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OF THE UNITED STATES

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

AUSTRIAN SECURITY CAPABILITIES FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION FORCES



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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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AUSTRIAN SECURITY CAPABILITIES FOLLOWING WITHDRAWAL OF OCCUPATION FORCES

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Austria's capability for maintaining its independence and security against internal and external pressures for at least one year following the simultaneous withdrawal of all occupation forces

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Communist Party in Austria remains weak

The Austrian population is strongly anti-Communist.

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3. If four-power troop withdrawal did not take place until 90 days after ratification of an Austrian treaty

5. Austria would not be able to defend itself against an invasion by Satellite forces, but we believe the USSR would be unlikely to risk an open Satellite invasion of Austria unless the Kremlin is prepared to accept general war.

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DISCUSSION

6. *Austria's Political and Economic Stability.*
There has been relatively little change in Austria's over-all stability and pro-Western orientation

[redacted] The government and the vast majority of the people, [redacted]

[redacted] continue to be strongly anti-Communist. The Communist vote in the 1949 national elections did not exceed about 5 percent in any zone.

While troop withdrawal would eliminate a burden on the Austrian economy, Austria still would not be self-supporting and cessation of US aid would cause serious economic deterioration. A withdrawal of US economic and political support would also

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3. *Probable Soviet Intentions.*

We believe that the USSR would estimate that the chances were poor for carrying off a successful coup with indigenous Austrian Communist forces after withdrawal of occupation troops. A Soviet attempt to support such

a coup covertly from the adjacent Satellites on a scale sufficient to insure success would be difficult to conceal. We believe that the Kremlin would estimate that such an attempt would provoke a strong Western reaction. For the same reason, we believe that the Kremlin would be unlikely to risk an open Satellite invasion of Austria, unless the Kremlin is prepared to accept general war.

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