

14 May 1963

copy  
FN (89)  
35  
1.3(a)(4)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, SR Division

SUBJECT: Plan for Informing Soviet Intelligence Services of U.S. Concern for Oleg V. Penkovskiy.

1. The following plan is designed not only to assure that word reaches many GRU and KGB ears that U.S. Intelligence is concerned about those who collaborate with us and who may be caught but also to grasp whatever slim opportunity there may be to save Penkovskiy's life.
2. On the first point, there is no doubt that many GRU and KGB officers realize that CIA was able to run a highly successful operation in a professional manner. Their professional respect for CIA must have gone up. They do not know what interest CIA has for the security and well-being of anyone who collaborates with CIA. If indeed word should be spread about that U.S. Intelligence is trying to save Penkovskiy's life, this is bound to have a tremendous impact on many in the ranks. The need for other Oleg Penkovskiy's, as the Director expressed to you recently, is now greater than ever. We must do all we can to achieve this.
3. There is no question in our minds that the impact of the Penkovskiy compromise and trial will have a deleterious effect upon any Soviet citizens, in or out of the RIS ranks, who may have entertained thoughts of either defection or working in place. Following the trial, Yuri Zhukov, commentator for PRAVDA stated "CIA does not give a hoot about the fate of their agents. All the promises they made to Penkovskiy.....have been broken. The spy is caught and he has been written off the books." This is the sort of Soviet action that the proposed plan will counter.
4. The plan envisages four identical letters to be delivered to two KGB rezidents and two GRU rezidents in Bonn, The Hague, Copenhagen and Rome. A local indigenous person can be paid to deliver a sealed envelope containing the message to the Soviet Embassy in each city. The reason four points were chosen was from our point of view to insure that delivery is made, that the message is not thrown out as a provocation since the letter states that three other identical messages are being simultaneously delivered in three other Soviet Embassies and particularly to assure that by word of mouth that at least a minimum number of Soviets who see the letter will pass the word around to their associates without

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

3 1 MAR 1992

1.3(a)(4)

raising in Soviet minds that a flooding of many Embassies with such messages was strictly a CIA propaganda ploy. Not only to establish a bona fide with the Soviets but also to worry them regarding intent, a copy of the photograph of Penkovskiy with Chief Marshal S.S. Varentsov will be included.

5. The question of whether Soviet authorities would surface this message to embarrass us is considered to be most unlikely since publication would only serve to further our interests. There is, despite our optimism on this point, no genuine attributability which the Soviets would gain by surfacing.

6. The four cities were chosen because the fact that they are in NATO countries may have the proper impact on the Soviets, and have had no past relationship with the Penkovskiy operation, and the remote chance of any flareback would have minimal effects in these particular countries.

7. It is suggested that the Soviets be directed to respond to a Post Office box in New York, which could be laid on by Security. In the event of a flap, the Post Office Department could easily deny the true identity of the holder of the box.

8. Should the Soviet authorities respond to the message, an analysis of the nature of their response would dictate our next moves. Certainly the negotiations in the beginning stages could be prolonged and vague. There will obviously be feeling out by the Soviets as to the nature of the "stick" and the "carrot".

9. It is recommended that this proposal, if accepted, be carried out without any reference to the British, in the light of the Soviet statement that "CIA does not give a hoot about the fate of their agents". In no way, does the plan envisage the problem of Wynne and Lonsdale.

10. Should the Soviet authorities refuse to respond, it is recommended that we carry out our threat by the appropriate publication in appropriate places of certain materials which Penkovskiy gave us relating to Soviet espionage abroad and to Soviet subversive planning and warlike views of the Soviet Government. There is much CA grist which can and should be pulled out and exploited by the West.

11. The Soviets will recognize this as a U.S. proposal and not a joint American-British proposal. This should in no way jeopardize whatever plans the British have for negotiating with the Soviets for the release of Wynne.

Joseph J. Bulik

George G. Kisevalter 1.3(a)(4)