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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT: "Some Conclusions on the
NATO Armed Forces' Exercise SIDE STEP", by
Colonel-General S. Ivanov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

2. In the interests of protecting our source, this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis within your office. Requests for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of this document in any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS

Enclosure

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Original: Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "Some Conclusions on the NATO Armed Forces' Exercise SIDE STEP", by Colonel-General S. Ivanov.

This article appeared in the 1960 Second Issue of a special version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. It is distributed only within the Ministry of Defense down to the level of Army Commander.

Headquarters Comment: Some of the detail on the attached map is unclear; although the majority of the designations can be accepted with confidence, there is some room for error in the breakdown of the various army corps and similar small print. It is also difficult to distinguish between the lines of the successive positions. The transliterated letters "N/N" indicate military units without designations.

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Some Conclusions on the NATO

Armed Forces' Exercise

"SIDE STEP".

by

Colonel-General S. Ivanov

The leaders of the aggressive NATO Bloc plan to launch a future World war primarily by means of a surprise attack against the countries of the Socialist Camp. One cannot rule out their launching a world war after a period of sharp political tension or local wars. They envisage carrying out preparations for an aggressive war in such a way that they will be interpreted as purely "defensive" preparations, not only by the enemy but also by the personnel of the armed forces and by the populations of the member-countries of the bloc.

Decisive significance is attached to the initial period of the war, in the course of which it is intended to destroy the atomic potential of the enemy, to disorganize the national administration and economy, to disrupt the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces, to undermine the morale of the people, and in this way to achieve the immediate strategic goals of the war and to predetermine its outcome to their benefit. For the fulfillment of these tasks it is planned to bring to bear the greatest possible number of forces and means capable of using nuclear weapons.

The operational plans for the initial period of the war are periodically tested in operational-strategic exercises, during which different variations for launching and waging war given various degrees of preparedness of the armed forces, are studied and tested.

From this point of view, the command-staff exercise, SIDE STEP, conducted in September 1959 with the participation of troops of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO merits special attention. In the importance of the problems which were being worked out, in its sweep and in the composition of the participants it was one of the largest exercises of recent years. It covered almost the entire area of Europe, of the Atlantic, and of the Mediterranean.

The commanders-in-chief and staffs of the armed forces of the North European, Central European, South European, Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters of military operations, the commanders and staffs of the branches (vid) of the armed forces and of the regions (rayon) in the theaters of military operations, the commanders and staffs of army groups, the tactical aviation commands of field and air armies, the commanding officers and staffs of army corps (altogether 19) and divisions (51), and also the commanding officers and staffs of atomic artillery, guided missile and free rocket units participated in the training exercise.

In addition, the central directorates of defense ministries, commands and staffs of military-territorial organs, rear elements (organ tyla), the central directorates of Ministries of Internal Affairs, of Transport, of the Merchant Fleet, of Economics, of Health, of Communications and a number of other agencies from all European member-countries of NATO participated in this exercise.

Exercise SIDE STEP consisted of four exercises which were conducted according to a common plan and against the background of a single strategic situation.

The most important were the exercises of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO of the Central European and of the Southeastern part of the South European Theaters of Military Operations in which problems of preparation and conduct of the first operations in the initial period of the war were worked on. The basic goals set were: perfection of the system for bringing the allied and national armed forces to combat readiness; testing the methods of using nuclear arms in the course of the initial operations; the organization of command; the coordination of forces and means and of the comprehensive support of military operations.

At the same time, a rear area exercise was conducted in all European theaters of military operations with the aim of testing the existing system of supply, as well as of studying the ability of member-countries of the bloc to support their armed forces with supplies independently. American troops stationed in Europe conducted a special rear area exercise, "RAPID SERVICE" ("Bystraya podacha"), in which questions of material-technical support of nuclear ground troops units were studied.

On the basis of a common operational-strategic situation, a naval exercise was also conducted on defense of communications and on control of merchant shipping, in which the coordination between the Allied NATO staffs and the national staffs and establishments on questions of defense of naval communications and of insuring uninterrupted merchant navigation in the beginning of the war was worked on.

Exercise SIDE STEP was under the command of the Supreme Commanders-in-chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO in Europe and on the Atlantic. For direct command of the exercise, directing staffs were created at all staffs of formations and large units of the armed forces, as well as at the commands of military-territorial organs of various establishments participating in the exercise.

This exercise was conducted against a background of "military operations" in Europe and in the Atlantic area between the armed forces of NATO (BLUE) and the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact (ORANGE).

According to the given situation, the war between BLUE and ORANGE began as a result of gradual sharpening of international tension lasting for more than five months. The situation and the actions of the two sides were worked out so as to place all the blame for unleashing the war on the ORANGE, that is, on the Socialist countries, while the imperialist states, the NATO members, would be represented as victims of aggression, supposedly forced to carry out counter measures to the "aggressive" actions of ORANGE. If this rather artless camouflage is discarded, the predatory plans and actions of the bloc headed by the USA can be seen distinctly through the entire idea and course of the exercise.

How then was the development of events up to the outbreak of war envisaged?

The first period (January-March 1959) was characterized by "international equilibrium". This was followed by a period of "international distrust" (April-June), during the course of which relations between the leading countries of the political groupings deteriorated. The reason for this was supposedly a mutually prejudiced appraisal of the actions of the two sides, doubt of the sincerity of each other's policies and also the deadlock

which had been reached in the negotiations of the leading powers on control of the production of nuclear arms (just exactly on control, rather than on prohibition of nuclear arms).

The period of distrust was followed by increased international tension (July-August).

Since the international situation "continued to intensify", the NATO command announced a threatening situation on 1 September which continued for two weeks (until 14 September). During this period all bloc participants mapped out measures for partial mobilization, for bringing the armed forces to combat readiness, and for establishing the necessary order in the rear. After this, the system of alerts adopted by NATO was put into effect (14-19 September), and during this time the armed forces were brought to full combat readiness and were deployed in operational formations.

In this manner, events gradually developed up to the beginning of armed conflict. Evidently the NATO command reckons that under these conditions the aggressive bloc will succeed in completely preparing for war against the countries of the Socialist Camp, and at the same time in disorienting world opinion, with which, it is true, the imperialists do not now especially concern themselves. However, this by no means signifies that they plan only this method of preparation for unleashing war. If we analyze other exercises, especially the practical measures of NATO in preparation for future war, then it is not difficult to be convinced of the fact that they place first priority on a surprise attack against the countries of the Socialist Camp, secretly prepared in a very short time.

Further events developed in the following manner: ORANGE, having concentrated three fronts (75 divisions) in the Central European Theater of Military Operations, and also considerable forces (24 divisions) on the Balkan Peninsula and in the Caucasus, launched massed air and missile nuclear strikes at 0530 hours on 19 September against airfields, the means of nuclear attack (sredstvo yadernogo napadeniya), ports, large communication nets, and against BLUE troops; simultaneously, they took the offensive with groupings of ground troops. In the Central European theater, ORANGE directed the main attacks in the directions of: Magdeburg; Hanover; Muenster; Eisenach; Frankfurt am Main; Kaiserslautern. Auxiliary attacks were launched in a series of directions (diagram I).

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On the Balkan Peninsula, the main attack was directed against Istanbul and two attacks against Salonika from the territory of Bulgaria and Albania. From the Caucasus, the offensive was carried out in a series of directions deep into Turkish territory.

BLUE carries out a nuclear offensive [attack] using strategic, tactical, and carrier aviation, missiles and other ground troop weapons. The groupings of ground troops on all fronts conduct defensive actions and by 24 September fall back to a depth of from 50 to 150 km, where they stop the offensive of ORANGE. At the same time BLUE concentrate their reserves and prepare to go over to the counter attack. At 1500 hours on 25 September the exercise was concluded.

Let us briefly examine the grouping of ground troops set up at exercise SIDE STEP at the beginning of military operations.

In the Central European Theater were deployed the two army groups - the Northern and the Central - which existed there in peacetime. The Northern Army Group consisting of 10 divisions, one brigade group, and two regiments, strengthened by four atomic support battalions (divizion atomnoy podderzhki), and a "Corporal" missile regiment was deployed in a 280 km strip (polosa) along the Weser and Fulda Rivers, 100-120 km to the west of the border between the FRG and the German Democratic Republic.

The Central Army Group consisting of the 7th American and the 1st French Armies (14 divisions, one tank group, four separate regiments (otdelnyy polk) and 24 atomic support battalions) deployed in a 475 km strip along a line located 30-50 km from the GDR border and in places up to 120 km.

The desire of the NATO command to cover the entire strategic front with divisions to an average operational density of 30 km per division attracts attention. In front of the defense line a cover zone (zona prikrytiya) is organized, where reconnaissance units operate and possibly, individual units from the first echelon divisions. Cover units are distributed along a considerable front. Their mission is to carry out holding actions in front of the basic defense line. They are incapable of offering serious resistance to the advance of our troops.

In the strategic reserve of the NATO command there were about 10-12 divisions from the complement of the first echelon of NATO (French and Belgian army corps, a Dutch division, West German units formed by mobilization, as well as large units transferred from North Africa, North America and England).

Approximately the same concept was applied to the operational formation of NATO forces on the Balkan Peninsula and in eastern Turkey.

Thus, in exercise SIDE STEP the NATO command organizes a typical linear defense along the entire strategic front, deploying the basic mass of its divisions in a single line. Such a defense condemned the ground troops to passivity, and consequently led to the instability of the entire defense, which was faced with strong offensive groupings of ORANGE ground troops superior to a significant degree to the NATO forces.

At first glance it may appear incomprehensible that the NATO command forms a defense in the theaters of military operations, which can not withstand an offensive when nuclear arms are used. If one analyzes the entire course of the exercise, however, then it is not difficult to be convinced of the fact that the NATO command in the exercise relied basically not on the action of ground forces, but on the use of a large quantity of tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, on the conduct of a nuclear offensive. Under these conditions, the ground troops which had been brought to readiness by the beginning of military operations, were entrusted with the task of covering the base locations of nuclear means (prikryt bazirovaniye yadernyye sredstva) and insuring the carrying out of a nuclear offensive and the deployment of the strategic reserves. By means of nuclear attacks, the NATO command evidently counted on inflicting such destruction on the enemy as to insure that its ground forces could go over to the offensive without engaging in---(4 or 5 words missing)---battles.

It is well known that ground troops are assigned an active role in the NATO plans of preparation for future war, especially in the Central European Theater. According to these plans, after a successful nuclear offensive, groupings of NATO ground troops must go over to a decisive offensive with the mission of destroying the troops of the Warsaw Pact countries, of occupying the territories of the GDR, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and of carrying

military operations onto the territory of the USSR. The most responsible role in the offensive is entrusted to the armored and airborne troops, who must quickly and effectively exploit the results of the nuclear strikes by decisive actions.

If for any reasons the surprise nuclear attack of the Western Bloc does not achieve the expected results, defensive operations by the ground troops are envisaged, in order to win time for the concentration of reserves and the creation of conditions for going over to the counter-offensive. It is calculated that this goal may be achieved in a short period. Defensive operations are also based on the massed use of nuclear weapons, on broad maneuvering of forces and means, on the carrying out of counter-attacks and counter-blows by highly mobile units and large units, and on the wide use of all possible obstacles. Facts at our disposal indicate that the defensive grouping of ground troops set up in the exercise did not fully ensure the conduct of such a defensive operation.

Let us examine the course of combat operations in exercise SIDE STEP.

According to the plan, ORANGE started military operations by striking massed nuclear blows by missile troops and aviation with the simultaneous taking of the offensive by the ground troops. Actually the game was conducted differently. ORANGE launched the first massed nuclear strike at 0530 hours on 19 September (on the Balkan Peninsula at 0500 hours), but the commanders of the exercise gave the signal for the use of nuclear weapons by BLUES at 0340 hours on 19 September, that is, almost two hours before the "enemy" attack. It follows that the first nuclear blow at the exercise was struck by the NATO troops, which is what they are indeed preparing for. This was a pre-emptive (uprezhdayushchiy) and not a "counter" (otvetnyy) nuclear attack, as the NATO command was trying to show.

From the first minutes of the war the NATO troops conduct a nuclear offensive on a broad scale. The nuclear offensive planned by our probable enemies in the initial period of the war can be arbitrarily divided into two parts. The first and main part is the destruction of objectives in the Soviet Union throughout the entire depth of its territory by strategic nuclear means of attack. This part of the nuclear offensive was not played out in the exercise, but it was taken into account. The second part of the

nuclear offensive involves the destruction of objectives on the borders of the theaters of military operations and partly on the territory of the USSR and of the other Socialist countries up to a depth of 1,000 km from the front line by forces and means under the jurisdiction of theater commands.

The principal means of nuclear attack in the theaters of military operations are tactical aviation and cruise missiles (samolety-snaryady) of the "Matador" type, which are at disposal of the command in the theater. The missile weapons and atomic artillery of the ground troops which are under the direction of the commands of army groups, field armies, and army corps, and in the US Army - of divisions as well, are also used.

The following missions were entrusted to tactical aviation in the course of the nuclear offensive; the destruction of the means of nuclear attack (sredstvo yadernogo napadeniya); the neutralization of radiotechnical equipment; the disruption of communications; the destruction of reserves and of other enemy objectives; the support of their own troop operations.

The battle against the means of nuclear attack was considered by the NATO command as one of the most important tasks of the nuclear offensive. This was conducted by the destruction of airfields and missile launch sites, nuclear weapons, aviation and missiles, and of command centers. The final goal of this battle was set as the achievement of nuclear superiority over the enemy.

To disrupt communications, bridges and road junctions were destroyed, and barriers were created by atomic means. This was also intended to disrupt and interdict the transport of troops and supplies, to make difficult the maneuvering of troops, and to prevent the bringing up of strategic reserves.

Tactical aviation was used for the direct support of ground troops by striking blows against the combat formations of enemy troops, enemy reserves, command posts, depots, and also by conducting aerial reconnaissance. However, only a limited number of aircraft was made available for the direct support of ground troops.

The organization of the centralized control (upravleniye) of nuclear strikes in the South European Theater of Military Operations attracts attention. The resources of the 6th Fleet and the air

command were combined. For this, an operational center for joint operations was formed at the 6th Allied Tactical Air Command; in this center there were representatives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of NATO Armed Forces in Europe, of the commander-in-chief of the armed forces of the theater and of the commanders of the ground forces, the air force, and the navy. This center received requests from field and air armies for nuclear strikes, took decisions and issued the necessary instructions. Under this system, more than two hours elapsed from the moment intelligence information was received concerning identified targets for nuclear strikes to the time an order was issued for their destruction.

Operational-tactical missiles and atomic artillery were used to strike nuclear blows against objectives in operational-tactical depth and to support the combat operations of the ground troops. The majority of the missile and atomic artillery units was allotted to the army corps. A "Corporal" missile regiment was left under the command of the Commander of the Northern Army Group, while two "Redstone" missile groups (grupa) were under the command of the Commander of the 7th American Army.

Available information, though incomplete, concerning the use of nuclear weapons in exercise SIDE STEP attests to the significant increase in the number of nuclear strikes during the first days of the operation in comparison with previous exercises. Thus, the 4th Allied Tactical Air Command used 180 nuclear units (yedinit) during the first 38 hours of the war, the 7th American Army used about 205 nuclear rounds (boyevyye priпасy) in six days. In the South European Theater of Military Operations 313 nuclear rounds were used in the six days of war, 255 of which were used during the course of the first three days.

The experience gained in working on the problems of the use of nuclear weapons in exercise SIDE STEP confirms the existence of plans by the NATO command for the use of sudden massed (several - words missing) - with the aim of winning nuclear superiority, inflicting defeat on enemy troops, changing the strategic situation to their advantage, and insuring that their ground troops can go over to the offensive. The implementation of these plans in a future war can cause great damage to our armed forces in the theaters of military operations, unless timely effective methods to disrupt the nuclear offensive of the enemy are undertaken by our side at the very beginning of the war. In this connection,

it is worth noting several weak points in the so-called nuclear might of NATO. The basic means for using nuclear weapons in the theaters of military operations by the probable enemy remains tactical aviation, against which combat is not a complex problem at the present time. A large proportion of the nuclear weapons of the NATO ground troops consists of the cumbersome 280 mm cannons and 203.2 mm howitzers, the annihilation of which does not present any special difficulty either.

In the exercise, a great deal of attention was given to the defeat in combat operations of the ground troops (proigrysh boyevykh deystviy sukhoputnykh voysk). Although these questions have not been sufficiently clarified, the following conclusions may still be made on the basis of available information.

Holding actions in the cover zone went on for one day. By the end of the day on 19 September, ORANGE approached the basic line of defense having negotiated a distance of from 30 to 120 km. From 20 to 24 September NATO troops carried out defensive operations and were forced to retreat with continuing resistance in all directions. The general depth of the withdrawal was on the average 100-150 km, the average tempo of the withdrawal was 10-15 km a day in major directions (na glavnykh napravleniyakh), and 20-30 km a day in secondary directions. The withdrawal was accomplished evenly, almost along the entire front, under cover of massed nuclear strikes. In the course of the defensive engagement, no active operations of any kind were apparent on the part of the groupings of ground troops. By the end of 24 September the front had stabilized. It can be supposed that from this line (rubezh) it was planned to go over to the counter-offensive with the concentrated strategic reserves, who had not participated in the defensive engagements.

The indicated method of conducting the defensive operations of NATO troops in exercise SIDE STEP has its strong and its weak sides. The strong side of the defense is the massed use of nuclear weapons, while its weak side may be considered to be the shallow linear formation of the ground troops and their insufficient aggressiveness during the course of the engagement. In order to shatter such a defense, it is necessary to destroy the means of nuclear attack and to organize skillfully the operations of mobile groupings of troops in the most important directions with the aim of quick penetration to a great depth and the conduct of maneuvering operations. As far as the reserves who have concentrated in the

rear are concerned, they can also be uncovered and crushed by nuclear strikes. However, in the preparation of our armed forces it is necessary to assume that they will have to conduct offensive operations in the beginning of a future war under more complex conditions and against a more aggressive enemy.

Let us examine in more detail the more important questions which were worked out in exercise SIDE STEP.

First of all let us consider the measures taken by the member-countries of the aggressive NATO Bloc in preparing for and launching the war. The study of these measures was one of the important goals of the exercise. Incidentally, by these measures one may judge to a certain degree the actual plans of the probable enemy in regard to the unleashing of war against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

In the period of mounting international tension, that is approximately two and a half months prior to the beginning of the war, a series of concealed measures are taken in the NATO countries in preparation for war. With the introduction of a threatening situation preparation is intensified. The NATO Command looks upon the threatening period as a period of direct preparation for war. Under various pretexts (conduct of exercises, various call-ups and other "usual" measures), a concealed and comprehensive build-up of the Bloc's preparedness for unleashing an armed conflict takes place during this period. First of all, it was planned to intensify construction and repair work at all installations (obyekt) of major military significance, with a simultaneous discontinuation of work at secondary and non-military installations. Government control was established for the distribution and consumption of fuel and critical raw materials; the security of airfields, storage depots, pipe lines, staffs, communications centers, and other important installations was strengthened; measures were carried out on a broad scale for antiaircraft defense and anti-atomic protection; the evacuation of the most important enterprises from border areas was planned.

Ten days prior to the beginning of military operations the transfer of French first-line large units and units from North Africa to France and onto the territory of the FRG begins. At the same time secret partial mobilization is carried out in a number of NATO member-countries and the building up to prescribed strength

of large units of the first echelon and the reserves; intelligence is activated as well.

In exercise SIDE STEP the introduction of a threatening situation did not signify change over to martial law. Martial law was introduced on 14 September, that is, five days before the war, when the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO received authority from the Permanent NATO Council (its highest political body) to put the alert systems into operation.

Two alert systems have been worked out in NATO: the military alert system, and the so-called official alert system. The first is brought into operation by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armed Forces of the Bloc even without the sanction of the NATO Council in that instance when armed conflict may be suddenly unleashed within a one to 36-hour period. In this system measures of a purely military nature are carried out -- bringing to combat readiness mainly the Allied Armed Forces.

The second alert system is brought into operation by a resolution of the NATO Council in that instance, when the military-political situation is aggravated relatively gradually. This system includes a simple, reinforced and a general alert, and signifies general political, military, and economic preparation by the Bloc for entry into war. It is important to note that the Supreme Commander-in-chief of the Allied Armed Forces of NATO is granted the right to independently declare a simple and reinforced alert in case of extraordinary circumstances.

In this manner, the military command of NATO, which is in the hands of the USA, has in essence unlimited authority to the extent of unleashing war, without considering the opinions of the other Bloc members. The alert declared by the Secretary of Defense of the USA, Gates, on the eve of the meetings of Chiefs of State in Paris, does not enter into the NATO alert system. This alert is considered to be an internal affair of the USA.

Exercise SIDE STEP was played out (3 or 4 words missing) alerts.

A Simple Alert was declared at 1700 hours on 14 September. On the basis of it the law on the state of emergency goes into effect in the member-countries of NATO. Secret mobilization

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measures are carried out on a broad scale, military reserves are called up, the units and large units assigned to the disposal of the NATO Command are brought up to wartime strength, as are the cadre units of national subordination. Armed forces in areas of permanent disposition are brought to combat readiness, as are the troops of territorial and local antiaircraft defense, the system of shore defense, etc. Reserve units of various branches of the service are formed, and new units of national defense forces (vnutrennaya oborona) and various units of special designation are created. The border defense, and the antiaircraft, anti-atomic, anti-chemical, and anti-bacteriological defense of troops, of the population, and of military and non-military installations are strengthened. The wartime communications system is brought into operation, and preparations are made for anti-communications obstructions (zagrazhdeniye) and destruction. The movement of material, technical and medical supplies into the zone of combat operations is begun. At the same time many other measures are also carried out (the limiting of non-military deliveries, partial evacuation of the means of transport from border areas, preparation for the evacuation of the population from combat zones, establishment of control over refugees, intensification of counter-intelligence, etc.).

Two days before the beginning of military operations a Reinforced Alert is declared. In these two days formations and large units are deployed along lines and in positions in accordance with the operational plan, and aerial reconnaissance is significantly increased. The Border Guard is replaced by ground troops. At this same time, the delivery of nuclear weapons to airfields and to firing positions is organized, and all the reserves of material supplies of the troops are brought up to the established norms. Evacuation of supply depots, enterprises, raw material reserves, and the means of transport from border areas to the rear is organized on a broad scale, censorship is introduced, and the means of electronic warfare (sredstvo radio-voyny) are readied for activation. The carrying out of the above-mentioned measures upon the declaration of a Reinforced Alert two days before the beginning of military operations has been noted in a number of training exercises. This indicates that the NATO Command is striving to limit to the utmost the time needed for deployment of armed forces and operational formations and their arrival in attack positions prior to the beginning of military operations.

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The order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief to use nuclear arms was given 26 minutes later, i.e., at 0340 hours.

We have examined in detail the measures carried out by the NATO Command in exercise SIDE STEP in the way of preparations for unleashing war. Of course, these are far from all of the measures which will be carried out in an actual situation. For this reason, our intelligence organs are faced with a complex and responsible mission -- to keep all the preparations of the probable enemy for unleashing a new war under constant observation in order to give timely warning to our armed forces.

Of all the measures carried out by the NATO Command in the way of preparations for unleashing war, mobilization of the armed forces of member-countries of the aggressive bloc merits special attention. In exercise SIDE STEP, secret partial measures for building up the armed forces through mobilization started 20 days before the beginning of military operations.

Five days prior to the beginning of war the scale of secret mobilization in all the member-countries of the aggressive NATO Bloc broadened significantly. We do not have full information concerning the specific form taken by the development of mobilization in this exercise. However, if a number of training exercises and certain other measures of the NATO Command are analyzed, one may come to the following conclusions.

In accordance with existing agreements, 86 divisions and a number of separate brigade groups, units, and subunits were assigned to the Allied Armed Forces from the 109 divisions available in the NATO countries at the beginning of 1960. However, of these, only 50 divisions, and 23 brigade groups and separate units were subordinated to the Allied Command. The remaining large units and units remain under the subordination of national commands as part of the troops of the first and second echelons.

The large units subordinated to the Allied Command are maintained in peacetime at full TO & E strength and do not require additional build-up through mobilization. Almost all of them participated in the exercise and were deployed in operational formations two days prior to the beginning of war. The members of NATO provided the following number of divisions: USA-5, FRG-8, England-3, France-4, Turkey-15, Greece-8 divisions. A small

number of divisions were provided by Belgium (two divisions), Holland (two divisions), and Portugal (one).

The first echelon of NATO is comprised of 16 divisions and four brigades. In peacetime, they are maintained at 60 percent personnel strength and 100 percent equipment strength. Five days are allotted for their mobilization build-up. It must be assumed that these divisions could be mobilized and fully ready by the beginning of war, although information is lacking about their use in the exercise.

The remaining 20 divisions which comprise the second echelon of NATO, are kept at only 25-30 percent strength during peacetime. It would require 10-20 days to bring them to combat readiness.

What base do the NATO countries have for the build-up of ground troops through mobilization?

In the USA, in addition to the existing 15 regular divisions (of which 5 divisions are in Europe) there are 52 National Guard and Army Reserve divisions (about 1.5 million men), a significant part of which systematically undergoes combat training. The Inactive Reserve consists of about 500 thousand men. In this manner, the USA has at its disposal a trained reserve of up to 2 million men. In the USA much attention is being given to the problem of insuring rapid mobilization and the reinforcement of troops deployed in overseas theaters of military operations.

The FRG had 11 divisions at the beginning of 1960. When the Simple Alert was declared (14 September), assembly points for mobilization were set up in Western Germany and the call-up of reserves was started under the guise of refresher training. By 17 September it was planned to bring all large units and units of the Bundeswehr to a full wartime complement, to form a considerable number of new units, and to form personnel reserves. Specifically, reserve battalions were formed in each of the eight divisions under the subordination of the NATO Command. In military districts 57 reserve training battalions were formed, which were deployed in areas adjoining the western border of the FRG. The total number of enlisted and non-commissioned officer personnel in the organized reserve by 17 September was 78 thousand men, and about 500 reserve officers. In addition - (several words missing) - men who had passed the examination but who had not served in the Bundeswehr.

In Great Britain at the beginning of 1960 there were six divisions and 13 brigades and brigade groups. The base for the build-up of ground troops in wartime is the territorial army, consisting of 10 divisions which in peacetime are kept at 70-80 percent strength.

In other NATO member-countries contingents of military trained reserves are formed. Large units and units of reserves similar to the American and English ones do not exist in the majority of these countries at the present time.

It would not be correct to evaluate the potential build-up of NATO armed forces through mobilization in terms of divisions of ground troops. Under contemporary conditions the evaluation of the probable enemy's potential for the means of nuclear attack acquires decisive significance. Means of this type which are available to the NATO Command are: tactical aviation, cruise missiles "Matador" and "Mace", tactical missiles ("Redstone", "Corporal", "Honest John", "Lacrosse", "Little John"), and atomic artillery (280 mm cannon and 203.2 mm howitzers). As is known, the strategic means of nuclear attack have not been put at the disposal of the NATO Command, they are in the hands of the Anglo-American command and may be used in addition to the existing forces of NATO.

At the present time, plans are maturing for the creation of allied strategic nuclear forces within the Western European Alliance which includes Great Britain, France, FRG, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxemburg, that is, not all the members of NATO. Evidently, what is intended is to create air force and IRBM units capable of using nuclear weapons. These units are considered to be the basic means of war in Europe. For the present, no such allied strategic nuclear forces as yet exist in Europe. In exercise SIDE STEP, operational-tactical nuclear forces were used.

By 17 September all the tactical aviation forces available to the Allied NATO Command were brought to full combat readiness. In the Central European Theater of Military Operations the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Commands, composed of 115 squadrons (about 2500 aircraft, including about 1,500 fighters-bombers and more than 500 fighters of the Air Defense), were readied. In addition, the USA and England allocated about 1,000 fighter-bombers and fighters of the Air Defense. This number of aircraft basically conforms to the combat strength of NATO aviation in peacetime.

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In the South European Theater of Military Operations the 6th Allied Tactical Air Command was brought to readiness. In addition, two tactical air squadrons were transferred to this theater from the USA and the carrier aviation of the 6th Fleet was used.

Significant forces of tactical aviation remain under the subordination of the national commands of the USA, England, and France. It was also planned to bring this aviation to combat readiness. In line with this the principal members of NATO are creating aviation reserves for replacing losses. The best are the Air Force reserves of the USA (the National Guard and the Air Force Reserve), which can also be brought to combat readiness.

Tactical missiles and atomic artillery are for the present under the command of the USA and, in part, England. At the present time, there are 48 battalions of guided missiles and free rockets of an operational-tactical designation and atomic artillery concentrated in the European theaters, of which 36 battalions are located in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. Evidently all of them took part in the exercise. In the last two days before the beginning of the war it was planned to deploy all these units in the appropriate areas and to equip them with nuclear weapons. The NATO Command considers that there is an insufficient quantity of these means of nuclear attack to support the combat operations of the allied ground troops. For this reason it is planned by 1963 to bring the number of battalions, together with the former ones, to 130 missile battalions of operational-tactical designation.

In this manner, exercise SIDE STEP and a number of other training exercises indicate that the NATO Command evidently plans to carry out in advance secret, comprehensive measures for the build-up of the armed forces through mobilization under conditions when war is preceded by a period of sharp political tension. At the same time it is known, that in recent years in the West many of the military ideologists of imperialism are coming out against the build-up of the armed forces through mobilization before the beginning of war in view of the difficulty of hiding this undertaking, and consequently, the impossibility of achieving a surprise attack. For this reason it is proposed to have such armed forces in standing combat readiness in peacetime, as they would be able to start military operations without undertaking the slightest noticeable mobilization measures prior to the beginning of armed

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conflict. It is fully possible that these views are reflected in the aggressive plans of the Command of the Anglo-American Bloc. We have many facts which indicate that this Command, utilizing numerous bases and the territories of the countries dependent on the USA and England, is striving to deploy in advance the necessary groupings of forces and means in the appropriate areas and in the theaters of military operations, from where they plan to start a war against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

Let us pause briefly on the problems which were worked on in the rear area exercises. These exercises took in all the European theaters of military operations. As already noted, in these exercises the existing system for supplying the armed forces of NATO with materiel was checked and the abilities of Bloc member-countries to independently support their troops assigned to NATO were studied.

The following principles were applied as the basis for organizing, material-technical support in the exercise. Each member-country of NATO was responsible for the materiel, technical, and medical support of its troops and determined independently the types and quantities of the materiel necessary for the support of combat operations. The commanders of the Allied troops were charged with the responsibility for distribution and use of the material-technical supplies allocated to their jurisdiction, for making up requisitions (together with the corresponding national authorities) for material-technical supplies, and for the fulfillment of these requisitions by the national authorities and by the NATO high command. The commanders of the national formations were responsible for the materiel, technical and medical support of the troops under their subordination.

Rear support of American and English ground troops was accomplished through zones of communication, which passed through the territories of France, FRG, Belgium, and Holland and were the connecting link between the USA, Great Britain and the zones of combat operations in the Central European Theater of Military Operations. In the aims of -- (part of one sentence missing) -- by rear units -- sectors, the base area (bazovyy uchastok) and the forward area (peredovoy uchastok) within the confines of which were located depots of various designations, rear units and establishments. The command for supplying atomic and missile weapons to the American ground troops was situated in the forward zone; it supplied these types of weapons to all atomic support units, including units assigned under the commands of other NATO

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members countries.

Motor transport was chiefly used for delivery of supplies; fuel and lubricants were delivered by pipe lines and brought up in tank trucks and RR tankcars. Special attention in the exercise was devoted to questions of rapid delivery of supplies from ports located on the French coast to depots in the zone of combat operations.

As a whole, the system of organization of material-technical support of ground troops in the exercise was characterized by extreme complexity; this was caused by the fact that the governments and commands of each NATO member-country were responsible for supporting their troops with essential supplies, as well as by the differences in the organization of supply of the national formations and troops assigned to the jurisdiction of the NATO Command. One of the vulnerable points in this system is the great extension of the lines of communication. It is sufficient to point out that the depth of the zones of communications of the American and English troops, without counting the depth of the combat operation zones, was more than 700-750 km. This forces the command to subdivide into sectors, which in turn complicates the organization of delivery and supply.

There were certain unusual features in the operational calculations of the norms used in the exercise for material-technical supply of the West German ground troops, which consisted of the fact that to facilitate the formulation of estimates, all types of reserves of material-technical supplies were calculated on the basis of unit average norms of supply for one man, expressed in kilograms. Food, clothing, engineer equipment, construction materials, POL, communications equipment and other items were planned in weight units per man.

The method of calculating losses deserves attention. Losses of personnel and combat materiel were determined by taking into account the place of the large unit in the operational formation (mesta soyedineniya v operativnom postroyenii) and the degree of intensity of combat operations. For the first seven days of war these losses were estimated approximately as follows: personnel - 14-21 percent; atomic artillery, guided missiles and free rockets, and combat vehicles - 30-40 percent; tactical aviation combat aircraft - 71 percent; and air defense aircraft - 53 percent (taking into account repairs of damaged aircraft); atomic weapons - 30-35 percent; conventional ammunition - 20-30 percent; POL - 20-35 percent.

Characteristically, losses of personnel, armament, and combat materiel during the first day of war were 3-5 times higher than the average daily losses for the seven days of the war.

The questions worked on in the naval exercise were basically those of defense of communications and control of merchant shipping during the first days of the war. The staffs of the allied naval and air forces on the Atlantic and in the zone of the English Channel, the staffs of the naval forces in the European theaters of military operations, and also merchant marine enterprises of the NATO member-countries took part in this training exercise.

In the design of the exercise it was planned that the main efforts of the NATO naval forces during the first days of the war be concentrated on the annihilation of nuclear missile weapons, airfields and submarine bases in the northwestern and southern areas of ORANGE territory, and on the defense of communications lines in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Prior to the beginning of combat operations mobilization measures were carried out in the naval forces and in the merchant fleet, specific tasks of the allied naval forces in different areas were defined, the dispersion of the forces and weapons of the fleet was provided for, material-technical support and the evacuation of bases and ports were organized, a centralized directorate of shipping was created, convoys were formed and other measures were carried out.

It was considered that with the beginning of military operations a significant part of the NATO naval bases, ports and airfields in Western Europe and in North America was destroyed or was put out of commission for a prolonged period as a result of ORANGE nuclear strikes, and that a part of the reserves of different types of supplies on hand at the beginning of the war in depots of the European member-countries of NATO was wiped out. In this connection, the NATO Command planned to organize loading-unloading work in small harbors, in roadsteads and in unequipped sectors of the coast, although this brought about a decrease in shipping turnover (sудооборот) and a shortage of coasting vessels.

According to the plan of the exercise command, the principal threat to the shipping of NATO member-countries was created by ORANGE submarines, deployed along communications lines in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean Sea, as well as by their

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aviation, which along with carrying out attacks against ports and ships at sea, laid mines in coastal communications lines and in the English Channel, the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean Sea. In these circumstances, the defense of naval communications was organized on a zonal principle, in accordance with which responsibility for the security of merchant navigation within the boundaries of a theater or region rested on the corresponding NATO naval commander. The guarding and defense of individual vessels which had not yet been brought into a convoy were organized only in areas of most intensive navigation with the use of antisubmarine vessels and aircraft for this purpose, as well as of aircraft carrier antisubmarine hunter-killer groups. With defense of naval communications lines organized in this manner, the NATO Command calculates that the communications lines will not be seriously disrupted at the beginning of the war.

The exercise shows that the NATO Command is devoting great attention to insuring uninterrupted merchant navigation in a future war.

We have examined the most important features of the exercise of the allied armed forces of the aggressive NATO Bloc, SIDE STEP, and the basic problems which were worked on in this exercise. As can be seen, the exercise was a many-sided one, in which many practical problems of preparation and conduct of war in Europe were tested. To a certain degree, the exercise reflects the official views of the command of the Anglo-American Bloc on the nature and methods of waging a future aggressive war against the countries of the Socialist Camp.

Special significance is attached to the advance implementation of mobilization measures to bringing the armed forces to combat readiness, to their deployment in operational formations, and to supplying them with all the essential means of support. The leaders of the Anglo-American Bloc are evidently not certain of the fact that the war unleashed by them will end as quickly as they wish. For this reason they are looking for methods of insuring the readiness of their armed forces even for a war which may be of long duration (last two words uncertain).

In the plans for waging the war the main reliance is placed on the use of nuclear weapons and on the carrying out of a nuclear offensive, with the aid of which it is calculated to drastically

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
change the correlation of forces in their favor and, it is hoped, to give the ground troops the possibility of conducting offensive operations. Among the means of using nuclear weapons, side by side with aviation great importance is attached to missiles of operational-tactical designation. At the same time, atomic barrel artillery is widely used as in the past. A large role is also assigned to the ground troops, who are given the mission of exploiting the results of a nuclear offensive for carrying military operations, as may be judged from certain available information, onto the territory of the Soviet Union.

On the whole, exercise SIDE STEP testifies to the aggressive nature of the NATO military preparations, which are openly directed against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist Camp. It is well to bear in mind, however, that the military preparations of NATO reflected in exercise SIDE STEP do not exhaust all the aggressive plans of the Anglo-American Bloc. As is known, in the future war which they are feverishly preparing against the USSR, the militaristic circles of this bloc place principal reliance on the strategic means of nuclear attack - strategic aviation, intercontinental missiles, missiles of intermediate range, and the aircraft carrier and missile carrier assault fleet. With the aid of these means of armed conflict they aim to solve the main problems of a future nuclear war.

All this obligates our command personnel to study thoroughly the experience of the training exercises of the probable enemy, to analyze more deeply all the measures carried out by them on the preparation and unleashing of a new war against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the Socialist Camp, and to take this into account in the preparation of our armed forces and in the working out of methods of thwarting the aggressive adventures of the NATO leaders.

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PLAN and COURSE of COMBAT OPERATIONS in the CENTRAL EUROPEAN THEATER