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Meeting No. 32 on 22nd September, 1961.

1. Subject was met at the RV point which is at the end of the Solferino footbridge at 19.30 hours by Roger and Harold. The party arrived at the safe apartment at 19.45 hours. The pick-up was covered by Michael and it went off with no incidents.
2. G.: Please let me have all documents which should be photographed now, so that you can have the originals back before the end of this meeting. We have arranged to have them photographed.  
(Subject gave his list of delegate candidates out of which a number would be arriving in PARIS. This was a list of four sheets including 89 names. The other documents was his GRU Administrative Travel Order.)

S.: Later I will show you which people on the list are KGB.

3. (Subject took out his notes and said) - Although we are fairly careful with our friends the French, I found out quite a bit of information which should be of considerable interest to them and of course to us. I will now review what I have done in this respect since I have arrived here. Yesterday at 09.00 hours on the second day of my arrival in PARIS I went to the Soviet Embassy. I was received very well by the Resident Gen. Major Ivan CHEREDEYEV who had just returned from MOSCOW where he was on temporary duty. He knows me for a long time since we worked together in the Mandate Commission which was processing students for the M.D.A. class with which I was involved. He was a Colonel then. I was astounded at his affable and direct attitude towards me. He said that several cables had come in about my arrival and I explained that I was delayed by the visa application. He said that he wanted to talk to me at length later but that he was about to have an operational meeting with his case officers on intelligence matters and he wanted me to participate at this meeting. He said that he would welcome my opinion on various matters at this

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meeting and I replied that I would be glad to be as helpful as I was able to be. He added that since I have come for twenty-five days and will be under his jurisdiction, in addition to resolving my own missions he would like me to help them.

4. S.: Their <sup>Re-Residentura</sup> Residentura is on the second floor of the Embassy building. Only the Military Intelligence people of GRU are on the second floor - Strategic Intelligence - and all of the rooms have been checked out. Secret matters may be discussed there except that names, dates etc. are not to be mentioned. I immediately saw two officers there with whom I had studied at the M.D.A. and who graduated with me in 1953. The Military Attache who was introduced to me was surprisingly Gen. Major SOKOLOV who was the former Chief of the Foreign Relations Section in MOSCOW. Formerly Gen. Major Michal MASLOV was the Military Attache here and he is now the Chief of the Foreign Relations Section in MOSCOW, while SOKOLOV has replaced him since a month and a half. The Naval Attache is also here, who is a Captain 1st Rank and who was the Assistant Naval Attache in Turkey while I was there. He is Vladimir PROKHOROV. There are many operational case officers under cover and I must spot every one of them who is here in PARIS. I will also spot all KGB officers, of whom I have already noticed several.

(5.) S.: We sat at this meeting from about 09.30 until 15.00 hours. The first deputy to the Resident, Igor Aleksandrovich ANANYEV was also there. He is under cover. The other deputy is actually second deputy KUDRYAVTSEV, the Counsellor, who is concerned with science and technology and whom I met two days ago. I was introduced as a GRU Headquarters officer on TDY in PARIS who would participate in the meeting. The topic of the meeting was to review the missions of GRU to the Residentura in France on the acquisition of military material samples and data (dobyvaniyu voennykh obraztsov vo Frantsii). These military samples consist of weapons and documents on their technology. Then every

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mission was discussed point by point. Every case officer was quoted his mission and this case officer was requested to detail the exact status of his progress in accomplishing his mission. Even Gen. MAJOR SOKOLOV was called upon to report, but he was not required to stand up to make his report. Even as Military Attache he has a mission here which is to obtain data on weapons or the weapons themselves through the Attaches of the countries of People's Democracies here in PARIS. The Poles here have succeeded in making some penetration and have made some Military samples available to them. I will report on all of these items in a moment since it is my duty to report this to you in the first instance. How you advise and warn our French friends is up to you, this is a secondary matter. In addition possibly I may succeed in fulfilling a tiny portion of these missions since some of them correspond to my own missions such as obtaining data on material like Nammo.

6. S.I. As you can see the position of Gen. MAJOR SOKOLOV as the Military Attache here is consistent with the re-organization I reported to you several months ago, namely that all Military Attaches abroad are strictly cut off from directing operational work, which is done by an under-cover Resident. The missions set forth to all Residenturas is to obtain by every possible means such as by monetary payments through agent networks, through contacts and acquaintances and even to steal if necessary, in short by all and every means using personal contacts, the countries of People's Democracies and Communists. The Communists here are very active and they are rendering tremendous assistance to the strategic intelligence case officers. This again invokes my constant remark to you, namely that maybe I am a complete fool but I cannot understand at all how Communist Parties are not completely eliminated and Communists brought under severe control in democratic countries, especially since they do such constant and considerable harm. I told you last time that it was a Communist source that reported about the GERMANS plans for redeployment of 230 military aircraft.

7. S.I. OCHEREDYEV was very severe with his case officers but he is

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very intelligent man; for example, when one case officer reported that he had assigned his agent the mission of obtaining two weapons out of his total mission of fourteen for fear of compromising himself to his agent, CHEREDEYEV called the case officer a fool, saying that he had already compromised himself by requesting the two weapons (or assemblies thereof) and had he given the agent the entire fourteen items, possibly by now some of these items could have been procured instead of waiting for the procurement of the two requested and holding back the other twelve until the first two were obtained. The officers are afraid of him, particularly since he has been promoted to General. Previously he had been the Chief of a Napravlenie and later the deputy to KONOVALOV, the Directorate Chief in GRU.

8. S.: The Communists are sitting all around and have penetrated everywhere. I am sure that they are bringing great harm to our mutual work and are hurting De GAULLE's domestic and foreign policy.

9. S.: The missions to obtain military weapons and material in France by the Rezidentura is duplicated in the Rezidenturas of all capitalist countries. The emphasis here is not so much on French military armament but on U.S. and British armament. In the list of items desired there is a tremendous number of items of U.S. manufacture.

They know the nomenclature of all latest items of equipment and weapons. They could only know this due to some leak out of U.S.A. About 90% of the items listed were of U.S. manufacture but these overlapped military equipment mutually used by Americans, French and West Germans, in short all NATO equipment.

10. G.: CHEREDEYEV said that the Rezidentura in the U.S. A. has given them the leads regarding the weapons which were the basis for the missions in France. One item was the small calibre U.S. mortar which has a very well developed system for targetting (tsentrirovanya i navodki). It can be well orientated along three planes. The mission is to obtain the mortar itself or, if that is not possible, its photograph and full

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technical data. Another mission was to obtain the U.S. "NATO" rifle and the cartridges for this rifle. They also wanted the latest models of the very well-developed U.S. and British gas masks. They are particularly interested in the filtering substances which have a very effective adsorption quality. Specifically they are concerned with what I believe is technically called the breathing cassette in which the filtering segments are placed. A great priority is placed on obtaining the secrets for anti-corrosive treatment of submarines and the submerged portions of Naval vessels. This is a repeat mission since they have been after this for a long time. This is a chemical type mission and our vessels require much more frequent dry-dock repair than the NATO vessels. Then there are twenty to twenty-five detailed missions involving various items in electronic technology applicable in rocketry. They are interested in all types of electronic units and assemblies of U.S., English or French manufacture, that are used in radio, radar, measuring instruments and guidance systems. Sketches and diagrams are particularly desired. Another item is a small U.S. rocket launched from aircraft which is capable of creating atmospheric disturbances against radar action. Apparently these rockets emanate some electro-magnetic waves which cause this disturbance. This serves to jam enemy radar beams. The way they explained it was that after firing this instrument descends slowly on a parachute and jams radio and radar.

11. S.: A universal mission for all Residenturas, but particularly here in France is to visit all chemical factories possible to determine the composition of the new solid fuel for rockets which has been developed by the French. They say that the French already have hundreds of solid fuel cartridges which are suitable for firing rockets. The French are considered to be world leaders in this field. Another requirement is to obtain all possible data on heat resistant steels. In this connection I found out that the nimonic series have been developed in U.S.A. and not in England. However, it seems that they are working together with the

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British in the development of heat resistant steels. In addition all data on the components of liquid fuels were also missions. The above comprised the basic items listed as missions and each case officer had a considerable number of missions to fulfil. But from the reporting that I heard by the individual case officers only a few missions have been accomplished and no case officer had fully accomplished all his missions. Another item I forgot to mention was the acquisition of electronic Naval depth gauging instruments. These were of U.S. and British manufacture. Missions regarding documentation consisted of technical data on steel production, rocket fuel production and all documentary data covering the items listed above. These missions for the obtaining of documents were also distributed by CHEREDEYEV to his case officers.

12. G.: How many case officers were present?

S.: There were ten officers present yesterday but these were not the whole contingent. Many were not permitted to attend. Let me see, CHEREDEYEV was there, his Deputy ANANYEV, the Military Attache SOKOLOV, the Naval Attache PROKHOROV - he has been here maybe four or five months - then Mikhail Kuz'mich SOLOVYEV - he is a GRU officer who was previously in GENEVA and he was transferred here with his wife and two children; he is in the technical group where there are also two KGB officers. There were five other officers present whom I will identify for you from photographs when you show them to me. I also visited the individual offices of the other GRU men who were not at this meeting and I knew several of them and greeted them, for example, GRIGORIYEV, Valentin, Captain 2nd Rank, who had studied at the MDA as my classmate. He works for PROKHOROV. CHEREDEYEV asked one of the five officers I did not name to send a cable to GRU stating that I had arrived safely. As a summary of this meeting all officers stated that they had assigned all of their missions for execution to their agents. They have a large number of agents and, as I mentioned before, they are greatly helped by the Communists here.

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13. S.: After the meeting I spoke to the Rezident and his deputies and detailed my mission. I said that I will try to find some new acquaintances by visiting the Soviet Exhibition and using the few acquaintances I have met in MOSCOW at the French Exhibition, should a contact prove to be of interest to the Rezident I would turn him over. I mentioned that I had the mission of obtaining some technical data and to find dead drops. The Rezident said that they had many dead drops in PARIS and that I was not to waste my time here but when my itinerary for travel through France would be established, then the Rezident would tell me in what towns dead drops would be desirable. He even offered me an operational car and chauffeur for my trip through France.

14. S.: At the meeting I was asked to speak and I told them of what items were purchased at the French Exposition in MOSCOW. The purchasing commission was the same one that had been to LONDON and at the French Exposition they purchased items totalling 2,600,000 new roubles. We purchased much of the electronic equipment which was shown there and for GRU considerable optical equipment was purchased. There were two officers from the GRU in this commission. One was Gen. Major of Engineers who works in the Information Directorate, VYSOTSKIY, and there was another Colonel from the Information Directorate in the Commission. For GRU they purchased automatic pilots which can operate in the far north, electronic equipment and optical equipment. The one who checked and authorized this large purchase was GVISHIANI's father-in-law, a Deputy of KHRUSHCHEV's and a member of the Presidium, KOSYGIN. I also mentioned which of the items they had listed, GRU considered to be of prime importance, since I was briefed on this prior to my departure and I also mentioned the symposium to be held at OXFORD on paper production. I also supported CHEREDEYEV's statement that duplicate samples are necessary, even if it has been reported that a certain item had already been obtained in another country.

15. S.: CHEREDEYEV was very please with me and was most courteous. He gave me French cigarettes and said that operational funds, which I /had not....

had not been given in MOSCOW, were available at any time should I need to entertain anyone. He escorted me to the door, asked me to come back any time and I went to dinner with ANANYEV and SOLOVYEV, to the TORGPREDSTVO where they have a dining room, near the Bois de Boulogne. After that I rested and went out with WYNNE and had a very nice time.

16. H.: Do they know that WYNNE is here?

S.: No. Let us talk about this now. I have a proposal which I think will simplify things for us considerably. Let me finish first describing circumstances leading up to this proposal. Today I went to the Embassy again, then I went to the Exposition with SOLOVYEV by metro, because he wanted to show me how the metro runs. There SOLOVYEV introduced me to the deputy director of the Exhibition. The Director is a clean man from the MVD but the Deputy is our man from GRU. His name is Leonid Vassilyevich <sup>NEDEKOV</sup> ~~NEDEKOV~~, a Colonel of GRU, under ROGOV like myself, who works under cover of MVD. I spoke to him for a short while and he said that an important delegation would be coming at 3 or 4 that afternoon and would I please return at that time. I had lunch with WYNNE and I went back to the Exhibition. There I spoke to him about my missions and I mentioned that an Englishman who has close ties with the GNIK and who had been at the French Exhibition in MOSCOW will possibly come to the Soviet Exhibition in PARIS for two or three days. I added that this man has many contacts with firms and is planning to organise a mobile exhibition in U.S.S.R. in 1962. I told you that WYNNE had mentioned this when he was at the Committee in MOSCOW, and there is a record of this discussion there. WYNNE also officially stated in the Committee that he would come to PARIS for two or three days. This is also on record. Therefore it would be very good if WYNNE would go to the Exhibition for two or three days. He should not go off to BELGRADE on Tuesday. In about ten days the Exhibition will close and after that we do not need WYNNE here at all. It is going to close on the 3rd of

/October. ....

October. WYNNE can even come to the Embassy to ask for me or I can simply meet him at the Exhibition. In that case I will tell the Embassy that the representative of many British firms who has close contact with our Committee has arrived here and in addition I can say that WYNNE has promised to bring me some worthwhile documentary material. This would be most plausible and in my view very correct. Of course if you say no, then WYNNE can go to BELGRADE, but please consider this. It is a fact that people come to this Exhibition from many countries, and WYNNE did say at the Committee that he would come here. If I met WYNNE at the Exhibition I could take him to a private office with NEGREV, pour him out operational wine and he can say that he has brought me a package of some material. This material I will deliver to the Embassy. I am just giving you a rough plan and you can arrange the details as you see fit. But this would simplify our work and be very good for me.

17. S.: I already met one businessman through NEGREV; I have his name written down in my notebook which is in my coat pocket. The man I met through NEGREV is Marcel WACHSPRESS from the Society of Franco-Russian Friendship. He speaks English, though poorly. He even criticised the Exhibition, he asked me why there were certain technical items there which could be of interest to specialists only and nothing from the country itself. There is nothing from Soviet life here. NEGREV told me today that the KGB are everywhere, no matter in what direction one spits. They are in the stands, amongst the interpreters and the guides. That's all I have on the Exhibition and with respect to WYNNE I again repeat that if he was to work with me for two days it would be very good for us and it would also strengthen WYNNE's position with the Committee since I would report that I met WYNNE here and that he brought me something.

18. S.: Tomorrow morning I am going directly to the Exhibition with Ivan Pavlovich KUDRYAVTSEV, the Deputy for Science and Technology,

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because one of our Ministers is arriving there, I believe from the Ministry of the River Fleet. In general up to the time of the closing of the Exhibition I will be going there and to the Embassy every day and after that I will take a short trip through France. Maybe I could pick something up either directly along the line of my mission or something similar to the missions I mentioned earlier. Some filter material for the gas mask even if it isn't the real thing, or a shell cartridge. I need your support in these things because it will help me attain greater stature and as a result I will be sent out more often on TDYs.

19. S.: The problem of my room has not yet been solved. What has happened is that they moved me out of my room to another one in the same hotel with the price just the same. (It was decided that WAYNE would get subject a room at the Palais d'Orsay and move subject into it if a room is available. The price there is 34 francs per day.) This is all that I have to report.

20. G.: We have lots of questions. Let's begin with the clarification of the information you gave us the day before yesterday.

S.: Yes, and please let me have my own reference notes.

G.: Here is the most important question. At the very beginning of your report you used the expression "if necessary KHRUSHCHEV will strike" at the time of the signing of the Peace Treaty. By whom was this specific statement made and what were the circumstances?

S.: This expression was not told to me by only one person. This concept was expressed to me by VARENTSOV and also by POZOVNYY and BUZINOV and in addition I have heard in the General Staff from those who are in a position to know and with whom I have friendly relations the same thing. This is all tied up with the general theme I reported that if you retreat from BERLIN then things will be quiet again for a year or a year and a half until KHRUSHCHEV starts yelling again that we have achieved a victory and that KENNEDY had been afraid.

G.: What was the context of the circumstances when this was said?

S.: Specifically BUZINOV asked me if I had 500 roubles with which

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to get some supplies of butter and sugar because he felt that things would be very bad in October. I asked him if he were not being panicky. He said "No. I am an old soldier but I have a feeling from what I see, and you must through your channels, how difficult things can be in October. I have been running from one place to another and sending officers to all kinds of bases where preparations to the point of combat readiness are being made. And I know that if the West begins to fire after the Peace Treaty we must be ready to strike them a hard blow and we do not have sufficient reserves of rockets.

21. G.: What specifically does KHRUSHCHEV lack to follow through an attack on the West?

S.: He does not have sufficient number of atomic warheads. They published in our press that we have 30,000 atomic weapons of various yields and many fools believe this; they have various size yields, but few - they are still making them. Similarly, although the R-11 and R-12 rockets have been found to be satisfactory and are being mass produced, the R-14 is still not in serial production.

22. G.: What else does he lack?

S.: Trained personnel cadres. Several years more are required. Is it not significant to have 2,500 students at one time at one Academy, the DZERZHINSKIY Academy in peacetime? And these can be seen going to their studies every day.

G.: Any other fundamental items - how about submarines?

S.: There are insufficient submarines. However, they do have an announced plan for attacking the United States and England using ICBMs, submarines and aviation. This was announced at the reception by KHRUSHCHEV himself, and he also mentioned that they had a nuclear weapon of one (sic) megaton.

G.: And who told you specifically about each of the other deficiencies?

S.: VARENTSOV told me many times about all these deficiencies I

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have mentioned above. On this I swear.

23. G.: What you have just answered would answer item 21 of your notes, since you just said that KHRUSHCHEV spoke of this at the reception you referred to.

S.: That is correct. I also forgot to mention that there is a lack of perfected electronic guidance systems. There has been a little quantity of rockets developed and with this small amount KHRUSHCHEV is attempting to scare us. However this maniac before the end of his life may desire to make this tremendous attack and that is what all the Russian people are afraid of and that is why I made the suggestion that it would be worth while to assassinate him. We would relax for a year or two before a new leader emerges and there would be a big fight for control of power. The most outstanding candidate now, the smartest, is MIKOYAN, who is still an old Leninist. MOLOTOV is ill and will not compete, KOZLOV and BREZHNEV are complete fools and these two don't like MIKOYAN since they are stooges of KHRUSHCHEV. They would not move up CHURAYEV either, he is a second rate man and he is ill; he is 57 years of age and he almost died recently - I must tell you about this.

24. S.: Last May 1st when I was in LONDON, CHURAYEV was at the May Day Parade and caught a severe cold and on the 2nd May there was a serious mine cave-in at KRIVOI-ROG and many miners were killed and KHRUSHCHEV ordered CHURAYEV to go there personally to investigate the disaster, since he was a Chief in the RFSFR. Sick or not CHURAYEV had to go and he was taken back from there with extreme pneumonia. He almost died and he was practically dead clinically until a medical colonel succeeded in giving him sufficient transfusions to bring him back to life. CHURAYEV related all this at the birthday party.

25. G.: On these general exercises in October what components of the satellite forces will participate?

S.: Evidently I didn't make this sufficiently clear in my report.

/In these....

In these general manoeuvres there is not a single unit which will not have its wartime military mission to accomplish. All will participate since a mock war will be declared. Irrespective of where one sits in what headquarters, all elements of troop deployment per phases such as D+5, D+10 etc. will be undergone, even to the point of establishing bakeries, laundries and field hospitals.

G.: And will these exercises be done as fully as you say by the satellite forces?

S.: Yes, just as completely. Of course, firing will be restricted or simulated and atomic bursts will be simulated also, but VARENTSOV and BUZINOV told me that there will also be rocket firing exercises. These may be done in the KAPUSTIN-YAR area or in some isolated place. This exercise is to train the rocket crews in target aiming. Although there will not be a general mobilization, this mass deployment of the entire standing army as it passes through its manoeuvre phases will put it into combat readiness to the extent of the forces now under arms. The Air Force and all services will participate and offensive as well as defensive phases will be scheduled. I forgot to mention another thing - all forms of signal communication will be intensively used to train those units properly.

26. G.: Please explain how many prominent commanders such as MALINOVSKIY and VARENTSOV, who will be delegates to the Party Congress can attend both the Congress and be at the manoeuvres.

S.: This is very simple. I myself participated at the Party meeting in the Kremlin when ZHUKOV was ousted. KHRUSHCHEV and the new Minister made a speech and in half an hour they left the Assembly which continued to make other speeches and cheered KHRUSHCHEV's policy all day long. Therefore at this Party Congress they will listen to KHRUSHCHEV's opening speech which will be the programme for the Congress, and go. The rest of the delegates will make speeches for seven to ten days. The big people will not attend discussions by delegates from kolkhozes.

/They will....

They will only be present at the main presentation of the programme and go. I also heard from POZOVNYY that during the Party Congress the entire PVO system for the defence of MOSCOW will be put on a strict combat alert.

27. G.: How about China?

S.: China will have a separate role in this. They will guard the possible hostile direction of American attack from Japan. China will also be represented at the Congress but it is still not known whether MAO TSE TUNG will come personally or not. They very much want to have him come to MOSCOW as a popularity gesture for the Congress. When I find out I'll report all this to you because I propose to make a personal visit on CHURAYEV.

28. S.: I would like to ask a question at this time if I may.

G.: Go ahead.

S.: I have been thinking for a long time that it would be a great advantage for us to invoke a small local conflict with the Soviets in some remote area, something like the Finnish War or the conflict in the Far East in the past. KHRUSHCHEV does not want this. It should be demonstrated that KHRUSHCHEV is the sole proponent of nuclear warfare and the only warmonger amongst all nations. He says that a local conflict would develop into a nuclear war. This is not true and a conflict using conventional weapons in Korea or Vietnam could be made. If a local conflict was created on the borders of Iran or Pakistan or Turkey and there was enough provocation for this, by the Americans and British, and a Soviet Army group of almost fifteen divisions were to be deployed in this direction, say 500,000 men, and both sides were employing conventional weapons, you would be surprised to see how many mass desertions by officers and men would take place from the Soviet Army to your side. Then this svoloch would see himself how weak his position is and he would have to cease all hostilities to patch up his Army. The Army today is seething, KHRUSHCHEV has abused it severely by his extensive discharges in the past, which is something that STALIN did not do. KHRUSHCHEV is called "the abuser of the Army". Our leaders should

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recognise how much dissatisfaction there is amongst the officers of the Soviet Army. Of course it is not for us, particularly for me, to suggest political action, wiser people will do this and it is not even our concern. However, I mention these things because I feel you should report the extent of the dissatisfaction in the Soviet Army. KHRUSHCHEV is today the new HITLER, an atomic HITLER and with the help of his stooges who support him he wants to start a world conflict so that prior to his death as he has said, "I will bury Capitalism."

29. G.: Will you explain very carefully this very important statement you made. You stated that on the 8th September there was a nuclear detonation using a rocket as a delivery means with a warhead of 16,000 kilotons. Do you realise that this is 16,000,000 tons or 16 megatons?

S.: Yes, 16,000 kilotons -- wait, I beg your pardon, 16,000 kilograms.

G.: That makes sense because that would be 16 kilotons.

S.: Yes, of course, that's what I had in mind.

G.: Then, will you tell me why was it specifically 16 kilotons, since usually your terms refer to 5, 10, 15 etc.

S.: Yes, that is true, they usually go by fives but evidently they have invented this particular yield and that is what they tested, but why, I do not have any idea.

30. G.: Have you ever heard even from rumours what is the largest Soviet nuclear weapon in TNT equivalent?

S.: I have heard of astronomical figures and it was announced that there is a 1 megaton bomb, which a hydrogen bomb could produce; however, I do not believe that they have tested this yet and they are still working on it. VARENTSOV never mentioned this, nor did any other person with whom I have talked.

31. G.: Are the R-12 and the R-14 rockets now VARENTSOV's rockets?

S.: Yes, they are VARENTSOV's rockets.

H.: Let us go a little further into this one. In VARENTSOV's

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article written at the beginning of 1961 he complained that he was not being given an operational tactical rocket with a range greater than a thousand kilometres, but these rockets have ranges which are much greater. Does he know when this change took place. (G. translates)

S.: At that time there were no R-14 rockets, they were only being made and now they do exist, but now he has been given them.

H.: But the article was written in the second issue of 1961 and these rockets must have been well advanced so VARENTSOV must have known that they were to be produced. Does he know if there has been any change in the subordination of missile control during this period between May and September? (G. Translates)

S.: This is entirely possible. And it is possible that they have given a portion of MOSKALENKO's rockets to VARENTSOV.

J.: How does he know that the R-12 and the R-14 are VARENTSOV's?

H.: Even though VARENTSOV went to their testing ground he might have gone there as an observer.

S.: When VARENTSOV went to KAPUSTIN Yar for the rocket tests he went there to accept them into his command from industry. He would not have gone there if they were not his rockets. He went there under the directive of the General Staff and of the Ministry of Defence.

G.: Did VARENTSOV tell you this?

S.: Yes, he said "I am going to KAPUSTIN Yar" and at the same time BUZINOV told me that there are such rockets.

32. H.: But the R-14 is still in the strategic range since it can go 4,500 kilometres with an atomic warhead and much further with a conventional warhead. Therefore it can't be called a tactical weapon.

S.: But none of us know that the R-14 will not be allotted to MOSKALENKO to fulfil his missions and also to VARENTSOV to fulfil his. In addition it is a very closely knit over-all command, both are under governmental control and particularly in a budgetary sense and if in the earlier stages VARENTSOV's rockets needed a greater range, MOSKALENKO

/would....

would have turned over some of his rockets for VARENTSOV's units to launch. The two commands are very closely co-ordinated, and it will continue to be this way and in case of war there would be a lot of rockets which would be turned over from one command to the other. This was foreseen and the commands are well controlled centrally.

G.: Is it not true that a long range rocket such as the R-14 could be used by VARENTSOV at shorter ranges.

S.: Of course it can. Any rocket can be fired at shorter ranges than its maximum but it is efficient to use a rocket at its maximum range. It would not be efficient to use such a large rocket with a 2,500 kilometre range to fire at a target a thousand kilometres away, when an R-11 could do this. However if there are no R-11s then a larger rocket would be used.

33. H.: But he did not say that VARENTSOV at any time had specifically stated that he is taking over command of the R-12 and R-14 rocket units.

S.: No there was no occasion for VARENTSOV to say this to me in those terms directly. He only mentioned that he lacked this and that and that MOSKALENKO has this and that, but the R-14 may be allocated to both VARENTSOV and MOSKALENKO by the High Command. I reported to you in LONDON that there is a tendency to unify both commands.

H.: Has he heard any more about this unification for single command since he last told us about it in LONDON? (G. translates)

S.: Yes, I had a conversation about this with BUZINOV only recently. BUZINOV does not wish to leave VARENTSOV's command and he is now working as the Deputy to the Chief of an OPDEL. He said that if VARENTSOV becomes the over-all unified commander his Adjutant would have a Major-General's slot and BUZINOV is hoping for this since he has been a Colonel for a long time. He hopes that this unification will take place quickly so that he can be with VARENTSOV and become a General/Adjutant. At this time the General Staff considers that this extensive reorganisation is difficult to do when the present political situation is so critical.

/If there....

If there were a relief of this tension they would push through this organisation in three or four months. BUZINOV knows the situation because he is very close to it and they are not doing this now because of the present situation. However, the concept has not been rejected, nor has it been considered incorrect and it will undoubtedly go through. In case of war now both commands will be very closely co-ordinated.

54. S.: As you know VARENTSOV is now a delegate to the Congress and will be nominated for a candidate for the Central Committee. We can't tell what will happen but he is in good standing. The Minister came to his birthday party, and he didn't go there because he loves VARENTSOV but it was probably suggested by the Central Committee, of which

MALINOVSKY is a member. CHURAYEV, however, came of his own free will.

In the past VARENTSOV had called MALINOVSKY a fool and from my own observation I did not think he was very bright and when we have time I will tell you more about him later - that is, how he behaved at this party. Now VARENTSOV is being kept in a prominent role. They made him a Chief Marshal, gave him the Order of Lenin and the Minister came to his party; this is rare for the Minister to do particularly as he had to go to LVOV the next day. Incidentally to this birthday party ZAKHAROV, the Chief of Staff, FIRSKIY, CHUIKOV, the new Chief of Civil Defence and ZHDANOV were also invited, but none of them were in MOSCOW on that day.

G.: Wasn't KARIKILLI there?

S.: Yes, he was, didn't I mention him?

35. G.: Who told you that the atomic warheads were all ready at the launching site?

S.: That was BUZINOV. And VARENTSOV said this also, he told it to POZOVNIY and to me.

H.: That's all right for NOVAYA ZEMLYA where they are doing the testing, but how do you know that the atomic warheads were delivered to these other places such as NORILSK and Frants-Josef Land.

/S.: ....

S.: I know that there were atomic warheads there because BUZINOV mentioned many officers who were being sent for one and two months duty to the bases I mentioned because there were atomic warheads there.

H.: The thing to determine is whether these warheads were always at these bases or were they recently moved there.

S.: I understand. The atomic warheads were recently moved there from all of their specific storage areas wherever they may have been, because they were to be placed in a position of combat readiness to support KHRUSHCHEV's belligerent policy.

A short pause was made to change tapes.

Side 2 ✓ 36. G.: Did Sergei Sergeievich by any chance mention the range dispersion (the Vd) of the R-12 rocket?

S.: No, he did not and I couldn't very well ask him, but it seems to me that the Vb of 160 metres is a more significant figure for us since it is the lateral dispersion.

✓ 37. G.: Is the constant travel of VARENTISOV's and MOSKALENKO's representatives to the missile bases a recent development or have they always been sent there?

S.: They have been always going there, even before. If that were not the case KNEDELIN would not have been killed. They are now going to the testing of nuclear detonations delivered by rockets and they are going more intensively and frequently now because KHRUSHCHEV has insisted that the launching of rockets with atomic warheads should be accurately worked out as soon as possible. KHRUSHCHEV even insists that they personally make inspections. Therefore both FYRSKIY and SEMENOV have been sent out and when necessary VARENTISOV goes also, since there are many sites at which tests are being made and many types of rockets to be tested. Trips are being made continuously by the officers concerned. This intensive testing is a clear-cut example of the preparedness of which I have mentioned.

✓ 38. G.: And this is also true for NORILSK and VORKUTA?

S.: Yes, and to give an example VARENTISOV said at his party

/that....

that he had just returned from SVERDLOVSK where he visited factories. I will send you a recent picture I have of VARENTSOV. You will see yourselves how tired he looks. But though he limps and moves around with difficulty, he is constantly flying around like a young boy because KHRUSHCHEV will have it no other way - just look at the example of CHURAYEV who almost died. They are all afraid of KHRUSHCHEV and must obey his orders or they will lose all they have. CHURAYEV bragged that he had a dacha given to him with 12,000 roses growing there, that is how these parasites live on the workers' blood. A capitalist doesn't live that way.

39. H.: I would like to get this absolutely right - who told him and when that atomic warheads were taken out of storage and delivered to the missile bases? (G. translates)

S.: When the situation over BERLIN became more tense, KHRUSHCHEV with the support of the Central Committee ordered that these atomic warheads be placed on a ready status and be delivered to the launching site in order to support his political policy with force and KHRUSHCHEV realises that we may strike him first.

G.: But who told you this?

S.: First of all BUZHNOV, then, when I was in Headquarters of Artillery, I heard from the various officers that they were being sent out to determine accurately in practice how long it takes to move up atomic weapons to their proposed launching positions, how long it takes to assemble and mount them into firing positions, what the reactions of the troops are to the concept of employing such weapons; in short, all previous paper calculations were now being checked out in practice. At the same time they are bringing themselves into a position that if atomic weapons are necessary to use they will be in position to be used.

H.: Did he hear about the movement of these warheads before the phase of atomic testing or after this period?

S.: They were moved up before this period and then the decision was made to test them by using rockets.

/H.: ....

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40. H.: But they are not being tested at all missile sites. They have tested them at NOVAYA ZEMLYA but not at every missile site. How does it work out when they move these atomic warheads to the various other sites when they have not already tested them? The two things seem illogical. It is logical to take warheads to the places where you are going to test them, but the testing is to get ready for war and there may be minor adjustments on parts that they haven't tested before. How can they in fact then move them to these other areas to be ready to be fired when they have not tested them? This appears to be a contradiction.

S.: There is no contradiction. Unfortunately we do not know the co-ordinates of the sites where they are being tested and the co-ordinates of the sites from which they will be launched. And I am sure that the testing is done at sites which have no relation to the launching sites that would be used in case of war. All we know are the general areas but it is a fact that these sites are not the same, for example, even on NOVAYA ZEMLYA there are concealed storage areas and launching sites all prepared for use in case of war but the actual testing that FYRSKIY is running may be several hundred kilometres away on NOVAYA ZEMLYA. Therefore there is no contradiction.

41. H.: Can I ask the question another way? Did he know in advance that the tests were going to start.

S.: Yes, I knew in advance that HOPEV was flying off and that the BERLIN border was to be closed four days before it happened. And I knew about two weeks ago that it was indispensable for us to test nuclear warheads with rockets as the delivery means. I knew this from BUZINOV and VARENISOV said "Rockets must be tested because we are not sure how they will work with atomic warheads." This, I knew after WYNNE left MOSCOW.

H.: How many days did it start after WYNNE left? It could only have been one or two days.

/S.: ....

S.: No, it was about the same time, let me look at the calendar. The BERLIN border was closed on 13 August, I knew about it about the 9th or 10th of August and I wanted to pass this information via the dead-drop on Monday. But already I heard the radio announcement that KONEV had flown off so the news was no longer secret. The fact that it was necessary to test nuclear weapons with rocket carriers I found out only after WYNNE left. I found it out the following week and it was clear then that KHRUSHCHEV was using the disagreement over the BERLIN status as an excuse to untie his hands with respect to nuclear tests. Obviously if I had known of this earlier I would have given this to WYNNE as a first priority instead of the cassettes. Later I considered putting the information in the dead-drop and calling and then I would have observed to see if it were picked up within one hour and if not I would have retrieved my message from the dead-drop. However, you warned me not to do this unless it were a case of great urgency and I was not sure how urgent this was.

G.: Before you leave we will establish for you clearly what is urgent and what is not.

42. G.: Now on NOVAYA ZEMELYA is there a polygon there or operational launch sites, or both?

S.: It is a fully equipped launching site for wartime as well as a testing area, and I have heard in our headquarters that our people were disturbed because the Americans and British have spotted our interest there since your submarine was in that area.

G.: And FIRSKIY is in charge of running the tests?

S.: Yes, he is. He is the first Deputy to VARENTSOV.

H.: How does he know that he is actually running the tests? This is something that I think needs a lot of definition. First of all at one stage he did say that apart from FIRSKIY running the tests, MOSKALENKO would be represented there. Then surely there are the atomic people who would be interested in the atomic part of it, then who is in over-all charge?

/S.: ....

S.: On NOVAYA ZEMLYA PYRSKIY is responsible for everything. And the fact that a representative from MOSKALENKO is there and representatives from the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers and even from committees that we don't know the names of now, they are simply there as observers, and I heard the Defence Minister express himself about PYRSKIY. I wish I had a recorder so that you could listen yourselves.

H.: If PYRSKIY is in charge of it, does this in fact mean that only testing of rockets as carriers for atomic warheads in the tactical range and not within the strategic range is being done and if testing is being done in the strategic range, where is this being done?

S.: This question is not correct. What is being tested is the action of nuclear weapons using rockets as a delivery means. What is important to determine are the deficiencies and errors in the rockets' operations etc. etc. All are present, those who will launch rockets at great ranges and those who will use rockets at smaller ranges. Even those who plan to fire at shorter ranges may tomorrow be assigned a mission to fire at greater ranges. The main thing is to make the tests. It is not important who is in charge, even though PYRSKIY is VARENTSOV's representative, there are other representatives there from MOSKALENKO. There is after all a centralised control by the Party and a centralisation of the All Union military and political organisation. And therefore they decided to assign PYRSKIY, first of all he is an engineer, a Colonel General, a representative of a Chief Marshal. He is an engineer by background and a specialist in atomic matters, and he is concerned with plants which produce fissionable material. After all these plants may produce atomic warheads one day for VARENTSOV and another day for MOSKALENKO, the plants are the same. So they appointed PYRSKIY and there is nothing unusual about that. MOSKALENKO was not offended by this at all. And if MOSKALENKO personally had not been there his deputy could possibly be of lower rank than VARENTSOV's representative.

/43. ....

43. G.: But does VARENTSOV have an over-all control, since PYRSKIY is his deputy in deciding what and how should be tested?

S.: No, PYRSKIY received a composite order from all concerned and he will submit his report to the Council of Ministers, the Central Committee and the Minister of Defence. He is there as a Government representative and anyone else could have been appointed if he were considered to be qualified.

H.: He stated that PYRSKIY was the expert on atomic matters. Can he give us any information on PYRSKIY's background?

S.: I don't mean that he is an atomic expert as such. He is an all-round intelligent and is a well educated man. He understands nuclear energy and equipment as well. He is an engineer by education whereas MOSKALENKO and VARENTSOV are not. PYRSKIY had been the Commander of Artillery in a military mission in ROSTOV the North Caucasian Military District. He was also the Commander of Artillery of an Army then he was made the Deputy to VARENTSOV. In this way VARENTSOV was strongly supported by PYRSKIY because he is an engineer. PYRSKIY does have many personal deficiencies, however, and VARENTSOV does not get along with him well. They do not have close personal relations. He does his work very well but as an individual he is always intriguing, he wants to be a Marshal of Artillery and he is jealous of VARENTSOV because he considers VARENTSOV to be a fool in technical matters. He is merely a strong administrator. VARENTSOV can operate massed artillery units effectively but from the viewpoint of technology, PYRSKIY is far above that.

44. G.: Is this base on NOVAYA ZEMLYA the most recent one?

S.: It's construction has been going on a long time. Some time ago I mentioned the North Regions to you but at that time I did not know exactly where.

G.: How about the other bases such as NORILSK, VORKUTA and Franz-Josef Land?

S.: They were also being prepared for a long time. I know that NORILSK and VORKUTA were closed to foreigners. I know this because a

/Canadian...

Canadian delegation came to MOSCOW on an exchange basis with delegations visiting the far north, in order to determine construction techniques in very cold climates. They wanted to go to VORKUTA but were refused permission. There is even an article by ODINTSOV in which the extensive work by numerous engineer forces in the far north are described. All kinds of underground shelters and fortifications have been constructed in the far north, particularly in the area of VORKUTA. All this underground work is done because of its extreme cold temperature and I am sure that there are many other bases in the far north. I will find out the locations of all the sites that I can but in the meantime you should expect that there are many more there. The principle to keep in mind is that they are building as many dispersed bases as possible avoiding large concentrations. These areas are being extensively prepared as launching sites for nuclear strikes. On the other hand from the defensive viewpoint thanks to dispersion and the isolated nature of the country, little damage to installations and personnel would result from enemy attacks.

45. G.: Now, with respect to armies, when you said that there are only two Soviet armies within the D.D.R., who told you this?

S.: FEDOROV told me this at the time that he came to MOSCOW en route for training his battalion at KAFUSTIN YaR. BUZINOV went there also and he is visiting FEDOROV now and when he returns he will tell me all about it.

G.: Before you stated that there were two tank armies there.

S.: No. That is a misunderstanding; I did not say that there were two tank armies there in their entirety. It is the same concept as when I said there are ten armies deployed in the general direction of the D.D.R. These are echeloned throughout the entire territories adjacent to and reaching far back from the D.D.R. They are part of the over-all Front commanded by Marshal KONEV. Some forces even lie in the U.S.S.R. territory. The tank armies and other armies are also echeloned back. Their main elements may be in the D.D.R. There are lots of tanks concentrated in the D.D.R. and when I said that there were two

/armies....

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armies within the territory and now a third one is being moved in, this means that their combat elements may be there but their rear services may be far back in Poland or in the Baltic area. To determine this exactly we would need a map laying out the entire order of battle. But in order to estimate the strength of the forces opposing us in this theatre, which are under KONEV, we must consider that he had nine armies in his command and now he has ten with the addition of the Eighth Mechanized Army.

46. G.: In other words only portions of the armies are actually in the D.D.R.?

S.: Of course, and FEDOROV told me that the local population was not pleased to see large Soviet troop units in their territory. For estimating purposes we should consider that there have been two Soviet armies in the D.D.R. and now the third has been brought in. It is entirely possible that D.D.R. divisions may be attached to these armies.

47. G.: Now with respect to this battalion which is the experimental anti-missile battalion, where is this battalion actually located?

S.: The Institute itself is in MOSCOW and I believe it is in the area of Bokrovskiy-Streshnevo but I will find out the exact location later. The battalion, however, is located at a testing site, but which one I do not know. It is not in the MOSCOW area, maybe it is in KAFUSTIN Yar.

48. G.: Here is a question regarding your item No. 14. Who told you about this?

S.: The fact that KHRUSHCHEV said that there can be no exclusively local war is general conversation in the entire General Staff. I cannot single anyone out, everyone speaks of this.

49. G.: And who told you about the delay in the demobilisation of 400,000 men?

S.: This is known exactly to BUZINOV. He said this twice to me.

G.: Why is he in a position to know this?

S.: Because VARENTSOV also has an organisational-mobilisation ottdel and they know the total personnel strength with respect to

/artillery....

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artillery troops and then someone must have told BUZINOV what portion of the artillery troops are involved with respect to the whole of the demobilisation delay of troops.

Another pause took place for the tape to be changed.

50. S.: Nowadays the KGB has again raised its head. One must again be careful of what is said. This is another of KHRUSHCHEV's strong control policies; after all, just look at the stature of the heads that rolled. And he is both the author and the initiator of all the trouble that the whole world is now so anxious about.

51. G.: Regarding the items about closing the BERLIN border, who told you about this and what were the circumstances?

S.: At VARENTSOV's house I was invited together with POZOVNYY and we sat around a table just as we are sitting here together with our wives. And POZOVNYY said "Don't talk about this, but we have prepared to shut the borders in BERLIN at six o'clock in the morning on the 13th August." Later BUZINOV told me the same thing. I was almost tempted to call up and tell you about this in open text or to put it in the dead-drop.

52. G.: You mentioned that in KREMENTCHUG there is this brigade with battalions of R-11s and R-12s.

S.: Yes, and if you show me my graduating class photograph I will spot the deputy commander, Lieut. Col. BONDARENKO.

G.: Of what use, are the R-11 battalions in KREMENTCHUG?

S.: That is only a rear area, they train there but if the brigade is needed it may even be transferred to Germany; this is only a home station, a garrison, and there is a training school there. It is simply a brigade and I do not know its number and it is a second echelon unit which is in the process of training, it may be even transferred to the Far East, to face Japan.

G.: That is very clear.

53. G.: Now, please tell us the proper title and the official position of the other persons who were at VARENTSOV's party. Let us take Gen. Polk. FOMIN, Gen. Polk. SAMEONOV and Professor RYABCHIKOV.

/S.: ....

S.: I understand, let us first take Gen. Polk. SAMSONOV. He is the former chief of staff of Artillery under VARENTSOV, just as KARIOFILLI is now. The Chief of Staff of GUKART (Glavnoye Upravleniye Komanduyeshchego Artillerii) of the Ground Forces. Don't mix this organisation up with GRAU now called GRAU, GUKART is the official designation of VARENTSOV's command. Today SAMSONOV is the Chief of a Faculty (Kathedra) of the VOROSHILOV Academy which has just recently been amalgamated with the Frunze Academy. He is the author of many artillery studies; he has written many articles and he participates in reviewing artillery manuals. He is an outstanding artillery theoretician. VARENTSOV made a special toast to him. He is a small bald man.

54. S.: Now Gen. Polk. POMIN of Artillery. He is rather ill these days. He is also an excellent artillery theoretician. His present duty - he is in this Council reviewing inventions, the Chief NII of GRAU, which supervises the work of other NIIs. At one time he too, like SAMSONOV now, was Chief of a Faculty in the VOROSHILOV Academy, now in the FRUNZE Academy. At one time he was also a prominent artillery commander during the war. He is a very close friend of Rodion Yakovlevich MALINOVSKIY because at one time they both served together in CHITA. Their families are also well acquainted and their two wives were also constantly yapping at the table at which they sat together.

55. S.: Now, Gen. Polk. KARIOFILLI. He is very ill and he wishes to retire. I just remembered, the deputy to KARIOFILLI is Gen. Lieut. VOSKRESENSKIY, who also met VARENTSOV at the LENINGRAD Railroad Station, greeted him and immediately flew off together with BUZINOV to the D.D.R. on an inspection trip. He is a small thin man. If he didn't have to go he would probably have been invited to the party because VARENTSOV has high hopes and reliance on VOSKRESENSKIY and hopes that one day he will be his Chief of Staff.

56. S.: Now as to Professor RYABOCHIKOV. He is about sixty years of age and a very prominent chemist, a professor and a doctor of chemical sciences and he works on bacteriological weapons. When he made his toast he said "I know Sergei Sergeievich not as well as the others

/present, ....

present, since I met him only at KARLSBAD and I have listened to everything said about him by those who have known him for decades and though I have only known him for several months I subscribe fully to what has been said about his being a great man, but in addition he is a most amiable person and thanks to his kindness and friendship I am a guest amongst you here." Although the professor was not drinking too much he did let it slip that for some time now he had been working on the preparation of certain artillery charges for the Generals present. MALINOVSKY frowned a bit when this was said since the man obviously referred to bacteriological charges for artillery and rockets. He said specifically "Sergei Sergeievich, I also load the items that you launch and fire." I already told you about this SEMENOV who was a former Deputy to VARENTISOV and who is now retired.

57. G.: Explain more about the GUKART.

S.: First of all under this Directorate all artillery schools and academies for ground forces are under VARENTISOV through this directorate. Previously Gen. Lieut. KUPIYEV was the Chief of the Upravleniye, but he has been retired. Now the Chief is Colonel LEBEDEV, who is the Chief of Military Training in GUKART. There is an intelligence section under Colonel ZAIKO. They have an organisation planning section which works as an organisational mobilisation section and also as a material supply section. There is a technical section, and there is an artillery material section. There is also an editorial section which formerly published the Artillery Journal which is no longer being published, but they have other publications to be concerned with.

G.: And undoubtedly they have a personnel section.

S.: Yes, of course, and they have an administrative office.

G.: How about an ammunition supply section?

S.: No, they would not have this, that would be under GRAU.

58. S.: What other questions do you have?

G.: Just a moment and I will get out the questions we have for

/you....

you to clarify based on your report to us on the 22nd August, which you passed through WYNN. Harold will you hand me the questionnaire on this subject, as well as his original notes so that he can refer to them. You certainly remember your first report of 22nd August on the BERLIN situation. Now, although events are moving fast and the situation has changed, please clarify the following..

S.: On basic matters nothing has changed; the tension still remains and I added when I arrived the day before yesterday that the problem of Iran will be linked to that of BERLIN.

59. G.: To what degree do satellite leaders know and accept KHRUSHCHEV's plan? and also include what the Chinese attitude is.

S.: Let us consider the Chinese separately and the other satellites on the other hand. I was not able to produce the exact letter of MAO TSE TUNG of the differences in views with KHRUSHCHEV, the letter has already been officially destroyed. With respect to all satellites except China they most completely agree with KHRUSHCHEV. They agree with every word of KHRUSHCHEV's; just look at Hungary.

FERENC and others said something different on their own foot and everything went straight into the hands of KADAR. Anyone who says the slightest thing different from what KHRUSHCHEV decides or states is immediately removed. Even GOMULKA who at one time attempted to run an independent course of sorts has now calmed down. All of these leaders execute KHRUSHCHEV's wishes, they even make the same type of aggressive speeches to impress KHRUSHCHEV. The Chinese apparently independent of the Soviet Union still want to stand in the forefront of the Communist movement. MAO TSE TUNG and his entire clique, stated that after the death of STALIN the influence of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has become weaker. But the time is still too soon for the Chinese to seize the position of the vanguard of the Communist movement, even though the population is three times that of the combined other Communist countries. From the viewpoint of numbers, and maturity in the Party sense as well as strength and correct thinking they

/consider....

consider themselves higher, more intelligent and more correct in their course than that of KHRUSHCHEV. Of course the Chinese will not do anything negative since there is a flood of gold, machinery and all other support going to China from us all the time, and they will not disturb the international position of Communism. Certainly not as openly as TITO has done. Therefore KHRUSHCHEV maintains a liberal attitude towards China and MAO TSE TUNG maintains a liberal attitude toward the U.S.S.R. They don't want to sharpen their differences. There are many fundamental differences between them that they have spoken about and these remain differences of opinion as before. Right now very little is said about China; judging from the reports in the papers one could assume that China does not exist. However, whenever there is a Congress or any other international problem is discussed, there is at least always a so-called "observer" there from China. He always supports and approves of what has been said and obviously China is closer to us than any non-Communist country. I mean by this the so-called vacillating countries. Therefore, despite everything else China must be considered to be a first rate friend and a reliable helper of the U.S.S.R. in any situation or difficulty. If a difficult situation develops, China will not insist on its own demands but will support the common cause of Communism. To what degree and on what scale is another matter; this is a problem which deserves thinking about. But the contradictions are not as critical as it may seem, each country is going along its own course and each one thinks that it is a right course. But China must always be considered as the supporter of the Soviet Union particularly in terms of military support and in that sense it should be considered as any other satellite of the U.S.S.R. China is not Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is really under our control although it is vacillating considerably. However, there is a great deal in common in the policy of TITO and MAO TSE TUNG.

60. G.: From whom did you find out about KHRUSHCHEV's statements which

\* ? S.: were quoted as what he would say at a high level conference. This

/information....

information was told by KORENEVSKIY to ZASORIN. KORENEVSKIY has very strong contacts in the Central Committee of the Communist Party. And it was stated to him that if the Western leaders go to a conference with KHRUSHCHEV about the German problem, KHRUSHCHEV will take his own position on the German problem. And let us look at this from a viewpoint of actuality. What else that is new, can KHRUSHCHEV state concerning the German problem? All he can say is "Very well I agree not to sign a peace treaty for another year" and this he does not want to do. But so far as the justification of his position and his views on the German problem, there is nothing more that he can add - he has said everything about it. Therefore, he will take the position that if a Conference on the German problem comes about but the conversations will also involve other matters, then he will discuss everything together. But if our leaders meet with him to discuss only the German problem to avoid a possible war over it and if Messrs. KENNEDY, MACMILLAN and De GAULLE state that they are willing to accept a certain flexibility concerning the German problem, on certain matters and will accept some points and not others, this would be a precedent for further consideration. And therefore they would ask KHRUSHCHEV to make certain suggestions and delay the signing of his peace treaty until everything was resolved, that is where KHRUSHCHEV would get up and leave the conference and say "I have nothing more to discuss." And this would be a complete repetition of PARIS where Mr. EISENHOWER met with KHRUSHCHEV. This came from the Central Committee to KORENEVSKIY, who is a very big man and is the Chief of the Information Directorate of GUN.

61. G.: Please explain this contradiction, KHRUSHCHEV's present belligerent attitude is completely opposite from the position that he fought so hard to attain at the 1st Party Conference. Can you explain and with referencing, what brought this about? I refer to KHRUSHCHEV's own contradictory words.

S.: I understand you perfectly. Everything is dialectically interwoven. Even DARWIN was a dialectician. When KHRUSHCHEV was

/speaking....

speaking about something entirely different to what he is saying now, in fact he was setting specific time dates when he would sign the German Peace Treaty and then denounced them, it is like swinging a club and then seeing that the reaction is not in his favour, so he stops swinging. At that time there were no military forces capable of supporting the policy he now advocates. Now he is sitting on a military horse and although he is not fully equipped to the maximum he is beginning to talk in a different way. Why has he kept quiet for so many years and now he is speaking loudly. He estimates that there are weaknesses in our western countries and he also considers that we are not fully prepared. He also knows some of our potential strengths in detail through his Communist agents particularly and will continue to know this unless we strangle these Communists and he feels that he has strength and can act this way and he feels that KENNEDY, MACMILLAN and De GAULLE must take him into account. Now that we are showing him firmness he is ill at ease, but he still hopes that we will swallow the second pill. What you refer to as a contradiction is actually a dialectic deviation and as military strength increases he wishes to use this means to gain a political victory in the German problem. And now if we falter he will win both a moral victory and additional time for himself. However, if KHRUSHCHEV is struck at with force he may recoil and think about it for a year or a year and a half. Of course he will arm during this period, as will we, and then this will be really a war of nerves. I repeat again that any concession to KHRUSHCHEV based on pure reason and humanitarian considerations will be regarded by KHRUSHCHEV as a weakness on our part. And incidentally all this stems from the problem that you invoked yourselves in, in 1956 in Egypt. In fact now that you still tolerate CASTRO in Cuba, he considers it an accomplishment on his part. You see the contradiction is this, whereas we use complete reason and humanitarian thinking in our approach to him, he translates this as an indication of weakness.

62. G.: Were these high level command changes made in connection

/with....

with the German situation, or were these changes which were planned earlier?

S.: This is again an example of KHRUSHCHEV's tactics, namely of wielding a stick. He had sent KONEV out, actually he had sacked KONEV just like he had SOKOLOVSKY, but when he needs them he calls them out again appealing to their Communist Party affiliation and to do what they should for the Party and Country. SOKOLOVSKY has already agreed to work for KHRUSHCHEV, but ZHUKOV as yet has not, but there are rumours that he will and the KONEV situation is a repetition of the same story as when ROKOSSOVSKY went down south to the Caucasian district. This is nothing but propaganda and I am sure that ZHUKOV will also agree to serve, we must await this.

63. G.: Does KHRUSHCHEV actually rely on the satellite armies in case of war?

S.: He is completely confident in the political nuclei of the political leaders in the satellite countries. He is sure of this and KADAR is as much a stooge of his as a Secretary of an Obkom.

G.: How about the troops?

S.: He is sure of a certain percentage of the troops but he does not trust them as a whole. That is why he relies so heavily on nuclear weapons. In short, if they want to live and eat to survive they had better support KHRUSHCHEV. This is why he states that any local conflict will develop into an atomic war. It is absurd and indicates absolute aggressiveness. And he is trying to frighten people by this, both ours and his own.

64. G.: Can you explain clearly exactly what is meant by a mechanised army?

S.: I have probably not clarified this sufficiently before. The word "mechanised" means everything on wheels, that means there are no foot soldiers and no horses, they have eaten all the horses. In addition all of these mechanical transports have been given more fire power such as tanks and self-propelled artillery. All other artillery is either /transported...

transported in a mounted form or is towed. As much as possible of the wheeled and tracked equipment is armoured, even personnel carriers have steel plate protection. All infantry rides on one form of equipment or another. A mechanised army may have varying composition; it may have four, five or six divisions, but all of them would be mechanised divisions, insofar as the infantry component is concerned. There can be variable numbers of tank divisions and mechanised divisions in the mechanised army. There is no set pattern.

65. G.: What is your concept of what is often referred to in your manuals as a Field Army and how does this differ from a Combined Arms Army (obshchevoiskovaya)?

S.: They are the same. Take for example the Sub-Carpathian Military District. Four armies were stationed there. Now, with the redeployment of the Eighth Mechanised Army there will be three. Two of these are Field Armies and one is an Air Army. When they speak of a Field Army they want to stress that it is primarily an infantry army, but different from a Mechanised Army. However, it is exactly the same as a Combined Arms Army - a Field Army can have varying numbers of rifle divisions depending on the mission assigned to the army and all kinds of other arms may be attached as needed.

G.: Would the divisions be motor-rifle divisions?

S.: No, the rifle divisions here would be foot soldiers.

G.: Therefore, the concept of a Combined Arms Army would mean that the rifle divisions you just spoke of have had engineer, tank and artillery units attached thereto and therefore the word "Combined Arms" is used.

S.: That is absolutely right.

66. G.: In case complications develop in connection with the German situation will Soviet Troops be sent into Roumania, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia?

S.: Without question and they will assume the prime combat role in these countries. KHRUSHCHEV would never permit independent

/satellite....

satellite army action for political reasons. He will have Soviet troops in front of them and behind them.

67. G.: If the allies succeed in forcing access to BERLIN, could then KHRUSHCHEV start a general war?

S.: KHRUSHCHEV does not want a world war and would attempt to defeat the allies locally, but if he feels that he has sufficient strength to knock out the USA and England, who are the leaders of NATO, it is possible that he may strike first. Even though in the past our General Staff and our foreign policies had condemned the concept of surprise attack such as Hitler used, but now they have gone around to the viewpoint that there is a great advantage to the side that makes a sudden massive attack first and they are preparing themselves to be in position to do so. Since he cannot muster enough strength to strike at all potential enemy countries simultaneously he is singling out the U.S. and Britain as his attack targets estimating that the other allies would disintegrate due to differences amongst themselves and be happy to be alive. The conclusion we can draw from this is that if he does not retreat from his wild proposals and impossible conditions we should strike him first, otherwise he may strike us.

68. G.: What are the present views of particular high-ranking officers regarding Soviet policy on Germany? and the role of Soviet forces? Do they agree or encourage KHRUSHCHEV?

S.: A Minister such as MALINOVSKIY agrees with KHRUSHCHEV completely, although to himself he may say that it may be too early to embark on such a risk. No-one can openly oppose KHRUSHCHEV, they would be simply removed. Each one is afraid of losing the benefits he has thanks to his high position. Do you think CHURAYEV wants to lose his estates with his twelve thousand roses? They would rather see everything go up in flames and go up themselves with it than say anything in opposition now and be removed.

69. G.: Who gave you the information that you reported regarding

/TITOV's....

TITOV's flight?

S.: These are the rumours going round all over the country, but no prominent person has told me anything about TITOV. The rumours going around are that TITOV only went around once, just like GAGARIN. The scientists, however, who have made these elaborate preparations also run tests secretly and to some degree they have had success. KHRUSHCHEV likes to bring forth military men as a screen. There are two versions of these rumours; one version is that TITOV made the same type of a vertical flight as the American did; the other version is that TITOV only circled the world once. I tried to bring this up but VARENTSOV says nothing, even though he must know the facts. BUZINOV does not know anything either because these things were done with great secrecy and the launchings were made from MOSKALENKO's bases. Possibly MOSKALENKO has nothing to do with cosmic flights, but unquestionably his bases were used for this. The Soviet people think that this was propaganda and although they understand that such feats are possible they do not believe it has been yet achieved. Of course, a flight once around can be exploited for delivering an attack against us.

70. G.: If, as you suggested, one rumour stated that a scientist went around a number of times in another vehicle, instead of TITOV, that in itself would be an accomplishment, so why would KHRUSHCHEV not announce it?

S.: The devil knows why. Maybe it is because he is so set on presenting military men. There is much that is unclear about this and although these are nothing but rumours, I felt it my duty to report this to you.

J.: In other words these are no more than low level rumours.

S.: That's right, but if everything had been so well perfected as KHRUSHCHEV alleges, then why did he not invite westerners, even KENNEDY, but at least news correspondents to witness the launching and results of these flights?

71. H.: I'd like to come back to one of the questions, since there is a slight difference here between what he said before and what he says now and I would like to know exactly how he got it. When he wrote us before he said that KHRUSHCHEV was going to do something about Turkey and Iran

/in September....

in September or October. He now says it is going to be in conjunction with BERLIN. I'd like to get this story absolutely straight and clear. Who first told him about Iran and Turkey which was after he left us in LONDON? What was said at that time and when was the position changed?

S.: I understand. The politics of the Central Committee and the Party is centralised and they can embark on any alternate routes and perform any metamorphosis in an opposite direction. First of all it is important to know that such a policy existed against Iran and continues to do this. This is what I reported to you. At that time they were planning to solve this problem in an isolated fashion and they only mentioned to me the month of September at that time. Then, I was told that it could also happen in October and I told you that after the Party Congress they would sign a Peace Treaty with Germany. Now I am clarifying this and am saying that this problem will be resolved simultaneously with the German problem. After the end of the war when our troops entered Iran they were not badly received by the local population and our troops even helped the peasants harvest their crops. Our intelligence reports that the entry of Soviet Troops now would not be badly received by the local population. KHRUSHCHEV contemplated giving an ultimatum similar to the one he gave a short time ago to Turkey and to Pakistan that if any more U.2 flights were sent from their airfields those airfields would be attacked. The ultimatum to Iran would state that if American bases were not removed from Iran, Soviet troops would move in. Obviously no-one would remove anything and if he moved in his troops then war would begin. That was one line of action, but they began to think more deeply about this. Possibly a conflict resulting from this would not work out well since there are also U.S. bases in Turkey and Pakistan; therefore it would be better to delay this for a month until October and in the meantime build up preparations. In the meantime the course of the extensive manoeuvres would be checked and troops deployed advantageously and since the Party Congress is meeting on 17th October, this problem can be handled simultaneously

/with....

with the German problem. A third possibility is that only the German question will be considered and our troops can be concentrated in the direction of Iran but would not go in. The important thing is to be prepared for any eventuality and to adopt that course of action which would be the most expedient politically, but of course all courses of action must be developed for possible use. Therefore this does not mean if they plan such a move for September that they would necessarily have to follow through. Preparations are going on intensively in the Caucasus in terms of troop training and preparations for possible military action. The island of ARTEMA has been closed. I had to report to you that preparations for this action in September were being made but one cannot tell when KHRUSHCHEV may decide that another course of action is more advantageous.

72. H.: I understand all that and it is perfectly clear, but I would like to know who told you exactly about the plans for Iran in the first instance.

S.: It was ZASOREN who is the Chief of the Napravleniye against Iran and now he has been visited by the Rezident from Iran PANTELEIMONOV. As soon as I return I will speak with him again and find out what has taken place. He is the one who told me September or October and then added that it probably would be in October together with the German problem.

73. H.: At the time that you wrote this you also said that they were considering to send CHUIKOV down there, but since then that has been changed. How was CHUIKOV connected with the Iran problem?

S.: At the time that KHRUSHCHEV sent KONEV off he wanted to place Marshals in every border military district. Therefore he was considering CHUIKOV together with a whole group of Marshals for an assignment, since then he has decided to make him the Chief of Civil Defence instead but it does not mean that CHUIKOV may not be again the Commander of Ground Forces which is being rumoured. All these moves are tentative considerations, but I assure you that if hostilities break out there will be a Marshal in every border military district.

/H.: ....

A.: What I am trying to get at is whether the timing of the change in the assignment of GHIKOV had anything to do with the change in the plans for action against Iran.

S.: That is entirely possible, it could have been, but I do not know for sure. You must realize that the Central Committee is deciding in case of war which Marshals to send to what border military district, because in case of war these districts will become fronts. There will be a front in the theatre of military action and a Marshal commands a front. Today even though Marshals are not actually present there that does not mean that preparation is not going on and possibly they have been already designated but have not gone there. When hostilities begin they will appear because the troops morale and prestige of a front is enhanced by the presence of a prominent Marshal who is a proven military leader.

74. G.: When did KHRUSHCHEV make this statement about chopping down the tree and then the branches will fall off themselves?

S.: He said this in the Kremlin during a reception. I don't know which one, he has them all the time but it was about the time that I wrote about it. You have no doubt heard from a Western ambassador about the incident when KHRUSHCHEV was drunk at a Reception and was speaking about a megaton bomb and although his people were trying to correct him he was mixing up TNT equivalents with actual weight. I think it must have been the French Ambassador.

75. G.: Since KHRUSHCHEV must be well aware of Western military superiority over Soviet armament, how can he be so arrogant?

S.: You see he feels that the West is not fully prepared and there are many contradictions between the members of NATO. He feels that if the West were better organised then it would be stronger but since there are contradictions in NATO it is possible that some of the nations would pull out of it and therefore it is weak.

G.: Does he not recognise the West's superiority in armament?

S.: He recognises that there is armament strength, but he feels that the contradictions in NATO are strong enough to justify his position and he anticipates winning because of this.

/76. ....

76. H.: I think it is time that we should be packing up to go - it is getting late. (Subject stood up and examined the artillery journals which he had photographed in order to spot the section on geodetic preparations for firing).

S.: By the way there will not be any more artillery journals published in 1961 the last issues are in 1960, from now on artillery articles will be placed in special sbornik, but I have put away for me in the Artillery Headquarters in a safe another journal which I have left there in order to photograph it when I return. The new artillery articles will be placed in the sbornik of the Voyennaya Mysl but it is possible that an entire issue can be devoted to artillery articles.

77. (Subject reviewed his mission assignments and again requested our help in introducing him to a French businessman. With respect to October meetings with Janet in MOSCOW the entire month was cancelled because Subject planned to go on leave immediately on his return and in addition not only would the time element be too short in October for his accumulating any material or photography immediately after leaving us but since he himself had stressed that the KGB activity during October and up to 15 November would be exceptionally heavy it would be wise to avoid contacts with Janet during this period.)

S.: However, we must arrange meetings for November. (Subject was told that it would be possible for him to meet again with Janet here in PARIS and at that time the meeting plans for the future would be worked out.)

S.: As long as I am in the Committee meeting arrangements with Janet at Receptions are fine but we must keep in mind that if I am transferred back to GRU then we must establish a system for future communications which would be exclusively on a clandestine basis. In addition to that we must work out a method for me to pass on urgent information to you, that is for that kind of data that you must have within twenty-four hours.

G.: We will work all this out prior to your departure.

/78. ....

78. The next meeting was set for Monday the 25th September at 19.30 hours but Subject would be given instructions to meet at a different RV point through WYNNE. Subject was told that prior to WYNNE's departure it would be well to take advantage of WYNNE and his car to make a short trip around PARIS. Subject agreed. Subject was shown a transcript of his first meeting and he was impressed by the amount of work it takes to record the meetings with him. He was told that we have to do this in order to report to our Governments what he has said as accurately as we can. In connection with the official meeting with WYNNE that Subject contemplated, he requested that WYNNE would bring him some material, something like technical brochures, he was shown some very fine French business firms brochures and he was quite pleased with some of these which he would select later as having notionally acquired through WYNNE or a French businessman. Subject's documents which were taken out by Roger to be photographed were now returned to him. Subject left at 24.00 hours and was delivered by car to the vicinity of his hotel, but a few blocks away by M.G. and J. There was no incident involved.

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