

1.3 (2) 4
SNIE [REDACTED]
7 December 1961

LBJ LIBRARY
Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 89-226
Document # 1

[REDACTED]

SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
NUMBER [REDACTED]

1.3 (2) 4

1.3 (2) 4

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN KATANGA

Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 7 December 1961. Concurring were The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

Approved for Release
Date 18 Jan 1990

[REDACTED]

No 2

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DISSEMINATION NOTICE**

1. This estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is for the information and use of the recipient and of persons under his jurisdiction on a need to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments.

- a. Director of Intelligence and Research, for the Department of State
- b. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- c. Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
- d. Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
- e. Director of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force
- f. Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for The Joint Staff
- g. Director of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
- h. Assistant Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
- i. Director of NSA, for the National Security Agency
- j. Assistant Director for Central Reference, CIA, for any other Department or Agency.

2. This copy may be retained or destroyed by burning in accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with the Office of Central Reference, CIA.

3. When an estimate is disseminated overseas, the overseas recipients may retain it for a period not in excess of one year. At the end of this period, the estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, or permission should be requested of the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with IAC-D-69/2, 22 June 1953.

4. The title of this estimate when used separately from the text, should be classified:
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

WARNING

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

DISTRIBUTION:

White House
National Security Council
Department of State
Department of Defense
Atomic Energy Commission
Federal Bureau of Investigation



POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN KATANGA

THE PROBLEM

To assess (a) the possibilities for negotiation between the Central Government and Katanga; (b) the consequences of Tshombe's departure or ouster from Katanga; (c) the consequences of a continued impasse between the Central Government and Katanga.¹

THE ESTIMATE

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The reintegration of Katanga province into the Congo Republic is now becoming such a critical issue as to threaten the position of Prime Minister Cyrillie Adoula. At the moment, negotiations between Adoula and Katanga President Moise Tshombe are stymied by the inability of either to bring effective pressure to bear on the other. The essential issue is the form of political organization for the Congo: confederation as demanded by Tshombe or a federal-type arrangement with a fairly strong central government as held by Adoula and the moderates. However, the strict limitations on their bargaining powers—imposed by conditions beyond their control—make each reluctant and indeed unable to offer concessions to the other. Moreover, the fighting which has broken out during the past several days in the Elisabethville area probably will affect the possibility of initiating systematic discussions of the constitutional issue. Exactly how, it is as yet too early to tell.

¹ This estimate was prepared in the early days of renewed fighting between UN and Katangan forces. Accordingly, it is possible that assessments (a) and (c) may be overtaken by events.

II. SOURCES OF TSHOMBE'S STRENGTH

2. Tshombe receives strong backing throughout much of the province from his own Lunda tribal groups, and, in association with his chief lieutenants, Interior Minister Munongo and Foreign Minister Kimba, enjoys tribal support throughout southern and eastern Katanga among the predominant non-Baluba peoples. Tshombe also obtains important financial resources from Katanga's mineral properties, which account for about 50 percent of the Congo's budgetary income and which are still largely owned and operated by Belgian interests. Katanga presently receives about \$44 million annually in tax revenues and dividends from the Union Minière and related companies. These contributions are paid to Katanga, via Brussels, and are used for Tshombe's military and other expenditures. Tshombe also receives considerable advice and guidance from the Union Minière managers in Katanga; they, in turn, are to some extent dependent upon him for protection and for the right to continue to operate.

3. White settlers in Northern Rhodesia and Angola fear an extension of the Congo's disorder into their areas. To prevent this, they are willing to give some political support and

to countenance the passage of some military supplies, mercenaries, and advisers to Tshombe. They are also willing to grant Katanga continued access to the sea for its exports. In Katanga, the remaining Belgian colons—upwards of 15,000—contribute to the comparatively healthy economy and provide badly-needed technical and administrative assistance. Moreover, some 500 Belgian colon "minutemen" and a 400-man European mercenary force constitute an effective core of military strength and in addition provide leadership to Katangan troops. The latter, up to the present at least, have proved superior to the Central Government's unruly army.

III. TSHOMBE'S ATTITUDE TOWARD NEGOTIATION

4. Tshombe harbors grave doubts about the wisdom of negotiating with Adoula. In his eyes, Leopoldville lacks sufficient political strength and administrative ability to govern effectively. He is afraid that the radicals holding important positions in the present administration will soon prevail over Adoula. In these circumstances, and recalling Lumumba's fate and his own earlier mistreatment at the hands of Congolese politicians, Tshombe fears for his personal safety should he go to Leopoldville. He fears for his political future should he accept any offer for high office in the present Central Government. He is also suspicious that any arrangement he might make with the Central Government concerning Katanga's revenues would fail to survive for very long once he gave up his "independence."

5. In Elisabethville, Tshombe is the strongest leader, but he is dependent upon the political support of his aides. It would be difficult for him to go far to meet Adoula's demands without incurring strong opposition from Munongo, Kimba, and their followers, the Lunda tribes, and the Europeans. Neither Munongo nor Kimba, the more extreme of the Katanga separatists, would be acceptable to the strong radical elements in the Central Government on whom Adoula

must depend, even if he personally could accept Tshombe.

6. In these circumstances, it is unlikely that Tshombe will undertake serious negotiation with the Central Government unless significant new pressures can be brought to bear on him. We explore below the various pressures which might be employed, including diplomatic and economic measures, moves by the Central Government, and actions by the UN.

IV. KATANGAN VULNERABILITY TO PRESSURE

7. Diplomatic pressure on Tshombe has been notably unsuccessful. The Belgian Government itself can exercise only limited authority over the many private Belgians and Belgian interests involved. There is probably little more that Premier Spaak can accomplish in view of his own political problems in Belgium. Because large sectors of public opinion in Europe are favorable to Tshombe, and because some moderates within African colonial and ex-colonial areas feel likewise, most of the European colonial and ex-colonial powers are unenthusiastic about applying pressure on him. In any case, we do not believe that mere persuasion, in the absence of strong military or economic pressure, will have any decisive effect upon Tshombe's position.

8. Presumably, economic pressure on Tshombe could be exercised through attempts to force the Union Minière, for example, to pay taxes to the Central Government instead of to Katanga, and to permit the Central Government to acquire dividends paid by commercial interests operating in Katanga. However, we believe these measures would take many months to prepare, and their usefulness would depend heavily on the willingness of the Belgian Government and other European commercial interests to cooperate fully in their execution. While these measures would—if effectively applied—substantially reduce the financial resources available to Tshombe, they probably would not in themselves force him to accept Adoula's

terms. Moreover, Tshombe could take countermeasures in Katanga itself which might blunt their effect.

9. Tshombe is weak in the northern half of Katanga, largely populated by the Baluba tribes. The Central Government is attempting to establish a Baluba state there, and has succeeded in stirring up some sentiment to that end. It has been assisted by some 2,000 troops from Stanleyville, whose entry into the region has been facilitated by the UN. However, even if such efforts should achieve some success, they would not get at the major sources of Tshombe's strength, would perhaps strengthen Gizengist influence in Katanga, and would open up the prospect of uncontrollable tribal warfare.

10. There would be a strong incentive for Tshombe to accommodate to the Central Government's terms if real strength and order developed in the areas now only nominally under Central Government control. If Tshombe ever came to realize that he was becoming isolated because the Central Government had effective armed forces, a functioning economy, and strong international support, then he would find it very difficult to hold out against negotiating some kind of arrangement satisfactory to the Central Government. However, the problems confronting the Central Government are so enormous that it would be many months before it could project so strong an image.

11. The greatest threat to the Katanga Government is that posed by UN military operations now going on in the province. Whatever may have been the immediate cause for the collapse of the cease-fire, the UN now appears to be attempting through a show of military force to convince Tshombe and his lieutenants that the die is cast and that he had best come to terms while he can still bargain. Given their present strength and deployment, UN forces will probably have great difficulty in accomplishing this, and may be able to do little more than maintain their present positions. With some reinforcement, which now seems to be taking place from

within the Congo, they may be able to establish limited control in certain areas. However, the withdrawal of forces from other parts of the Congo is leaving those areas dangerously exposed to new disorders arising from army indiscipline, tribal enmities, and political intrigues.

V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF TSHOMBE'S DEPARTURE OR OUSTER

12. It appears that pressure upon the Katanga Government for a negotiated agreement with Leopoldville will be very difficult to apply effectively. It is, of course, conceivable that Tshombe and his lieutenants might be removed by more forceful and direct means—assassination, accident, or full-scale UN intervention. In such an event, there would be a virtually complete political vacuum in the area. There is no obvious local leader who would be generally acceptable throughout Katanga. There would be aspirants for leadership, including some in the present Katanga Government, and a number of tribal enclaves might be established.

13. The most serious problem which would be posed by the destruction of the Katanga regime would be the danger of large-scale tribal warfare, either as a natural consequence of confusion in the wake of Tshombe's removal, or as the result of an attempt by the Central Government to impose an administration unacceptable, on tribal or other grounds, in considerable portions of Katanga. If it were to avoid complete chaos, the UN would almost certainly be forced to exercise extensive, if not virtually complete, governing authority in Katanga for an indefinite period.

14. In the event that Tshombe should be eliminated through assassination or an accident which left his principal lieutenants unharmed, the latter would attempt to continue the Katanga regime and to carry out essentially the same policies which Tshombe has pursued. However, they would be more erratic and extreme, and would probably be confronted with more internal dissension and conflict, partly of their own making.

VI. CONSEQUENCES OF A CONTINUED
IMPASSE

15. Adoula has been under great pressure to solve the Katanga problem ever since he became Prime Minister. He has always been vulnerable because he lacks strong political or tribal support in his own right, and he has been dependent upon a variety of political forces, extremist, moderate, and tribal, whose support might be withdrawn at any time. If he fails to reintegrate Katanga soon he may be ousted by the extremists; moreover, he runs a similar risk should he lower his sights and come to an accommodation with Tshombe on essentially the latter's terms. His political position would obviously be greatly strengthened, not only against his political enemies in the Leopoldville Government but against Tshombe as well, if he could demonstrate that he had access to substantial funds, military supplies, and foreign assistance not available to other Congolese politicians.

16. At the moment, Adoula is probably hoping that the UN will rescue him from his difficulties. If the UN should fail to resolve the Katanga problem in the present context, he

himself may feel compelled to undertake military operations against Katanga, and to obtain military assistance from non-UN sources in order to do so. If he cannot get this from the West, he will probably accept offers already made by the Soviet Bloc. Ironically, even if the Katanga problem were settled on Adoula's terms, his political future would still be in jeopardy. Opposition to Tshombe has been a unifying force; it has brought moderates and extremists alike together under Adoula. Once this force is removed the radicals would be disposed to try to overturn Adoula.

17. Whatever may be done to resolve Katanga's separatism, the Congo as a whole seems likely to remain in turmoil for many months to come, with UN presence required for an indefinite period if a minimum degree of order is to be maintained. Aside from the problems of Katanga and the Gizengists, the Congo seems likely to remain plagued with the problems of lack of army discipline, massive unemployment, lack of national consciousness, tribal rivalries, and lack of leadership and training at all levels of government and in the economy as a whole.