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COUNTRY : NORTH VIETNAM (NVN)
 SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN)

SUBJECT : Contradictions Between Official
 Policy And VC Sentiments Concerning DATE OF REPORT : 13/12/67
 The Treatment of Wounded Allied
 Prisoners of War NO. OF PAGES : 2

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DATE AND PLACE : 4 December 1967 (O - B)
 OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, Vietnam

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SOURCE: []

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S U M M A R Y

According to VC policy, all captured U.S. personnel, whether wounded or not, were to be well treated by their captors. Several men in Source's unit grumbled at the rule and commented that they would do otherwise, especially with wounded captives. Many hardships would be borne by soldiers in charge of caring for the wounded; they would have to be carried and fed out of community stocks, which consequently lowered everyone's ration. Source overheard a conversation at a Party meeting in which the principal speaker said that a battle could not be considered a success unless there were prisoners to show for it.

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ATTACHMENTS: 1.3(a)(4)

Approved for Release
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None

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1. Political cadres instructed the men that captured U.S. personnel, whether wounded or not, were to be taken prisoner and treated well. They were to receive the same rations as the VC, and their wounds treated if necessary. No one was allowed to shoot the wounded.
2. There were conflicts between what the cadres preached and what the men felt. Source alleges that he overheard discussions among the troops to the effect that they would shoot US/GVN wounded regardless. They looked at having to care for U.S. wounded as an additional hardship, a burden that only they and not the political cadres would experience. First they would have to carry the wounded, and it was difficult enough carrying their own wounded. Secondly, the prisoner would have to share their food rations. A little resentment was built up against the political officer for the men knew that he would not have to carry wounded prisoners or share his rations.
3. Source speculated that cadres would send a man to the rear for trial if he was caught killing a wounded prisoner of war. Prisoners were needed for interrogations that would be conducted in the rear. Source did not know how closely the unit would follow its policy towards captured personnel as they never had the opportunity to take a prisoner. Moreover, the policy was confusing, for the men were urged to capture and treat prisoners well on one hand and were instructed at pre-battle briefings to try and annihilate the enemy on the other.
4. One reason why the cadres were so emphatic about taking prisoners was that it was considered a yardstick whereby the success or failure of a VC campaign or battle could be gauged. Source overheard some cadres discussing this point as he walked by their table at a large party meeting held in July 1967. One party official informed the others that a battle could not be considered successful unless they had prisoners.

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