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ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS PROBLEM
RELATIVE CAPABILITIES AND
THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL

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THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS PROBLEM — RELATIVE CAPABILITIES AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CONTROL¹

THE PROBLEM

To estimate present and future relative military capabilities of the Arab states and Israel and the likelihood of hostilities, and to examine the prospects for control of Arab-Israeli arms and reactions to and consequences of implementation of an arms control program.


CONCLUSIONS

1. We believe that an outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities is possible at any time, and that the chances of such hostilities are increasing. They could begin as a result of an Israeli decision to call for a showdown before the Arabs gain military superiority or as a result of developments in or interaction between a number of dangerous situations, among which the instability of the regime in Jordan is currently the most delicate. A continuation of the Arab-Israeli arms race will increase the danger of war.

2. We believe the Israel Defense Force is now more effective militarily than any

combination of Arab forces likely to be opposed to it and could probably defeat the Arab forces if Israel retained freedom of air action. The UAR, however, has the advantage in weapons and available manpower. Assuming that present sources of supply to both the UAR and Israelis continue open, the degree of improvement in Arab training and morale will become a major factor in relative Arab-Israeli military capabilities. Thus at some point, probably not far in the future, as Arab military proficiency rises, Israel may be faced with Arab forces which, though inferior on a man-for-man or unit-for-unit basis, are superior to the Israel Defense Force.

3. Should Israel not have freedom of air action, the capabilities of its ground forces would be substantially reduced. We estimate that the UAR air forces could achieve air superiority if they could in the future develop personnel capable of exploiting their advantages in equipment



(b)(1)
(b)(3)

and widely dispersed air fields. Even if the Israelis maintained freedom of action in the air, logistic and economic difficulties would prevent them from holding extensive Arab territory for long. In any event they probably could not overrun more than the Sinai Peninsula, parts of Jordan, southern Lebanon, and a portion of southwest Syria, not including Damascus.

4. An embargo on the flow of arms to the Arab-Israeli area would probably reduce the danger of war, although it would not

be so important in this respect as other factors of a political and psychological nature.

5. With strong US and USSR support there would be a good chance that a UN-sponsored arms limitation agreement could be reached. Such an agreement could be effective, however, only with the support of the US and USSR and the cooperation of Israel and the UAR. We believe that the chances for such support and cooperation are slim.

DISCUSSION

1. ARAB-ISRAELI MILITARY RESOURCES²

6. The Arab armed forces surpass the Israel Defense Force both in numbers of men under arms and in weapons of most categories, but Israel enjoys a distinct superiority in combat effectiveness and has the advantage of geographical and political unity. Israel has an army of 55,000 and can, within 48 hours, mobilize another 145,000. Israel could not maintain this larger force mobilized for more than a short time without severe economic strain. The UAR alone, in contrast, has 165,000 men continually under arms and the other Arab states have at least another 135,000. The UAR surpasses Israel in tank armament, the difference being particularly notable in medium and heavy tanks. The UAR has substantially greater holdings of medium artillery and anti-tank weapons, though Israel has more light artillery and rocket launchers. The UAR has 326 jet aircraft, of which 70 are light bombers. Israel has 109 jet fighters, 20-odd jet fighter-bombers which can be used for long-range ground attack and bombing missions, and 9 light piston bombers. Israel's arms are a mixture of Western types, with French types making up all its anti-tank missiles and a large proportion

of its artillery and light tanks. The UAR retains some Western arms but is approaching standardization in Soviet weapons. Most other Arab states are armed with a mixture of Western weapons types.

7. The Israel Defense Force, despite its inferiority in arms, continues to excel the Arab forces in organization, training, leadership, morale, and the will to fight. It is in a better state of readiness than the Arab forces, which are handicapped by low levels of technical proficiency, organization, training, and leadership. Unlike Israeli military leadership, the effectiveness of Arab military leadership is impaired by its involvement in politics, both internal and inter-Arab, and its discipline is much weaker. Although the capabilities of Arab military personnel will continue to improve with both Bloc and Western training and continued Arab political and diplomatic victories will improve morale, it is almost certain that the Arab states could not effectively combine their military forces under a central command in the next few years.

8. In order to maintain its military superiority, Israel is seeking to obtain sizeable amounts of arms from the US and other Western countries, including fighter aircraft from France (now Israel's principal arms supplier) and submarines from the UK. While Israel

²Tables showing present Arab and Israeli holdings of arms are appended.

will probably be able to obtain additional arms, there is a definite limit to the armaments which its available personnel can man. The Israelis are aware that as Arab military proficiency rises and if the Bloc continues to provide arms, there will come a time when the Israel Defense Force cannot match the combined Arab armies however many weapons Israel may have obtained. Israel is particularly interested in acquiring nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and has been conducting nuclear research with some assistance from France and the US.

9. Egypt received substantial shipments of arms from the Soviet Bloc in 1956 and 1957, but has not added greatly to its arms inventory this year, except for three Soviet submarines. Syria, however, has continued to receive shipments. The Egyptians and Syrians probably have more weapons than they can now effectively absorb, so that the limit upon their military capabilities is the proficiency of their personnel rather than weapons holdings. When the UAR forces have further need for arms, we believe the Bloc will arrange to provide them.

10. The armed forces of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan have no Soviet Bloc weapons and have little or no capability for offensive operations. Iraq has had no weapons directly from the Soviet Bloc, although the UAR is probably transferring some such weapons. For the immediate future, we do not believe that Iraqi armed forces have any significant capability against Israel. While Bloc arms have been supplied to Yemen in quantities which are considerable in relation to Yemen's size, we do not believe that Yemen's military capabilities in relation to Israel are of any significance.

II. DANGER OF RESUMPTION OF ARAB-ISRAELI HOSTILITIES

11. The Arab-Israeli war in Palestine in 1948-49 has never been effectively concluded. The Israelis have sought to establish their state as a normal and accepted element in the area. The Arabs on their part have refused to accept Israel or acknowledge their defeat in the Palestine war. Both sides have

helped maintain a state of hostile tension, the Arabs by blockade and harassment and Israel by raids and intimidation. Another round with Israel and the fulfillment of Arab claims to Palestine have remained implicit in Arab thought and conduct. Hostility to Israel has become a principal force behind the Arab unity movement and overt expression of that hostility has become essential to success in Arab politics. In these circumstances there has been and continues to be grave danger of war.

12. *Stabilizing factors.* In the midst of the bitter emotions and crackling tensions that characterize Arab-Israeli relations, we believe that there are some factors which tend to stabilize and to prolong the present situation. The Arabs are afraid of Israeli military abilities; the Israelis are aware of their vulnerability to Arab air attack. Another and perhaps equally important factor is the prevalent belief that the US is committed to the preservation of Israel and that the USSR is committed to the support of the UAR and its allies, a belief which leads each side to question whether a real victory over the other is now possible. On the Arab side there has been a growing belief that time is working in the Arab behalf and that circumstances will ultimately lead to the downfall of Israel. The presence of UN representatives in the area has had a stabilizing influence, particularly the United Nations Expeditionary Force in the Sinai and Gulf of Aqaba area.

13. *Search for external support.* Both Israelis and Arabs will evaluate their situation and make their decisions with respect to each other in the context of their understanding of the intentions of the great powers. Both will seek to mobilize world opinion on their side and to gain a position in which support could be obtained by UN action. Israel will continue to seek a security guarantee from the US. In the area it is currently seeking to develop special ties with Turkey and Iran. Nasser and the Pan-Arab nationalists will seek to obtain both Western and Soviet Bloc support against an Israeli attack. If such an attack does come they will hope to have assurances of Soviet support stated in such terms as to deter Western powers from assisting Israel.

14. *Prospects for war.* Despite growing Arab military capabilities, Israel's sense of military peril is probably not now so acute as to induce it to disregard the dangers of resort to preventive war. For his part, Nasser will wish to avoid a showdown until he is convinced that he has achieved military superiority. Even then he might be restrained by the knowledge that the Israelis would remain capable of inflicting serious damage on his forces and by the prospect of Western support for Israel.

15. Nevertheless, the growth of Arab military strength relative to that of Israel is increasing the chances of a deliberate resort to war. If the Israelis became convinced that the time was approaching when they could no longer defend themselves effectively, they would be likely to think once again in terms of a preventive war to assure survival, relegating international political and psychological factors and economic considerations to the background. If Nasser's Pan-Arab group believed it had achieved clear military superiority over Israel, it would be greatly tempted to blot out Israel.

16. At any time other circumstances leading to major hostilities might develop. A collapse of the shaky regime in Jordan or an attempt to establish by *coup d'etat* a pro-Nasser regime would probably lead to Israeli action in the West Bank area of Jordan. This, in turn, would probably result in a clash with Jordanian and perhaps also UAR forces. The Israelis might also move into the West Bank area if a pro-Nasser government were to come to power by generally peaceful means. Should the UAR become embroiled in serious difficulties internally, in its relations with other Arab states, or in its relations with the West, the Israelis might consider the opportunity to destroy Nasser too good to pass up. Conversely, Nasser might seek to escape domestic or inter-Arab troubles by focussing attention on Israel. Finally, there will be continuing danger that local friction over one of the numerous trouble spots on the Arab-Israeli borders or in the Gulf of Aqaba, could lead to major hostilities, especially since Nasser is likely to use his growing military power to attempt to intimidate Israel and force concessions from it.

17. Thus there are a number of ways in which war between Israel and one or more Arab states could start. These circumstances, plus the general instability of the Middle East, and the high tensions prevailing there, lead us to the conclusion that an outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities is possible at any time, and the chances of such hostilities are increasing.

III. MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS IN EVENT OF WAR³

18. In estimating relative Arab and Israeli military capabilities we are aware of the demonstration of the superiority of Israeli military personnel in the Palestine War of 1948-49 and the Sinai campaign of 1956. We are also aware, however, of the present UAR advantage in arms, and particularly in jet aircraft and numerous widely dispersed air fields. Israel's smaller air force, on the other hand, must operate from fewer bases in a geographically restricted area. We believe that if the UAR air forces had competent leadership and air crews they could, whether or not the element of surprise were involved, probably gain air superiority in the event of war with Israel. We are unable to assess precisely the present capabilities of UAR air forces personnel; we believe that they are now inferior to Israeli personnel but that they are improving.

19. In present circumstances, if the Israelis were to maintain freedom of action in the air, Israeli ground forces could probably by D+20 seize and hold the Gaza Strip, West Jordan, southern Lebanon, and the southwest corner of Syria. At the same time Israel could probably seize and hold strategic points in the

³ We believe it unnecessary for purposes of this estimate to seek to differentiate between situations in which Jordan and Iraq were and were not involved. It is likely that Jordan would become involved whatever the position of its government because Israel would move into the West Bank area. Even in that event, however, we believe that the bulk of the Jordanian Army would stay on the East bank. Under present circumstances we believe it unlikely that the Iraqi Government could spare or support significant forces for use against Israel; Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen are also unlikely to be able to make any significant military contribution in a war with Israel.

Sinai Peninsula and gain and maintain control of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba, though it might not be able to control the sea approaches. The Israel Defense Force, with freedom of action in the air, could probably defeat Arab forces in Jordan and Syria while holding the Egyptians on the Sinai front and doing considerable damage to their forces. Thus the Israelis could effectively reduce the Arab ability to make war and for some time remove the military threat to their own country.

20. It is unlikely that the Arab armies would be able to engage in effectively coordinated operations. They probably could, however, defend the Suez Canal line and Damascus, though perhaps not Amman, if Israel simultaneously engaged with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The Arabs could severely harass Israel with *fedayeen* commando attacks.

21. As already noted, these judgments on relative Arab-Israeli military capabilities are based on the premise that the Israelis retain freedom of action in the air. If, however, the UAR air forces achieved air superiority, the offensive capabilities of the Israeli ground force would be substantially reduced. Moreover, whatever the situation with respect to control of the air, Israeli logistical difficulties would prevent maintenance of forces in advanced positions outside the country's borders for more than two or three months. Thus the Israelis might not be able to hold these positions for long if hostilities were protracted. Even though the Israelis were obliged to withdraw to their frontiers, however, we believe that the Arabs would be unable to overrun Israel.

22. The pattern of arms acquisition by both Israelis and the UAR has been too erratic for trends to be plotted or for future holdings to be precisely estimated. Perhaps the most important aspect of the situation is that, so long as the Israelis and the UAR retain access to their respective sources of supply in the West and in the Bloc, military hardware is not likely to be decisive in determining relative military strength. Should one side or another obtain markedly superior weapons, such as advanced types of jet aircraft or missiles, it

would of course have an advantage, but only so long as the other side failed to obtain compensating equipment. Given the probable attitude of the USSR toward the UAR and of the major Western powers toward the Israelis, we believe it unlikely that such an imbalance would long continue.

23. Under these circumstances, the likelihood of a significant change in relative military capabilities will depend in large part on the extent to which the UAR succeeds in realizing the potential of its far greater military manpower. It is probable that, for some time to come, the Arabs will suffer from deficiencies in individual skills, organization, leadership, and morale. Nevertheless, the ability of the Arabs to use modern equipment will almost certainly improve as they gain in training and experience. Moreover, increased confidence in their professional abilities is likely to result in higher morale and possibly in an increased will to fight. Thus at some point probably not far in the future, as Arab military proficiency rises, Israel may be faced with Arab forces which, though perhaps still not equal to Israeli forces on a man-for-man or unit-for-unit basis, are superior to the Israel Defense Force.

IV. CONSEQUENCES OF CONTINUATION OF PRESENT ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONSHIP

24. *Political and psychological.* A continuation for the next year or so of the present Arab-Israeli situation and relationship, including further build-up of arms on both sides, is likely to magnify present tensions and increase present dangers. An increase in the military strength of the UAR will also enable it to move toward other goals in addition to that of matching or surpassing Israeli strength. Such an increase would enable Nasser further to extend his influence and authority throughout the Arab world and to exert additional pressures upon the remaining conservative governments.

25. *Economic.* The economies of Israel and the UAR are severely burdened by the cost of their military establishments, which seriously restricts economic development. Arms purchases use up a considerable part of the money

contributed to Israel from abroad, thus reducing the amounts available for economic development. This diversion is, however, offset to some extent by the tendency of foreign contributions to go up in times of military threat to Israel. Furthermore the Arab blockade increases the cost of Israel's imports and prevents the realization of Israel's potential as an area trading and manufacturing center. The UAR is trading large quantities of cotton for Soviet Bloc arms and has in addition accepted heavy long-term credit obligations. It is unlikely, however, that within the foreseeable future expenditures for arms will cause economic breakdown in either country.

26. *Attitudes toward US and USSR.* Prolongation of present Arab-Israeli relations and continuation of the arms build-up over the next year or so is likely to have further significant and clearly recognizable effects upon area attitudes toward the great powers. The US is likely to be more clearly identified in Arab eyes as the enemy of Arab nationalism and the Soviet Union as its supporter. If significant military supplies are provided Israel by the US, prospects for re-establishment of good relations between the US and the bulk of the Arab area will be reduced. Since, however, the Arabs have long believed that the US is supporting Israel, relations between the US and the Arabs are likely to be more seriously affected by US involvement in inter-Arab conflicts and those involving the Arabs and US allies.

27. *Prospects for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem.* We believe that in the prevailing state of tension and mutual suspicion in the Middle East neither a general settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem nor agreement on major individual issues can be brought about. Even if the US and the USSR were to agree on the desirability of a settlement, basic animosities would continue, and prospects for a settlement would remain poor.

V. PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI AREA

28. The Arab-Israeli conflict existed before the spiralling arms build-up and arms control would not, in itself, solve the basic problems

behind it. The arms race does, however, contribute to bitterness and suspicion. It greatly increases the danger of the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the UAR and, along with other factors in the situation, obstructs progress toward the improvement in the general atmosphere which is a prerequisite of a settlement. Because of the way in which it encourages the identification of the entire West as the enemy of the Arabs and the Soviet Bloc as their friend, the arms race diminishes the chances for an improvement in US relations with the majority of the Arabs. A cessation or limitation of the arms build-up would reduce but not eliminate the dangers implicit in the Arab-Israeli situation.

29. *Arms embargo.* An arms embargo would be the most direct and most effective means of halting the Arab-Israeli arms race, but it would require agreement between the Western powers and the USSR. If the great powers agreed to impose an arms embargo on the area they could probably bring influence or pressure to bear on other arms producers which would greatly reduce the flow of arms to the Arab-Israeli area. Both the Arabs and Israelis, unless they were persuaded to join in an agreement to limit arms imports would, however, seek arms from irregular sources and by devious channels in an attempt to improve their positions. The establishment of an embargo would facilitate the development of a general arms limitation agreement for the area under UN or other auspices.

30. *Effects upon Arab-Israeli capabilities of an agreement to limit shipment of arms to the area.* In the event of such an agreement, Israel would enjoy an advantage in that it has better facilities and skills for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition than the Arab states. There is, however, a definite limit as to quantity and nature of the armaments which could be manufactured. The Arabs, on the other hand, would probably be in a position ultimately to increase their military capabilities beyond their present level by improving the ability of their military personnel effectively to utilize the equipment which they now have. Limitation of the flow of armaments to the Arab-Israeli area would

probably not have as much effect upon the likelihood of war as other factors of a political and psychological nature.

31. *UN sponsored agreement on limitation of armaments.* If a UN body were constituted to study the limitation of armaments in the area, the Israeli and Arab governments would probably cooperate with it at least to the extent of discussing the problem. Yet no Arab state would be likely to take any step in the matter until the UAR had made its position clear; after this happened the rest of the Arab states would probably follow Nasser's lead. There would in any event be great difficulties in reaching any useful agreement. Both Arabs and Israelis would be disinclined to allow UN inspectors access to their military installations, even on a temporary basis for purposes of setting up a control. Arabs would almost certainly refuse to negotiate with Israelis on arms limitation as on other subjects; the UN would have to deal independently with each side, and neither side would be likely to agree to anything until assured that its adversary had made at least a commensurate agreement. The whole business would prove very complicated.

32. With strong US and USSR support there would be a good chance that a UN-sponsored arms limitation agreement could be reached. Its effectiveness would depend largely upon the willingness of the USSR to implement it. An inspection system made up of UN teams at the main seaports, air fields, and communications centers and with aerial inspection rights could probably determine whether an agreement to limit arms imports were being carried out, but only if the UAR and Israel were willing to cooperate. Intelligence sources could probably provide the US with a reliable check on general adherence to any agreement, but it would probably be difficult for the US to prove any violations (e.g. before the UN) without compromising at least some sensitive sources.

33. *Soviet interests.* We believe that the Soviet Union will seek to exploit its position of influence and prestige in the Arab world, and is unlikely to enter into or support any agreement which would detract from the posi-

tion which it has achieved. The Soviets will probably calculate that a prolongation of tensions in the Middle East, dangerous though it may be, is likely to intensify strains between the US and Arab nationalist regimes, and thereby continue to advance Soviet interests. Nevertheless there are reasons why the Soviets might consider entering into an agreement on the limitation of the flow of arms to the area. They have several times expressed their willingness to work out a joint embargo of arms to the Middle East. If negotiations were embarked upon it is likely that the Soviets would seek to include Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan in the embargo area and take the position that the US would have to withdraw from military bases in the area in order to make the embargo complete. It is possible, however, that the Soviets have some interest in a more limited embargo and might not press demands which they knew would be unacceptable to the US. However, it would probably oppose effective enforcement measures. We believe that they do not desire a general war at this time and that they may wish to reduce the dangers implicit in the Arab-Israeli situation. They might also value an agreement between themselves and the West on arms limitation in the Middle East because it would enhance their own standing as a power with interests and responsibilities in the area. And they may also feel that the revolutionary social and political situation in the Middle East, which they have for some time been exploiting with considerable success, would not become less profitable after an agreement on arms limitation.

34. *Arab reactions.* The Arab reaction to a great power arms embargo and a UN sponsored arms limitation agreement would probably be generally adverse. They would regard such moves as attempts by the great powers to arbitrate their affairs and to limit their freedom of action. They would fear that the West was involved in some devious scheme to provide an advantage for Israel or to halt the progress of the Arab military build-up so as to retain Israel's present position. Use of the UN would not allay Arab suspicions because of their tendency to regard the UN as an instrument of the US. They would also suspect

the motives of the Soviet Union. It is possible, though unlikely, that all these objections might be overcome in Nasser's mind by other considerations. We believe that Nasser regards the possibility of a joint Israeli and Western attack as the greatest danger that confronts him. He might conclude that an arms limitation agreement participated in by the US and the USSR would protect him against that eventuality. He might also calculate that during a period of arms limitations the Arabs could make greater gains in military strength than the Israelis.

35. *Israeli reactions.* The Israelis have always cherished their freedom of action and have been particularly proud of their ability to defend themselves. They would almost certainly not accept any reduction of their military strength and at present would probably

oppose any limitation on imports of arms. However, with the continuation of the situation with which they are now confronted — i.e. one in which virtually the entire Arab area is hostile and in which Western influence is greatly reduced — the Israelis might conclude that they can no longer hope to retain indefinitely the capability for defeating the Arabs. They might therefore come to accept an arms limitation agreement sponsored by the UN and linked with a great power understanding on the area. They might hope that it would provide greater security than a continued race for arms superiority over the Arabs, as well as releasing funds sorely needed for development. They would accept such an agreement, however, only if they were satisfied that they had a firm and clear security guarantee by the US.

SELECTED ARMAMENTS INVENTORY¹
(As of 30 September 1958)

	Tanks ^a		Misc. Armored Vehicles			Field Artillery			Antitank		Anti-Aircraft		Mortars		
	L	Med.	H	Self Prop.	75-105mm	108-155mm	Self Prop.	57-75mm	Rocket Launchers & Recoilless Weapons	20-40mm	75-130mm	81-120mm			
													40mm	120mm	
UAR Egypt	40	202	72	586	8	116	147*	141	249	1,200	412	74	278		
UAR Syria	—	257	—	505	9	81	142*	114	124	103	433	38	433		
Total UAR	40	459	72	1,091	17	197	289	255	373	1,303	845	112	711		
Iraq	36	31	85*	193	—	182	32	—	97	190	147	24	222		
Jordan	—	109	—	463	—	95	18	12	172	248	84	—	156		
Lebanon	40	43	—	142	6	64	24	—	—	97	78	12	80		
Yemen	—	61	—	124	20	—	34	—	135	10	106	26	—		
Saudi Arabia	38	18	—	114	—	67	6	—	15	1,784	114	32	638		
Total Arab	152	721	157	2,127	43	605	403	267	792	3,632	1,374	208	1,807		
Israel	165	435	—	1,381	114	584	92	124	385	5,599	914	92	1,534		

¹ Certain obsolete items have been omitted.

* Centurion tanks, although medium-gunned, are classified as heavy (by weight) in this inventory.

• Including 51 32-tube 130mm truck mounted rocket launchers.

THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION (As of 30 September 1958)

Strength of Ground Forces, Including Reserves, Deployed in Areas Adjacent to Israel		Total Strength of Arab Armies	
UAR Egypt	12,500	UAR Egypt	100,000
UAR Syria	40,000	UAR Syria	65,000
Total UAR	52,500	Total UAR	165,000
Iraq	1,800*	Iraq	60,000
Jordan	50,300	Jordan	50,300
Lebanon	7,000	Lebanon	8,600
Saudi Arabia	6,000	Saudi Arabia	15,000
Israel	55,000		
(M+48 hrs=200,000)			

* Located near Jordanian-Iraqi border at pumping station H-3.

AIR FORCE
(As of 30 September 1958)

COUNTRY	FIGHTER		BOMBER		TRANSPORT	OTHER		TOTAL	TOTAL A. F. PERS
	JET.	CONV:	JET.	CONV:	JET.	CONV:	CONV:		
UAR Egypt	178	15	70	3	48	10	70	394	4,375
UAR Syria	50	16	—	—	10	18	106	200	1,259
Total UAR	228	31	70	3	58	28	176	594	5,334
Iraq	48	38	—	—	6	—	79	171	3,252
Jordan	12	—	—	—	—	2	20	34	875
Lebanon	10	—	—	4	—	4	21	39	400
Yemen	—	30	—	—	3	—	12	45	UNK
Saudi Arabia	20	—	—	8	11	—	34	73	197
Total Arab	318	99	70	15	78	34	342	956	10,158
Israel	129	39	—	9	22	13	119	331	2,948

NAVAL FORCES
(As of 30 September 1958)

	Destroyers	Patrol Vessels	Motor Torpedo Boats	Mine Craft	Subs	Amphib. Craft	Other	Total Naval Pers.
UAR Egypt	4	6 ¹	25	8	6	—	9	8,000
UAR Syria	—	3	7-9	—	—	3	5	697
TOTAL UAR	4	9	32-34	8	6	3	14	8,697
Iraq	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	193
Jordan	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	120 ⁴
Lebanon	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	100
Saudi Arabia	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Total Arab	4	13	32-34	8	6	5	19	9,170
Israel	2	8	15 ²	—	—	20-22 ³	6	3,720

¹ Two in reserve.

² Two, or possibly five, PT's are building in France.

³ One LCVP is under construction in Italy.

⁴ These personnel are officially assigned to the Army.