor to sell his program to him. Wolff would keep in touch with us.

Wolff had enquired about an alleged British agent, one Captain Ducker, who had recently been turned over to him by Graziani and released to return to SACMED via Switzerland (apparently with the idea of helping to negotiate a surrender). Wolff was puzzled as to what role Captain Ducker was really playing.

(On 13 March, OSS Bern signalled that Ducker had turned out to be a British SOE agent named Lt. Mallaby who had used this clever ruse

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in order to get out of Italy and report to SOE. Being out on parole, he proposed to return to Wolff's HQ where two other British officers had been left as hostages. Ducker had already spent a week in a Swiss internment camp, and OSS representative, without disclosing the background, had arranged that Mallaby wait in Switzerland as there was no time limit on his parole. If there were a further meeting with Wolff, the matter could easily be cleared inasmuch as Mallaby's story checked with Wolff's).

Parri ("Maurizio", CLN agent mentioned in paragraph VI above) had been delivered in Zurich unconditionally and even prior to any indication that OSS representative would see Wolff. OSS representative had seen him in good health the night of 8 March. Parri, at that time, did not know how he had been released. Stating that it was important that the circumstances of his release be kept secret, OSS representative proposed that when Parri's presence in Switzerland became known, it be hinted that he was freed in exchange for a German P/W.

Truthfully or not, Wolff claimed that Himmler was unaware of his activities.

Since Wolff apparently controlled all police on entire Swiss - Italian frontier, it was thought that we now had a means of quick contact with top German personalities in Northern Italy. An intermediary (Y) was to have further meeting with Wolff on 9 March and a full report would follow by regular channels.

XII. On 9 March, OSS Caserta informed OSS representative (who shall

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henceforth be called X) that Field Marshal Alexander had outlined to Marshal Brook a proposed plan involving the dispatch to Switzerland of two senior staff officers who might meet with German representatives. OSS had been directed to submit a plan for all necessary steps, including arrangements for a meeting place in Switzerland and transportation to and from that place to Annemasse or vicinity. In addition OSS would be called upon to provide communications, clerical assistance, interpreters and all necessary safeguards for the security of the operation which, within OSS, was to be known by the code name SUNRISE.

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(Earlier in the day, Colonel Glavin had called a meeting of staff officers to outline the developments and to determine the manner in which OSS might meet whatever responsibilities it was asked to undertake. He cautioned that the success of the project depended upon absolute secrecy).

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XIII. 10 March. A supplementary report from X stated that Wolff had been accompanied to Zurich by Dollmann; Lt. Col. Wenner, his military expert; Zimmer and Parelli. X had consented to see only Wolff who, accompanied by a Swiss intermediary, came to his apartment on the evening of 8 March. X and Y (the intermediary mentioned in paragraph XI above) then talked to Wolff alone, and Y later interviewed Wolff and Dollmann.

It was apparent that Wolff was a distinctive personality. Everything indicated that he represented the more moderate element in the Waffen SS with a certain mixture of romanticism. He was the most dynamic personality in Northern Italy and - after Kesselring - the most powerful.

Wolff stated that the time had come when some German with the power to act should lead Germany out of the war. To end useless and material destruction he was willing to act and felt that he could persuade Kesselring to join him. As far as Northern Italy was concerned, he and Kesselring controlled the situation; and as far as Western Austria was concerned, his own authority included the Vorarlberg, Tyrol and the Brenner Pass with both Northern and Southern approaches. In contrast with the situation of 20 July 1944, Hitler and Himmler would be powerless to take effective countermeasures were Wolff and Kesselring to take joint action. Particularly because many Generals on the Western Front were waiting for someone to take the lead, their joint action would have vital repercussions. As far as

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his own personal safety was concerned, Wolff made no requests.

To bring about action Wolff envisaged the following procedure:

1) He would meet Kesselring, with whom for several years he claimed the closest personal relations, over the weekend of 10 - 11 March with the purpose of obtaining a definite commitment. Kesselring, who had insisted that throughout his long military career he had always kept his oath of allegiance and was now too old to change his ideas, would have the problem of reconciling any such proposals with his oath; but Wolff believed that Kesselring could be won over to the futility of the struggle and that, above his duty to the Fuehrer, was his duty to the German people.

2) With Kesselring he would draft an appeal to be signed by Kesselring, Bohn, himself and others, setting forth the uselessness of the struggle, their responsibility toward the German people to terminate it, and an appeal to military commanders and all concerned to disassociate themselves from the Himmler - Hitler control: The Germans would end all hostilities in Northern Italy.

3) In order to reach the German leaders and the German people, a radio and leaflet campaign would be prepared.

Wolff believed that were Kesselring won over, he would come secretly to Switzerland to meet Allied military representatives and to

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coordinate purely military measures of surrender based on the above appeal. Apparently no one in Kesselring's immediate staff was suited to do this for him; Roettiger, his Chief of Staff, was not yet acquainted with the project.

In addition to the release of Parri (already reported), Wolff, as evidence of his ability to act, prepared:

1) To discontinue active warfare against the Partisans, keeping up only the necessary pretence pending execution of the plan;

2) To release into Switzerland several hundred JEWS (Jews or Jedburghs ?) interned at Bozen. Wolf claimed that he had refused whatever ransom money had been offered for them, and if it had disappeared, it had been swallowed up by intermediaries;

3) To assume full responsibility for the safety and treatment of 350 British and American prisoners, of whom 150 were in the hospital at Mantua and 200 on the southern outskirts of that city. This, he claimed, accounted for all the British and American prisoners held in Northern Italy as the rest had recently been transferred to Germany;

4) To release into Switzerland Sogno Franci if said individual, who was a well-known patriot working with CLNAI and the British whose release Parri particularly desired, could be found;

5) To facilitate, insofar as he could, the return to

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North-Italy of all Italian officers then held in Germany who might, in the post-hostilities period, prove useful.

6) Wolff would welcome the help of Neurath whom he felt had considerable influence on Kesselring. He would invite Neurath to join him in Italy.

Early in February Wolff had seen Hitler and Himmler and advised them of the general hopelessness of the North Italian situation but had received from them no definite instructions.

X commented that, while it was necessary to withhold final judgment until the results of the Wolff - Kesselring conversations were known, he believed that this might present a very unique opportunity to shorten the war and to permit the occupation of Northern Italy and possibly, even, the penetration of Austria under the most favorable conditions. It might, also, wreck German plans for the establishment of a Maginot. X trusted that if he got word that Kesselring or another high military authority were coming to Switzerland, with the power to alter the course of military affairs, SACMED would be prepared to send to Switzerland an appropriate military representative. X wished it clearly understood that he had engaged in no negotiations; he had merely listened to Wolff's presentation and had stated, with no refutations on Wolff's part, that unconditional surrender was the only possible course.

X knew of no particularly close relations between Kesselring and Himmler.

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XIV. On 10 March, full details of the SURRISSE plan as approved by AFHQ were wired to Bern (and Washington). Col. Weil with fourteen personnel would proceed to Annemasse 11 March to join Crockett who arrived there 10 March to confer with X. This personnel would be kept in France as a pool to supplement whatever X could provide. They would be introduced into Switzerland only as they were needed and as security was assured. AFHQ had designated Col. Glavin as Secretariat for the conference, and he and one interpreter would accompany AFHQ staff conferences on the date later to be announced. X was to have full ^{discretion} ~~description~~ on the final choice of a meeting site. X was to secure from Wolff a statement that he, Wolff, and his selected associates would proceed to Switzerland at a date chosen by AFHQ. When X had notified Caserta that arrangements were completed AFHQ would move within twenty-four hours.

XV. On 11 March, X signalled that success of the operation depended upon complete secrecy. Pointing to the fact that he had not yet had final word from Wolff and that the cooperation of Kesselring was essential, He nevertheless implied that if this were acceptable to AFHQ, the two senior staff officers might well come to Annemasse in readiness for proposed meeting. In all events, he could meet with initial personnel requirements provided OSS Caserta supplied the communications. He had not yet mentioned the affair to his British SOE or SI colleagues, though he could readily work with either or both if it were so desired.

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No word whatever would be given to the Germans until AFHQ had given him clearance. In any event, he did not expect to hear from the Germans until 12 March at the earliest.

XVI. Col. Glavin signalled X that Weil and Party had left early that morning before the arrival of X's signal described in paragraph XV above. Since AFHQ had placed full responsibility on OSS alone to handle all arrangements, he did not deem it necessary or desirable to consult British colleagues.

XVII. On 12 March, X signalled that Parelli had just returned from seeing Wolff. Parelli stated that when Wolff had reached Pesano (HQ South), he had telephoned Kesselring's HQ only to find that Kesselring had just been summoned to Hitler's HQ. Wolff expected him back within three days, but there was a chance that he might never return. The meeting was, therefore, postponed pending word from Kesselring. X suggested that AFHQ consider whether they would be interested in contacting Wolff, assuming, of course, that he had a plan of action. Wolff had said that he would come to Switzerland at any time.

X had suggested to Parelli that Wolff indicate (a) What he proposed to do if Kesselring did not return; (b) What he would do if he likewise were ordered to report to the Fuehrer; (c) If he refused to report, what was his plan, and what forces would he dispose of to carry it out; (d) What areas could he temporarily control for possible contact with Allied forces even if the principal Army commanders

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did not cooperate.

X surmised that Kesselring's call to the Fuehrer's HQ might foreshadow an attempted evacuation of Northern Italy and that if Kesselring did not convince Hitler and Himmler that he would cooperate he might be given either a new command or prison.

XVIII. Supplementing this message (See paragraph XVII above) completing Parelli's report, X submitted the following:

1) Upon his return to Italy, Wolff had received a telegram from Kaltenbrunner advising him to avoid establishing contact in Switzerland as it might mean catastrophe for Kaltenbrunner's own plans. Upon investigation, Wolff had discovered that Harster, at the time of Dollmann's first trip to Switzerland, had wired Kaltenbrunner advising him that an attempt might be made to effect contacts in Switzerland. According to Parelli, Wolff felt that this wire was sent to cover Dollmann's track and that Harster was dependable. (X considered this explanation possible but difficult to verify).

2) Based on information that Mussolini had obtained Spanish consent for entry and was preparing to flee to Spain, he would be placed under armed guard.

3) Wolff considered that Obersturmbannfuhrer Wuensche, now believed to be hospitalized in France, might be useful to further his plans. (X asked Paris to give Bern full information on Wuensche's availability and sentiments.

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4) If trustworthy and available, Wuensch might be used as an exchange to cover the disappearance of Parri which Wolff, reputedly, was having difficulty explaining.

5) Wolff had claimed to have three milliard nominal value shares in Italian companies on the disposition of which he asked advice.

6) He had again enquired as to whether we had any requests for the facilitation of a return from Germany to Northern Italy of Italian officers who might be useful in the post-war period. (See paragraph XIII above). X had suggested no action which might compromise an already highly involved situation.

XIX. On 13 March, X signalled that for reasons of security Glavin and staff conferees should eventually enter Switzerland via Basel. As neither Wolff nor eventually Kesselring could be absent for any length of time at this crisis without awakening serious suspicion, the meeting place should be somewhere near the Swiss - Italian border. He had selected a quiet spot near Ascen/a.

XX. On 13 March, Glavin signalled X that although the Germans had not signified they were ready, AFHQ had decided to move at once. Two representatives, accompanied by Col. Glavin, would leave at noon that day for Lyon.

XXI. 13 March. According to a signal from Annemasse, the SUNRISE

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to Bern

Party arrived in Lyon at 1630 hours. They were to proceed to Annemasse 14 March to meet with X.

XXII. At 0114 hours 14 March. A signal was sent to SUNRISE Party at Annemasse stating that CIGS had enquired as to what arrangements had been made for the entry of AFHQ representatives into Switzerland and whether or not similar arrangements might be made for Russian generals. Had any further contact been made with Wolff?

235
from Caserta
to
Annemasse

XXIII. At 1750 hours 14 March, a reply from Annemasse stated that, under certain conditions, a single Soviet representative might be introduced into Switzerland provided he joined the SUNRISE Party as part of a group.

208
to
Caserta
from
Annemasse

XXIV. At 1930 hours 14 March, the SUNRISE Party requested that code names be issued for personalities involved in proposed negotiations. At 2345 14 March, code words were sent to SUNRISE Party.

405
to Bern

XXV. At 0149 hours 15 March, SUNRISE Party signalled that a conference between Col. Glavin, X and others concerned had been held at OSS HQ Annemasse and that arrangements had been made to cross the border the following day and arrive at Bern to await future developments.

210
to
Caserta
from
Annemasse

XXVI. At 0245 hours 15 March, a full report on the Annemasse

211
to
Caserta
from
Annemasse



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conference was signalled.

X, it was said, indicated that about three weeks ago, Kesselring had asked Neurath to meet Westphal, his Chief of Staff, and Blaskowitz, Commanding Army Group H. They were queried by Neurath for Kesselring to determine their views in respect to the need for negotiation with the Allies. (This information had been furnished to SHAEF through OSS).

With reference to X's suggestions to Parelli (See paragraph XVII above):

(1) Wolff proposed to go ahead even if Kesselring did not return but had pointed out that he would delay his action in an attempt to win over Kesselring's successor, if there were one; if he failed, he would then act alone.

(2) If Kesselring were not present, Wolff would not leave to report to Hitler. If Kesselring's successor had arrived, Wolff would delay his reply to such an order.

(3) If above-described conditions regarding Kesselring and his successor existed, Wolff would come to Switzerland with military advisors who would bring with them the answer as to what areas they could control.

Wolff further stated that he would be glad to take an OSS radio operator to his HQ who could keep him in touch with the SUNRISE Party. According to X, Wolff had taken a position described as an honorable one; he was committed to go through with his plans and decisions.

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Late information received through OSS contact with Wolff indicated that Wolff had narrowly missed death by Allied bombing as he returned from his last meeting in Switzerland.

Wolff had stated that Kaltenbrunner was then at Feldkirch; that in his judgment the time for any coup was with simultaneous offensives on East and West Fronts. Wolff sought advice on the disposal of Koehler and Borghese forces. Wolff pointed out that if Kaltenbrunner were to arrive at his HQ, he would be unable to leave without embarrassment or risk. (It was evident that on 13 March Wolff did not know that there was a successor being appointed for Kesselring).

Signal further stated that, judging from all available information, X had the feeling that Himmler sought peace; X considered that the potential results of an early meeting between AFHQ and qualified German representatives would (1) secure a full surrender, or (2) effect confusion behind the German lines, or (3) obstruct the development of a German Maquis, or (4) effect a combination of (2) and (3) in the event that (1) could not be realized.

Request was made for a daily military intelligence summary.

XXVII. At 1220 hours 15 March, word arrived that Glavin, Weil, Lennitzer and Airey had crossed the Frontier under civilian cover and were proceeding to Bern.

*213
to
Caserta
from
Annemasse

unnumbered
(1) from
Bern

XXVIII. 15 March. 1832 hours. SGS wired SUNRISE Party that Combined Chiefs of Staff had been notified of pertinent points in their message described in Paragraph XXIII above.

unnumbered
(2) from
Caserta
to
Bern

XXIX. SGS signalled that CCS had stated that Russian representatives would not join SUNRISE in Switzerland. SUNRISE was to carry out orders as circumstances permitted. Russians would take part in discussions at AFHQ on arrival of German delegation.

* 520
from
Bern

XXX.* 16 March. SUNRISE wired SGS that intermediaries between X and Critic had left Bern early 15 March and were expected back from Critic's quarters on Saturday or Sunday. Meantime, arrangements were being made so that Nicholson and McNeely might be near at hand for next meeting in the vicinity of Locarno.

* 530
(13) direct link
from
Bern

XXXI. 17 March. SUNRISE signalled SGS that intermediary had returned and that possibilities of conference between X and Critic looked favorable for Monday, 19 March.

* 3
from
Joshua

XXXII. 18 March. SUNRISE Party wired from vicinity of Locarno that Critic, who would appear on Monday, had given intermediary following information: Emperor had been put in command of Western

* Critic - Wolff
Emperor - Kesselring
Glazier - Vietinghof

Graduate - Zimmer
Nicholson - Lemnitzer
McNeely - Airey

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Front and would be replaced by Glazier. While new appointment would delay any immediate move in Northern Italy, it might open up possibilities on the Western Front.

unnumbered
from
Joshua

XXXIII. 19 March. SUNRISE Party acknowledged SGS' authorization to meet Critic and his associates if situation developed to make this desirable.

* 540
(4) direct link

XXXIV. 20 March. SUNRISE signal summarized meeting with Critic held near Locarno 19 March. Following a long conference between X and Critic, Nicholson and McNeely had decided to meet with Critic. Nicholson told Critic that the problem resolved itself into whether Critic should try his hand with Glazier, or should proceed to Emperor's HQ on the Western Front before seeing Glazier. Critic had decided to leave on 20 March for Emperor's HQ for purpose of obtaining his support and return to make definite proposals to Glazier. His trip could not be accomplished in less than five days; it might take as much as seven.

Throughout the whole meeting, Critic made no reference to any conditions of surrender and did not attempt to bargain. It seemed possible, therefore, that Critic had already gone further with the Emperor than he had previously admitted.

* 541
from
Bern

XXXV. 21 March. SUNRISE signalled SGS that arrangements were being made for next meeting with Critic, assuming his mission were

TOP SECRET

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successful. Nicholson felt that Critic would come to next meeting either with definite plans and proposals or admit his inability to act. Approval of plan to wait in Switzerland for such a meeting was requested.

* 539
from
Bern

XXXVI. Colonel Glavin and Weil signalled brief statement for relay to 109.

* 538
from
Bern

XXXVII. 21 March. McNeely forwarded summary of intelligence obtained at meeting of Critic on 19 March, giving an estimate of Critic himself and a report as to the forces whom Critic claimed to control in the rear areas.

To
* 5 Bern
(Genesis)
from
Caserta

XXXVIII. 21 March. SGS approved SUNRISE Party's remaining in Switzerland to await next contact with Critic.

* 549
from Bern

XXXIX. 22 March. Movement report from Glavin and Weil.

* 489
to
Bern
from
Caserta

XL. 22 March. Wire to Glavin and Weil assured them that all OSS plans had been made for North Italian capitulation insofar as was practicable.

* 547
from
Bern

XLI. 23 March. Recommendation from Nicholson and McNeely that Farri as a security measure be removed from Switzerland and taken to Italy for conferences. Before he left Switzerland he would have

conferred with Cadorna and could bring latest appraisal of situation in North Italy to AFHQ.

*6 to Joshua
*497 to Bern
from
Caserta

XLII. 24 March. SGS signalled approval of trip for Parri an escort.

*564
from
Bern

XLIII. 24 March. SUNRISE signalled SGS suggesting that Cadorna accompany Parri to Caserta. (Parri would travel under pseudonym Amalfi; Cadorna as Montesano).

*566
from
Bern

XLIV. 25 March. Colonel Glavin signalled orders that OSS, taking instructions from AFHQ, should handle Parri and Cadorna during their stay in Southern Italy.

*509
from
Caserta
to
Bern

XLV. 25 March. SGS signalled approval that Cadorna accompany Parri.

*574
from
Bern

XLVI. 25 March. Nicholson signalled SGS that X and McNeely had just returned from conferences with 476 and two Swiss intermediaries, one of the latter two having been in contact with Critic's aide, Graduate, who travelled between Milan and the frontier. According to Graduate, Critic's HQ had had no word from him until late 24 March, when it was established that Critic could not return before Wednesday, 28 March. Critic hoped that the SUNRISE Party "would not go away angry".

[REDACTED]

* 576 from
Bern
* 10 from
Genesis
to
Caserta

XLVII. 27 March. Nicholson wired SGS that there had been no word from Critic the previous evening.

Although it was too early to comment on the significance of the report with relation to SUNRISE, Rahn and Harster had both been returned to Germany and, it was understood, were participating in a meeting at Hitler's HQ.

* 575 from
Bern
* 9 from
Genesis
to
Caserta

XLVIII. 27 March. Nicholson and McNeely sent SGS their appreciation of the situation: (See # 575 from Bern). Critic's free movements, his frequent absences from his HQ, the relay of telephone messages between Emperor's HQ and Milan, and the complicity of members of his staff, all suggested a well-accepted and sympathetic background for surrender, at least in SS circles. In the event of Critic's failure to return, or further delay, there was no alternative left but for the SUNRISE Party to return to AFHQ, leaving the original OSS channels open for continued contact.

* 588
from
Bern

XLIX. 29 March. Nicholson and McNeely wired SGS a further appreciation of events. A considerable number of people were aware of SUNRISE, these including not only German authorities in North Italy but certain elements of Swiss SI and a few people in North Italian commercial and industrial circles. (See # 588 from Bern).



Critic was expected to return to his HQ the evening of 28 March.

(During the night of 28 - 29 March, after an exchange of telegrams between Caserta and Annemasse, a plane was sent to Lyon/Bron to pick up Parri and Cadorna).

L. 29 March. Nicholson signalled SGS that Parri and Cadorna had left for Caserta only with reluctance. They had been assured that every effort would be made to return them to North Italy when conditions permitted. He recommended that arrangements be made for them to confer with G-3, G-5 and other staff sections concerned with occupational problems, and to visit HQ AC and 15 AG

* 594 from Bern
* 15 from Genesis to Caserta

LI. 30 March. Nicholson wired SGS that Critic was then believed to have returned to his HQ, that the SUNRISE Party was leaving for Locarno to make arrangements for the next meeting which might take place over the weekend of 1 April. If the situation did not develop favorably, he recommended that the Party be permitted to return to Caserta.

* 603 from Bern
* 16 from Genesis to Caserta

LI a. 31 March. In # 593 from Bern, McNeely requested that G-2 wire SUNRISE Party's appreciation of the situation (See Paragraphs XLVIII and XLIX) to G-2 Washington and DMI, London.

* 593 from Bern





* 566
to
Bern

LI b. 2 April. SGS replied that Chief of Staff deemed it unwise to repeat mere opinions to higher headquarters. Reports to G-2 Washington and DMI would be confined to facts.

* 555
to
Bern

LII. 31 March. SGS queried the SUNRISE Party as to how much Parri and Cadorna knew about SUNRISE-CROSSWORD.

* 610 from
Bern
* 17 from
Genesis
to
Caenta

LIII. 1 April. Nicholson and McNeely wired SGS that it was confirmed that Critic had returned to his HQ after having received a sympathetic hearing from the Emperor who had authorized him to speak with Glazier in his behalf. While Critic intended to be in Switzerland Monday or Tuesday, 2 or 3 April, Nicholson and McNeely did not pin much hope on his bringing Glazier as was intended. They thought, however, that in order to reinsure himself personally, Critic would come with some offer, probably impractical, dealing with the rear areas under his control.

* 614
from
Bern

LIV. 2 April. Nicholson confirmed his earlier message that Parri and Cadorna knew nothing about SUNRISE-CROSSWORD.

* 616 from
Bern

LV. 2 April. Request was made that a special plane be sent to Lyon 3 April to pick up SUNRISE Party.

* 26 from
Genesis

LVI. 3 April. 0345 "B" hours. Word was sent to Bern and



* 279 to
Annunasse ; * 572 to Bern

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Annemasse that a plane would arrive at Lyon that afternoon.

617
from
Bern

LVII. 3 April. 1515 hours. Word came from Nicholson and McNeely (# 617 from Bern) that Parilli had crossed the border the morning of 2 April but had not been accompanied by Critic who had been warned by Himmler that he was not to leave Italy. Critic had apparently conferred with Glazier, according to Parilli's report, but, as Nicholson and McNeely noted, neither Critic nor Glazier had sent any suggestions via Parilli as to what should happen next. Nicholson and McNeely had sent word back to Critic that if he and Glazier wished to surrender, they could send parlementaires to the Allies directly through the lines. Critic was reminded of his undertaking not to carry out Hitler's orders for the destruction of Northern Italy.

In view of developments, Nicholson and McNeely recommended they be allowed to return to Caserta.

581 to
Bern

LVIII. 3 April. SGS wired SUNRISE that D/SAC had approved their return on 4 April.

(Entire SUNRISE Party arrived at Marchinese the afternoon of 4 April).

631 from
Bern

LIX. 7 April. X signalled that the Swiss press had published

the story that two members of the Italian resistance had been liberated by the Germans to take part in peace negotiations with the Allies. Ferruccio Parri had been one of them.

LX. 7 April. X signalled that Graduate had arrived Friday evening, 6 April, reporting that Critic was meeting with Glazier and others Friday night and Saturday morning and that Parilli was bringing a full report.

* 635
from
Bern

LXI. 7 April. Nicholson wired to X a paraphrase of SAC message to CCS, summarizing the SUNRISE-CROSSWORD appreciation of developments (See # 595 to Bern).

* 595
to
Bern

LXII. 8 April. X wired that Parilli had arrived in Switzerland. A full report would be forthcoming.

* 643
from
Bern

LXIII. 9 April. # 647 from Bern gave a full account of Parilli's report. He had delivered SUNRISE' messages to Critic on 3 April. Critic had met with Glazier the night of the 5th and again the afternoon of the 7th.

* 647
from
Bern

On 6 April Critic had met with his commanders and cautioned each to prevent destruction within his own area. A statement dictated by Critic as representing Glazier's position had been submitted to X. This, which was forwarded in its original German

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in # 646 from Bern, set forth stipulations of a surrender with military honors and the maintenance of a substantial portion of the Army Group as a future instrument of order inside Germany. Pointing out that the matter should be settled, if possible, on one trip, Glazier, Roettiger and Critic had joined in an urgent request that they be given a draft of the capitulation which they were expected to sign. Critic had stated that Glazier was ready to sign an unconditional surrender if it could be put in a form which was consonant with his honor. Parilli and Graduate were waiting in Switzerland in case SUNRISE had any message to send to Critic or wished to give X any suggestions SUNRISE wished to convey as coming from X.

612
to
Bern

LXIV. 9 April. Nicholson's reply to X suggested a message which was to come from X after consultation with "his military advisers": It was impossible to send a draft copy of any capitulation, as, in accordance with the usages of war this was only to be handed to parlementaires on their arrival at an appropriate HQ. Any parlementaires who came through the lines should include officers with absolute authority to act in the name of the commander.

Nicholson cautioned X against giving the Germans any excuse for claiming that the Allies were negotiating. The sole object was to arrange for parlementaires to come to AFHQ with full powers to arrange the details of a military surrender. X was further cautioned against sending to the Germans, through inter-

mediaries, anything in writing which the Germans could use to suggest that negotiations were in progress.

LXV. 9 April. X signalled the substance of a second memo from Critic (See # 648 from Bern), wherein Critic confirmed his obligations with regard to preventing destruction in North Italy but stated that in some instances this would be impossible to control. Critic further stated that military action against the Partisans could only be withheld insofar as the Partisans desisted from guerrilla warfare. Critic emphasized that some exchange for Parri and Usmiani was most urgent, or at least a written indication that something in the way of an exchange was being prepared.

* 648
from
Bern

LXVI. 10 April. X assured Nicholson that nothing had been done which the Germans could construe as evidence that actual negotiations were in progress. Nicholson's message (See Paragraph LXIV above) had been conveyed to Parilli and Graduate, both of whom were returning to Fasano the night of 10 April.

* 662
from
Bern

If the matter were not settled by the weekend of 15 April, X asked advice on the possibility of sending 476 and a radio operator to Milan in order to facilitate communications.

LXVII. 11 April. X signalled Nicholson that 476 was convinced

* 668
from
Bern

[REDACTED]

he could do a profitable service if sent to Milan. The security question at this late date did not seem to offer serious risks.

* 626
to
Bern

LXVIII. 11 April. Nicholson signalled X that he and McNeely felt that the Germans might have been using Critic and the SUNRISE project in an effort to drive a wedge between the Anglo-Americans and the Russians. There was evidence that the Germans had the story about Parri and Cadorna being involved in negotiations. It was, therefore, of greatest importance not to connect Parri and Cadorna with SUNRISE-CROSSWORD.

* 627
to
Bern

LXIX. 11 April. In answer to a message noted in LXV above, Nicholson signalled X that there were no German officers willing to serve as an exchange for Parri.

* 671
from
Bern

LXX. 12 April. X signalled Nicholson saying that, in spite of the evidence in hand, he considered that there was at least a fifty per cent chance that Critic's behavior was genuine. He realized, nevertheless, that we must play our cards close to our chest and would act accordingly. He awaited Nicholson's permission to show the contents of the cable described in Paragraph LXVIII above to 476. Barnes, who was thoroughly briefed, would handle SUNRISE with 476 were X called to Paris as he well might be
13 - 15 April.



LXXI. 12 April. X signalled Nicholson suggesting that he
interview Mallaby who, through personal contact, might be able
to furnish an evaluation of Critic's motives.

* 667
from
Bern

LXXII. 13 April. X signalled that Parrilli was expected to return 14 - 15 April, that Critic was still hopeful of results and had had phone call from the Emperor's new HQ. Von Pohl, who had 50,000 men in his command, would approve surrender.

* 684
from
Barr

LXXIII. 13 April. X signalled that he had borrowed radio operator from Hyde and had sent him into Milan to "maintain contact with SUNRISE group" and would communicate direct to us. Operator told nothing about SUNRISE. It was important to keep in mind that any message from him would be material received from Critic, Parrilli, Graduate, et al, and all messages must, therefore, be carefully screened.

* 685
from
Barr

LXXIV. 13 April. SGS wired X that after careful consideration they disapproved 476's proposed trip to Milan.

* 633
to
Barr

There was no satisfactory evidence that Critic had not visited the Emperor, that SGS believed there was always an even chance that the Germans would attempt to make trouble between the Allies.

X was given permission to show his cable # 626 from Nicholson to 476.

LXXV. 14 April. Message in German stated that radio operator Walter had safely arrived in Milan, asked if letter for 110 was meant for Critic. Who was 476? Request that the staff map of Rovereto area

* 1
from
Fairbury

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be given the Professor.

LXXVI. 14 April. Signal from McNeely to l10 stated that Critic had been making contacts with such Allied secret agencies with which he could get in touch.

On 7 April, in a meeting at Bogliasco attended by Mussolini, Glazier, Critic, Roettiger, Dollmann and others, it had been decided to carry out a fighting withdrawal to the Adige.

At an unspecified date, Critic had informed one subsource that he knew negotiations had taken place between a representative of the Allied Command and Graziani and Pavolini, which negotiations were viewed with disfavor by the German Command in Italy. Nicholson commented that this seemed to fit in with Mallaby's story about his meeting with Graziani.

According to Critic, the German Command in Italy was afraid of possible Gestapo reprisals, and they were waiting for the inevitable disintegration of Germany which they considered imminent.

McNeely's own view was that Critic hoped to have it both ways in that, while waiting for the disintegration of Germany and planning a fighting withdrawal, he and other CROSSWORD personalities felt they were insuring themselves and at the same time helping general German policy by arousing Russian suspicion of Anglo-American intentions.

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643
to
Bevn

LXXVII. 15 April. Message to Hyde requested all details on instructions given to Walter and precise details as to contents of letter.

LXXVIII. 15 April. Message in German from Walter addressed to Weibel in Lucerne said connections with Swiss telephone exchange BAMBURG had been good for several days.

LXXIX. 15 April. Message from 679 (Barnes) stated that Graduate had come to Lugano at noon that day, that Professor Husmann and Weibel had conferred for an hour and a half at Luzerne.

Graduate carried a personal letter from Critic stating in substance that he regretted the death of President Roosevelt; and whatever happened X could count on Critic since he was convinced of the logic of ideas discussed (in first meeting 19 March); that in spite of new difficulties, Critic was convinced of the final success of "their mutual effort".

Graduate reported that he had reached Fassano 11 April. Critic had been "very pleased" with the message Graduate brought him (See Paragraph LXIV for Nicholson's suggested message that no draft copy of any capitulation could be handed to him until the arrival of parlementaires at an appropriate HQ). Critic and Graduate had left Fassano to visit Glazier who gave them a cold reception, the reason

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being that Glazier had heard that a British officer, name unknown, had contacted a staff officer of the Ligurian Corps and asked to be presented to Glazier for the purpose of discussing surrender. This Englishman referred to negotiations which had already been had between Glazier and X, identifying X by his correct name.

Glazier did not see the Englishman but, believing himself betrayed, threatened to send a cover-up letter to Joedl stating that the Allies wished to push negotiations but that Glazier did not wish to do so until he had received Joedl's clearance. Rahn, Hoettiger and Critic had persuaded Glazier not to send the letter.

13 April, Himmler called Critic and instructed him to leave immediately for Berlin by fastest possible means. Instead, Critic sent Himmler a letter by officer courier stating that it was useless for him to come to Himmler, that the Allied invasion of Germany would be a complete success and that Himmler should come to Critic and make use of existing Allied contacts to surrender the whole of Germany to the Allies.

14 April, Himmler called Critic's HQ first in the morning and again in the afternoon asking why Critic had not arrived. Critic's adjutant told him that Critic was absent but that a special courier had been sent with a message to Himmler.

Graduate stated that Critic was now determined to surrender with or without the consent of Glazier. Though he was not completely

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sure of Glazier, Critic had seen the Chief Commanders on 12 and 13 April and felt sure they were with him regardless of Glazier. Critic begged X to stop any intensified offensive. He would take "full responsibility and guarantee that during present week all would be surrendered". Parilli was waiting for Himmler's reply and would join Weibel, Husmann and Graduate to meet with X and 476, planning to be in Bern late the night of 16 April.

Gauleiter Hofer, who was completely in accord with Critic was reported to have talked to Hitler and Himmler 12 April and to have learned that they planned to stay in Berlin and, instead of discussing the "reduit", were crazily talking of a new offensive.

LXXX. 16 April. Further signal from 679 gave intelligence items reported by Graduate:

1. The location of Glazier's HQ at Recoaro (South of Rovereto).
2. That Rauff, second in command of SS in Italy, was now wholly in accord with Critic.
3. That the territory East of the Isonzo River had been transferred from Glazier's command to Loehr's. Pohl had placed all his Luftwaffe personnel West of the Isonzo and, subsequent to Critic's letter to Himmler, had blocked the Brenner with flak to protect against entry from the West.

Radio operator Walter was secure in Graduate's house in Milan, but that bombings were making life and radio transmission difficult.

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LXXXI. 16 April. X signalled for further information on Critic's alleged contacts with other Allied agencies. Did Nicholson and McNeely know anything about the Englishman who had used X's name? The letter given Walter by Hyde was completely innocuous. It had now been recovered.

LXXXII. 17 April. Message from X (copy of which was sent to Paris for 109) supplemented earlier reports on the 15 April conference. (See Paragraphs LXXIX and LXXX above). Parilli had seen Critic's letter to Himmler which was dispatched by Sayle who reached Berlin at 1700 hours 15 April.

At 0700 hours 16 April Rauff (Critic's second in command of SS) called Parilli to Fasano where Venner told him that after receiving Critic's letter, Himmler had called Critic several times. Critic had left for Berlin via Munich where he was reported to have arrived 1000 hours 16 April. There was no confirmation of his arrival in Berlin.

Critic had given to Venner a message to be delivered by Farrilli to X to the effect that Critic was going to Berlin because he thought there was a chance to do something for the entire German people. He expected to return 17 April. Critic ordered Graduate to await news at the Chiasso frontier and check periodically at the HQ at Fasano.

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X commented that Himmler might now eliminate Critic; alternatively, he might use Critic to establish some contact for Himmler himself. X would naturally refuse to have anything to do with the latter alternative.