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COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)
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S U M M A R Y

During June 1967 VC CUU LONG Regiment operating in AN NHA Hamlet, GIO LINH District, THUA THIEN Province, had captured about 35 U.S. prisoners. However, U.S. aircraft had bombed the rear base killing about 28 of these prisoners. VC soldiers were instructed not to kill or seriously wounded U.S. prisoners of war (POW's). If an American POW was wounded, he was to be given medical care before being evacuated and also be given the food available at the VC unit. While Source's unit was at QUYET THANG Agricultural Site in March 1967, each squad was issued about three sheets of printed English lessons for possible use in combat in SVN.

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ATTACHMENTS:
None
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1. Source discussed the problem of captured U.S. prisoners with his unit political officer Lieutenant CHU in July 1967. During June 1967 VC Regiment CUU LONG operating in AN NHA Hamlet (northwest of CON THIEN base), GIO LONG District, THUA THIEN Province, had captured about 35 U.S. prisoners. CUU LONG Regiment transferred the prisoners to the rear base. At the time of prisoner transfer, a number of U.S. aircraft had bombed the rear base killing about 28 prisoners. The remaining seven prisoners were sent north by the CUU LONG Regiment.
2. The political officer described the U.S. prisoners as very courageous as indicated by their refusal to obey the VC escort order to move. The U.S. prisoners believed they belonged to the biggest army of the world and therefore had no reason to feel defeated by a small country like Vietnam. The VC understood this complex and instructed their soldiers to carry the POW's if necessary. The heavy set of an American necessitated four VC soldiers to carry one POW. The U.S. prisoners did execute the other orders to drop weapons, to put their hands on their heads and to allow the VC soldiers to search them. The VC soldiers were instructed not to kill or seriously threaten the prisoners because all of them were very precious. If an American FOW was wounded, he was to be given medical care before being evacuated and also be given the food available at the VC unit. Each soldier was later issued three meters of rope with which to tie the FOW's.
3. While in battle the unit must try to capture prisoners. If they won a battle but captured no FOW's they were considered not to have achieved their requirements. Regiment 29 (Source's) had not captured any prisoners.
4. While Source's unit was at QUYET THANG Agricultural Site in March 1967, each squad was issued about three sheets of printed English lessons for possible use in combat in SVN. The lesson consisted of about ten short conversation English sentences with Vietnamese phonetics printed alongside for easy practice. Source said that they had no help in learning pronunciation but simply practiced by themselves. The sentences consisted of orders such as: "Put down your weapon!" ; "Hands up!" ; and "Turn off your radio."

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