1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

NIE 52-68
9 May 1968

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

NUMBER 52-68

Communist Insurgency in Thailand

Approved for Release
Date 23 DEC 1991

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, and the NSA.

Concurring:

Mr. Sherman Kent, Acting CIA Member of USIB

Mr. Thomas L. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter, USA, Director of the National Security Agency

Abstaining:

Mr. Howard C. Brown, Jr., Assistant General Manager, Atomic Energy Commission

and Mr. William C. Sullivan, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

1.3(a)(4)

[redacted]

[redacted]

CONTENTS

	Page
THE PROBLEM	1
CONCLUSIONS	1
DISCUSSION	2
I. THE SITUATION	2
A. The Insurgency	2
B. Counterinsurgency	6
II. PROSPECTS	9

[redacted]


THAILAND
COMMUNIST
INSURGENCY REGIONS
BURMA
LAOS
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
CAMBODIA
SOUTH VIETNAM
GULF OF SIAM
MALAYSIA
Nan
Chiang Mai
Tak
Phitsanulok
Lop Buri
Nakhon Ratchasima
Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya
BANGKOK
Trat
Prachuap Khiri Khan
Chumphon
Nakhon Si Thammarat
Phuket
Phatthalung
Trang
Pattani
Satun

[redacted]

COMMUNIST INSURGENCY IN THAILAND

THE PROBLEM

To assess the probable development of Communist insurgency in Thailand over the next two years or so.

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Communist insurgent threat to the stability of the Thai Government has not grown appreciably over the past year despite the appearance of insurgent activity in additional areas of the country. At the heart of the insurgents' failure to make significant progress is the lack of a charismatic leader or a compelling issue with which to stir popular emotions. The insurgent movement is further handicapped by its foreign flavor; its policies are strongly influenced by Peking and its leaders are predominantly Thai-born Chinese.

B. The Thai Government has generally shown increasing competence in dealing with the insurgency. But many problems remain, including bureaucratic rivalries and the failure of the government and the army to make the most effective use of the resources already at their disposal.

C. Despite its many serious handicaps, it is probable that the insurgency in Thailand, with the continued support of Peking and Hanoi, will persist and even increase in intensity over the next two years or so. Even though government suppression activities may become more effective, it is unlikely that major guerrilla units will be eliminated; the guerrillas will probably gain in skill and continue to find sufficient numbers of adventurous youth and disaffected peasants to maintain something like their current personnel strength. The Northeast will continue to be the key area, but the local threat in the North may become more serious.

[redacted]

D. The insurgent movement would almost certainly benefit from a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the Communists; the benefits would be even greater if all Laos fell to Communist control. But the Thai Government would not be disposed to accommodate with the domestic insurgents in either case, and there would not be an automatic and rapid growth in the insurgent movement. The effectiveness of the counterinsurgency program, however, could be diminished by political instability at the center resulting from the combined impact of Communist successes in Indochina, uncertainty as to the future role of the US on the Southeast Asian mainland, and divisions over the international political adjustments thought necessary to ensure Thailand's survival in a new environment.

DISCUSSION

I. THE SITUATION

1. In mid-1965, the longstanding Communist subversive campaign in Thailand erupted into active insurgency in the northeastern part of the country: Communist guerrilla bands began to offer armed resistance to government security patrols; politically-motivated assassinations increased sharply; and, a few months later, the first insurgent-initiated attacks on government security forces and their outposts occurred. During the past year or so, similar insurgent activity—on a much smaller scale—has surfaced in other regions of the country: the West-Central, the Mid-South, and, particularly, the North. (Maps 1 and 2.) Meanwhile, the Thai Government has responded to the Communist challenge with a broad-gauged counterinsurgency program designed to destroy the insurgents, neutralize their supporters, and—over the longer term—to ensure the loyalty to Bangkok of the population in the affected areas.

A. The Insurgency

2. *Northeast.* Northeastern Thailand remains the focus of the insurgency campaign in Thailand; in 1967, an estimated 85-90 percent of all insurgent incidents occurred there.[1]

3. Insurgent incidents in the Northeast increased irregularly from the inception of active insurgency in mid-1965, reached a peak of about 100 incidents during March 1967, then dropped sharply to half this level for the remainder of the year. In recent months, the incident count has gone up slightly.[2] In contrast

[1] The term "insurgent incident" used in this estimate includes: "armed incidents" (i.e., insurgent- *and* government-initiated clashes); "terrorist incidents" (i.e., assassinations, kidnappings, sabotage, and seizure of supplies); and, "armed propaganda incidents" (i.e., village indoctrination meetings held by armed insurgent groups).

[2] As in Vietnam, weather affects insurgency and counterinsurgency operations in Thailand. The Northeast, perhaps more than any large area of Southeast Asia, has distinct dry (November-March) and wet (May-September) seasons.


THAILAND
MAJOR
ETHNIC GROUPS
THAI
Central Thai, Thai Khorat, Thai Lao, Thai Yuan, Shan
MALAY
CHINESE
MON-KHMER
Cambodian, Kui
VIETNAMESE
TIBETO-BURMAN
Karen, Lahu
MEO-YAO
BURMA
LAOS
CAMBODIA
NORTH VIETNAM
SOUTH VIETNAM
GULF OF TONKIN
GULF OF SIAM
ANDAMAN SEA
MERGUI ARCHIPELAGO
STRAIT OF MALACCA
MALAYSIA
SUMATRA (Indonesia)
DAO PHU QUOC (Vietnam)
DEMARCATION LINE
Samneua
Nam Dinh
Luang Prabang
Xieng Khouang
Vinh
Chiang Rai
Chiengmai
Nan
Lampang
Phrae
VIENTIANE
Nong Khai
Udon Thani
Loei
Nakhon Phanom
Khammouane
Tak
Phitsanulok
Khon Kaen
Mukdahan
Savannakhet
Moulmein
Phetchabun
Maha Sarakham
Nakhon Sawan
Ubon Ratchathani
Warin Chamrap
Pakse
Nakhon Ratchasima
Surin
Kanchanaburi
Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya
BANGKOK
Chachoengsao
Samut Prakan
Samut Songkhram
Tavoy
Sisophon
Kompong Thom
Rayong
Mergui
Trat
Prachuap Khiri Khan
PHNOM PENH
Sihanoukville
Chumphon
Ranong
Surat Thani
Nakhon Si Thammarat
Krabi
Phuket
Trang
Pattani
Satun
PENANG
Butterworth
CENTRAL THAI
THAI KHORAT
THAI LAO
VIETNAMESE
CAMBODIAN
KUI
KAREN
SHAN
LAHU
MEO
THAI YUAN
Mekong
Nam Phong
Mae Nam Chao Phraya
Mae Nam Mun
Nam Ping
Nam Pa Sak
TONLE SAP
150 Miles
Kilometers
BOUNDARY REPRESENTATION IS NOT NECESSARILY AUTHORITATIVE

53540 6-66

to the situation a year ago, the majority of armed incidents now appear to be at government initiative; those initiated by the insurgents are mainly very small-scale harassments, and the insurgents usually suffer more casualties than the government, though the totals on both sides are small.

4. It appears that the Communist force has not grown significantly over the past year. "Hardcore" insurgent strength—i.e., full-time guerrillas—in the Northeast is probably about 1,500 compared to an estimated 1,300 a year or so ago. The backbone of this force continues to be the several hundred northeastern Thai and Sino-Thai (i.e., Thai-born Chinese) who were trained and indoctrinated in Communist China, North Vietnam, or in Pathet Lao-controlled areas of Laos in the early 1960's.

5. It may be, of course, that the Communists have not been seeking to augment their guerrilla units, preferring to concentrate first on the development of local centers of support. We cannot estimate the number of their village supporters—i.e., those who sympathize, provide information and supplies, yet continue as village residents—but it is probable that such support remains small. The continuing Communist resort to terrorism and other coercive tactics is one indication of Communist difficulty in gaining adherents in the villages.

6. While the government has apparently been able to contain the insurgency in the Northeast, most of the guerrilla units are still intact and concentrated in some of their original base areas in the highlands of Nakhon Phanom and Sakon Nakhon Provinces, near the Mekong opposite central Laos. Although insurgent groups have often been forced to move by government incursions, Thai security forces have generally not been able to prevent their escape nor have they maintained a presence in these rugged and isolated districts.

7. *North.* There were occasional armed clashes between security forces and dissident tribal elements in the rugged, forested highlands of northern Thailand as early as February 1967. In early December, however, fairly large-scale government security probes into Nan and Chiang Rai Provinces, along the Laos border, led to 20 or more clashes within a few weeks, with relatively heavy casualties for government forces. The insurgents demonstrated considerable skill and discipline during the many engagements and initiated a number of generally successful assaults on police outposts and army patrols. Levels of activity on this new guerrilla front have remained high. There has been some armed activity in distant Tak Province on the Burmese border.

8. We do not have a good basis for estimating the number of insurgents in the North. Although those actually under Communist discipline probably number no more than a few hundred, tribal dissidents on occasion swell the numbers of those actually engaged in local violence. In addition, Pathet Lao personnel, whose operations near the Thai border are directed primarily against the Government of Laos, appear at times to support the insurgency in Thailand from their side of the border.

9. Most of the insurgents in the North are probably hill tribesmen, principally Meo. (Map 3.) Some 270 are believed to have received extensive paramilitary

[redacted]



58942 5-68 CIA

[redacted]

training in North Vietnam or in Pathet Lao-controlled areas of Laos in 1965 and 1966. The insurgency in the North appears to be organized and led by Thai and Sino-Thai affiliated with the Communist apparatus in the Northeast, many of them trained in China, North Vietnam, or Laos. They have been able to exploit such longstanding tribal grievances as police interference with slash-and-burn agriculture and illegal opium cultivation. Tribal animosities have been aggravated recently by the growing competition between tribesmen and migrating Thai lowlanders for agricultural lands and timber rights in what has become, with government support, an area of new settlement and development.

10. *West-Central.* Communists have been engaged in organizational activity among poor peasants in the provinces along the Burmese border west of Bangkok for many years, but acts of violence were rare until May 1967 when a terrorist band attacked a police patrol. Sporadic ambushes have continued in this sector. Most of the action has occurred in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province where Thailand is narrowest. Total insurgent strength in the entire region may be about 75, mainly local Thai with Communist connections. The group also includes some Karen tribesmen, but insurgent tactics do not appear to involve exploitation of any specifically ethnic grievances.

11. *Mid-South.* In peninsular Thailand, small insurgent bands composed of locally-recruited Thai and Sino-Thai, and totaling perhaps 200 persons, began sporadic assassinations and kidnappings in mid-1966. The response of Thai security forces has led to an average of three or four armed clashes per month, usually at government initiative. There have also been a few ambushes and armed propaganda meetings in recent months. The insurgents operate mainly from rugged mountainous areas and focus their appeal on local economic grievances. Few villages appear to be under their influence.

12. *Malay South.* The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM), which is predominantly ethnic Chinese, has maintained a skilled, tightly-disciplined, and well-equipped guerrilla force in Thailand's southernmost provinces since it was driven from Malaya in the late 1950's.[3] The posture of this force has been essentially defensive; it has engaged in firefights only when caught by Thai or combined Thai-Malaysian patrols. There were about 15 such encounters in 1967, the same number as in 1966. The strength of the CPM force is about 800-1,000; it is composed to an increasing degree of Thai-born Chinese. In addition, as many as 2,500 local Chinese youths resident in the villages have received some jungle training from the CPM. Recruiting of Malays, who constitute the majority ethnic group in these provinces, has been slow despite considerable anti-government feeling rooted in economic grievances and pan-Malay sentiment.

B. Counterinsurgency

13. *General.* The Thai counterinsurgency performance has been uneven, but the government has generally shown growing competence in its approach to the problem. Security forces have demonstrated increasing ability in suppression

[3] This force is often termed the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO).

operations, although important deficiencies remain. The nonmilitary aspects—positive efforts to improve local government and economic conditions—have also received considerable attention but with more mixed results. There are several reasons for this: the relatively brief period since the onset of the insurgency, the conservative fiscal views of those segments of the government in charge of resource allocation, bureaucratic rivalries within the Thai Government, and a general incomprehension of the needs of certain ethnic minorities.

14. While the military leaders who rule Thailand recognize the importance of nonmilitary aspects of counterinsurgency, they tend to have a firmer understanding of the techniques of armed suppression. This tendency is reinforced by their view of the insurgency as arising not so much from domestic grievances as from foreign inspiration and support. In addition, like most of the central Thai—those who inhabit the rich and densely-populated alluvial lowlands around Bangkok—Thai leaders tend to look down upon their "country cousins" of the remote Northeast and to view the minority tribesmen of the North and the Malays of the South as alien and inferior.

15. An even more persistent problem has been the inevitable involvement of the counterinsurgency program in the bureaucratic struggles of Bangkok. The civilian ministries are jealous of their respective prerogatives and coordination among them is poor. The military are reluctant to support programs that might limit the prerogatives of the army and they press for actions which serve to broaden its responsibilities. In October 1967, as a result of army pressure, the role of the Counter Subversion Operations Command (CSOC), set up in December 1965, was drastically modified.[4] The army was put in operational charge of all counterinsurgency efforts, civilian as well as military, in the Northeast, North, and West-Central areas. For these areas, CSOC was relegated to the status of a policy planning board, and it retained operational control of actual programs only in the Mid- and Malay South. It is still too soon to assess all the effects of this changeover. However, suppression operations do appear to have been executed more energetically since October, and army leaders have so far shown themselves sensitive to the importance of nonmilitary aspects of counterinsurgency and have exercised restraint in applying the army's overall direction to civilian programs. In view of this restraint and the fact that the army generally enjoys better relations with the populace than does the police, the army's new role may well increase popular cooperation with the counterinsurgency effort.

16. *Forces.* The army has committed 3,000 troops, including three infantry battalions, to armed suppression in the Northeast. These forces have had success in defeating Communist-led guerrilla units, in dislodging them from their

[4] The original CSOC mechanism reflected a belief that the civil administration should be the primary instrument of the counterinsurgency effort. Military and police elements would provide manpower and materiel, but their operations would be subordinated to other counterinsurgency activities. In practice, CSOC never really functioned as an integrated command; military (and police) commanders resented taking orders from provincial governors and their support for CSOC operations was often less than wholehearted.

strongholds by means of large-scale sweeps, and army units have demonstrated a capability to bring security by their presence to populated areas. Even in the Northeast, however, the ability of the armed forces to collect intelligence and to respond quickly to such intelligence as is available still leaves much to be desired. The tendency toward slow response is only partially a mobility problem; there is also some lack of aggressiveness and willingness to make the most of available resources. These deficiencies help to explain the army's failure so far to eliminate the insurgent bands. Moreover, the army chiefs still appear to feel the need to keep substantial numbers of troops in Bangkok, in part for political reasons.

17. Recent army suppression activities in the West-Central and Mid-South regions have been as ineffective in eliminating the guerrilla threat as the police operations formerly conducted in these regions. In the North, the recent army performance has been particularly poor. Comparatively large forces have had little impact on insurgent capabilities and have sustained relatively heavy casualties. The army response has included calling in air strikes on Meo villages and forcibly relocating large numbers of tribesmen against the advice of local officials; these actions probably antagonized many tribesmen. Army leaders now appear to be settling down for the longer pull and are becoming more sensitive to the requirements of the situation.

18. The Provincial Police, once a full partner in the Thai counterinsurgency effort, are now clearly subordinate to the military. Though they participate in army-directed patrol and sweep operations, their lack of proper training and equipment limit their effectiveness as a counterinsurgency force. The 7,600-man Border Patrol Police (BPP), an elite paramilitary force which has long been heavily engaged in the North and the Malay South, is better able to combat the insurgent threat. During the recent upsurge of activity in the North, however, BPP platoons were badly mauled in surprise attacks.

19. Other paramilitary forces have been organized in recent years to help combat the insurgent threat; like the regular police, they are under the Ministry of Interior. The Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) predates the insurgency; its 5,000 active members in the Northeast assist in patrolling threatened districts. Though neither well-trained nor well-equipped, the VDC presence is sometimes sufficient to discourage overt guerrilla activity. The Village Security Officer (VSO) and People's Assistance Team (PAT) programs were initiated in threatened areas of the Northeast in 1966. The 1,200 VSO members act, in effect, as bodyguards of village leaders. The 400 or so PATs are better armed and indoctrinated. They combine antisubversion and civic action functions at the village level and their villages are not often harassed. It is planned to combine the VSO and PAT programs into a Village Security Force (VSF) under the authority of village leaders; over the next two years, 9,000 men are to be deployed into three threatened northeastern provinces.

20. *Nonmilitary Programs.* Despite recent changes in the CSOC role, counterinsurgency programs in the economic and political fields continue essentially

unchanged. One of the more ambitious has been the Accelerated Rural Development (ARD) program, an attempt to bring together the assets of several government departments under a coordinating committee in Bangkok (and under the governor at the province level) to promote economic development in depressed rural areas. Other economic efforts include the Mobile Development Units (MDU), teams of specialists working on small-scale projects and attempting to stimulate self-help efforts in selected villages, and the village-level programs of the Community Development Department. The chief political effort has been the Department of Local Administration's Developing Democracy Program, which has sponsored some 400 elected Tambon (township) Councils as examples of democracy at the grass roots level, hopefully giving the people a sense of participation in government; these councils have been provided some funds for use on projects for which there is a local demand. Mobile Information Teams (MIT) also tour villages throughout the country dispensing medical and agricultural advice, at the same time giving political lectures, showing films, and providing educational entertainment. Efforts to reach people in remote areas through dialect radio broadcasts have also been stepped up.

21. For the most part, these programs are currently focused on the more vulnerable districts of the Northeast. The ARD program has resulted largely in the construction of many feeder roads in that area, which will doubtless bring long-term economic and security benefits; the program has accomplished less, however, in the way of small-scale, village level projects whose usefulness is immediately apparent to the inhabitants, although it has recently begun to concentrate more on such efforts. The MDUs, after an encouraging start, have not proved as mobile as expected and hence have been able to influence only a limited number of villages. Obviously, the economic deficiencies which the Communists attempt to exploit have so far been only partially ameliorated. However, by involvement of increased numbers of security and civilian personnel to the Northeast and other remote areas, and by its efforts to improve the quality of these personnel, the government has probably gained respect and authority in these areas.

II. PROSPECTS

22. The Communist insurgent threat in Thailand has not grown appreciably over the past year or so. In the main arena, the Northeast, insurgents appear to have been concentrating on building their organization in the villages. They have not, however, taken over any well-populated area, attracted many recruits, or sparked substantial support among the rural populace. While the guerrilla units remain essentially intact and capable of continued small-scale antigovernment action, they have been increasingly on the defensive and reluctant to risk government counteraction.

23. In the North, the insurgents have become increasingly active, but disaffection appears to be confined to tribal peoples who comprise only a small fraction of the region's population and dwell in the most remote areas. The

expansion of the active insurgency into the West-Central and Mid-South regions over the past year or so has alarmed the Thai Government, but insurgent units in these regions pose no present threat to government control of populated areas. There is no evidence that the CPM insurgents of the Malay South are preparing to join the Communist assault on Thailand.

24. At the heart of the insurgent's failure to make significant progress is their inability to win widespread sympathy. They lack the charismatic leadership and the inflammatory racial or nationalistic issues which have inspired successful guerrilla movements elsewhere in Asia; existing grievances do not seem sufficient to stir the villagers to join up. Furthermore, the direction of the insurgency is in the hands of the Thai Communist Party (CPT), a movement with only a few hundred to a thousand members, little indigenous support, and an essentially foreign complexion; it is dominated by Sino-Thai and has long been responsive to direction from Peking.

25. Through its strong influence, if not control, over the CPT, some of whose leaders are in Peking, Communist China probably has the paramount voice in policy matters concerning the Thai insurgency. Hanoi, because of its guerrilla training program and other support, also has an influential role. It is likely, therefore, that the interests of the CPT are often subordinated to those of Peking and Hanoi, who exploit the insurgency in their own interests instead of permitting its Thai leaders to operate in accordance with the local situation. The commencement of the active insurgency in mid-1965, for example, was almost certainly a by-product of Communist strategy in Vietnam. In local terms, the move was probably premature, exposing the still weak guerrilla organization to government counteraction and hampering longer term Communist growth in the villages.

26. Despite its many serious handicaps, it is probable that the insurgency in Thailand will expand somewhat in geographic scope and, in some regions, even increase in intensity over the next two years or so. Even though government suppression activities may become more effective, it is unlikely that major guerrilla units will be eliminated, and the guerrillas will probably continue to find sufficient numbers of adventurous youth and disaffected peasants to maintain something like their current personnel strength. Moreover, as the years pass, the surviving guerrillas will become increasingly skillful in evading government forces. They will continue to maintain pressure on the government through small-scale violent tactics, but they will probably stress more covert propaganda and organizational work in hopes of developing a strong base for the longer term.

27. The persistence of the insurgency will depend heavily on Peking and Hanoi, who will continue to provide its overall direction and to train and dispatch into Thailand the limited numbers of Thai nationals they are able to recruit and exfiltrate to territories under their control. Peking and Hanoi will not be greatly deterred by setbacks in Thailand. They have accepted a modification of insurgent tactics, emphasizing terrorism and avoiding military confrontation, but there is little chance that Mao's doctrines of armed struggle in rural areas will be abandoned in the near future.

28. The primary objective of the insurgency will continue to be the Northeast, because of its proximity to Communist bases in Laos and traditional isolation from the national government in Bangkok. The North, however, is likely to see a continuing intensification of the insurgent effort. The terrain is ideal for guerrillas; many tribesmen are strongly antagonistic toward the government; the counterinsurgency program there is in its infancy; and the region is easily accessible to Pathet Lao bases. Insurgency in the West-Central and Mid-South provinces will probably continue as predominantly terrorist movements designed to divert the government from more important sectors of Communist activity in the Northeast and North. The Communists of the Malay South could become a serious problem should they decide, at some point, to change their general line and direct their efforts against the Thai Government.

29. *Thailand and the Vietnamese War.* Whatever the outcome of the war in Vietnam, Thai leaders will remain strongly committed to the defeat of the Communist insurgency on their soil. The Thai would assume, however, that a settlement in Vietnam favorable to the Communists would lead to increased Communist efforts in Thailand and would expect an even more intense threat should Laos fall under Communist control or appear close to doing so.

30. Under these circumstances, Thai pressures on the US for firmer commitment and increased assistance would be heavy. While a US response that did not fully satisfy Thai demands would not reduce the determination of the present leadership to deal with the internal threat, Thai receptiveness to US advice would probably decline and their preoccupation with avoiding complete dependence upon the US would increase. Moreover, if the nature of the settlement, the circumstances attending it, and the US response to Thai pressures made it appear that the US was withdrawing from significant efforts to curb the extension of Communist power on the Southeast Asian mainland, their felt need to devise new political arrangements to protect Thailand both internally and externally could lead to divisions within the leadership and to increased opposition to it. The outcome of the political instability likely under these circumstances would depend heavily on the interplay of many variables we cannot now predict with any confidence. It is unlikely that any significant individuals or groups within or outside the present leadership would see their political fortunes best advanced by an accommodation with the Thai Communists, whatever new policies might be advocated with respect to foreign Communist regimes. Almost certainly, however, the effectiveness of the government's counterinsurgency effort would decline during a period of political instability in which the military leadership was divided or felt itself significantly threatened.

31. The Communist side, of course, would be greatly encouraged by a Hanoi triumph in Vietnam. And Peking and Hanoi might decide the time was ripe for increased support to the Thai insurgency. But such support would not lead automatically to a rapid growth in the insurgent threat; much would still depend on attitudes and policies in Bangkok.

32. The complete occupation of Laos by the Communists in the wake of a Vietnam settlement favorable to Hanoi would certainly assist the insurgent cause. The psychological impact of the fall of Laos would be even greater than that of a Communist takeover in Vietnam, given Thailand's traditional view of Laos as its first line of defense. The resultant demoralization would doubtless affect provincial officials involved in counterinsurgency programs as well as the leadership in Bangkok. In addition, logistic support and infiltration from across the border would undoubtedly grow and this in turn would substantially increase the difficulties of coping with guerrillas throughout the North and Northeast.

33. Cessation of hostilities in Vietnam on terms clearly favorable to the US and the GVN would encourage the Thai in their campaign of suppression, but would not, by itself lead to any slackening of Chinese determination to foster the Thai insurgency. Hanoi's reaction is less predictable, but it would probably not wish to abandon the field to Peking. The Communists might decide to revise strategy, turning from violence to the longer term task of building a more substantial revolutionary base in Thailand.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

[illegible]

[illegible]

- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- [illegible]