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Brets

CONCERNING PENKOVSKIY MEMOIRS

1. As mentioned in an earlier memorandum, we believe that to base the story of Penkovskiy's life on the fiction that he was a KGB Agent throughout most of his career is wrong. In addition to the reasons mentioned previously, in the opinion of those most familiar with the case here, the allegation would not be accepted as true by those whom we most want to impress with the documents--the officers of the Soviet intelligence services and other Soviet officials. The introduction of this element in the story might make it more complicated and difficult to understand in the West. Western journalists seemed to have had considerable difficulties understanding Penkovskiy the man and in analyzing the case based on the facts now overtly available. To throw in this further twist might confuse them totally.

2. We think that not only would the story be more valid, but also more dramatic if it sticks closer to the main facts and to Penkovskiy's own words. The contact report in which he gives the history of his life in some detail, for example, could be used almost verbatim to cover a considerable part of his life. Although details are important to establish the authenticity of the document, the version of his autobiography which we have reviewed seems to include some material concerning the war period that is irrelevant not only to the story, but even to Penkovskiy's life. In general the document does not stress as much as it could those forces which alienated Penkovskiy. There are also some passages which depict Penkovskiy as more grasping and more of a careerist than perhaps in fact he was and certainly more than he need be for the purposes of his story. For example, on the top of page five he seems to rejoice that in 1937-39 the purge of the officer corps opened up room at the top for bright up-and-coming officers. It seems to us that Penkovskiy's motives could be effectively explained by proper stress on the role his father's fate played in his own life; in addition, such instances of secret police brutality as that which caused the suicide of Marshal Varentsov's daughter Nina and the insight he gained into the true attitudes and characters of leading Soviet personalities could suffice to fill in the picture.

3. Specifically, we would recommend revisions along the following lines :

a. Excision of all references to his purported recruitment by the KGB and his work for them as an agent. There are eleven such references of varying lengths on pages 7, 12, 14, 16, 21, 23, 25, 27, 28, and 29.

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b. Having removed the KGB as a source of stress and conflict which caused his disillusionment and defection, we should play up other sources of stress :

1) The fear which was a part of his life from earliest childhood as the result of uncertainty about his father's disappearance. Even as a child he could feel the uneasiness which gripped his mother and his other relatives whenever he asked about his father. This would have been especially evident on each of the many occasions when forms, such as applications for school, Komsomol membership, etc., had to be filled out. The injustice of a system which would hold a boy responsible for his father's transgressions was apparent to him from his earliest days.

2) This fear was the cause of the young Penkovskiy's desire to excel in everything. He felt he had to prove his value and loyalty to the state and to the Party. It accounts for his political zeal, which resulted in his becoming a Commissar. It was behind his repeated volunteering for combat duty in World War II (rather than a wish to escape the KGB), and explains his seeking after medals and decorations--visible symbols of loyal service.

3) The personal tragedies which he witnessed or heard of, such as the suicide of Varentsov's daughter, served to reinforce his fear. When he became aware of a clear case of injustice he at first tended to regard it as an act of fate. Later in life, he began to regard these instances as defects in the Soviet system itself.

4) He was eager to enter the GRU when he got the chance as this was another seal of approval placed upon him by the state and Party and lessened his vulnerability.

5) Though he approved of the post-Stalin slackening of controls of the USSR, the execution of Beriya and the curbing of the power of the KGB, he was sickened by the hypocrisy of the Soviet leaders who had licked Stalin's boots when he was alive and who now attack him in speeches and in print, yet who in practice continue many of the worst aspects of his repressive policies. He interpreted the denigration of Stalin simply as a political maneuver by Khrushchev in order to consolidate his power.

6) Penkovskiy was sickened by the brutal and unjust treatment of Marshal Zhukov and other loyal, capable officers who had served their countries long and well by Khrushchev and the Party.

7) Having reached the upper fringes of Soviet officialdom, Penkovskiy was disgusted by what he saw and experienced there. Intrigue and conspiracy, influence peddling, apple-polishing, gossip-wongering, character assassination are normal everyday tools of the trade for young Soviet officials trying to get ahead. Penkovskiy felt obliged to fight back with these same weapons and actually was good at it, but all the while he was sickened by it.

8) His service abroad and his contacts with foreigners gave him an objective frame of reference within which he could criticize the Soviet system.

9) When he was finally confronted with the fact that his father had served in the White Army and was killed fighting against the Reds, he thought that his years of loyal and valuable service would prevent this fact from being used against him. He soon learned that this was not the case. He got no more promotions; he was removed from or turned down for key positions which could have led to further advancement of his career. The injustice of punishing a son for the sins of his father in this fashion served to catalyze the other elements of his hostility to the Soviet regime.

10) He came to see the Soviet regime as a festering sore which was infecting the entire body of Soviet society, as a power system interested only in the perpetuation of power, as a hinderance rather than an aid to the Russian people in their fight to achieve their destiny.

c. The result should be a ringing indictment of the Soviet system. It should try to show that a human being with a conscience in Penkovskiy's position must turn against the system or lose his self-respect.

d. We should cut out some of the lengthy discussion of the history of the second world war and follow more closely Penkovskiy's own words at the first meeting, when he discussed this time of his life.

e. We should incorporate whenever possible Penkovskiy's own words and phrases from the tapes. We should also include personalities, names, anecdotes and experiences, all genuine from these tapes. This should help to make the document come alive more and the characters mentioned in it appear more as real people.

4. We feel that the material already extracted from the tapes and compiled in 12 chapters under the heading "Penkovskiy's Memoirs" should definitely be included, but that its present form and organization is probably not the most suitable. Tentatively, we

suggest that it would be better to build up to the chapter "Be Firm With Khrushchev" by leading off with the chapters on "Berlin," "Soviet Leadership," "Political Control of the Armed Forces," "The Soviet Marshal," and "Opposition to Khrushchev in the Army and the Fall of Zhukov." The remaining chapters might be then arranged as follows: "Soviet Rockets," "Nuclear Weapons," "Soviet Intelligence Activity," "Sino-Soviet Relations," "Soviet Policy towards Underdeveloped Countries," and finally "Soviet Dissatisfaction." Considerable editing and rearranging of material within each chapter will no doubt be required. In many passages, for instance, it is obvious that Penkovskiy is talking directly to individuals who are representatives of the U. S. and British governments. Such passages must be changed, and Penkovskiy must seem to be addressing whatever audience is suitable with the cover story for the document's surfacing. Also, in editing this material, we must give careful attention to the question of time. The statements were made over a period of several months. Some statements refer to historical events which had not yet happened, and other statements refer to the same event after it had happened. All these statements must appear to have been written at the time when, according to the cover story, Penkovskiy says he wrote them.

5. We would like to consider adding to the volume some of the documentary evidence, a question we plan to raise with your representative who is scheduled to visit here in July.