

TO: CSF/9

Jan 11, 1961

1962

SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

1.3(a)(4)

1. The episode reported in [REDACTED] letter of 22 December, when [REDACTED] left alone for a few minutes in BUZINOV's office in the midst of a pile of secret papers, whipped out his Minox and tried to photograph VARENTSOV's "Theses", is but the latest and most dramatic illustration of a problem which has been troubling everyone connected with the case here for some time: the colossal and ever increasing risks that we are permitting [REDACTED] to take in the pursuit and transmittal of documentary intelligence. Another good illustration is the 420 page manual on atomic weapons which we recently requested [REDACTED] to obtain, and which now looks as if it will be of no more than marginal interest. Our frequent admonitions to [REDACTED] to be careful, to think first and foremost of his own security, to meet [REDACTED] less often, etc., etc, -- in the context of our simultaneous requests to ~~take~~ retake p. 18 of this, pp. 11-13-15 of that, and pp. 1-420 of the other -- are of a "stop it, I love it" nature, and have clearly been interpreted by [REDACTED] in this vein.

2. It is clear that the great dangers to the operation in its present stage lie in the frequent meetings with [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] photographic endeavours, the two being of course largely interdependent. It should be sufficient to note that [REDACTED] has had 10 meetings with [REDACTED] in the past ^{11 (Oct 20 to Jan 5 inclusive)} 22 weeks, and that she has gone to the meeting site on several other occasions. ^{In this same period, [REDACTED] has passed 27 rolls of film.} These risks are not a constant factor in our operational equation; they increase geometrically with the regularity and frequency of the meetings and the amount of material photographed and passed.

3. It should be noted that just because these risks were justified at one stage in the operation, does not mean that they are necessary now. The following factors deserve consideration:

a) the translation backlog;

b) the evaluation backlog: consumers have not had a chance to

properly digest the documents already provided. (It seems to me that it's entirely possible that we have already reached a point of diminishing returns on some of the articles and manuals.)

c) the improvement in [REDACTED] own reporting, which is 1.3(a)(4)

increasingly timely, specific and well-sourced.

In the light of these factors, it seems to me that we can well afford to call a halt on photography for a few months; ~~this will allow~~ this will allow [REDACTED] to "cool off" and will enable us to get caught up on the backlog and to take better stock of what we have. 1.3(a)(4)

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4. Everything else appears to be shipshape, and future prospects are brighter than ever, what with [REDACTED] rise in professional stature and the avenues of access opening up before him (e.g. KOPOLENKO). All the more reason to examine carefully at this time whether or not we are justified in jeopardizing this unique source in the interests of acquiring more military manuals (in this connection, the record shows clearly that [REDACTED] himself is not a good judge of what risks he can and should take).

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5. It is recommended that [REDACTED] be immediately instructed to suspend all documentary photography until further notice, and to concentrate on his own reporting. It is further recommended that we reduce the scheduled meetings with [REDACTED] to once every two weeks.

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[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

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