
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STATE/INR DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA SOO ONE OCR ORR DCS CGS CIA/NMC FXO, DDT This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the manning of the Various Carlot In Its In Its Inc.
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THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.
DIST 14 MARCH 1967
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM Deputy TRIEN
DOI JUNE TO AUGUST 1966 Admin Mgt
Soty e 7-
U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR
ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 JANUARY 1967)
SOURCE
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她只起来,一切一点,心里看了这样的"我就看到这一个人"的"你说这个人,这个人",我看到一个一个说道。[building]
Approved for Release Date September 1993

IN -21345 PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES 1. (SUMMARY. VIET CONG (VC) POLICY TOWARD PRISONERS OF WAR (POW'S) WHICH DATES BACK TO THE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE FRENCH IS STILL APPLICABLE TO U.S. POW'S. BASICALLY, THE CAPTURING OF THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF U.S. FORCES IS ENCOURAGED, IN ORDER THAT THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR INTELLIGENCE, PROPAGANDA AND POLITICAL PURPOSES. THIS POLICY HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN CANRIED OUT, HOWEVER, BECAUSE VC TROOPS WERE NOT AWARE OF 1T, BECAUSE THEY SOUGHT TO AVENGE THEIR COMRADES BY KILLING THE ENEMY, BECAUSE OF DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED IN TRANSFERRING PRISONERS · TO THE COMMAND POST, AND BECAUSE IT WAS EASIER TO KILL POW'S WHEN THE UNIT HAD TO WITHDRAW UNDER DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. VC MILITARY REGION (MR) FIVE UNITS HAD TAKEN NO U.S. PRISONERS IN THE LAST TWO YEARS. AS A RESULT, A THREE-PHASE CAMPAIGN WAS INAUGURATED IN EARLY 1966 TO INDOCTRINATE ALL CADRES AND TROOPS IN THE VC POW POLICY, TO DISSEMINATE SLOGANS AND OPERATIONAL PLANS FOR CAPTURING U.S. TROOPS AND TO RECAPITULATE THE SUCCESSES OF THE VARIOUS UNITS IN CAPTURING U.S. FORCES.> 2. VC GENERAL HEADQUARTERS DOCUMENTS WHICH DEALT WITH DA IN 107361

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POLICY TOWARD U.S. POW'S MADE THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS IN

ASSESSING THE POSITION OF U.S. TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN): (1)

WHEN U.S. ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL ADVISORY AID TO SVN FAILED TO

PRODUCE RESULTS, THE U.S. WAS FORCED TO SHOW ITS TRUE COLONIALIST

INTENTIONS BY SENDING TROOPS TO SVN AND BOMBING NORTH VIETNAM

(NVN), AN ACTION WHICH PROVES THAT THEY ARE AGGRESSORS AND WHICH

WILL EARN THEM THE CONDEMNATION OF ALL PROGRESSIVE PEOPLE IN

THE WORLD. (2) INCREASED U.S. TROOP STRENGTH PROVIDES MORE

OPPORTUNITIES FOR CAPTURING AND KIDNAPPING AMERICAN PERSONNEL


AND FOR CARRYING OUT PROPAGANDA EFFORTS AIMED AT ENCOURAGING U.S.

FORCES TO DEFY ORDERS AND TO SUPPORT THE VC REVOLUTIONARY

CAUSE, BECAUSE THE U.S. TROOPS, PARTICULARLY OFFICERS, ALTHOUGH WELL TRAINED, ARE AFRAID OF THE HARDSHIPS OF WAR. (3) MOST

U.S. SERVICEMEN ARE DRAFTEES FROM THE WORKING CLASS WHO HAVE
BEEN DELUDED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT INTO THINKING THAT THEY ARE
FIGHTING TO DEFEND THE FREE WORLD. THE TASK OF THE VC IS TO
TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE FACT THAT THE U.S. FORCES ARE FAR FROM
HOME AND ENGAGED IN A DIFFICULT GUERRILLA WAR, BY WINNING THEN
OVER, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE NOT CAPTIVES, BY MAKING THEN AWARE
OF THE TRUE NATURE OF THEIR MISSION IN VIETNAM, THEREBY SOWING
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
DISUNITY IN THEIR RANKS.

THEY CAN BE EXPLOITED FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES; THEY CAN BE EXPOLITED FOR PROPAGANDA AND COUNTER-PROPAGANDA PURPOSES THROUGH. RADIO BROADCASTS AND INTERVIEWS PUBLISHED IN THE NEUTRALIST AND PRO-COMMUNIST PRESS; THEY CAN BE USED POLITICALLY TO FURTHER THE CAUSE OF COMMUNISM BEYOND THE LIMITED CONTEXT OF VIETNAM BY PROPAGANDIZING THEM, BRAIN WASHING THEM, AND CONVERTING THEM INTO COMMUNIST OR PRO-COMMUNIST CADRES WHO WILL WORK ACTIVELY FOR THE PARTY IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY AFTER THEY HAVE BEEN RELEASED.

IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO CALL FOR AN EXCHANGE OF POW'S. DURING
THE PAST TWO YEARS, HOWEVER, MR FIVE HAS CAPTURED NO U.S.
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN SPITE OF NUMEROUS ENGAGEMENTS. THEREFORE,
DURING AN MR FIVE CELEBRATION HELD IN EARLY 1966 IN THE JUNGLE
PAREA OF SON HA DISTRICT, QUANG NGAI PROVINCE, FIELD GRADE
POLITICAL OFFICER MAJOR GENERAL CHU HUY MAN AND DEPUTY FIELD
GRADE POLITICAL OFFICER SENIOR COLONEL TRINH CALLED ON ALL
UNITS TO MAKE A THOROUGH STUDY OF PARTY AND NON GOVERNMENT

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PAGE 4



THE UNIT TO THE COMMAND POST; AND WHEN A UNIT WAS SURROUNDED

EASIER.

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OR HAD SUFFERED MANY CASUALITES PRISONERS WERE KILLED TO MAKE WITHDRAWAL

