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SNIE 20-63
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12 June 1963.

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SECURITY CONDITIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE
DURING PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S VISIT
(23 JUNE - 3 JULY 1963)

NOTE: This is the final version of the estimate and additional text will not be circulated.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE
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Central Intelligence Agency

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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.

Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 12 June 1963. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Director of the National Security Agency; and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB abstained, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

12 June 1963

SUBJECT: SNIE 20-63: SECURITY CONDITIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE
DURING PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S VISIT (23 June-
3 July 1963)

THE PROBLEM

To assess security conditions in West Germany and West Berlin, Ireland, England, and Italy, with particular reference to the possibility of incidents which would endanger or embarrass President Kennedy during his impending visit (23 June-3 July 1963).

SUMMARY

During the President's West European trip, the likelihood of dangerous or embarrassing incidents is smaller than it has been on any of his other recent foreign trips. West Germany and West Berlin, Ireland, England, and Italy all have generally stable, pro-US governments, and the popularity of the President among the people of these

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areas is widespread and real. The Communists or other dissident groups -- ultrarightist, ethnic, etc. -- are not likely to see any profit in threatening the President's security. It is of course always possible that some individual or small group might attempt an act of violence against the President.

THE ESTIMATE

1. Although they are unlikely to occur, three types of organized hostile activity are conceivable during the President's trip: (a) actions physically endangering the President; (b) demonstrations designed to humiliate or embarrass the President or his hosts; and (c) attempts by various groups to draw attention to local political issues. If demonstrations in any of these categories are planned, they will probably be discovered in advance by the authorities, and will almost certainly be rapidly brought under control by the well organized and generally efficient national security forces. In all the areas on the President's itinerary, the security forces have Communist, ultrarightist, and other dissident groups well infiltrated.

2. Any group which tried to instigate hostile demonstrations could be expected to recognize that actions physically endangering the

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President would be likely to damage rather than advance the group's own aims. It is therefore likely that no major group will deliberately initiate such actions, and that Soviet directives to Communist parties in Western Europe will counsel restraint in this regard.

3. Attempts at peaceful demonstrations intended to humiliate or embarrass the President are also unlikely, though less so. Communist or other groups probably realize that such attempts would be rapidly brought under control by the police, but might believe that the very fact of such attempts would embarrass the President or his hosts. The principal issue on which such demonstrations might be based is racial discrimination in the US. In West Germany, there are numerous African university students, some of whom might conceivably band together to demonstrate against treatment of the Negro in the US. In Italy and England, Communist-dominated or leftist groups might try to wave propaganda placards and signs on this subject. The instigators of demonstrations on this or any other "anti-Yankee" subject would find little support among the local populations, a situation different from that in the Latin American countries which the President has visited.

4. Various antinuclear warfare themes comprise another subject on which demonstrations are possible. Communist groups, especially in Italy, may try to organize demonstrations favoring Soviet positions

on a nuclear test ban and disarmament, or opposing a NATO multilateral nuclear force. They may also try to demonstrate against possible future plans for basing Polaris submarines in Italy. Representatives of various British antinuclear warfare groups such as the Spies for Peace, the Committee of One Hundred, or the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament will probably wave "ban the bomb" placards along the route of any scheduled motorcades to and from the airport in Great Britain, and at any other public appearances the President might make. Representatives of these groups might also try to enter Ireland and agitate for their cause during the President's visit.

5. In West Berlin, there is an additional issue which could spark attempts at demonstrations. The Soviet Union has already protested the plans of West German Chancellor Adenauer to participate in the Berlin ceremonies during the President's visit, on the ground that the West German Government has no authority or rights in West Berlin. If any demonstrations against either Adenauer or Kennedy are planned, however, US intelligence as well as the West German internal security service will have very good prospects of knowing about them in advance. Furthermore, since US military units in West Berlin still have the status of a force of occupation, they have the legal right, jointly with the other Western occupying powers, to take whatever measures are necessary to ensure the security of the area.

6. There are some possibilities of demonstrations not directed against the President, but designed to publicize local causes close to the hearts of the instigators. Although we are almost certain that any demonstrations in this category would be easily controllable by the various police forces, issues on which agitation might occur are listed below as being of possible relevance to the security conditions surrounding the President's trip.

West Germany &
West Berlin:

Demonstrations in support of German reunification, or, by East European refugee groups, for the liberation of Eastern Europe. Any possible demonstrations, however, would be insignificant in size, and probably confined to the carrying of placards.

Ireland:

Agitation for a unified Ireland. Although the Irish Republican Army has been disbanded, it is possible that some individuals might try to demonstrate for a return of the northern counties.

England:

None.

Italy:

Agitation by small, extreme rightwing neofascist groups to publicize their campaign against an "opening to the left" in Italian politics.

Efforts by German speaking autonomists in the South Tyrol area of northern Italy to focus attention on their grievances against Rome. There have been fewer acts of terrorism by this group in the past year than in earlier years.

7. Two other matters unrelated to possible demonstrations and agitation may have a bearing on the security of the President during this trip. First, the Presidential party will of course fly over East German territory to and from West Berlin. Although the risks inherent in this cannot be ignored, we are almost certain that neither the Soviets nor the East Germans will provoke an incident in the Berlin air corridors during the President's flights. Secondly, in Ireland, the friendly and exuberant crowds who will wish to see and hear the President may create a security problem. The Irish look upon President Kennedy's

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visit as a triumphal homecoming for one of their own and as a great compliment being paid them by a world leader. The Irish police are relatively inexperienced in crowd control and the crowds will be far larger than any with which they have previously had to cope. The police may underestimate the problems involved and the manpower needed to protect the Presidential party from such overfriendliness.

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