


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Intelligence Information Report

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PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

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REPORT NO.
DATE DISTR. 27 January 1971

COUNTRY North Vietnam/South Vietnam

DCI 1964 through 31 October 1970

SUBJECT Detention and Treatment of American Prisoners of War in North and South Vietnam

~~502-02.3~~
501-08(6)

ACQ Vietnam, Saigon (27 November 70) FIELD NO.

SOURCE

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Summary: The apprehension and detention of American prisoners of war (POWs) in North Vietnam (NVN) are the responsibility of the Armed Public Security Forces. There are specific procedures relating to the handling of American POWs captured in NVN and to their subsequent exploitation for tactical and strategic information. American POWs were

Approved for Release
Date September 1993

STATE	DIA	ARMY	NAVY	AIR	NSA	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)

ACBT - OCH Gmt. Some source & basically same info as disseminated in CIA IR dtd 5 Jan 71. Description and capture details (para's 7 & 8) fit - SP4 K. ALBERT, PW - 21 May 70.
ONCSI Distr:
ASPC-S - 1
✓ PHGP - w-1
ICDI - SID - 1cy
OCH files - 1-File
1 - non file.

MAJ. F. E. SHEAFFER, GS 12 MAY 1971

considered generally cooperative and much important information of tactical value was obtained from them. In not publicizing the identities of the American POWs, NVN retained a free hand for the continued exploitation of the POWs. Some American POWs reportedly were to be retained in NVN, just as some French POWs had been retained after the armistice in 1954. End Summary.

1.3(a)(4)

1. The Armed Public Security Forces (APSF) (Luc Luong Cong An Vo Trang) was the principal Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) agency responsible for the arrest and apprehension of American POWs in NVN. It was also responsible for the detention of the American POWs and had some responsibility for their interrogation.

2. According to DRV policy, American POWs were to be humanely treated during and after apprehension, but all appropriate measures were to be taken to preclude escape. American POWs were disrobed immediately, because some American pilots, using radio equipment concealed in their uniforms, had been able to summon help from other U.S. aircraft. This policy was adhered to by the militia, APSF, and members of the Ministry of National Defense (MND) but often not by the people, who harbored animosity toward American flyers.

[] had heard of numerous cases in which American pilots had been beaten by the people in Thaph Hoa and Nghe An Provinces. When apprehended by villagers, a captured pilot was taken to the nearest village authority, who notified the district authorities, who had transportation facilities and transported the POW to the province level, where he was turned over to the APSF. [] the Public Security Services on the province level did not become involved in the handling of American POWs in NVN nor were they given access to the POWs.

1.3(a)(4)

3. In June 1966 [] saw an American pilot captured in Ninh Binh (now Nam Ha) Province while he was enroute from Nam Dinh to Ninh Binh. The pilot's aircraft was downed while attempting to bomb a bridge on Route 10 located near Voi Mountain. Two members of the APSF appeared on the scene in a jeep within less than five minutes, apprehended and disrobed the pilot, who offered no resistance, and immediately drove off with him. The pilot, who was later identified in a newspaper article as a captain, was about 1.70 meters tall. (Field Comment: Much of the information in this paragraph and in paragraph five was given preliminary dissemination []

4. In about December 1966 (or February 1967) [] saw an American F-4 aircraft, which had been shot down near Nam Ha City, Nam Ha Province. He did not see the pilot, who had bailed out and landed about 200 meters from shore and was apprehended by two members of an Air Defense unit who swam after him. Although the pilot had surrendered his weapon while swimming toward shore, a U.S. helicopter appeared on the scene and rescued the pilot. The body of the co-pilot was found washed ashore the following day. []

1.3(a)(4)

[] the Air Defense units involved received a severe reprimand, and other Air Defense units were alerted to U.S. methods of rescuing downed pilots.

5. In February or March 1967, while in Hanoi, [] witnessed a bombing attack by U.S. aircraft on the Long Bien Bridge. [] who was then near the Gia Lam Airfield by the Gia Lam Railroad Factory, saw one aircraft downed and one U.S. pilot captured by the APSF. The pilot, who was big and about 1.80 meters tall, was surrounded by several APSF jeeps

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almost at the point of his descent. [] later heard that the pilot was a major. Since this event occurred after the North Vietnamese had ceased to publicize the apprehension of U.S. prisoners, [] saw nothing on this POW in the newspapers. [] stated that he had seen a photograph of the pilot in a Hanoi newspaper.)

6. In late 1966, while near the Hoan Kiem lake, [] saw an American pilot, reportedly a colonel, being marched through the streets of Hanoi on Dinh Tien Hoang Street. The purpose of this was to stir up hatred of the North Vietnamese people against the Americans.

7. []

[] policies applied to prisoners in NVN apparently were similarly applied in SVN. In early 1970, Vu Hong Ha and Nguyen Tien Vien, assistant commander and political officer, respectively, of Viet Cong (VC) Battalion 810, which was subordinate to the Tuyen Duc Province (Military) Unit, told members of the battalion that any VC unit which captured an American would be rewarded. The size of reward would be dependent on the grade and importance of the captured American POW. On 21 May 1970, Company 2 of Battalion 810, while attacking a U.S. convoy on Route 20 near Dinh An Hamlet, Duc Trong District, Tuyen Duc Province, captured an American. Company 2 had opened fire on the last vehicle of a convoy, a jeep, after the remainder of the convoy had passed. One of the occupants of the jeep, instead of taking shelter as the others had done, remained in the open and stayed near the jeep. The Company 2 commander approached the jeep and motioned to the American to come to him. The unarmed American reportedly did not resist. (Field Comment: The date, location and circumstances of the reported capture are the same as those of [REDACTED], carried as captured by the Joint Prisoner Recovery Center.) [] who were nearby with other members of Battalion 810 on a food supply mission, accompanied the American prisoner to a Montagnard hamlet, Nam Pan, in Duc Trong District, where both the Surgical Group and Company 1 of Battalion 810 were deployed. [] the American was considered a "surrenderer," rather than a POW, because of his failure to resist. Company 1 of Battalion 810 guarded the American until instructions from higher headquarters were received. According to the commander of Battalion 810, this was the first time that the VC had captured an American in Tuyen Duc Province.

8. Because of her knowledge (limited) of English, [] a nurse assigned to the Surgical Group [] was asked to assist the Company 1 commander in debriefing the American. She spoke to him on 22 and 23 May 1970 and remembers the following: The initial of his first name was "K." He was single, white, born about 1951, had arrived in SVN in 1969 and had served there more than one year. Prior to entering the service he had been a university student. He came from Chicago, Illinois, was of Catholic faith and had two sisters who were students. The prisoner's father was a farmer and his mother a housewife. He was 1.80 meters tall and quite slender. He claimed to have been a driver assigned to an engineering unit in Duc Trong District after having earlier served with an infantry unit. The prisoner was dressed in green fatigues and had removed his insignia while still in the jeep. While Battalion 810 initially thought he was an enlisted man, information was later received from VC agents and members of the infrastructure in the area of the capture that the American was actually a captain. Various cadres of Battalion 810 came to see the American.

throughout the period of his three-day stay with Company 1. The American denied knowing anything about U.S. aircraft or the deployment of tanks in the Dalat area. []

[] knowledge of English is elementary, and [] she had problems in communicating with the American because he spoke too fast. She obtained some answers from him in writing after posing questions to him, at times also in writing.) The American was treated well, was permitted to share the company commander's bunker at night, and was permitted to use the commander's radio to listen to American broadcasts. [] also treated a wound on his left leg (a superficial skin injury). After three days the American was evacuated to the Enemy Proselyting Section of Tuyen Duc Province. []

[] later heard that the American POW had been interrogated by members of the Enemy Proselyting and Security Sections. During his stay with Company 1, the entire company was used to guard the American and to establish perimeter defense. No one was permitted to see him except senior cadres of Battalion 810 and of the VC Tuyen Duc Province Unit. []

9. American POWs were considered important sources of tactical information by the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Air Force (AF). []

[] American pilots had provided information on flight techniques, maneuvers, operational capabilities and other information on U.S. aircraft, which had aided the NVA AF Air Defense units in devising successful counter-measures against attacks. Also, []

[] American pilots had provided information on the tactical organization and flight formations of U.S. attacks which permitted the Air Defense to concentrate their attacks upon the flight commander's aircraft. []

10. []

[] most American POWs were cooperative or were ultimately persuaded to become cooperative because of the good treatment they received, which even included the serving of whole chicken, in lieu of turkey, on certain American holidays. In spite of this cooperation, the information from the American POWs could not always be accepted as reliable. [] had not heard that violence was used against American POWs, though it had been used earlier against French POWs. []

11. After mid-1966, NVN decided not to publicize the names, ranks or other information on captured American POWs. []

[] this decision was related to NVN exploitation of these prisoners for information and to their exploitation by other Communist Bloc countries. []

[] the American prisoners by name would place NVN in an untenable position, in that it would then have to deal with U.S. demands for the return of each prisoner of war who had been identified. By not identifying them, NVN would avoid having to account for those who had died or those whom NVN did not wish to return to the U.S., as had occurred with some French POWs after the 1954 Armistice (see below). Also, by keeping secret the identities of the American POWs, NVN prevented the U.S. from ascertaining precisely what information may have been compromised by each POW, thus precluding the Americans from negating the counter-measures which NVN had devised against U.S. aircraft. []

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12. [] did not know any locations where American prisoners were detained in NVN.

13. [] after the 1954 Armistice, an unknown number of French POWs who were highly knowledgeable on technical or scientific matters had not been returned to France. These French POWs, who were subsequently considered "international residents" of NVN and who were permitted to marry North Vietnamese girls, were kept in restricted camps in former Son Tay Province (now Ha Dong) and were provided all the necessary facilities for production activities related to their technical knowledge. [] American POWs were considered of much greater value than the former French prisoners whom NVN had decided not to return to France.

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14. Field Dissem: State USMACV 7th Air Force NAVFORV CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC []

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