

Leonhart
Negot.

VIETNAM

INTRODUCTION

Hanoi propaganda repeatedly claims that Washington is "creating difficulties" in selecting a site for DRV-U.S. contacts and is thus delaying talks between the two sides. The statement by a DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman on 13 April defends the suggested sites of Phnom Penh and Warsaw and says cryptically, without naming them, that "a number of sites" suggested by the United States "are not convenient for the DRV." The foreign ministry spokesman and other propagandists complain that the present U.S. attitude on the venue for contacts is not consistent with past declarations by the President and other officials of readiness to go anywhere, any time, to talk with the DRV.

The Liberation Radio, which had broadcast the 3 April DRV Government statement, has not acknowledged the exchanges between Hanoi and Washington regarding plans for contacts between the two sides.

Peking has still not mentioned the DRV Government statement or Hanoi's initiative on contacts; however, a PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article on the 15th cites President Johnson's rejection of Phnom Penh as a site for "contacts between the two parties" as further proof of U.S. hypocrisy regarding peace talks.

Moscow scores the United States for rejecting Phnom Penh and Warsaw as sites for contacts with the DRV and accuses it of procrastination on talks while continuing to bomb large portions of the DRV. Unlike Hanoi, Soviet media mention some other specific possible sites, but do not acknowledge that the United States has proposed five different venues.

Hanoi juxtaposes charges of U.S. procrastination on contacts with complaints that the air strikes against the DRV from the 17th to the 20th parallel have been intensified and that air "intrusions" are taking place throughout the country. But Hanoi stops short of suggesting that this would affect DRV "readiness" to establish contacts with the United States. Alleged air-defense victories continue to be reported routinely, and VNA on the 16th claims the downing of a plane over Haiphong, which, it notes, is "far north of the 20th parallel." The item puts the total of downed planes at 2,838, an increase of nine in the past week.

Hanoi on 10 April announces the visit, from 4 to 10 April, of an East German party-government delegation headed by SED Secretary and Politburo member Kurt Hager. According to Hanoi, the delegation was received by Le Duan and Truong Chinh, and it met with a DRV delegation

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which included Pham Van Dong, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Le Thanh Nghi, and Xuan Thuy.

On the 16th, VNA announces that the National Assembly Standing Committee has appointed Xuan Thuy as "minister of the DRV Government," and Tran Quang Huy as chairman of the cultural and educational board of the premier's office. Thuy, who was foreign minister from 1963 to 1965, is a Party Central Committee member and head of the foreign relations department of the CC. Huy is an alternate Party Central Committee member and deputy chief of the CC's central department of propaganda and training.

Hanoi reports on current military action in South Vietnam continue to highlight engagements in Quang Tri and in the Third Corps. A 9 April Liberation Radio commentary hailing the establishment of "revolutionary" or "people's" administrations claims that the people's administration will "rule over South Vietnam" and lead the resistance struggle to victory.

Moscow continues to stress Soviet aid to Vietnam, and a 13 April PRAVDA editorial praises the CPSU plenum's assertion of determination to continue aid to Vietnam and the WFTU General Council's special Moscow meeting on solidarity with Vietnam. Comment, including reports of protest meetings and a statement by the Soviet maritime union, continues to score the Chinese for obstructing Soviet aid by their detention of a Soviet tanker carrying fuel to Vietnam.

DRV-U.S. CONTACTS

HANOI Hanoi's first discussion of the issue of a site for preliminary DRV-U.S. contacts following its 8 April release of Foreign Minister Trinh's interview with CBS' Collingwood comes in a 12 April NHAN DAN commentary, summarized by VNA and broadcast by Hanoi radio in the domestic service. NHAN DAN says that the United States is finding "unjustified pretexts" for refusing to agree to Phnom Penh as the site for the preliminary DRV-U.S. contacts. The commentary recalls that in his interview Trinh had expressed readiness for contact "in Phnom Penh or another place to be mutually agreed upon," but this reference to "mutual agreement" is not repeated in subsequent propaganda.

The first available reference in Hanoi propaganda to its alternate suggestion of Warsaw as a site comes in a NHAN DAN Commentator article carried by VNA early on the morning of the 13th. It says that after refusing to meet in Phnom Penh, the United States has rejected the idea of Warsaw and that on the 11th Presidential Press Secretary Christian said that the United States wanted contacts to be made in a neutral country.

Some eight hours after VNA's release of the NHAN DAN article, Hanoi radio broadcast the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement which gives Hanoi's version of the chronology of developments since the DRV Government statement on the 3d. The spokesman says that following the United States' 10 April rejection of Phnom Penh--"on the pretext that it had technical difficulties since it has no diplomatic mission there"--Hanoi on 11 April suggested Warsaw. And he adds that on the 12th, U.S. authorities, without answering regarding Warsaw, "demanded" that the site be in a neutral country where both sides have diplomatic missions and adequate communications. The spokesman acknowledges that on the 10th the United States had suggested other venues but he does not name them: He says only that "they suggested a number of sites that are not convenient for the DRV side."

The foreign ministry spokesman says that the U.S. rejection of Hanoi's proposals for the site of the contacts runs counter to past statements by the President and other U.S. officials expressing willingness to go anywhere to talk. And surrounding propaganda seeks to document this by citing specific remarks, including the President's statement in his 31 March speech that the United States is ready to send its representative to "any forum, at any time, to discuss the means of bringing this war to an end." The President's 29 September 1967 speech in San Antonio is cited frequently along with several other statements by him and by Secretary Rusk.

In revealing that Hanoi on the 11th had suggested Warsaw as a site, the foreign ministry spokesman avoids saying how or where this "suggestion" was made and does not refer to any private communications. A NHAN DAN article on the 16th, summarized by VNA and broadcast in Hanoi radio's domestic service, implies that private exchanges are not going on. NHAN DAN says that while the United States rejects the sites for contacts proposed by the DRV, "the spokesman for the U.S. President claimed that contacts between the DRV and the United States on the question of the site are continuing. This is yet another trick of the United States to delay contacts and appease public protest." DRV media in the past have displayed sensitivity to reports on private communications with the United States and have on occasion flatly denied such reports. But those denials were not made against a background like the current one of a specific public Hanoi initiative for preliminary contacts leading to possible formal talks.

President Johnson's complaint, in his remarks upon arrival in Hawaii, that the DRV had not responded to the U.S. suggestions of sites is promptly labeled "a distortion of the truth." A Hanoi radio commentary, broadcast in the domestic service on the 16th, counters with the argument that the foreign ministry spokesman on the 13th

"officially rejected the sites suggested by the United States as not convenient to the DRV side." But consistent with Hanoi's avoidance of mentioning any venues other than Phnom Penh or Warsaw, the commentary ignores the President's statement that he had proposed Geneva, Rangoon, New Delhi, Vientiane, Djakarta, or "any other suitable place." The broadcast interprets the President's statement that Hanoi has not made "a serious reply" in the two weeks since the U.S. limitation of air strikes against the North as a "demand for reciprocity." It routinely says that the United States has no right to demand reciprocity and repeats that what is needed is a complete and unconditional cessation of "acts of war" against the DRV and an end to the "aggression" against Vietnam.

A NHAN DAN commentary, reported by VNA on the 17th, rehashes other comment in saying that U.S. delaying of preliminary contacts is at variance with its professed willingness to go anywhere. In mentioning the President's trip to Honolulu, NHAN DAN quotes him as saying that "the U.S. limited bombing has been in force for two weeks without progress toward peace contacts." The paper says nothing about his complaint over the absence of a Hanoi response; however, it quotes State Department spokesman McCloskey as saying on the 15th that the United States hopes for an official message of response from Hanoi on other sites, and that it is trying to find a mutually acceptable site.

This latest NHAN DAN commentary echoes other propaganda in saying that world public opinion is demanding that the United States quickly agree to Warsaw. The commentary dismisses U.S. objections to Warsaw since it is not a neutral country, but does not defend it as a site. Other comment, however, repeatedly notes the size of the U.S. diplomatic mission there and says there would be no difficulty with communications. On at least two occasions, Hanoi brings up the fact that the United States has been using Warsaw as the site for contacts with the CPR. VNA on the 14th in rounding up press opinion as published in NHAN DAN quotes AFP to this effect. And the 16 April NHAN DAN commentary, as broadcast in the domestic service, quotes the Japanese MAINICHI as saying that it is difficult to understand why the United States refused Warsaw, where it has held talks with the CPR for years.

MOSCOW Before DRV media had mentioned Warsaw as a site for contacts, on 12 April a TASS dispatch from its Hanoi correspondents said that "it is believed in Hanoi official circles" that Washington's rejection of Warsaw as a site for preliminary contacts was unjustified for four reasons: The United States had expressed its willingness to meet any place, at any time; it said it was willing to establish contact with the DRV as soon as possible; Warsaw has a U.S. embassy, a staff of correspondents and communications; and Warsaw has been the site for over 10 years of Sino-U.S. contacts. Earlier, on the 11th,

TASS' Hanoi correspondents had cited "reliable sources" as saying that the DRV had suggested Warsaw as a site for contacts after the United States rejected Phnom Penh.

Moscow commentators, like Hanoi, charge the United States with procrastinating and trying to delay talks while continuing to bomb southern portions of the DRV and preparing for further escalation in the South. Yuriy Zhukov, in a PRAVDA article carried by the domestic service on 15 April, says that U.S. propaganda depicted President Johnson's 31 March announcement of a bombing limitation and readiness to discuss ways of ending the war as a great concession. And he adds that "many international observers" think that the United States expected the DRV to ignore the announcement and that U.S. "aggression" then could be intensified. Zhukov notes that while Washington delays the solution of the question regarding the venue for contacts it is intensifying its military operations in South Vietnam. He says that the United States is hoping to secure through force "an advantageous basis" for the solution of the Vietnam question, and is testing whether it can "extract some kind of concession from the Vietnamese."

Moscow on the 11th, in a domestic service review of the weekly NEW TIMES, notes that military writer Lt. Col. A. Leontyev recalls that the Soviet Government on 5 April officially endorsed the DRV's 3 April statement, observing that it shows a practical way toward ending the war. And Leontyev adds that "it is obvious that the time has come for a political settlement in Vietnam." (In discussing the war in the South, Leontyev says the allies' casualties are growing. But at the same time he says that "of course, in any war both sides suffer losses. The South Vietnam liberation forces, which are fighting a cruel and powerful enemy, suffer many losses." Such an acknowledgment is rare, but not unprecedented in Soviet propaganda; Leontyev, for example, broached the issue in commentaries last January and in November 1967)

TASS' 16 April report of the President's Honolulu trip cites him as saying on arrival that the United States is ready to meet any challenge in the field of battle, and interprets this as a U.S. intention to continue escalation. Comment, including a widely broadcast commentary by Shakov on the 16th, asserts that the President will discuss further escalation at Honolulu, and, as Shakhov says, the meeting thus confirms the impression that "Washington has never really wanted to negotiate on Vietnam."

Moscow's only available mention of the President's comments on Hanoi's negative attitude regarding contacts comes in a brief broadcast to the United Kingdom on the 17th which cites him as "alleging" that "Hanoi was to blame for the delay in choosing the site for preliminary

contacts." The broadcast accuses the State Department of making another move to "torpedo" contacts, now adding the condition that the site must allow for "participation in the talks of America's allies." The report further says that after rejecting Phnom Penh and Warsaw as sites, "Washington now intends to entrust a neutral partner with further negotiations."

Some Moscow comment--including a Moscow radio broadcast in Mandarin on 10 April and one in Rumanian on the 12th, as well as a Mandarin broadcast over Radio Peace and Progress on the 10th--attacks the Chinese for ignoring the DRV's 3 April statement declaring readiness for DRV-U.S. contacts. Referring to NCNA's 5 April commentary deprecating the bombing limitation, Moscow asserts that by failing to mention the DRV's statement the Mao clique shows that it is actually "opposed to this important political proposal of the DRV Government." The commentators also score NCNA for accusing the USSR of colluding with the United States against Vietnam, and recall that the USSR has given the Vietnamese "the largest share of aid." The commentators recall that Peking had also opposed DRV Foreign Minister Trinh's statement late last year on willingness to talk if the United States unconditionally halted the bombing. Moscow has periodically charged Peking with opposing talks and striving to "prolong" the war.

EAST EUROPE On 12 April Warsaw's PAP releases an "authorized" statement announcing the readiness of the Polish Government to "create all necessary and appropriate conditions" to facilitate a U.S.-DRV meeting in Warsaw. This is Warsaw's first official comment on the developments of the past two weeks; it had not officially endorsed the 3 April DRV Government statement although East Berlin, Bucharest, Sofia, and Prague had done so. In later routine comment Warsaw reports that the United States rejected Warsaw as a site for contacts.

On 15 April East Berlin's ADN reports that Deputy Foreign Minister Kiesewetter received the DRV acting charge d'affaires who handed him the 13 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement at which time Kiesewetter condemned U.S. "delaying maneuvers." On the same day Sofia's BTA releases a commentary by its editor scoring the United States for rejecting Hanoi's suggested meeting places. Other East European media denounce the U.S. moves in routine comment.

PEKING The CPR failure to acknowledge the 3 April DRV Government statement appears the more blatant in view of the 15 April PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article which discusses the issue of DRV-U.S. contacts. Commentator notes that the President has "rejected" Phnom Penh as the site of contacts, without indicating who proposed the site. He says that this incident alone

is "enough to reveal that the 'peace talks' of the U.S. imperialist chieftain are a big fraud." The article does not mention Warsaw, although it appears four days after reports that Hanoi had suggested the Polish capital as an alternate site.

Criticism of the President's announcement of a limitation of the air strikes against the DRV follows the line of the 5 April NCNA commentary--Peking's first and only other comment on the President's 31 March speech. Commentator says that in only two weeks the President's "murderous intentions are revealed," and the article cites the callup of reservists and the intensified bombing of the DRV. The USSR is typically charged with colluding with the imperialists and the article concludes with Peking's standard line that the United States must be thoroughly defeated on the Vietnam battlefield.

AIR STRIKES AGAINST THE DRV

The DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement on the 13th and other propaganda on potential DRV-U.S. contacts complain of the intensity of air strikes since the President's 31 March announcement of limitation of the bombing. The spokesman says that aircraft and warships have intensified their bombing and strafing of DRV territory between the 17th and 20th parallels and that Secretary of Defense Clifford "brazenly declared that U.S. reconnaissance will continue north of the 20th parallel." The 16 April NHAN DAN article on the venue for contacts says that attacks from Thanh Hoa to Vinh Linh have been stepped up. And it claims that on the 13th and 14th many reconnaissance missions were flown near Hanoi. VNA reports of air activity list areas north of the 21st parallel where "air intrusions" allegedly have taken place, but these items do not mention reconnaissance. And VNA in claiming that a plane was downed over Haiphong on the 16th does not identify the type.

A NHAN DAN editorial on the 17th hails the "brilliant" air-defense victories on the 15th. It says that five planes were downed over Nghe An, Quang Binh, and Ha Tinh provinces, making it one of the biggest victories in a single day this year. The editorial claims "massive U.S. attacks from Thanh Hoa Province to the Vinh Linh area," but asserts that all attacks have been foiled. It gives credit to the anti-aircraft forces, the missile force, the regional army, and the militia force. Like other comment it links the alleged U.S. delaying tactics on establishing contacts with the DRV with its intensification of air strikes in the North and escalation in the South.

Propaganda generally does not claim that there have been air strikes above the 20th parallel. But VNA on the 15th says that the People's

Air Force "blasted down" one of the U.S. aircraft "raiding a populated area 60 kilometers southwest of Ninh Binh Province capital between the 20th and 21st parallel." Ignoring the Defense Department denial, the 13 April NHAN DAN Commentator article repeats the earlier charge that on 4 April "U.S. aircraft attacked Lai Chau Province," and VNA inserts an editor's note explaining that "this is nearly 500 kilometers west-northwest of Hanoi." (A 5 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement included Lai Chau in a list of alleged targets without saying anything about its location. But a 5 April NHAN DAN Commentator article noted the target in Lai Chau Province "close to the Vietnam-China border.")

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOUTH

Hanoi media still concentrate attention on battles connected with the two major allied operations in the First and Third Corps: Operation Pegasus around Khe Sanh, which ended on 15 April, and Operation Complete Victory--which began on 8 April--and its predecessor Operation Quyet Thang (determined to win). According to a VNA summary on the 15th, a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary that day claims that these operations were launched to conceal allied defeats, give a pretense of initiative, and cope with the insurgents' "mounting military and political offensive." The commentary says that the allies, having been pushed into the towns, are now unable to defend them and are "trying to ease the pressure by making desperate sorties into the countryside." The commentary says that the insurgents with various forms of attacks are "taking full advantage of the propitious moment with the enemy at last trickling out from their strongholds and dispersing in the field."

A 16 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary on General Abrams' appointment as commander in Vietnam calls Abrams a last choice of the Administration who can "only worsen the situation." It says that the replacement of Westmoreland by Abrams "marks the bankruptcy of the search-and-destroy and pacification strategy" and, quoting REUTERS as saying that the United States was shifting to the clear-and-hold tactics advocated by Abrams, it claims this is a "step back strategically speaking." The article also disparages the policy of shifting more of the fighting to the ARVN troops. Like earlier Hanoi radio comment on the 12th and Liberation Radio comment on the 13th, QUAN DOI NHAN DAN asserts that Abrams will fail and it adds that he will be a scapegoat in the "final stage" of the war.

KHE SANH The 15 April QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary claims that the PLAF struck allied forces on highway 9, causing them to "bog down" in their "attempt to lift the siege of Khe Sanh" and that "staggering blows" have been dealt "both to those under siege and to the reinforcements." It states that the latter "had five battalions and eight companies completely wiped out or heavily decimated before

the linkup could be made." A commentary in the army paper on the following day claims that, "far from relieving Khe Sanh," the air cavalry and ARVN paratroopers in Operation Pegasus "have thrown this base into greater confusion and danger" and have "thus fallen into the PLAF siege." It says that although the allies reached Khe Sanh, they "did not succeed in rescuing it because they could not revive the exhausted and weakened U.S. Marines there."

The PLAF command sent a congratulatory message to units on the Khe Sanh front, broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 13th, which claims that in the first three months of this year the insurgents in northern Quang Tri killed, wounded, or captured nearly 15,000 allied troops, mostly Americans, and downed or destroyed 250 planes.

VNA on the 11th claims that, in the week ending 9 April, the PLAF inflicted 2,193 allied casualties, mostly GIs, shot down or damaged 19 planes, and seized a large quantity of military equipment. VNA on the 14th claims that the PLAF on the 12th and 13th repeatedly "battered" U.S. cavalry and South Vietnamese paratroopers respectively in Khe Sanh and Lang Vei, causing many losses. VNA on the 15th alleges that from 13 to 15 April the PLAF on the Khe Sanh front "kicked the enemy" out of Lang Vei and continued besieging "Ta Con"--the Khe Sanh base--"tightening their noose around this position and encircling and attacking the enemy encampments in the Khe Sanh area." The item says that during this period over 300 U.S. and ARVN troops were wiped out, two helicopters destroyed, and many weapons seized, and claims that this brings the total of allied troops killed or wounded in this area to more than 3,000 from 3 to 15 April.

On the 13th, according to this same VNA report, the PLAF shelled Ta Con, the U.S. encampment at Lang Vei, and hills in the Khe Sanh-Lang Vei area. An attack on Hill 656, five kilometers southeast of Lang Vei, is alleged to have taken a toll of 70 U.S. air cavalrymen. Shellings on the 14th of Ta Con, Hills 571 and 845, and the eastern part of Pa Ka allegedly caused over 90 casualties and caused the allies to pull out of Lang Vei and many surrounding spots. VNA on the 16th claims that a 14 April surprise attack by the PLAF on Hill 656 completely wiped out a U.S. company of over 140 men.

The only action mentioned on the 15th is the shelling of the Ta Con position. VNA on the 16th, reporting action taking place that day, claims that PLAF gunners pounded a U.S. company which tried to push toward Hill 622, wiping out 50 GIs, and that the PLAF intercepted the rest of the U.S. force, causing 70 casualties, and attacked another U.S. company aiming for the same hill, causing 40 casualties. At Hill 519, northeast of Lang Vei, the VNA report claims that the PLAF fired on two U.S. companies moving toward the hill and "knocked down"

over 50 GIs. VNA says that on the 16th the PLAF inflicted a total of 210 casualties on U.S. troops in the Khe Sanh area.

SAIGON AND QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in its 15 April commentary
THE THIRD CORPS characterizes the two operations around the Saigon
area, Operation Quyet Thang and its successor
Complete Victory, as "merely loose combinations or small, separate
police raids and a totaling of troops of all kinds who happen to be
present in the theatre." It says that the allied forces are "operating
without definite direction of attack and practically without
coordination" and claims that the guerrillas frustrated Quyet Thang at
the outset and that Operation Complete Victory will be defeated more
ignominiously.

A Liberation Radio commentary on the 16th claims that in Operation
Quyet Thang about 4,000 troops, mostly Americans, were annihilated and
more than 200 tanks and armored cars and about 30 aircraft destroyed.
In disparaging Operation Complete Victory, the commentary claims that
the units taking part in the operation are those that were "seriously
defeated" during the general offensive and in Quyet Thang. It asks
how the allies, who were unable to control the five provinces around
Saigon in Quyet Thang, can hope to drive the Viet Cong from the 11
provinces "as they have loudly boasted." The commentary concludes by
asserting that the armed forces and people are determined to turn
Complete Victory into "complete defeat."

Actions connected with these operations which have been reported by
VNA are all located in Tay Ninh Province. VNA on the 15th reports
that against Operation Complete Victory on 12 April, the PLAF mounted
a surprise attack on the encampment of a U.S. battalion 16 kilometers
north of Dau Tieng district town, wiping out over 400 GIs. The VNA
item also reports a PLAF assault on a position of the U.S. 25th
Division 77 kilometers northwest of Saigon on the 14th.

CRIMES NHAN DAN in a commentary on 17 April carried by VNA
that day lists several alleged "crimes" of the allies
and claims that "annihilation is the fate that awaits the killers." The
commentary asserts that these actions point to the fact that "the U.S.
aggressors have been driven to the wall" and they are "taking vengeance
on old people, women, and children." Saying that these acts "cannot
pass with impunity," the paper concludes by recalling attacks by the
PLAF on the allies in areas where the "crimes" reportedly occurred.
There are several VNA items describing specific "crimes" allegedly
committed by the allies, including one on the 16th which claims that
U.S. and Korean troops killed 1,235 people in four districts of Quang
Nam and Quang Ngai provinces since February.

KHMER
NEW YEAR

The An Giang committee of the NFLSV issued a communique, summarized by VNA on 13 April, which ordered the PLAF in the area to cease military attacks during the Khmer new year, from 13 to 16 April. It says that the Khmer ARVN troops and personnel of the Saigon government will be allowed to return home provided they "do not go by groups and do not carry weapons or means of espionage." PLAF troops are urged to help the Khmers but also to heighten their vigilance and punish any allied attempts to disturb the festival. On 23 March the western Nam Bo NFLSV committee issued a communique allowing new year's visits by Khmer troops and government personnel but did not order a cease fire. VNA publicized this communique 27 March and Liberation Radio broadcast it on 10 April.

WESTERN, CENTRAL
NAM BO COMMUNIQES

The third special communiques of the PLAF commands of western and central Nam Bo were broadcast by Liberation Radio on 29 and 30 March but are only now available. The communiques update the "victories" since the beginning of the Tet offensive on 31 January and cover the period up to 15 March; the second special communique from each of these areas was broadcast on 7 March. (The third special communique of the southern Trung Bo PLAF command, dated 20 March, was also broadcast by Liberation Radio on 30 March, but poor reception precluded processing. The last communique for southern Trung Bo was broadcast on 11 March.)

The western Nam Bo communique--dated 20 March--claims the "annihilation or capture" of more than 18,000 allied troops, including 2,440 Americans, and the "disintegration" of more than 30,000 ARVN troops, policemen, and GVN personnel. The communique says that 375 planes were destroyed, 247 military vehicles smashed, and 77 tankers and fuel transports sunk or burned. The casualties, according to the commentary, put out of action over 40 percent of the ARVN force in the area.

The central Nam Bo command communique, dated 15 March, claims that insurgents killed, wounded, or captured more than 18,500 allied troops, including 3,100 GIs. It says that 430 military vehicles and 100 planes were destroyed and 60 ships sunk. Like the western Nam Bo communique, it claims the liberation of large areas. Hailing attacks on communication lines, it asserts that insurgents destroyed 20 allied roads.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

REVOLUTIONARY
ADMINISTRATIONS

Expanded claims for the leadership role of the "revolutionary" or "people's" administration in South Vietnam are made in a 9 April Liberation Radio commentary. It asserts that the administration is being built "into a strong and stable administration which will lead the general

offensive and uprising quickly to complete victory" and that "the people's administration will become the single organization which will rule over South Vietnam and will lead the anti-U.S. national salvation resistance of the South Vietnamese people to final victory." At the same time, the commentary speaks of the NFLSV as being the leader of the South Vietnamese people.

The commentary repeats the claim of the fourth PLAF special communique last month that 1.6 million people in more than 600 villages and hamlets have been liberated and says that "the people's administration has been and is being established throughout the liberated areas, the rural areas, in many towns and areas close to large cities, and in important areas along the strategic communications lines of the enemy." A Liberation Radio broadcast in Mandarin on 12 April echoes the 9 April commentary and further claims the establishment of "peasants' revolutionary committees." It says "revolutionary political power" has been set up "in many streets of Saigon, Hue, and many other provincial cities."

THUA THIEN-HUE
COMMITTEE

On 16 April Liberation Radio broadcasts the third communique of the Thua Thien-Hue Revolutionary Committee which, it reports, was adopted at a 1 April meeting, presided over by Le Van Hao, to review the situation during the past month and to set forth a number of new tasks. (The second communique of the committee was broadcast by Liberation Radio on 6 March.) The communique claims that, due to the massive allied troop buildup, the area holds an important position in the southern battlefield. Routinely claiming success in the spring offensive, the communique sets forth tasks for the people to take advantage of the "favorable situation." Stating that the "revolutionary administration at all echelons has been further strengthened and has become increasingly effective," it calls on these administrations to carry out tasks including opposition to conscription, preparation for establishing a "rural convention" as a basis for all relations in the village and to assure building a new village life, and several economic tasks such as studying the land problem, assuring a good harvest, and establishing a budget.

SECURITY

Liberation Radio on 15 April broadcasts a commentary on "vigilance" and the "safeguarding of secrets" attributed to "Tan Cong"—a pseudonym which can be translated as "attack." Tan Cong says that since the spring offensive the allies have tried to reestablish their control machinery in "recently liberated" areas by using "remaining troops for relief operations"

in an attempt to drive out the insurgent armed forces and by "every cunning trick and every form of espionage to collect information for their bombing and shelling and their rangers." He insists that allied efforts have failed because of "our network to safeguard secrets and guard against evil acts" throughout the liberated areas. The commentary stresses the role of the people in security efforts and cites alleged instances of the people's cooperation in discovering and capturing allied "agents."